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NASA NTRS1988

Zero/zero rotorcraft certification issues. Volume 2: Plenary session presentations

This report analyzes the Zero/Zero Rotorcraft Certification Issues from the perspectives of manufacturers, operators, researchers and the FAA. The basic premise behind this analysis is that zero/zero, or at least extremely low visibility, rotorcraft operations are feasible today from both a technological and an operational standpoint. The questions and issues that need to be resolved are: What certification requirements do we need to ensure safety. Can we develop procedures which capitalize on the performance and maneuvering capabilities unique to rotorcraft. Will extremely low visibility operations be economically feasible. This is Volume 2 of three. It presents the operator perspectives (system needs), applicable technology and zero/zero concepts developed in the first 12 months of research of this project.

Adams, Richard J.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Zero/zero rotorcraft certification issues. Volume 3: Working group results

This report analyzes the Zero/Zero Rotorcraft Certification Issues from the perspectives of manufacturers, operators, researchers and the FAA. The basic premise behind this analysis is that zero/zero, or at least extremely low visibility, rotorcraft operations are feasible today from both a technological and an operational standpoint. The questions and issues that need to be resolved are: What certification requirements do we need to ensure safety. Can we develop procedures which capitalize on the performance and maneuvering capabilities unique to rotorcraft. Will extremely low visibility operations be economically feasible. This is Volume 3 of three. It provides the issue-by-issue deliberations of the experts involved in the Working Groups assigned to deal with them in the Issues Forum.

Adams, Richard J.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Spectrum for UAS Control and Non-Payload Communications

There is an increasing need to fly UAS in the NAS to perform missions of vital importance to National Security and Defense, Emergency Management, and Science as well as commercial applications (e.g. cargo transport). To enable integration of UAS into the National Airspace System, several critical technical barriers must be eliminated, including: Separation Assurance/Sense and Avoid - the uncertainty surrounding the ability to interoperate in ATC environments and maintain safe separation from other aircraft in the absence of an on-board pilot. Human Systems Integration - lack of standards and guidelines with respect to UAS display information as well as lack of Ground Control Station (GCS) design requirements to operate in the NAS. Certification - lack of airworthiness requirements and safety-related data specific to the full range of UAS, or for their avionics systems or other components. Communications - lack of standard, certifiable data links and aviation safety spectrum to operate such links for civil UAS control communications.

Kerczewski, Robert J.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Towards Run-time Assurance of Advanced Propulsion Algorithms

This paper covers the motivation and rationale for investigating the application of run-time assurance methods as a potential means of providing safety assurance for advanced propulsion control systems. Certification is becoming increasingly infeasible for such systems using current verification practices. Run-time assurance systems hold the promise of certifying these advanced systems by continuously monitoring the state of the feedback system during operation and reverting to a simpler, certified system if anomalous behavior is detected. The discussion will also cover initial efforts underway to apply a run-time assurance framework to NASA's model-based engine control approach. Preliminary experimental results are presented and discussed.

run time assurance↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Necessity of Functional Analysis for Space Exploration Programs

As NASA moves toward expanded commercial spaceflight within its human exploration capability, there is increased emphasis on how to allocate responsibilities between government and commercial organizations to achieve coordinated program objectives. The practice of program-level functional analysis offers an opportunity for improved understanding of collaborative functions among heterogeneous partners. Functional analysis is contrasted with the physical analysis more commonly done at the program level, and is shown to provide theoretical performance, risk, and safety advantages beneficial to a government-commercial partnership. Performance advantages include faster convergence to acceptable system solutions; discovery of superior solutions with higher commonality, greater simplicity and greater parallelism by substituting functional for physical redundancy to achieve robustness and safety goals; and greater organizational cohesion around program objectives. Risk advantages include avoidance of rework by revelation of some kinds of architectural and contractual mismatches before systems are specified, designed, constructed, or integrated; avoidance of cost and schedule growth by more complete and precise specifications of cost and schedule estimates; and higher likelihood of successful integration on the first try. Safety advantages include effective delineation of must-work and must-not-work functions for integrated hazard analysis, the ability to formally demonstrate completeness of safety analyses, and provably correct logic for certification of flight readiness. The key mechanism for realizing these benefits is the development of an inter-functional architecture at the program level, which reveals relationships between top-level system requirements that would otherwise be invisible using only a physical architecture. This paper describes the advantages and pitfalls of functional analysis as a means of coordinating the actions of large heterogeneous organizations for space exploration programs.

program management↗

NASA NTRS2020

Laser Based Remote and Rapid Inspection for Composite Plates

Composites have been extensively used in aero structure and become the predominate components in the new airframes. Thus, rapid and effective inspection for composite structures is highly desired in aerospace engineering in order to shorten the certificate cycle for new structures or provide safety guarantee for existing ones. In this paper, a laser based remote Lamb wave inspection system is presented and implemented on composite plates for simulated damage detection. The system employs pulsed laser (PL) and scanning laser Doppler vibrometer (SLDV) for noncontact and remote Lamb wave actuation and wavefield sensing. A composite plate with simulated defect (surface bonded quartz rod) is inspected with the PL-SLDV laser system. Wave scattering are observed in the SLDV acquired wavefield and the damage is further evaluated with wavefield imaging and frequency wavenumber analysis. Potential application towards automatic PL Lamb wave excitation is also explored through employing an industry robotic arm towards rapid inspection.

Lamb waves↗

NASA NTRS2023

Safety Case for Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operations at NASA Langley Research Center

This Technical Memorandum (TM) is written to provide for dissemination of the methods and safety considerations for operations of small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)at NASA Langley Research Center. It includes the Safety Case used to acquire a BVLOS Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the FAA and is being published to enable others to benefit from this work. The intended operations, subject to approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), will include a combination of Within Visual Line of Sight (WVLOS) and Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights, comprising of at most five sUAS operating concurrently, with no more than three operating BVLOS. Flights will occur in a subset of the Langley Air Force Base (LAFB) Class D airspace (KLFI) at a maximum altitude of 400 ft AGL. Most operations within this subset will take place in the City Environment Range Testing for Autonomous Integrated Navigation (CERTAIN) Range. The CERTAIN Range includes airspace inside the borders of NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). Additional airspace over the northern section of CERTAIN will be requested as part of the Certificate of Authorization (COA). NASA LaRC BVLOS operations on the CERTAIN Range can be broken down into five critical components needed to meet the 14 CFR § 91.113 see and avoid requirement: 1) procedural deconfliction with LAFB for UAS operations at or below 400 ft and manned aircraft at or above 900’ AGL; 2) ground equipment for detection of intruder aircraft and to support communications between crewmembers ; 3) sUAS vehicles with advanced onboard automation capable of autonomously maintaining safe separation; 4) BVLOS standardized operating procedures (SOPs); 5) and personnel to execute the flight operations in accordance with the SOPs and respond to airborne contingencies. The introduction of new ground equipment includes the use of the Remote Operations for Autonomous Missions (ROAM) UAS Operations Center, development and use of an Integrated Airspace Display (IAD), use of the L-STAR and GA-9120 radars, and the incorporation of standardized Vertiports. The ROAM Operations Center will be the central point for all BVLOS sUAS operations. All command and control (C2), voice communications and airspace awareness displays will reside inside ROAM. The IAD will provide raw data from ADS-B, FLARM, radar tracks and telemetered GPS vehicle positions for interpretation by an Airspace Monitor. The radars will search the class D airspace around the CERTAIN Range and serve as a backup to procedural deconfliction procedures coordinated with LAFB. In the event of a procedural deconfliction breakdown, radar detections of non-participating aircraft will be available so that the 91.113 see and avoid requirement can still be safely met. Finally, the incorporation of Vertiports will have video and network connectivity that enables large numbers of sUAS launches and recoveries from a single location. This is a continuation of the remote command and control of unpiloted aircraft component focused on evaluating unpiloted aircraft flight crew roles and responsibilities, control interfaces and the associated data links needed to operate a fleet of aircraft within a UAM Ecosystem. This work supports the development of future aviation operational concepts based on an Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level (UML) 4 environment (Patterson, 2020). It is assumed that future airspace will include hundreds of simultaneous aircraft operations within the airspace, therefore scalable operations are essential for enabling this future airspace to become a reality. Follow on work includes envisioned flights that expand operations beyond the CERTAIN range and lead to an effective Maritime Surveillance capability.

Matthew W Coldsnow↗

NASA NTRS1982

Aerospace technology and commercial nuclear power; Proceedings of the Workshop Conference, Williamsburg, VA, November 18-20, 1981

An attempt has been made to compare the technologies, institutions and procedures of the aerospace and commercial nuclear power industries, in order to characterize similarities and contrasts as well as to identify the most fruitful means by which to transfer information, technology, and procedures between the two industries. The seven working groups involved in this study took as their topics powerplant design formulation and effectiveness, plant safety and operations, powerplant control technology and integration, economic and financial analyses, public relations, and the management of nuclear waste and spent fuel. Consequential differences are noted between the two industries in matters of certification and licencing procedures, assignment of responsibility for both safety and financial performance, and public viewpoint. Areas for beneficial interaction include systems management and control and safety system technology. No individual items are abstracted in this volume

Grey, J.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Certifying Domain-Specific Policies

Proof-checking code for compliance to safety policies potentially enables a product-oriented approach to certain aspects of software certification. To date, previous research has focused on generic, low-level programming-language properties such as memory type safety. In this paper we consider proof-checking higher-level domain -specific properties for compliance to safety policies. The paper first describes a framework related to abstract interpretation in which compliance to a class of certification policies can be efficiently calculated Membership equational logic is shown to provide a rich logic for carrying out such calculations, including partiality, for certification. The architecture for a domain-specific certifier is described, followed by an implemented case study. The case study considers consistency of abstract variable attributes in code that performs geometric calculations in Aerospace systems.

Lowry, Michael↗

NASA NTRS2015

A Battery Certification Testbed for Small Satellite Missions

A battery pack consisting of standard cylindrical 18650 lithium-ion cells has been chosen for small satellite missions based on previous flight heritage and compliance with NASA battery safety requirements. However, for batteries that transit through the International Space Station (ISS), additional certification tests are required for individual cells as well as the battery packs. In this manuscript, we discuss the development of generalized testbeds for testing and certifying different types of batteries critical to small satellite missions. Test procedures developed and executed for this certification effort include: a detailed physical inspection before and after experiments; electrical cycling characterization at the cell and pack levels; battery-pack overcharge, over-discharge, external short testing; battery-pack vacuum leak and vibration testing. The overall goals of these certification procedures are to conform to requirements set forth by the agency and identify unique safety hazards. The testbeds, procedures, and experimental results are discussed for batteries chosen for small satellite missions to be launched from the ISS.

Certification↗

NASA NTRS2017

Development of a New Departure Aversion Standard for Light Aircraft

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have recently established new light aircraft certification rules that introduce significant changes to the current regulations. The changes include moving from prescriptive design requirements to performance-based standards, transferring many of the acceptable means of compliance out of the rules and into consensus standards. In addition, the FAA/EASA rules change the performance requirements associated with some of the more salient safety issues regarding light aircraft. One significant change is the elimination of spin recovery demonstration. The new rules now call for enhanced stall warning and aircraft handling characteristics that demonstrate resistance to inadvertent departure from controlled flight. The means of compliance with these changes in a safe, cost-effective manner is a challenging problem. This paper discusses existing approaches to reducing the likelihood of departure from controlled flight and introduces a new approach, dubbed Departure Aversion, which allows applicants to tailor the amount of departure resistance, stall warning, and enhanced safety equipment to meet the new proposed rules. The Departure Aversion approach gives applicants the freedom to select the most cost-effective portfolio for their design, while meeting the safety intent of the new rules, by ensuring that any combination of the selected approaches will be at a higher equivalent level of safety than today's status quo.

Borer, Nicholas K.↗

NASA NTRS1982

Wind shear and vortex wake research in UK, 1982

A wind shear and vortex wake and their impact on aircraft were investigated. The systems and advice to help pilots, and rational scientific methods to assist in advising certification authorities and those interested in improving flight safety were developed. Wind Shear and Vortex Wakes are related, they are both invisible enemies of aircraft in the form of large disturbances in the atmosphere, both cause major accidents. Problems of building wakes at airports are is considered. Research on wind shear was initiated by the American FAA following the Boston, New York and Denver accidents to civil airliners. This resulted in: useful advice to pilots about wind shear; better attempts by the meteorologists at forecasting wind shear conditions; and useful ideas for wind shear measurement and warning systems. Three major research tasks are outstanding: (1) Worldwide measurements to give reliable estimates of probability and details of the forms of large wind shears; (2) Developments of real time wind shear measuring systems for ground or airborne use; and (3) Establishing relationships between measured wind shear and the potential hazard to an aircraft, or class of aircraft.

Alan A. Woodfield↗

NASA NTRS1991

FY 1991 safety program status report

In FY 1991, the NASA Safety Division continued efforts to enhance the quality and productivity of its safety oversight function. Recent initiatives set forth in areas such as training, risk management, safety assurance, operational safety, and safety information systems have matured into viable programs contributing to the safety and success of activities throughout the Agency. Efforts continued to develop a centralized intra-agency safety training program with establishment of the NASA Safety Training Center at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). The objective is to provide quality training for NASA employees and contractors on a broad range of safety-related topics. Courses developed by the Training Center will be presented at various NASA locations to minimize travel and reach the greatest number of people at the least cost. In FY 1991, as part of the ongoing efforts to enhance the total quality of NASA's safety work force, the Safety Training Center initiated development of a Certified Safety Professional review course. This course provides a comprehensive review of the skills and knowledge that well-rounded safety professionals must possess to qualify for professional certification. FY 1992 will see the course presented to NASA and contractor employees at all installations via the NASA Video Teleconference System.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1995

Concurrent engineering research center

The projects undertaken by The Concurrent Engineering Research Center (CERC) at West Virginia University are reported and summarized. CERC's participation in the Department of Defense's Defense Advanced Research Project relating to technology needed to improve the product development process is described, particularly in the area of advanced weapon systems. The efforts committed to improving collaboration among the diverse and distributed health care providers are reported, along with the research activities for NASA in Independent Software Verification and Validation. CERC also takes part in the electronic respirator certification initiated by The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, as well as in the efforts to find a solution to the problem of producing environment-friendly end-products for product developers worldwide. The 3M Fiber Metal Matrix Composite Model Factory Program is discussed. CERC technologies, facilities,and personnel-related issues are described, along with its library and technical services and recent publications.

Callahan, John R.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Very Light Aircraft: Revitalization through Certification

As the future of the general aviation industry seems to be improving, a cultural paradigm shift may be imminent with the implementation of an advanced, revolutionary transportation system within the United States. By observing the support of government and industry for this idea, near and long term effects must be addressed if this change is going to occur. The high certification costs associated with general aviation aircraft must be reduced without compromising safety if a new transportation system is to be developed in the future. With the advent of new, streamlined rules recently issued for the certification of small aircraft, it seems as though new opportunities are now available to the general aviation industry. Not only will immediate benefits be realized with increased sales of certified small aircraft, but there would now be a way of introducing the advanced concepts of future aircraft at varying degrees of technology and cost as options to the customer.

Zyskowski, Michael K.↗

NASA NTRS2021

Toward Certification of Machine-Learning Systems for Low Criticality Airborne Applications

The exceptional progress in the field of machine learning (ML) in recent years has attracted a lot of interest in using this technology in aviation. Possible airborne applications of ML include safety-critical functions, which must be developed in compliance with rigorous certification standards of the aviation industry. Current certification standards for the aviation industry were developed prior to the ML renaissance without taking specifics of ML technology into account. There are some fundamental incompatibilities between traditional design assurance approaches and certain aspects of ML-based systems. In this paper, we analyze the current airborne certification standards and show that all objectives of the standards can be achieved for a low-criticality ML-based system if certain assumptions about ML development workflow are applied.

Avionics↗

DOE OSTI2022

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS2005

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗