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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8

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NASA NTRS2021

Toward Certification of Machine-Learning Systems for Low Criticality Airborne Applications

The exceptional progress in the field of machine learning (ML) in recent years has attracted a lot of interest in using this technology in aviation. Possible airborne applications of ML include safety-critical functions, which must be developed in compliance with rigorous certification standards of the aviation industry. Current certification standards for the aviation industry were developed prior to the ML renaissance without taking specifics of ML technology into account. There are some fundamental incompatibilities between traditional design assurance approaches and certain aspects of ML-based systems. In this paper, we analyze the current airborne certification standards and show that all objectives of the standards can be achieved for a low-criticality ML-based system if certain assumptions about ML development workflow are applied.

Avionics↗

NASA NTRS2005

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗

NASA NTRS1990

NASA safety standard for lifting devices and equipment

NASA's minimum safety requirements are established for the design, testing, inspection, maintenance, certification, and use of overhead and gantry cranes (including top running monorail, underhung, and jib cranes), mobile cranes, derrick hoists, and special hoist supported personnel lifting devices (these do not include elevators, ground supported personnel lifts, or powered platforms). Minimum requirements are also addressed for the testing, inspection, and use of Hydra-sets, hooks, and slings. Safety standards are thoroughly detailed.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1980

Space shuttles: A pyrotechnic overview

Pyrotechnic components specified in Shuttle system designs to accomplish varied tasks during all mission phases are described. The function of these pyrotechnics in the operation of the space shuttle vehicle is discussed. Designs are presented for pyrotechnics with innovative features of those meeting unique shuttle requirements for safety and reliability. A rationale for the qualification and certification of these devices is developed. Maintenance of this qualified system in production hardware is explained through a description of shuttle flight certification review process.

Graves, T. J.↗

NASA NTRS1987

A monograph of the National Space Transportation System Office (NSTSO) integration activities conducted at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center for the EASE/ACCESS payload flown on STS 61-B

The integration process of activities conducted at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) for the Experimental Assembly of Structures in Extravehicular activity (EASE)/Assembly Concept for Construction of Erectable Space Structures (ACCESS) payload is provided as a subset to the standard payload integration process used by the NASA Space Transportation System (STS) to fly payloads on the Space Shuttle. The EASE/ACCESS payload integration activities are chronologically reviewed beginning with the initiation of the flight manifesting and integration process. The development and documentation of the EASE/ACCESS integration requirements are also discussed along with the implementation of the mission integration activities and the engineering assessments supporting the flight integration process. In addition, the STS management support organizations, the payload safety process leading to the STS 61-B flight certification, and the overall EASE/ACCESS integration schedule are presented.

Chassay, Charles↗

NASA NTRS2005

STS-114/Discovery Flight Readiness Review Press Briefing

This press briefing on Flight Readiness Review (FRR) for the STS-114 Discovery flight is shown. Dean Acosta, Deputy Associate Administrator for Public Affairs, introduces the panel. The panel consist of: Michael Griffin, NASA Administrator, William Readdy, Associate Administrator of Space Operations, Bill Parsons, Space Shuttle Program Manager, and Mike Leinbach, NASA Launch Director. Questions from the media includes the following topics: certification, countdown, ice on the external tank, debris, and safety of the Space Shuttle Discovery.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2006

Hydrogen and Storage Initiatives at the NASA JSC White Sands Test Facility

NASA WSTF Hydrogen Activities: a) Aerospace Test; b) System Certification & Verification; c) Component, System, & Facility Hazard Assessment; d) Safety Training Technical Transfer: a) Development of Voluntary Consensus Standards and Practices; b) Support of National Hydrogen Infrastructure Development.

Maes, Miguel↗

NASA NTRS2016

National Unmanned Aerial System Standardized Performance Testing and Rating (NUSTAR)

The overall objective of the NUSTAR Capability is to offer standardized tests and scenario conditions to assess performance of the UAS. The following are goals of the NU-STAR: 1. Create a prototype standardized tests and scenarios that vehicles can be tested against. 2. Identify key performance parameters of all UAS and their standardized measurement strategy. 3. Develop standardized performance reporting method (e.g., consumer report style) to assist prospective buyers. 4. Identify key performance metrics that could be used by judged towards overall safety of the UAS and operations. 5. If vehicle certification standard is made by a regulatory agency, the performance of individual UAS could be compared against the minimum requirement (e.g., sense and avoid detection time, stopping distance, kinetic energy, etc.).

Testing↗

NASA NTRS2014

Industry Initiated Core Safety Attributes for Human Spaceflight for the 7th IAASS Conference

Now that the NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is beginning its full certification contract for crew transportation to the International Space Station (ISS), is it time for industry to embrace a minimum set of core safety attributes? Those attributes can then be evolved into an industry-led set of basic safety standards and requirements. After 50 years of human space travel sponsored by governments, there are two basic conditions that now exist within the international space industry. The first, there is enough of a space-faring history to encourage the space industry to design, develop and operate human spaceflight systems without government contracts for anything other than services. Second, industry is capable of defining and enforcing a set of industry-based safety attributes and standards for human spaceflight to low-Earth orbit (LEO). This paper will explore both of these basic conditions with a focus on the safety attributes and standards. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is now starting to dialogue with industry about the basic safety principles and attributes needed for potential future regulatory oversight. This process is not yet formalized and will take a number of years once approval is given to move forward. Therefore, throughout the next few years, it is an excellent time and opportunity for industry to collaborate together and develop the core set of attributes and standards. As industry engages and embraces a common set of safety attributes, then government agencies, like the FAA and NASA can use that industry-based product to strengthen their efforts on a safe commercial spaceflight foundation for the future. As the commercial space industry takes the lead role in establishing core safety attributes, and then enforcing those attributes, the entire planet can move away from governmental control of design and development and let industry expand safe and successful space operations in LEO. At that point the governmental agencies can focus on oversight of the industries' defined standards and enforcement for common welfare of the space-faring populous and overall public safety.

crew transportation↗

NASA NTRS1994

A Custom Robotic System for Inspecting HEPA Filters in the Payload Changeout Room at the NASA Kennedy Space Center

In this paper, the prime objective is to describe a custom 4-dof (degree-of-freedom) robotic arm capable of autonomously or telerobotically performing systematic HEPA filter inspection and certification in the Shuttle Launch Pad Payload Changeout Rooms (PCR's) on pads A and B at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida. This HEPA filter inspection robot (HFIR) has been designed to be easily deployable and is equipped with the necessary sensory devices, control hardware, software and man-machine interfaces needed to implement HEPA filter inspection reliably and efficiently without damaging the filters or colliding with existing PCR structures or filters. The main purpose of the HFIR is to implement an automated positioning system to move special inspection sensors in pre-defined or manual patterns for the purpose of verifying filter integrity and efficiency. This will ultimately relieve NASA Payload Operations from significant problems associated with time, cost and personnel safety, impacts realized during non-automated PCR HFIR filter certification.

Spencer, James E., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Agency Additive Manufacturing (AM) Certification Support Team (AACT) Risk Reduction – Safe Life Category: Fracture Control Framework for Un-inspectable Fracture Critical AM Parts

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to support the development of a governing philosophy to provide a consistent and systematic approach for fracture control certification of additive manufacturing (AM) hardware that cannot be reliably inspected. The overall goal of the NESC assessment was to make progress toward a framework for general certification of un-inspectable fracture critical AM hardware and toward approaches for evaluating risks associated with these components. This report contains the results of the assessment.

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRS2018

Verification and Validation Challenges for Adaptive Flight Control of Complex Autonomous Systems

Autonomy of aerospace systems requires the ability for flight control systems to be able to adapt to complex uncertain dynamic environment. In spite of the five decades of research in adaptive control, the fact still remains that currently no adaptive control system has ever been deployed on any safety-critical or human-rated production systems such as passenger transport aircraft. The problem lies in the difficulty with the certification of adaptive control systems since existing certification methods cannot readily be used for nonlinear adaptive control systems. Research to address the notion of metrics for adaptive control began to appear in the recent years. These metrics, if accepted, could pave a path towards certification that would potentially lead to the adoption of adaptive control as a future control technology for safety-critical and human-rated production systems. Development of certifiable adaptive control systems represents a major challenge to overcome. Adaptive control systems with learning algorithms will never become part of the future unless it can be proven that they are highly safe and reliable. Rigorous methods for adaptive control software verification and validation must therefore be developed to ensure that adaptive control system software failures will not occur, to verify that the adaptive control system functions as required, to eliminate unintended functionality, and to demonstrate that certification requirements imposed by regulatory bodies such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can be satisfied. This presentation will discuss some of the technical issues with adaptive flight control and related V&V challenges.

Nguyen, Nhan T.↗

NASA NTRS2021

A Guide for Aircraft Certification by Analysis

Analysis-based means of compliance for airplane and engine certification, commonly known as "Certification by Analysis" (CbA), provides a strong motivation for the development and maturation of current and future flight and engine modeling technology. The many benefits of CbA include streamlined product certification testing programs at lower cost while maintaining equivalent levels of safety. Flight and engine testing represent a substantial cost to airplane and engine development programs. This report provides a far-reaching vision for CbA and presents a research roadmap for computational technology development to enable CbA.

certification by analysis↗

NASA NTRS2012

Certification of COTS Software in NASA Human Rated Flight Systems

Adoption of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in safety critical systems has been seen as a promising acquisition strategy to improve mission affordability and, yet, has come with significant barriers and challenges. Attempts to integrate COTS software components into NASA human rated flight systems have been, for the most part, complicated by verification and validation (V&V) requirements necessary for flight certification per NASA s own standards. For software that is from COTS sources, and, in general from 3rd party sources, either commercial, government, modified or open source, the expectation is that it meets the same certification criteria as those used for in-house and that it does so as if it were built in-house. The latter is a critical and hidden issue. This paper examines the longstanding barriers and challenges in the use of 3rd party software in safety critical systems and cover recent efforts to use COTS software in NASA s Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) project. It identifies some core artifacts that without them, the use of COTS and 3rd party software is, for all practical purposes, a nonstarter for affordable and timely insertion into flight critical systems. The paper covers the first use in a flight critical system by NASA of COTS software that has prior FAA certification heritage, which was shown to meet the RTCA-DO-178B standard, and how this certification may, in some cases, be leveraged to allow the use of analysis in lieu of testing. Finally, the paper proposes the establishment of an open source forum for development of safety critical 3rd party software.

Goforth, Andre↗

NASA NTRS2005

Introduction to Flight Test Engineering [Introduction Aux Techniques Des Essais En Vol]

Flight test is at the core of what organizations must do in order to validate the operation and systems on an aircraft. While the AGARDograph series 300 and 160 series deal with aspects of this testing, this volume pulls it all together as an introduction to the process required to do effective flight test engineering. This volume was originally published in 1995. Its utility has been proven in that many flight test organizations and universities have requested copies for their engineers and students. It was felt that re-issuing it in a new format designed for electronic publication would be valuable to the community. This second printing changes none of the text, but rather reformats it. All the original references to AGARD (instead of RTO) are left in place so that none of the flavor of the original publication is lost. This is the Introductory Volume to the Flight Test Techniques Series. It is a general introduction to the various activities and aspects of Flight Test Engineering that must be considered when planning, conducting, and reporting a flight test program. Its main intent is to provide a broad overview to the novice engineer or to other people who have a need to interface with specialists within the flight test community. The first two Sections provide some insight into the question of why flight test and give a short history of flight test engineering. Sections 3 through 10 deal with the preparation for flight testing. They provide guidance on the preliminary factors that must be considered; the composition of the test team; the logistic support requirements; the instrumentation and data processing requirements; the flight test plan; the associated preliminary ground tests; and last, but by no means least, discuss safety aspects. Sections 11 through 27 describe the various types of flight tests that are usually conducted during the development and certification of a new or modified aircraft type. Each Section offers a brief introduction to the topic under consideration, and the nature and the objectives of the tests to be conducted. It lists the test instrumentation (and, where appropriate, other test equipment and facilities) required, describes the test maneuvers to be executed, and indicates the way in which the test data is selected, analyzed, and presented. The various activities that should take place between test flights are presented next. Items that are covered are: who to debrief; what type of reports to send where: types of data analysis required for next flight; review of test data to make a comparison to predicted data and some courses of action if there is not good agreement; and comments on selecting the next test flight. The activities that must take place upon completion of the test program are presented. The types of reports and briefings that should take place and a discussion of some of the uses of the flight test data are covered. A brief forecast is presented of where present trends may be leading.

Test facilities↗

NASA NTRS2005

Space Based Range Demonstration and Certification (SBRDC)

This viewgraph presentation describes the development, utilization and testing of technologies for range safety and range user systems. The contents include: 1) Space Based Range (SBR) Goals and Objectives; 2) Today s United States Range; 3) Future Range; 4) Another Vision for the Future Range; 5) STARS Project Goals; 6) STARS Content; 7) STARS Configuration Flight Demonstrations 1 & 2; 8) Spaceport And Range Technologies STARS Objectives and Results; 9) Spaceport And Range Technologies STARS FD2 Objectives; 10) Range Safety Hardware; 11) Range User Hardware; and 12) Past/Future Flight Demo Plans

Sakahara, Robert↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Close out the Critical Commitment for System Wide Safety’s Technical Challenge 3 (TC 3)

- Deliver validated methods and recommended practices to reduce certification costs for ground and onboard vehicle guidance and control systems through expanded acceptability of analysis as evidence for certification FY 2022. - Communicate results to maximize public awareness of the research and transfer capabilities via a set of on-demand training seminars and supporting materials including reports, publications and open source software codes where applicable.

Joseph C Coughlan↗

NASA NTRS2014

UAS-Systems Integration, Validation, and Diagnostics Simulation Capability

As part of the Phase 1 efforts of NASA's UAS-in-the-NAS Project a task was initiated to explore the merits of developing a system simulation capability for UAS to address airworthiness certification requirements. The core of the capability would be a software representation of an unmanned vehicle, including all of the relevant avionics and flight control system components. The specific system elements could be replaced with hardware representations to provide Hardware-in-the-Loop (HWITL) test and evaluation capability. The UAS Systems Integration and Validation Laboratory (UAS-SIVL) was created to provide a UAS-systems integration, validation, and diagnostics hardware-in-the-loop simulation capability. This paper discusses how SIVL provides a robust and flexible simulation framework that permits the study of failure modes, effects, propagation paths, criticality, and mitigation strategies to help develop safety, reliability, and design data that can assist with the development of certification standards, means of compliance, and design best practices for civil UAS.

Buttrill, Catherine W.↗