SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “safety critical software”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 145 records · Page 8

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2013

Maintaining the Health of Software Monitors

Software health management (SWHM) techniques complement the rigorous verification and validation processes that are applied to safety-critical systems prior to their deployment. These techniques are used to monitor deployed software in its execution environment, serving as the last line of defense against the effects of a critical fault. SWHM monitors use information from the specification and implementation of the monitored software to detect violations, predict possible failures, and help the system recover from faults. Changes to the monitored software, such as adding new functionality or fixing defects, therefore, have the potential to impact the correctness of both the monitored software and the SWHM monitor. In this work, we describe how the results of a software change impact analysis technique, Directed Incremental Symbolic Execution (DiSE), can be applied to monitored software to identify the potential impact of the changes on the SWHM monitor software. The results of DiSE can then be used by other analysis techniques, e.g., testing, debugging, to help preserve and improve the integrity of the SWHM monitor as the monitored software evolves.

Runtime Monitor↗

NASA NTRS2014

Power, Avionics and Software - Phase 1.0:

This report describes Power, Avionics and Software (PAS) 1.0 subsystem integration testing and test results that occurred in August and September of 2013. This report covers the capabilities of each PAS assembly to meet integration test objectives for non-safety critical, non-flight, non-human-rated hardware and software development. This test report is the outcome of the first integration of the PAS subsystem and is meant to provide data for subsequent designs, development and testing of the future PAS subsystems. The two main objectives were to assess the ability of the PAS assemblies to exchange messages and to perform audio testing of both inbound and outbound channels. This report describes each test performed, defines the test, the data, and provides conclusions and recommendations.

Communiocations↗

NASA NTRS1975

Space Tug avionics definition study. Volume 1: Executive summary

A top down approach was used to identify, compile, and develop avionics functional requirements for all flight and ground operational phases. Such requirements as safety mission critical functions and criteria, minimum redundancy levels, software memory sizing, power for tug and payload, data transfer between payload, tug, shuttle, and ground were established. Those functional requirements that related to avionics support of a particular function were compiled together under that support function heading. This unique approach provided both organizational efficiency and traceability back to the applicable operational phase and event. Each functional requirement was then allocated to the appropriate subsystems and its particular characteristics were quantified.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2016

Design, Development, and Testing of a UAV Hardware-in-the-Loop Testbed for Aviation and Airspace Prognostics Research

The airspace is becoming more and more complicated, and will continue to do so in the future with the integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), autonomy, spacecraft, other forms of aviation technology into the airspace. The new technology and complexity increases the importance and difficulty of safety assurance. Additionally, testing new technologies on complex aviation systems & systems of systems can be very difficult, expensive, and sometimes unsafe in real life scenarios. Prognostic methodology provides an estimate of the health and risks of a component, vehicle, or airspace and knowledge of how that will change over time. That measure is especially useful in safety determination, mission planning, and maintenance scheduling. The developed testbed will be used to validate prediction algorithms for the real-time safety monitoring of the National Airspace System (NAS) and the prediction of unsafe events. The framework injects flight related anomalies related to ground systems, routing, airport congestion, etc. to test and verify algorithms for NAS safety. In our research work, we develop a live, distributed, hardware-in-the-loop testbed for aviation and airspace prognostics along with exploring further research possibilities to verify and validate future algorithms for NAS safety. The testbed integrates virtual aircraft using the X-Plane simulator and X-PlaneConnect toolbox, UAVs using onboard sensors and cellular communications, and hardware in the loop components. In addition, the testbed includes an additional research framework to support and simplify future research activities. It enables safe, accurate, and inexpensive experimentation and research into airspace and vehicle prognosis that would not have been possible otherwise. This paper describes the design, development, and testing of this system. Software reliability, safety and latency are some of the critical design considerations in development of the testbed. Integration of HITL elements in the development phases and veri cation/ validation are key elements to this report.

HITL↗

NASA NTRS2017

A Virtual Laboratory for Aviation and Airspace Prognostics Research

Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), autonomy, spacecraft, and other aviation technologies, in the airspace is becoming more and more complicated, and will continue to do so in the future. Inclusion of new technology and complexity into the airspace increases the importance and difficulty of safety assurance. Additionally, testing new technologies on complex aviation systems and systems of systems can be challenging, expensive, and at times unsafe when implementing real life scenarios. The application of prognostics to aviation and airspace management may produce new tools and insight into these problems. Prognostic methodology provides an estimate of the health and risks of a component, vehicle, or airspace and knowledge of how that will change over time. That measure is especially useful in safety determination, mission planning, and maintenance scheduling. In our research, we develop a live, distributed, hardware- in-the-loop Prognostics Virtual Laboratory testbed for aviation and airspace prognostics. The developed testbed will be used to validate prediction algorithms for the real-time safety monitoring of the National Airspace System (NAS) and the prediction of unsafe events. In our earlier work1 we discussed the initial Prognostics Virtual Laboratory testbed development work and related results for milestones 1 & 2. This paper describes the design, development, and testing of the integrated tested which are part of milestone 3, along with our next steps for validation of this work. Through a framework consisting of software/hardware modules and associated interface clients, the distributed testbed enables safe, accurate, and inexpensive experimentation and research into airspace and vehicle prognosis that would not have been possible otherwise. The testbed modules can be used cohesively to construct complex and relevant airspace scenarios for research. Four modules are key to this research: the virtual aircraft module which uses the X-Plane simulator and X-PlaneConnect toolbox, the live aircraft module which connects fielded aircraft using onboard cellular communications devices, the hardware in the loop (HITL) module which connects laboratory based bench-top hardware testbeds and the research module which contains diagnostics and prognostics tools for analysis of live air traffic situations and vehicle health conditions. The testbed also features other modules for data recording and playback, information visualization, and air traffic generation. Software reliability, safety, and latency are some of the critical design considerations in development of the testbed.

LVC-DE↗

NASA NTRS2022

Space ROS: Architecture Roadmap

Space ROS is a matured version of ROS 2 using flight software engineering practices to facilitate mission- and safety-critical applications. This roadmap was developed by the team to communicate the planned future evolution of Space ROS

Austin Probe↗

NASA NTRS2016

Final Report of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Agile Benchmarking Team

To ensure that the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) community remains in a position to perform reliable Software Assurance (SA) on NASAs critical software (SW) systems with the software industry rapidly transitioning from waterfall to Agile processes, Terry Wilcutt, Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) established the Agile Benchmarking Team (ABT). The Team's tasks were: 1. Research background literature on current Agile processes, 2. Perform benchmark activities with other organizations that are involved in software Agile processes to determine best practices, 3. Collect information on Agile-developed systems to enable improvements to the current NASA standards and processes to enhance their ability to perform reliable software assurance on NASA Agile-developed systems, 4. Suggest additional guidance and recommendations for updates to those standards and processes, as needed. The ABT's findings and recommendations for software management, engineering and software assurance are addressed herein.

Software Assurance↗

NASA NTRS1978

Fault-tolerant software for aircraft control systems

Concepts for software to implement real time aircraft control systems on a centralized digital computer were discussed. A fault tolerant software structure employing functionally redundant routines with concurrent error detection was proposed for critical control functions involving safety of flight and landing. A degraded recovery block concept was devised to allow collocation of critical and noncritical software modules within the same control structure. The additional computer resources required to implement the proposed software structure for a representative set of aircraft control functions were discussed. It was estimated that approximately 30 percent more memory space is required to implement the total set of control functions. A reliability model for the fault tolerant software was described and parametric estimates of failure rate were made.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2001

Evolution of safety-critical requirements post-launch

This paper reports the results of a small study of requirements changes to the onboard software of three spacecraft subsequent to launch. Only those requirement changes that resulted from post-launch anoma-lies (i.e., during operations) were of interest here, since the goal was to better understand the relation-ship between critical anomalies during operations and how safety-critical requirements evolve. The results of the study were surprising in that anomaly-driven, post-launch requirements changes were rarely due to previous requirements having been incorrect. Instead, changes involved new requirements (1) for the software to handle rare events or (2) for the software to compensate for hardware failures or limitations. The prevalence of new requirements as a result of post-launch anomalies suggests a need for increased requirements-engineering support of maintenance activities in these systems. The results also confirm both the difficulty and the benefits of pursuing requirements completeness, especially in terms of fault tolerance, during development of critical systems.

Software requirements↗

NASA NTRS1997

Software Design Improvements: Software Benefits and Limitations - Part 1

Computer hardware and associated software have been used for many years to process accounting information, to analyze test data and to perform engineering analysis. Now computers and software also control everything from automobiles to washing machines and the number and type of applications are growing at an exponential rate. The size of individual program has shown similar growth. Furthermore, software and hardware are used to monitor and/or control potentially dangerous products and safety-critical systems. These uses include everything from airplanes and braking systems to medical devices and nuclear plants. The question is: how can this hardware and software be made more reliable? Also, how can software quality be improved? What methodology needs to be provided on large and small software products to improve the design and how can software be verified?

Lalli, Vincent R.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Autonomous Flight Safety System

Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is an independent flight safety system designed for small to medium sized expendable launch vehicles launching from or needing range safety protection while overlying relatively remote locations. AFSS replaces the need for a man-in-the-loop to make decisions for flight termination. AFSS could also serve as the prototype for an autonomous manned flight crew escape advisory system. AFSS utilizes onboard sensors and processors to emulate the human decision-making process using rule-based software logic and can dramatically reduce safety response time during critical launch phases. The Range Safety flight path nominal trajectory, its deviation allowances, limit zones and other flight safety rules are stored in the onboard computers. Position, velocity and attitude data obtained from onboard global positioning system (GPS) and inertial navigation system (INS) sensors are compared with these rules to determine the appropriate action to ensure that people and property are not jeopardized. The final system will be fully redundant and independent with multiple processors, sensors, and dead man switches to prevent inadvertent flight termination. AFSS is currently in Phase III which includes updated algorithms, integrated GPS/INS sensors, large scale simulation testing and initial aircraft flight testing.

Ferrell, Bob↗

NASA NTRS2001

Evolution of safety-critical requirements post-launch

requirements↗

NASA NTRS2009

A Verification-Driven Approach to Traceability and Documentation for Auto-Generated Mathematical Software

Model-based development and automated code generation are increasingly used for production code in safety-critical applications, but since code generators are typically not qualified, the generated code must still be fully tested, reviewed, and certified. This is particularly arduous for mathematical and control engineering software which requires reviewers to trace subtle details of textbook formulas and algorithms to the code, and to match requirements (e.g., physical units or coordinate frames) not represented explicitly in models or code. Both tasks are complicated by the often opaque nature of auto-generated code. We address these problems by developing a verification-driven approach to traceability and documentation. We apply the AUTOCERT verification system to identify and then verify mathematical concepts in the code, based on a mathematical domain theory, and then use these verified traceability links between concepts, code, and verification conditions to construct a natural language report that provides a high-level structured argument explaining why and how the code uses the assumptions and complies with the requirements. We have applied our approach to generate review documents for several sub-systems of NASA s Project Constellation.

Denney, Ewen W.↗

NASA NTRS1997

The Need for V&V in Reuse-Based Software Engineering

V&V is currently performed during application development for many systems, especially safety-critical and mission-critical systems. The V&V process is intended to discover errors, especially errors related to entire' domain or product line rather than a critical processing, as early as possible during the development process. The system application provides the context under which the software artifacts are validated. engineering. This paper describes a framework that extends V&V from an individual application system to a product line of systems that are developed within an architecture-based software engineering environment. This framework includes the activities of traditional application-level V&V, and extends these activities into the transition between domain engineering and application engineering. The framework includes descriptions of the types of activities to be performed during each of the life-cycle phases, and provides motivation for activities.

Addy, Edward A.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Tools Ensure Reliability of Critical Software

In November 2006, after attempting to make a routine maneuver, NASA's Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) reported unexpected errors. The onboard software switched to backup resources, and a 2-day lapse in communication took place between the spacecraft and Earth. When a signal was finally received, it indicated that MGS had entered safe mode, a state of restricted activity in which the computer awaits instructions from Earth. After more than 9 years of successful operation gathering data and snapping pictures of Mars to characterize the planet's land and weather communication between MGS and Earth suddenly stopped. Months later, a report from NASA's internal review board found the spacecraft's battery failed due to an unfortunate sequence of events. Updates to the spacecraft's software, which had taken place months earlier, were written to the wrong memory address in the spacecraft's computer. In short, the mission ended because of a software defect. Over the last decade, spacecraft have become increasingly reliant on software to carry out mission operations. In fact, the next mission to Mars, the Mars Science Laboratory, will rely on more software than all earlier missions to Mars combined. According to Gerard Holzmann, manager at the Laboratory for Reliable Software (LaRS) at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), even the fault protection systems on a spacecraft are mostly software-based. For reasons like these, well-functioning software is critical for NASA. In the same year as the failure of MGS, Holzmann presented a new approach to critical software development to help reduce risk and provide consistency. He proposed The Power of 10: Rules for Developing Safety-Critical Code, which is a small set of rules that can easily be remembered, clearly relate to risk, and allow compliance to be verified. The reaction at JPL was positive, and developers in the private sector embraced Holzmann's ideas.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2012

Statechart Analysis with Symbolic PathFinder

We report here on our on-going work that addresses the automated analysis and test case generation for software systems modeled using multiple Statechart formalisms. The work is motivated by large programs such as NASA Exploration, that involve multiple systems that interact via safety-critical protocols and are designed with different Statechart variants. To verify these safety-critical systems, we have developed Polyglot, a framework for modeling and analysis of model-based software written using different Statechart formalisms. Polyglot uses a common intermediate representation with customizable Statechart semantics and leverages the analysis and test generation capabilities of the Symbolic PathFinder tool. Polyglot is used as follows: First, the structure of the Statechart model (expressed in Matlab Stateflow or Rational Rhapsody) is translated into a common intermediate representation (IR). The IR is then translated into Java code that represents the structure of the model. The semantics are provided as "pluggable" modules.

Pasareanu, Corina S.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Safety

Software requirements, design, implementation, verification and validation, and especially management are affected by the need to produce safe software. This paper discusses the changes in the software life cycle that are necessary to ensure that software will execute without resulting in unacceptable risk. Software is being used increasingly to monitor and control safety-critical processes in which a run-time failure or error could result in unacceptable losses such as death, injury, loss of property, or environmental harm. Examples of such processes maybe found in transportation, energy, aerospace, basic industry, medicine, and defense systems.

Leveson, Nancy G.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Trades, Architecture, and Design of the Joint Augmented Reality Visual Informatics System (Joint AR) Product

Future expeditions will enable exploration and study of the planetary surfaces of the Moon and Mars by performing extravehicular activity (EVA) operations. Present-day International Space Station (ISS) EVA operations require an intricate choreography of crew, space suits, tools, systems, and flight teams to plan, train, and execute with limited advanced informatics. In this paper, the Joint Augmented Reality Visual Informatics System (Joint AR) project team at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) characterizes the design space for developing a modular augmented reality (AR) device for a spacesuit form factor that can support crew decision-making for EVA. The Joint AR product was defined via trade studies and market analysis of previous EVA display efforts, various AR components such as optics, commercial AR systems, light engines, data interfaces, and graphics engine software. This paper outlines the defining architectural design decisions, including safety criticality considerations, interfaces, and computer architectures. The outcomes of these studies result in a prototype design which is defined here as the Joint AR product. This work aims to enable a community-wide discussion toward realizing necessary suit-compatible AR features and capabilities for future missions.

Paromita Mitra↗