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NASA NTRS2010

A Recipe for Success OSHA VPP and Wellness

This slide presentation reviews the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) which is a program to promote effective worksite-based safety and health. In the VPP, management, labor, and OSHA establish cooperative relationships at workplaces that have implemented a comprehensive safety and health management system. The history of JSC's Total Health program and the movement from the Safety and Total Health program and the efforts to become certified by OSHA is reviewed.

Keprta, Sean↗

NASA NTRS1989

Expert systems applied to spacecraft fire safety

Expert systems are problem-solving programs that combine a knowledge base and a reasoning mechanism to simulate a human expert. The development of an expert system to manage fire safety in spacecraft, in particular the NASA Space Station Freedom, is difficult but clearly advantageous in the long-term. Some needs in low-gravity flammability characteristics, ventilating-flow effects, fire detection, fire extinguishment, and decision models, all necessary to establish the knowledge base for an expert system, are discussed.

Smith, Richard L.↗

NASA NTRS2008

DARPA/USAF/USN J-UCAS X-45A System Demonstration Program: A Review of Flight Test Site Processes and Personnel

The Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program is a collaborative effort between the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), the US Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN). Together they have reviewed X-45A flight test site processes and personnel as part of a system demonstration program for the UCAV-ATD Flight Test Program. The goal was to provide a disciplined controlled process for system integration and testing and demonstration flight tests. NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) acted as the project manager during this effort and was tasked with the responsibilities of range and ground safety, the provision of flight test support and infrastructure and the monitoring of technical and engineering tasks. DFRC also contributed their engineering knowledge through their contributions in the areas of autonomous ground taxi control development, structural dynamics testing and analysis and the provision of other flight test support including telemetry data, tracking radars, and communications and control support equipment. The Air Force Flight Test Center acted at the Deputy Project Manager in this effort and was responsible for the provision of system safety support and airfield management and air traffic control services, among other supporting roles. The T-33 served as a J-UCAS surrogate aircraft and demonstrated flight characteristics similar to that of the the X-45A. The surrogate served as a significant risk reduction resource providing mission planning verification, range safety mission assessment and team training, among other contributions.

Cosentino, Gary B.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Intelligent Hardware-Enabled Sensor and Software Safety and Health Management for Autonomous UAS

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) can only be deployed if they can effectively complete their mission and respond to failures and uncertain environmental conditions while maintaining safety with respect to other aircraft as well as humans and property on the ground. We propose to design a real-time, onboard system health management (SHM) capability to continuously monitor essential system components such as sensors, software, and hardware systems for detection and diagnosis of failures and violations of safety or performance rules during the ight of a UAS. Our approach to SHM is three-pronged, providing: (1) real-time monitoring of sensor and software signals; (2) signal analysis, preprocessing, and advanced on-the- y temporal and Bayesian probabilistic fault diagnosis; (3) an unobtrusive, lightweight, read-only, low-power hardware realization using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in order to avoid overburdening limited computing resources or costly re-certi cation of ight software due to instrumentation. No currently available SHM capabilities (or combinations of currently existing SHM capabilities) come anywhere close to satisfying these three criteria yet NASA will require such intelligent, hardwareenabled sensor and software safety and health management for introducing autonomous UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). We propose a novel approach of creating modular building blocks for combining responsive runtime monitoring of temporal logic system safety requirements with model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network-based probabilistic analysis. Our proposed research program includes both developing this novel approach and demonstrating its capabilities using the NASA Swift UAS as a demonstration platform.

Robotics↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

STEReO 1.0 Overview

STEReO brings together several technologies in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM), Autonomy, Communications, Human Factors, and Domain Expertise & Tools, aimed at providing scalability and flexibility, as well as operational resiliency to dynamic changes during a disaster event. Some of the concepts STEReO explores are: collaborative tools to ingest remote sensing information and distribute a common mission operating picture, apply ad-hoc communication networks to facilitate timely information sharing and communication of changes, vehicle-to-vehicle and onboard autonomy technologies ensure the safety and resiliency of operations, and apply NASA’s UAS traffic management system (UTM) as a public safety UAS Service Supplier (USS) to access and coordinate use of the airspace by both manned and unmanned operations. The potential benefits of STEReO include: standardized, cross-platform communication means increased interoperability and ease of cooperation/collaboration, increased situation awareness and common operating picture allow for earlier detection and decision making, and scalable to size and complexity of environment, operations, and mission objectives. This presentation gives an informational overview of the STEReO project to attendees of the System Wide Safety (SWS) Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop.

emergency response operations↗

NASA NTRS2003

Propulsion Health Monitoring for Enhanced Safety

This report presents the results of the NASA contract Propulsion System Health Management for Enhanced Safety performed by General Electric Aircraft Engines (GE AE), General Electric Global Research (GE GR), and Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory (PSU ARL) under the NASA Aviation Safety Program. This activity supports the overall goal of enhanced civil aviation safety through a reduction in the occurrence of safety-significant propulsion system malfunctions. Specific objectives are to develop and demonstrate vibration diagnostics techniques for the on-line detection of turbine rotor disk cracks, and model-based fault tolerant control techniques for the prevention and mitigation of in-flight engine shutdown, surge/stall, and flameout events. The disk crack detection work was performed by GE GR which focused on a radial-mode vibration monitoring technique, and PSU ARL which focused on a torsional-mode vibration monitoring technique. GE AE performed the Model-Based Fault Tolerant Control work which focused on the development of analytical techniques for detecting, isolating, and accommodating gas-path faults.

Butz, Mark G.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.

Hill, Janice L.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Satellite Communications for Aeronautics Applications: Technology Development and Demonstration

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is performing research and development to improve the safety and increase the capacity of the National Airspace System (NAS). Improved communications, especially to and from the aircraft flight deck, has been identified as an essential enabling technology for future improvements to the air traffic management system and aviation safety. NASA's Glenn Research Center is engaged in research and development of satellite communications technologies for aeronautical applications. A mobile aero terminal has been developed for use with Ku band commercial communications satellites. This experimental terminal will be used in mobile ground and air-based tests and demonstrations during 2000-2004. This paper will describe the basic operational parameters of the Ku Band aero terminal, the communications architecture it is intended to demonstrate, and the key technology issues being addressed in the tests and demonstrations. The design of the Ku Band aero terminal and associated ground testbed, planned tests and demonstrations, and results to date will be presented.

Kerczewski, Robert J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Expanding Our Understanding of What Constitutes a Safety-Relevant Occurrence

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. The study of human contributions to safety represents a vast and largely unexplored opportunity to learn. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform system design, safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors.

Jon B Holbrook↗

NASA NTRS2006

Another Approach to Enhance Airline Safety: Using Management Safety Tools

The ultimate goal of conducting an accident investigation is to prevent similar accidents from happening again and to make operations safer system-wide. Based on the findings extracted from the investigation, the "lesson learned" becomes a genuine part of the safety database making risk management available to safety analysts. The airline industry is no exception. In the US, the FAA has advocated the usage of the System Safety concept in enhancing safety since 2000. Yet, in today s usage of System Safety, the airline industry mainly focuses on risk management, which is a reactive process of the System Safety discipline. In order to extend the merit of System Safety and to prevent accidents beforehand, a specific System Safety tool needs to be applied; so a model of hazard prediction can be formed. To do so, the authors initiated this study by reviewing 189 final accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) covering FAR Part 121 scheduled operations. The discovered accident causes (direct hazards) were categorized into 10 groups Flight Operations, Ground Crew, Turbulence, Maintenance, Foreign Object Damage (FOD), Flight Attendant, Air Traffic Control, Manufacturer, Passenger, and Federal Aviation Administration. These direct hazards were associated with 36 root factors prepared for an error-elimination model using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), a leading tool for System Safety experts. An FTA block-diagram model was created, followed by a probability simulation of accidents. Five case studies and reports were provided in order to fully demonstrate the usefulness of System Safety tools in promoting airline safety.

Lu, Chien-tsug↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Methods to Collect and Analyze Data on Human Contributions to Aviation Safety: A Panel Discussion

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety-producing behaviors in addition to safety-reducing behaviors. Opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors are discussed.

Aviation Safety↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Methods to Collect and Analyze Data on Human Contributions to Aviation Safety: A Panel Discussion

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors. The panel will discuss opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors.

aviation safety↗

NASA NTRS2016

Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

Cotton, William B.↗

NASA NTRS1977

System safety in manned spaceflight

System safety in manned spaceflight is discussed with attention to the organization of the NASA safety effort, hazard identification and resolution, safety program integration, risk management visibility, and space transportation system payload safety. Key ingredients of the safety program, including concepts such as a distinct and appropriate level of responsibility for safety, and comprehensive and appropriate safety requirements from the policy level to the system level, are summarized. Program safety interrelationships are indicated.

Hammack, J. B.↗

NASA NTRS1987

System-Assurance Analysis for Nuclear Powerplants

System-assurance-analysis (SAA) methodology developed for aerospace launch-support systems proposed for nuclear powerplants. Study shows it is feasible and practical to apply SAA methodologyto nuclear powerplants. Essentially combination of analytical techniques related to safety and reliability with information system assisting managers in making decisions affecting safety and reliability.

Page, Donald W.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Crew Factors in Flight Operations XIV: Alertness Management in Regional Flight Operations Education Module

Regional operations encompass a broad range of pilots and equipment. This module is intended to help all those involved in regional aviation, including pilots, schedulers, dispatchers, maintenance technicians, policy makers, and others, to understand the physiological factors underlying fatigue, how flight operations affect fatigue, and what can be done to counteract fatigue and maximize alertness and performance in their operations. The overall purpose of this module is to promote aviation safety, performance, and productivity. It is intended to meet three specific objectives: (1) to explain the current state of knowledge about the physiological mechanisms underlying fatigue; (2) to demonstrate how this knowledge can be applied to improving flight crew sleep, performance, and alertness; and (3) to offer strategies for alertness management. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NISH) reports are used throughout this module to demonstrate that fatigue is a safety issue in the regional operations community. The appendices at the end of this module include the ASRS reports used for the examples contained in this publication, brief introductions to sleep disorders and relaxation techniques, summaries of relevant NASA publications, and a list of general readings on sleep, sleep disorders, and circadian rhythms.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Crew Factors in Flight Operations XV: Alertness Management in General Aviation Education Module

Rosekind, Mark R.↗

NASA NTRS2004

ASAP Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This is the First Quarterly Report for the newly reconstituted Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). The NASA Administrator rechartered the Panel on November 18,2003, to provide an independent, vigilant, and long-term oversight of NASA's safety policies and programs well beyond Return to Flight of the Space Shuttle. The charter was revised to be consistent with the original intent of Congress in enacting the statute establishing ASAP in 1967 to focus on NASA's safety and quality systems, including industrial and systems safety, risk-management and trend analysis, and the management of these activities.The charter also was revised to provide more timely feedback to NASA by requiring quarterly rather than annual reports, and by requiring ASAP to perform special assessments with immediate feedback to NASA. ASAP was positioned to help institutionalize the safety culture of NASA in the post- Stafford-Covey Return to Flight environment.

Source record↗