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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2010

Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

There are several engineering disciplines, such as reliability, supportability, quality assurance, human factors, risk management, safety, etc. Safety is an extremely important engineering specialty within NASA, and the consequence involving a loss of crew is considered a catastrophic event. Safety is not difficult to achieve when properly integrated at the beginning of each space systems project/start of mission planning. The key is to ensure proper handling of safety verification throughout each flight/mission phase. Today, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) operations engineers continue to conduct these flight product reviews across all open flight products. As such, these reviews help ensure that each mission is accomplished with safety requirements along with controls heavily embedded in applicable flight products. Most importantly, the S&MA operations engineers are required to look for important design and operations controls so that safety is strictly adhered to as well as reflected in the final flight product.

Smalls, James R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

Approximately eleven years ago, the International Space Station launched the first module from Russia, the Functional Cargo Block (FGB). Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Operations (Ops) Engineers played an integral part in that endeavor by executing strict flight product verification as well as continued staffing of S&MA's console in the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) for that flight mission. How were these engineers able to conduct such a complicated task? They conducted it based on product verification that consisted of ensuring that safety requirements were adequately contained in all flight products that affected crew safety. S&MA Ops engineers apply both systems engineering and project management principles in order to gain a appropriate level of technical knowledge necessary to perform thorough reviews which cover the subsystem(s) affected. They also ensured that mission priorities were carried out with a great detail and success.

Jones, Cheryl L.↗
DOE OSTI2026

MARVEL Reactor Fuel Performance Report

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) project is producing a high temperature liquid metal-cooled nuclear test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to ultimately improve the integration of microreactors to end-user applications. This ambitious effort seeks to design, authorize, construct, test, and operate the reactor within five years. In order to construct and operate the MARVEL reactor in a timely manner, the system will utilize materials and component designs which have already been used, qualified, or licensed from previous reactors. The MARVEL reactor will be located at the INL Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility in the north high-bay equipment pit and will use the existing 304 stainless steel-clad U-ZrH1.6 pin-type fuel system developed by General Atomics and purchased from TRIGA International. This fuel has been previously qualified under the United States Department of Energy’s (US DOE) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program. Even though the regulator of the MARVEL reactor is the US DOE, the standards and overall approach recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is well-defined and utilized here. Following NUREG-1537 regulatory guidance, this report documents the authorization case for the MARVEL fuel system’s application to MARVEL and establishes stable and predictable fuel performance during the most thermophysically unfavorable conditions achievable in the MARVEL reactor. To that end, this report provides a comprehensive survey of the known thermophysical properties, performance, and quantitative relationships associated with the MARVEL reactor fuel element and uses this information to determine its mechanical integrity and risk of reaching unacceptable conditions during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the reactor using the most conservative assumptions available. The information contained herein is compiled from a combination of historical reports and peer reviewed scientific publication manuscripts. Known mechanisms under which the fuel is susceptible to failure are highlighted and compared to conditions that could exist in the MARVEL reactor during an unanticipated transient or accident scenario. The two scenarios considered for analysis in this report are (1) an unprotected loss of flow accident and (2) a hypothetical unprotected loss of coolant accident during the loss of flow accident. Preliminary 2D steady-state analyses herein indicate that both fuel-cladding chemical interactions and fuel-cladding mechanical interactions are negligible throughout the fuel’s operational cycle under both normal and high temperature accident scenario conditions. Although higher fidelity 3D time-dependent modeling and simulations are planned, the following may be concluded presently. The MARVEL fuel element maintains its geometric stability and structural integrity during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the MARVEL reactor. The hoop stress during the unprotected loss of flow accident reaches about -1.27 MPa; this negative stress indicates that it is compressive rather than tensile. The compressive stress is a result of the NaK pressure on the outside of the fuel element, caused by the restricted thermal expansion of the NaK coolant, exceeding the internal pressures generated inside of the fuel element. The hoop stress generated in the cladding during the unprotected loss of coolant accident reaches a maximum of about approximately 10 MPa, which is nearly an order of magnitude less than the predicted yield strength of the cladding under high-temperature accident scenario conditions. Calculations were compared with results from high performance computational simulations using BISON and are in very close agreement. A conservative MARVEL fuel meat peak temperature limit of 900 °C is recommended presently, which is about 180 °C higher than the peak fuel temperature predicted to occur during the most extreme accident. Based on the known properties and behavior of the MARVEL fuel element, the fuel successfully meets its design and safety requirements under normal and most extreme accident conditions with a large safety margin.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2007

A Conceptual Aerospace Vehicle Structural System Modeling, Analysis and Design Process

A process for aerospace structural concept analysis and design is presented, with examples of a blended-wing-body fuselage, a multi-bubble fuselage concept, a notional crew exploration vehicle, and a high altitude long endurance aircraft. Aerospace vehicle structures must withstand all anticipated mission loads, yet must be designed to have optimal structural weight with the required safety margins. For a viable systems study of advanced concepts, these conflicting requirements must be imposed and analyzed early in the conceptual design cycle, preferably with a high degree of fidelity. In this design process, integrated multidisciplinary analysis tools are used in a collaborative engineering environment. First, parametric solid and surface models including the internal structural layout are developed for detailed finite element analyses. Multiple design scenarios are generated for analyzing several structural configurations and material alternatives. The structural stress, deflection, strain, and margins of safety distributions are visualized and the design is improved. Over several design cycles, the refined vehicle parts and assembly models are generated. The accumulated design data is used for the structural mass comparison and concept ranking. The present application focus on the blended-wing-body vehicle structure and advanced composite material are also discussed.

Mukhopadhyay, Vivek↗
NASA NTRS1993

Use of photostress and strain gages to analyze behavior of weldments and use of photostress and strain gages to analyze behavior of an aft skirt test specimen

Previous work using Photostress on TIG welded, heat treated specimens of 2219-T87 parent material and 2319 weld material indicated that behavior of the joint can be highly irregular and non-uniform. Welded joints 1.40 inches thick exhibited a totally non-uniform behavior through the weld thickness with the 'wide' side of the weld being much more ductile than the 'narrow' side. It is believed that this difference in behavior through the weld is, in part, caused by procedures used when laying the weld bead. Joints similar to weldments in references 1 and 2 are an integral part of the aft skirt of the SRB of the shuttle. Since the ultimate safety factor for the lower portion of the weld is below the minimum required safety factor, a photostress analysis of this lower portion will be conducted in the vicinity of the weld. A test program using photostress will be conducted in accordance with the project planning document entitled 'Photostress Evaluation Requirements for AFT Skirt Test Article No. 4'.

Gambrell, S. C.↗
NASA NTRS1977

System safety in manned spaceflight

System safety in manned spaceflight is discussed with attention to the organization of the NASA safety effort, hazard identification and resolution, safety program integration, risk management visibility, and space transportation system payload safety. Key ingredients of the safety program, including concepts such as a distinct and appropriate level of responsibility for safety, and comprehensive and appropriate safety requirements from the policy level to the system level, are summarized. Program safety interrelationships are indicated.

Hammack, J. B.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Human Factors Process Task Analysis Liquid Oxygen Pump Acceptance Test Procedure for the Advanced Technology Development Center

A process task analysis effort was undertaken by Dynacs Inc. commencing in June 2002 under contract from NASA YA-D6. Funding was provided through NASA's Ames Research Center (ARC), Code M/HQ, and Industrial Engineering and Safety (IES). The John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Engineering Development Contract (EDC) Task Order was 5SMA768. The scope of the effort was to conduct a Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HF PFMEA) of a hazardous activity and provide recommendations to eliminate or reduce the effects of errors caused by human factors. The Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Pump Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) was selected for this analysis. The HF PFMEA table (see appendix A) provides an analysis of six major categories evaluated for this study. These categories include Personnel Certification, Test Procedure Format, Test Procedure Safety Controls, Test Article Data, Instrumentation, and Voice Communication. For each specific requirement listed in appendix A, the following topics were addressed: Requirement, Potential Human Error, Performance-Shaping Factors, Potential Effects of the Error, Barriers and Controls, Risk Priority Numbers, and Recommended Actions. This report summarizes findings and gives recommendations as determined by the data contained in appendix A. It also includes a discussion of technology barriers and challenges to performing task analyses, as well as lessons learned. The HF PFMEA table in appendix A recommends the use of accepted and required safety criteria in order to reduce the risk of human error. The items with the highest risk priority numbers should receive the greatest amount of consideration. Implementation of the recommendations will result in a safer operation for all personnel.

Diorio, Kimberly A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Final Report - Regulatory Considerations for Adaptive Systems

This report documents the findings of a preliminary research study into new approaches to the software design assurance of adaptive systems. We suggest a methodology to overcome the software validation and verification difficulties posed by the underlying assumption of non-adaptive software in the requirementsbased- testing verification methods in RTCA/DO-178B and C. An analysis of the relevant RTCA/DO-178B and C objectives is presented showing the reasons for the difficulties that arise in showing satisfaction of the objectives and suggested additional means by which they could be satisfied. We suggest that the software design assurance problem for adaptive systems is principally one of developing correct and complete high level requirements and system level constraints that define the necessary system functional and safety properties to assure the safe use of adaptive systems. We show how analytical techniques such as model based design, mathematical modeling and formal or formal-like methods can be used to both validate the high level functional and safety requirements, establish necessary constraints and provide the verification evidence for the satisfaction of requirements and constraints that supplements conventional testing. Finally the report identifies the follow-on research topics needed to implement this methodology.

Wilkinson, Chris↗
DOE OSTI2022

Sludge Batch 10 (SB10) Acceptance Evaluation: Radionuclide Concentrations in Tank 51 Washed Qualification Sample

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been tasked with the radionuclide characterization of the washed Sludge Batch 10 (SB10) qualification sample. The washed SB10 qualification sample is based on SRR Engineering guidance and the sample slurry is expected to be similar in composition to Tank 51 slurry after final preparations for transfer to Tank 40. Forty-four radionuclides along with total alpha and beta activity have been reported herein. These radionuclide measurements are required for the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Radiological Evaluation Program, DWPF Technical Safety Requirements (TSR)/Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Evaluation, and the DWPF Solid Waste Characterization Program.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2008

Building on the Past - Looking to the Future: A Focus on Payload Safety

The history of the space industry stretches far and above lunar landings to the construction of the International Space Station. For years, humans have sought to understand the nature of the universe. As society grows in knowledge and curiosity of space, the focus of maintaining the safety of the crew and vehicle habitability is of utmost importance to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) community. Through the years, Payload Safety has developed not only as a Panel, but also as part of the NASA community, striving to enhance the efficiency and understanding of how business should be conducted as more International Partners become involved. This is the first in a series of papers and presentations in what is hoped to be an annual update that provides continuous challenges and lessons learned in the areas of communication, safety requirements and processes and other areas which have been vital to the Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP).

Nash, Sally K.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Initial Motor Winding Insulation Lifetime Experimental Results for Electric Aircraft Applications

Electric and hybrid-electric aircraft require high-performance and reliable electric motors to meet aviation performance and safety requirements. One of the most common failure mechanisms in electric motors is winding insulation breakdown. In this paper, initial set of aging experiments are carried out on twisted pairs and motorette specimens. The twisted pairs are aged with multiple steady-temperature thermal aging cycles. The motorette specimens are thermally cycled by applying current to the windings. Partial discharge inception voltage is tracked and reported throughout the aging process. The end goal of this work is to develop methods and models for assessing the lifetime of motor winding insulation in electric and hybrid electric aircraft applications.

Thomas Tallerico↗
NASA NTRS1990

A review of nuclear electric propulsion spacecraft system concepts

The last 25-30 years of system concepts and design philosophies for spacecraft employing nuclear-electric propulsion (NEP) are reviewed. NEP spacecraft-system design constraints and criteria are identified, including radiation exposure of humans and electronics, thermal control requirements, effluent contamination of spacecraft surfaces, surface erosion, launch-vehicle integration, operations and safety requirements, attitude control, EM interference, and power control and distribution. The impact on spacecraft design philosophy of these constraints and criteria is explored. Several NEP spacecraft are characterized and discussed with respect to the propulsion system used. The electric propulsion system catagories are electrothermal (arcjet), EM (magnetoplasmadynamic and pulsed-inductive thruster) and electrostatic (ion engine). A brief summary of the mission, nuclear power source, electric propulsion system, and spacecraft configuration are provided for each NEP spacecraft concept.

Deininger, W. D.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Nuclear safety policy working group recommendations on nuclear propulsion safety for the space exploration initiative

An interagency Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program. These recommendations, which are contained in this report, should facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG has recommended a top-level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the SEI nuclear propulsion safety program. In addition, the NSPWG has reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. These recommendations should be useful for the development of the program's top-level requirements for safety functions (referred to as Safety Functional Requirements). The safety requirements and guidelines address the following topics: reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground testing, and other considerations.

Marshall, Albert C.↗
NASA NTRS1972

An isotope heat source integrated with a 7 kW/e/ to 25 kW/e/ Brayton cycle space power supply.

The power system described is intended for applications in a manned space mission. The Isotope Reentry Vehicle (IRV) developed is considered together with the Heat Source (HS), the Heat Source Heat Exchanger and the Brayton Cycle Power Conversion Module. Other subjects discussed include the IRV/Brayton cycle spacecraft integration concept, abort and deorbit mechanization, emergency cooling methods, and crew shielding requirements. Mounting and integration for the IRV is to a large degree controlled by nuclear safety requirements. Another major factor in the installation concept is the type of emergency cooling or passive heat dump mode used in rejection of HS energy.

Ryan, R. L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Designing an Alternate Mission Operations Control Room

The Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) is a multi-project facility that is responsible for 24x7 real-time International Space Station (ISS) payload operations management, integration, and control and has the capability to support small satellite projects and will provide real-time support for SLS launches. The HOSC is a serviceoriented/ highly available operations center for ISS payloads-directly supporting science teams across the world responsible for the payloads. The HOSC is required to endure an annual 2-day power outage event for facility preventive maintenance and safety inspection of the core electro-mechanical systems. While complete system shut-downs are against the grain of a highly available sub-system, the entire facility must be powered down for a weekend for environmental and safety purposes. The consequence of this ground system outage is far reaching: any science performed on ISS during this outage weekend is lost. Engineering efforts were focused to maximize the ISS investment by engineering a suitable solution capable of continuing HOSC services while supporting safety requirements. The HOSC Power Outage Contingency (HPOC) System is a physically diversified compliment of systems capable of providing identified real-time services for the duration of a planned power outage condition from an alternate control room. HPOC was designed to maintain ISS payload operations for approximately three continuous days during planned HOSC power outages and support a local Payload Operations Team, International Partners, as well as remote users from the alternate control room located in another building. This paper presents the HPOC architecture and lessons learned during testing and the planned maiden operational commissioning. Additionally, this paper documents the necessity of an HPOC capability given the unplanned HOSC Facility power outage on April 27th, 2011, as a result of the tornado outbreak that damaged the electrical grid to such a degree that significantly inhibited the Tennessee Valley Authority's ability to transmit electricity throughout the North Alabama region.

Montgomery, Patty↗
NASA NTRS2014

Designing an Alternate Mission Operations Control Room

The Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) is a multi-project facility that is responsible for 24x7 real-time International Space Station (ISS) payload operations management, integration, and control and has the capability to support small satellite projects and will provide real-time support for SLS launches. The HOSC is a service-oriented/ highly available operations center for ISS payloads-directly supporting science teams across the world responsible for the payloads. The HOSC is required to endure an annual 2-day power outage event for facility preventive maintenance and safety inspection of the core electro-mechanical systems. While complete system shut-downs are against the grain of a highly available sub-system, the entire facility must be powered down for a weekend for environmental and safety purposes. The consequence of this ground system outage is far reaching: any science performed on ISS during this outage weekend is lost. Engineering efforts were focused to maximize the ISS investment by engineering a suitable solution capable of continuing HOSC services while supporting safety requirements. The HOSC Power Outage Contingency (HPOC) System is a physically diversified compliment of systems capable of providing identified real-time services for the duration of a planned power outage condition from an alternate control room. HPOC was designed to maintain ISS payload operations for approximately three continuous days during planned HOSC power outages and support a local Payload Operations Team, International Partners, as well as remote users from the alternate control room located in another building.

Montgomery, Patty↗