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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2003

A Dynamic Risk Model for Evaluation of Space Shuttle Abort Scenarios

The Space Shuttle is an advanced manned launch system with a respectable history of service and a demonstrated level of safety. Recent studies have shown that the Space Shuttle has a relatively low probability of having a failure that is instantaneously catastrophic during nominal flight as compared with many US and international launch systems. However, since the Space Shuttle is a manned. system, a number of mission abort contingencies exist to primarily ensure the safety of the crew during off-nominal situations and to attempt to maintain the integrity of the Orbiter. As the Space Shuttle ascends to orbit it transverses various intact abort regions evaluated and planned before the flight to ensure that the Space Shuttle Orbiter, along with its crew, may be returned intact either to the original launch site, a transoceanic landing site, or returned from a substandard orbit. An intact abort may be initiated due to a number of system failures but the highest likelihood and most challenging abort scenarios are initiated by a premature shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The potential consequences of such a shutdown vary as a function of a number of mission parameters but all of them may be related to mission time for a specific mission profile. This paper focuses on the Dynamic Abort Risk Evaluation (DARE) model process, applications, and its capability to evaluate the risk of Loss Of Vehicle (LOV) due to the complex systems interactions that occur during Space Shuttle intact abort scenarios. In addition, the paper will examine which of the Space Shuttle subsystems are critical to ensuring a successful return of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and crew from such a situation.

Henderson, Edward M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

History of Space Shuttle Rendezvous

This technical history is intended to provide a technical audience with an introduction to the rendezvous and proximity operations history of the Space Shuttle Program. It details the programmatic constraints and technical challenges encountered during shuttle development in the 1970s and over thirty years of shuttle missions. An overview of rendezvous and proximity operations on many shuttle missions is provided, as well as how some shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations systems and flight techniques evolved to meet new programmatic objectives. This revised edition provides additional information on Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo/Soyuz. Some chapters on the Space Shuttle have been updated and expanded. Four special focus chapters have been added to provide more detailed information on shuttle rendezvous. A chapter on the STS-39 mission of April/May 1991 describes the most complex deploy/retrieve mission flown by the shuttle. Another chapter focuses on the Hubble Space Telescope servicing missions. A third chapter gives the reader a detailed look at the February 2010 STS-130 mission to the International Space Station. The fourth chapter answers the question why rendezvous was not completely automated on the Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle vehicles.

Goodman, John L.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Restartable solid motor stage for shuttle applications

The application of restartable solid motor stages to shuttle missions has been shown to provide a viable supplement to the shuttle program. Restartable solid motors in the 3000 pound class provide a small expendable transfer stage that reduces the demand on the shuttle for the lower energy missions. Shuttle operational requirements and preliminary performance data provided an input for defining design features required for restartable solid motor applications. These data provided a basis for a configuration definition that is compatible with shuttle operations. Mission by mission analysis showed the impact on a NASA supplied mission model. The results showed a 15% reduction in the number of shuttle flights required. In addition the amount of shuttle capability used to complete the mission objectives was significantly reduced. For example, in the 1979 missions there was a 62% reduction in shuttle capability used. The study also showed that the solid motor could provide a supplement to the TUG that would allow TUGS to be used in a recoverable rather than an expendable mode. The study shows a 71% reduction in the number of TUGs that would be expended.

Rohrbaugh, D. J.↗
NASA NTRS1977

A guide for space lawyers to understanding the NASA Space Shuttle and the ESA Spacelab

An investigation is conducted concerning the appropriate characterization of the Space Shuttle, taking into account appearance, functions, and purpose. It is concluded that in terms of purely technological criteria, the Shuttle can best be described as an 'aerospace vehicle'. Questions related to the legal characterization of the Shuttle are considered. On the basis of the Shuttle's purpose as the most important criterion, it is suggested that the Shuttle should be considered basically as a 'spacecraft', 'space vehicle', or 'space object'. Attention is given to the Shuttle's relationship to multilateral space conventions, the possibility that the Shuttle could be legally defined as an 'aircraft' under certain circumstances, the Shuttle and the Chicago Convention, and the status of Spacelab as only one part of a U.S. flag spacecraft.

Sloup, G. P.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Main propulsion system test requirements for the two-engine Shuttle-C

The Shuttle-C is an unmanned cargo carrying derivative of the space shuttle with optional two or three space shuttle main engines (SSME's), whereas the shuttle has three SSME's. Design and operational differences between the Shuttle-C and shuttle were assessed to determine requirements for additional main propulsion system (MPS) verification testing. Also, reviews were made of the shuttle main propulsion test program objectives and test results and shuttle flight experience. It was concluded that, if significant MPS modifications are not made beyond those currently planned, then main propulsion system verification can be concluded with an on-pad flight readiness firing.

Lynn, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Toward a history of the space shuttle. An annotated bibliography

This selective, annotated bibliography discusses those works judged to be most essential for researchers writing scholarly studies on the Space Shuttle's history. A thematic arrangement of material concerning the Space Shuttle will hopefully bring clarity and simplicity to such a complex subject. Subjects include the precursors of the Space Shuttle, its design and development, testing and evaluation, and operations. Other topics revolve around the Challenger accident and its aftermath, promotion of the Space Shuttle, science on the Space Shuttle, commercial uses, the Space Shuttle's military implications, its astronaut crew, the Space Shuttle and international relations, the management of the Space Shuttle Program, and juvenile literature. Along with a summary of the contents of each item, judgments have been made on the quality, originality, or importance of some of these publications. An index concludes this work.

Launius, Roger D.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Reach performance while wearing the Space Shuttle launch and entry suit during exposure to launch accelerations

Crewmen aboard the Space Shuttle are subjected to accelerations during ascent (the powered flight phase of launch) which range up to +3 G(sub x). Despite having 33 missions and nine years experience, not to mention all the time spent in development prior to the first flight, no truly quantitative reach study wearing actual crew equipment, using actual Shuttle seats and restraints has ever been done. What little information exists on reach performance while under acceleration has been derived primarily from subjective comments gathered retrospectively from Shuttle flight crews during their post mission debrief. This lack of reach performance data has resulted in uncertainty regarding emergency procedures that can realistically be performed during and actual Shuttle ascent versus what is practiced in the ground-fixed and motion-based Shuttle Simulators. With the introduction on STS-26 of the current Shuttle escape system, the question of reach performance under launch accelerations was once again raised. The escape system's requirement that each crewman wear a Launch/Entry Suit (LES), parachute harness, and parachute were all anticipated to contribute to a further degradation of reach performance during Shuttle ascent accelerations. In order to answer the reach performance question in a quantitative way, a photogrammetric method was chosen so that the actual reach values and associated envelopes could be captured. This would allow quantitative assessment of potential task performance impact and identify areas where changes to our Shuttle ascent emergency procedures might be required. Also, such a set of reach values would be valid for any similar acceleration profile using the same crew equipment. Potential Space Station applications of this data include predicting reach performance during Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) operations.

Bagian, James P.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Dual Liquid Flyback Booster for the Space Shuttle

Liquid Flyback Boosters provide an opportunity to improve shuttle safety, increase performance, and reduce operating costs. The objective of the LFBB study is to establish the viability of a LFBB configuration to integrate into the shuttle vehicle and meet the goals of the Space Shuttle upgrades program. The design of a technically viable LFBB must integrate into the shuttle vehicle with acceptable impacts to the vehicle elements, i.e. orbiter and external tank and the shuttle operations infrastructure. The LFBB must also be capable of autonomous return to the launch site. The smooth integration of the LFBB into the space shuttle vehicle and the ability of the LFBB to fly back to the launch site are not mutually compatible capabilities. LFBB wing configurations optimized for ascent must also provide flight quality during the powered return back to the launch site. This paper will focus on the core booster design and ascent performance. A companion paper, "Conceptual Design for a Space Shuttle Liquid Flyback Booster" will focus on the flyback system design and performance. The LFBB study developed design and aerodynamic data to demonstrate the viability of a dual booster configuration to meet the shuttle upgrade goals, i.e. enhanced safety, improved performance and reduced operations costs.

Blum, C.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Space Shuttle Projects Overview to Columbia Air Forces War College

This paper presents, in viewgraph form, a general overview of space shuttle projects. Some of the topics include: 1) Space Shuttle Projects; 2) Marshall Space Flight Center Space Shuttle Projects Office; 3) Space Shuttle Propulsion systems; 4) Space Shuttle Program Major Sites; 5) NASA Office of Space flight (OSF) Center Roles in Space Shuttle Program; 6) Space Shuttle Hardware Flow; and 7) Shuttle Flights To Date.

Singer, Jody↗
NASA NTRS1996

Silicone Contamination Camera for Developed for Shuttle Payloads

On many shuttle missions, silicone contamination from unknown sources from within or external to the shuttle payload bay has been a chronic problem plaguing experiment payloads. There is currently a wide range of silicone usage on the shuttle. Silicones are used to coat the shuttle tiles to enhance their ability to shed rain, and over 100 kg of RTV 560 silicone is used to seal white tiles to the shuttle surfaces. Silicones are also used in electronic components, potting compounds, and thermal control blankets. Efforts to date to identify and eliminate the sources of silicone contamination have not been highly successful and have created much controversy. To identify the sources of silicone contamination on the space shuttle, the NASA Lewis Research Center developed a contamination camera. This specially designed pinhole camera utilizes low-Earth-orbit atomic oxygen to develop a picture that identifies sources of silicone contamination on shuttle-launched payloads. The volatile silicone species travel through the aperture of the pinhole camera, and since volatile silicone species lose their hydrocarbon functionalities under atomic oxygen attack, the silicone adheres to the substrate as SiO_x. This glassy deposit should be spatially arranged in the image of the sources of silicone contamination. To view the contamination image, one can use ultrasensitive thickness measurement techniques, such as scanning variable-angle ellipsometry, to map the surface topography of the camera's substrate. The demonstration of a functional contamination camera would resolve the controversial debate concerning the amount and location of contamination sources, would allow corrective actions to be taken, and would demonstrate a useful tool for contamination documentation on future shuttle payloads, with near negligible effect on cost and weight.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2007

Probabilistic Analysis of Space Shuttle Body Flap Actuator Ball Bearings

A probabilistic analysis, using the 2-parameter Weibull-Johnson method, was performed on experimental life test data from space shuttle actuator bearings. Experiments were performed on a test rig under simulated conditions to determine the life and failure mechanism of the grease lubricated bearings that support the input shaft of the space shuttle body flap actuators. The failure mechanism was wear that can cause loss of bearing preload. These tests established life and reliability data for both shuttle flight and ground operation. Test data were used to estimate the failure rate and reliability as a function of the number of shuttle missions flown. The Weibull analysis of the test data for a 2-bearing shaft assembly in each body flap actuator established a reliability level of 99.6 percent for a life of 12 missions. A probabilistic system analysis for four shuttles, each of which has four actuators, predicts a single bearing failure in one actuator of one shuttle after 22 missions (a total of 88 missions for a 4-shuttle fleet). This prediction is comparable with actual shuttle flight history in which a single actuator bearing was found to have failed by wear at 20 missions.

Oswald, Fred B.↗
NASA NTRS2010

EVA 2010: Preparing for International Space Station EVA Operations Post-Space Shuttle Retirement

The expected retirement of the NASA Space Transportation System (also known as the Space Shuttle ) by 2011 will pose a significant challenge to Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) on-board the International Space Station (ISS). The EVA hardware currently used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed assuming that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for refurbishment, or if necessary for failure investigation. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support hardware and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2015, and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, the EVA 2010 Project was jointly initiated by NASA and the OneEVA contractor team. The challenges addressed were to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, to secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, to protect for EMU hardware operability on-orbit, and to determine the source of high water purity to support recharge of PLSSs (no longer available via Shuttle). EVA 2010 Project includes the following tasks: the development of a launch fixture that would allow the EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) to be launched on-board alternate vehicles; extension of the EMU hardware maintenance interval from 3 years (current certification) to a minimum of 6 years (to extend to 2015); testing of recycled ISS Water Processor Assembly (WPA) water for use in the EMU cooling system in lieu of water resupplied by International Partner (IP) vehicles; development of techniques to remove & replace critical components in the PLSS on-orbit (not routine); extension of on-orbit certification of EVA tools; and development of an EVA hardware logistical plan to support the ISS without the Space Shuttle. Assumptions for the EVA 2010 Project included no more than 8 EVAs per year for ISS EVA operations in the Post-Shuttle environment and limited availability of cargo upmass on IP launch vehicles. From 2010 forward, EVA operations on-board the ISS without the Space Shuttle will be a paradigm shift in safely operating EVA hardware on orbit and the EVA 2010 effort was initiated to accommodate this significant change in EVA evolutionary history.

Chullen, Cinda↗
NASA NTRS2010

Post-Shuttle EVA Operations on ISS

The expected retirement of the NASA Space Transportation System (also known as the Space Shuttle ) by 2011 will pose a significant challenge to Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) on-board the International Space Station (ISS). The EVA hardware currently used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed assuming that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for refurbishment, or if necessary for failure investigation. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support hardware and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2015, and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, the EVA 2010 Project was jointly initiated by NASA and the One EVA contractor team. The challenges addressed were to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, to secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, to protect for EMU hardware operability on-orbit, and to determine the source of high water purity to support recharge of PLSSs (no longer available via Shuttle). EVA 2010 Project includes the following tasks: the development of a launch fixture that would allow the EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) to be launched on-board alternate vehicles; extension of the EMU hardware maintenance interval from 3 years (current certification) to a minimum of 6 years (to extend to 2015); testing of recycled ISS Water Processor Assembly (WPA) water for use in the EMU cooling system in lieu of water resupplied by International Partner (IP) vehicles; development of techniques to remove & replace critical components in the PLSS on-orbit (not routine); extension of on-orbit certification of EVA tools; and development of an EVA hardware logistical plan to support the ISS without the Space Shuttle. Assumptions for the EVA 2010 Project included no more than 8 EVAs per year for ISS EVA operations in the Post-Shuttle environment and limited availability of cargo upmass on IP launch vehicles. From 2010 forward, EVA operations on-board the ISS without the Space Shuttle will be a paradigm shift in safely operating EVA hardware on orbit and the EVA 2010 effort was initiated to accommodate this significant change in EVA evolutionary history. 1

West, William↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight Controller Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. As the space shuttle program ends in 2011, a review of how training for STS-1 was conducted compared to STS-134 will show multiple changes in training of shuttle flight controller over a thirty year period. This paper will additionally give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams have been trained certified over the life span of the space shuttle. The training methods for developing flight controllers have evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Standards and Specifications for Ground Processing of Space Vehicles: From an Aviation-Based Shuttle Project to Global Application

Proprietary or unique designs and operations are expected early in any industry's development, and often provide a competitive early market advantage. However, there comes a time when a product or industry requires standardization for the whole industry to advance...or survive. For the space industry, that time has come. Here, we will focus on standardization of ground processing for space vehicles and their ground systems. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, and emergence of a new global space race, affordability and sustainability are more important now than ever. The growing commercialization of the space industry and current global economic environment are driving greater need for efficiencies to save time and money. More RLV's (Reusable Launch Vehicles) are being developed for the gains of reusability not achievable with traditional ELV's (Expendable Launch Vehicles). More crew/passenger vehicles are also being developed. All of this calls for more attention needed for ground processing-repeatedly before launch and after landing/recovery. RLV's should provide more efficiencies than ELV's, as long as MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) is well-planned-even for the unplanned problems. NASA's Space Shuttle is a primary example of an RLV which was supposed to thrive on reusability savings with efficient ground operations, but lessons learned show that costs were (and still are) much greater than expected. International standards and specifications can provide the commonality needed to simplify design and manufacturing as well as to improve safety, quality, maintenance, and operability. There are standards organizations engaged in the space industry, but ground processing is one of the areas least addressed. Challenges are encountered due to various factors often not considered during development. Multiple vehicle elements, sites, customers, and contractors pose various functional and integration difficulties. Resulting technical publication structures and methods are incongruent. Some processing products are still done on paper, some electronic, and many being converted in between. Business systems then are not fully compatible, and paper as well as electronic conversions are time-consuming and costly. NASA and its Shuttle contractors setup rules and systems to handle what has produced over 130 RLV launches, but they have had many challenges. Attempts have been made to apply aviation industry specifications to make the Shuttle more efficient with its ground processing. One efficiency project example was to make a Shuttle Maintenance Manual (SMM) based on the commercial ATA (Air Transport Association of America) Spec 100 for technical publications. This industry standard, along with others, has been a foundation for efficient global MRO of commercial airlines for years. A modified version was also made for some military aircraft. The SMM project found many similarities in Spec 100 which apply to the Shuttle, and room for expansion for space systems/structures not in aircraft. The SMM project team met with the ATA and representatives from NASA's X-33 and X-34 programs to discuss collaboration on a national space standard based on Spec 100. A pilot project was enabled for a subset of Shuttle systems. Full implementation was not yet achieved, X-33 and X-34 were cancelled, and the Shuttles were then designated for retirement. Nonetheless, we can learn from this project how to expand this concept to all space vehicle products. Since then, ATA has joined with ASD (AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe) and AIA (Aerospace Industries Association) to form a much-enhanced and expanded international specification: Sl000D, International Specification for Technical Publications. It includes air, land, and sea vehicles, missiles, support equipment, ordnance, and communications. It is used by a growing number of countries for commercial and government products. Its modular design is supported by a Common Source Dabase (CSDB), and COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) software is available for production of IETP's (Interactive Electronic Technical Publications). A few space industry products in Europe have begun to apply Sl000D already. Also, there are other related standards/specifications which have global implications. We have an opportunity to adapt Sl000D and possibly other standards for use with space vehicles and ground systems. Sl000D has plenty of flexibility to apply to any product needed. To successfully grow the viability of the space industry, all members, commercial and government, will need to engage cooperatively in developing and applying standards to move toward interoperability. If we leverage and combine the best existing space standards and specifications, develop new ones to address known gaps, and adapt the best applicable features from other industries, we can establish an infrastructure to not only accelerate current development, but also build longevity for a more cohesive international space community.

Ingalls, John↗
NASA NTRS2009

Shuttle Shortfalls and Lessons Learned for the Sustainment of Human Space Exploration

Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood. Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.

Zapata, Edgar↗
NASA NTRS1974

Earth Observatory Satellite system definition study. Report 6: Space shuttle interfaces/utilization

An analysis was conducted to determine the compatibility of the Earth Observatory Satellite (EOS) with the space shuttle. The mechanical interfaces and provisions required for a launch or retrieval of the EOS by the space shuttle are summarized. The space shuttle flight support equipment required for the operation is defined. Diagrams of the space shuttle in various configurations are provised to show the mission capability with the EOS. The subjects considered are as follows: (1) structural and mechanical interfaces, (2) spacecraft retention and deployment, (3) spacecraft retrieval, (4) electrical interfaces, (5) payload shuttle operations, (6) shuttle mode cost analysis, (7) shuttle orbit trades, and (8) safety considerations.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1983

Atmospheric determination for Shuttle aerodynamic studies

Evaluation of the aerodynamic performance of the Shuttle during atmospheric reentry requires a determination of the free-stream atmospheric properties along the entry path. This determination must be of the best possible accuracy in order to fully utilize the Shuttle as an aerodynamic flight research vehicle. To accomplish this, two Shuttle Orbiter experiments, the Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer (SUMS) and the Shuttle Entry Air Data System (SEADS), are being developed to provide onboard measurements. SUMS will measure freestream parameters in the high altitude (above 90 km), high Mach number (M above 20) regions where conventional static pressure measurements are not available. SEADS will provide research quality data below about 90 km. Since these two experiments were not installed for the Shuttle developmental flights, an alternate method was needed to determine the freestream atmospheric properties along the entry trajectory. The method which was developed is described with a discussion of the results from the first five Shuttle flights.

Price, J. M.↗