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At least 145 records · Page 8

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NASA NTRS1991

Nuclear safety for the space exploration initiative

The results of a study to identify potential hazards arising from nuclear reactor power systems for use on the lunar and Martian surfaces, related safety issues, and resolutions of such issues by system design changes, operating procedures, and other means are presented. All safety aspects of nuclear reactor power systems from prelaunch ground handling to eventual disposal were examined consistent with the level of detail for SP-100 reactor design at the 1988 System Design Review and for launch vehicle and space transport vehicle designs and mission descriptions as defined in the 90-day Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) study. Information from previous aerospace nuclear safety studies was used where appropriate. Safety requirements for the SP-100 space nuclear reactor system were compiled. Mission profiles were defined with emphasis on activities after low earth orbit insertion. Accident scenarios were then qualitatively defined for each mission phase. Safety issues were identified for all mission phases with the aid of simplified event trees. Safety issue resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were compiled. Resolution approaches for those safety issues not covered by the SP-100 program were identified. Additionally, the resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were examined in light of the moon and Mars missions.

Dix, Terry E.↗

NASA NTRS1985

Space Station crew safety alternatives study. Volume 4: Appendices

The scope of this study considered the first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for Initial Operational Capability (10C) during the early 1990's. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration and debris.

Peercy, R. L., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Fire safety concerns in space operations

This paper reviews the state-of-the-art in fire control techniques and identifies important issues for continuing research, technology, and standards. For the future permanent orbiting facility, the space station, fire prevention and control calls for not only more stringent fire safety due to the long-term and complex missions, but also for simplified and flexible safety rules to accommodate the variety of users. Future research must address a better understanding of the microgravity space environment as it influences fire propagation and extinction and the application of the technology of fire detection, extinguishment, and material assessment. Spacecraft fire safety should also consider the adaptation of methods and concepts derived from aircraft and undersea experience.

Friedman, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2006

Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention: Managing Knowledge for Successful Mission Operations

Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.

Johnson, Teresa A.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Space Shuttle Orbiter main propulsion system flight safety enhancement

The Space Shuttle main propulsion system, like other major elements of the vehicle, has been part of an ongoing program to enhance the flight safety of the Space Transportation System. This activity, inherent in the basic program since its inception, has continued as part of a renewed review of failure modes and effects pertaining to flight-critical functions. Selected components were further evaluated, their potential for impacting flight safety was defined, and then the necessity for changing their design and/or operational practices was determined. Major examples of such components are the 17-inch disconnect and gaseous oxygen flow control valve. This paper summarizes that activity and provides examples of critical processes and components that have been or are being modified to enhance flight safety.

Cota, Phillip E.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Engineering and Safety Partnership Enhances Safety of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP)

Project Management must use the risk assessment documents (RADs) as tools to support their decision making process. Therefore, these documents have to be initiated, developed, and evolved parallel to the life of the project. Technical preparation and safety compliance of these documents require a great deal of resources. Updating these documents after-the-fact not only requires substantial increase in resources - Project Cost -, but this task is also not useful and perhaps an unnecessary expense. Hazard Reports (HRs), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs), Critical Item Lists (CILs), Risk Management process are, among others, within this category. A positive action resulting from a strong partnership between interested parties is one way to get these documents and related processes and requirements, released and updated in useful time. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) at the Marshall Space Flight Center has implemented a process which is having positive results and gaining acceptance within the Agency. A hybrid Panel, with equal interest and responsibilities for the two larger organizations, Safety and Engineering, is the focal point of this process. Called the Marshall Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), its charter (Space Shuttle Program Directive 110 F, April 15, 2005), and its Operating Control Plan emphasizes the technical and safety responsibilities over the program risk documents: HRs; FMEA/CILs; Engineering Changes; anomalies/problem resolutions and corrective action implementations, and trend analysis. The MSERP has undertaken its responsibilities with objectivity, assertiveness, dedication, has operated with focus, and has shown significant results and promising perspectives. The MSERP has been deeply involved in propulsion systems and integration, real time technical issues and other relevant reviews, since its conception. These activities have transformed the propulsion MSERP in a truly participative and value added panel, making a difference for the safety of the Space Shuttle Vehicle, its crew, and personnel. Because of the MSERP's valuable contribution to the assessment of safety risk for the SSP, this paper also proposes an enhanced Panel concept that takes this successful partnership concept to a higher level of 'true partnership'. The proposed panel is aimed to be responsible for the review and assessment of all risk relative to Safety for new and future aerospace and related programs.

Duarte, Alberto↗

NASA NTRS1993

Achievements and challenges of Space Station Freedom's safety review process

The most complex space vehicle in history, Space Station Freedom, is well underway to completion, and System Safety is a vital part of the program. The purpose is to summarize and illustrate the progress that over one-hundred System Safety engineers have made in identifying, documenting, and controlling the hazards inherent in the space station. To date, Space Station Freedom has been reviewed by NASA's safety panels through the first six assembly flights, when Freedom achieves a configuration known as Man Tended Capability. During the eight weeks of safety reviews spread out over a year and a half, over 200 preliminary hazard reports were presented. Along the way NASA and its contractors faced many challenges, made much progress, and even learned a few lessons.

Robinson, David W.↗

NASA NTRS1985

Space station crew safety: Human factors interaction model

A model of the various human factors issues and interactions that might affect crew safety is developed. The first step addressed systematically the central question: How is this space station different from all other spacecraft? A wide range of possible issue was identified and researched. Five major topics of human factors issues that interacted with crew safety resulted: Protocols, Critical Habitability, Work Related Issues, Crew Incapacitation and Personal Choice. Second, an interaction model was developed that would show some degree of cause and effect between objective environmental or operational conditions and the creation of potential safety hazards. The intermediary steps between these two extremes of causality were the effects on human performance and the results of degraded performance. The model contains three milestones: stressor, human performance (degraded) and safety hazard threshold. Between these milestones are two countermeasure intervention points. The first opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against stress. If this countermeasure fails, performance degrades. The second opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against error. If this second countermeasure fails, the threshold of a potential safety hazard may be crossed.

Cohen, M. M.↗

NASA NTRS1984

Space Station crew safety - Human factors model

A model of the various human factors issues and interactions that might affect crew safety is developed. The first step addressed systematically the central question: How is this Space Station different from all other spacecraft? A wide range of possible issue was identified and researched. Five major topics of human factors issues that interacted with crew safety resulted: Protocols, Critical Habitability, Work Related Issues, Crew Incapacitation and Personal Choice. Second, an interaction model was developed that would show some degree of cause and effect between objective environmental or operational conditions and the creation of potential safety hazards. The intermediary steps between these two extremes of causality were the effects on human performance and the results of degraded performance. The model contains three milestones: stressor, human performance (degraded) and safety hazard threshold. Between these milestones are two countermeasure intervention points. The first opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against stress. If this countermeasure fails, performance degrades. The second opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against error. If this second countermeasure fails, the threshold of a potential safety hazard may be crossed.

Cohen, M. M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Evolution of Space Shuttle Range Safety (RS) Ascent Flight Envelope Design

Ascent flight envelopes are trajectories that define the normal operating region of a space vehicle s position from liftoff until the end of powered flight. They fulfill part of the RS data requirements imposed by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) on space vehicles launching from the Eastern Range (ER) in Florida. The 45SW is chartered to protect the public by minimizing risks associated with the inherent hazards of launching a vehicle into space. NASA s Space Shuttle program has launched 130+ manned missions over a 30 year period from the ER. Ascent envelopes were delivered for each of those missions. The 45SW envelope requirements have remained largely unchanged during this time. However, the methodology and design processes used to generate the envelopes have evolved over the years to support mission changes, maintain high data quality, and reduce costs. The evolution of the Shuttle envelope design has yielded lessons learned that can be applied to future endevours. There have been numerous Shuttle ascent design enhancements over the years that have caused the envelope methodology to evolve. One of these Shuttle improvements was the introduction of onboard flight software changes implemented to improve launch probability. This change impacted the preflight nominal ascent trajectory, which is a key element in the RS envelope design. While the early Shuttle nominal trajectories were designed preflight using a representative monthly mean wind, the new software changes involved designing a nominal ascent trajectory on launch day using real-time winds. Because the actual nominal trajectory position was not known until launch day, the envelope analysis had to be customized to account for this nominal trajectory variation in addition to the other envelope components.

Brewer, Joan D.↗

NASA NTRS2005

International Cooperation in the Field of International Space Station (ISS) Payload Safety

In the frame of the International Space Station (ISS) Program cooperation, in 1998, the European Space Agency (ESA) approached the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with the unique concept of a Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) "franchise" based at the European Space Technology Center (ESTEC), where the panel would be capable of autonomously reviewing flight hardware for safety. This paper will recount the course of an ambitious idea as it progressed into a fully functional reality. It will show how a panel initially conceived at NASA to serve a national programme has evolved into an international safety cooperation asset. The PSRP established at NASA began reviewing ISS payloads approximately in late 1994 or early 1995 as an expansion of the pre-existing Shuttle Program PSRP. This paper briefly describes the fundamental Shuttle safety process and the establishment of the safety requirements for payloads intending to use the Space Transportation System and International Space Station (ISS). The paper will also offer some historical statistics about the experiments that completed the payload safety process for Shuttle and ISS. The paper 1 then presents the background of ISS agreements and international treaties that had to be taken into account when establishing the ESA PSRP. The detailed franchising model will be expounded upon, followed by an outline of the cooperation charter approved by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, and ESA Director of Manned Spaceflight and Microgravity. The resulting ESA PSRP implementation and its success statistics to date will then be addressed. Additionally the paper presents the ongoing developments with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. The discussion will conclude with ideas for future developments, such to achieve a fully integrated international system of payload safety panels for ISS.

Heimann, Timothy↗

NASA NTRS1972

Investigation of Structural Factors of Safety for the Space Shuttle

A study was made of the factors governing the structural design of the fully reusable space shuttle booster to establish a rational approach to select optimum structural factors of safety. The study included trade studies of structural factors of safety versus booster service life, weight, cost, and reliability. Similar trade studies can be made on other vehicles using the procedures developed. The major structural components of a selected baseline booster were studied in depth, each being examined to determine the fatigue life, safe-life, and fail-safe capabilities of the baseline design. Each component was further examined to determine its reliability and safety requirements, and the change of structural weight with factors of safety. The apparent factors of safety resulting from fatigue, safe-life, proof test, and fail-safe requirements were identified. The feasibility of reduced factors of safety for design loads such as engine thrust, which are well defined, was examined.

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NASA NTRS2015

Safety Review Process: International Space Station Program (Revision F)

The International Space Station (ISS) Program has developed a safety review process to execute its responsibilities for the overall integrated safety of the ISS. This process will assess the design and operations of the ISS hardware/elements(including visiting vehicles during integrated ISS operations)and its ground support equipment in accordance with the applicable safety requirements as specified in Section2.0.

ISS↗

NASA NTRS1993

Risks and issues in fire safety on the Space Station

A fire in the inhabited portion of a spacecraft is a greatly feared hazard, but fire protection in space operations is complicated by two factors. First, the spacecraft cabin is an enclosed volume, which limits the resources for fire fighting and the options for crew escape. Second, an orbiting spacecraft experiences a balance of forces, creating a near-zero-gravity (microgravity) environment that profoundly affects the characteristics of fire initiation, spread, and suppression. The current Shuttle Orbiter is protected by a fire-detection and suppression system whose requirements are derived of necessity from accepted terrestrial and aircraft standards. While experience has shown that Shuttle fire safety is adequate, designers recognize that improved systems to respond specifically to microgravity fire characteristics are highly desirable. Innovative technology is particularly advisable for the Space Station, a forthcoming space community with a complex configuration and long-duration orbital missions, in which the effectiveness of current fire-protection systems is unpredictable. The development of risk assessments to evaluate the probabilities and consequences of fire incidents in spacecraft are briefly reviewed. It further discusses the important unresolved issues and needs for improved fire safety in the Space Station, including those of material selection, spacecraft atmospheres, fire detection, fire suppression, and post-fire restoration.

Friedman, Robert↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Overview of Past Space Nuclear Reactor Functional Safety Principles in the Context of Recent Policy Changes

Space nuclear reactor technology development and associated approaches to safety have been ongoing for over 60 years. This paper selects functional safety principles associated with space reactors at several points in time since the early 1980s and provides an overview of their general content, similarities, and differences, as well as how they have evolved. It also reflects, where applicable, on how recent Federal policies in the area of space nuclear systems may affect how these safety principles apply to future activities.

Crew Safety↗

NASA NTRS1978

Occupant safety in the Space Shuttle

The nature of Space Shuttle missions, i.e., the inclusion of non-pilot payload specialists in addition to military test pilots, necessitates a greater attention to built in safety features than on previous spacecraft. Basic systems such as fire protection, anti-depressurization, toxicity control, and protection from radiation are handled in a manner similar to that of past missions, but some important deviations are noted, most importantly those pertaining to the provisions for on-orbit rescue. A Personnel Rescue System (PRS) is outlined, describing EVA operations whereby the pilots are able to don pressure suits and the crew can be transferred to another vehicle in balloon-like enclosures, which provide one hour's worth of life support and protection from the space environment. Also mentioned are provisions for the quick abort and reentry of the Shuttle Orbiter, as well as passive safety provisions for the Spacelab module.

Schulze, N. R.↗

NASA NTRS1979

Plume interference with space shuttle range safety signals

The computational procedure for signal propagation in the presence of an exhaust plume is presented. Comparisons with well-known analytic diffraction solutions indicate that accuracy suffers when mesh spacing is inadequate to resolve the first unobstructed Fresnel zone at the plume edge. Revisions to the procedure to improve its accuracy without requiring very large arrays are discussed. Comparisons to field measurements during a shuttle solid rocket motor (SRM) test firing suggest that the plume is sharper edged than one would expect on the basis of time averaged electron density calculations. The effects, both of revisions to the computational procedure and of allowing for a sharper plume edge, are to raise the signal level near tail aspect. The attenuation levels then predicted are still high enough to be of concern near SRM burnout for northerly launches of the space shuttle.

Boynton, F. P.↗

NASA NTRS1971

In-space propellant logistics and safety

Preliminary guidelines for the basic delivery system and safety aspects of the space shuttle configuration in connection with the transport, handling, storage, and transfer of propellants are developed. It is shown that propellants are the major shuttle space load and influence shuttle traffic modeling significantly.

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