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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction, A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2021

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Materials and Fuels Complex Five-Year Mission Strategy (FY21- FY25)

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through its designated mission of advancing innovative nuclear energy solutions, is actively engaged in the research, development, demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear technology, as well as in fostering private-public partnership for technology development. Key to the success of INL’s mission is the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), the only complex in the U.S. that hosts a world-class assemblage of facilities, capabilities and instruments for handling, testing, and characterizing radioactive materials. Driven by its mission/vision of “Engineering and Experiments that Drive the World’s Nuclear Energy Future,” MFC is at the center of INL’s – and indeed the Department of Energy’s – advanced nuclear technology development initiatives, providing essential capabilities such as engineering-scale high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel production, reactor demonstration facilities, post-irradiation examination, and transient irradiation testing. Furthermore, MFC provides an ideal environment for test beds that are utilized for research, development and demonstration (RD&D) activities on used fuel treatment, nuclear non-proliferation, forensics, and nuclear power sources used for space exploration missions conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Materials and Fuels Complex (FY2021-2025 Five-Year Mission Strategy)

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through its designated mission of advancing innovative nuclear energy solutions, is actively engaged in the research, development, demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear technology, as well as in fostering private-public partnership for technology development. Key to the success of INL’s mission is the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), the only complex in the U.S. that hosts a world-class assemblage of facilities, capabilities and instruments for handling, testing, and characterizing radioactive materials. Driven by its mission/vision of “Engineering and Experiments that Drive the World’s Nuclear Energy Future,” MFC is at the center of INL’s – and indeed the Department of Energy’s – advanced nuclear technology development initiatives, providing essential capabilities such as engineering-scale high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel production, reactor demonstration facilities, post-irradiation examination, and transient irradiation testing. Furthermore, MFC provides an ideal environment for test beds that are utilized for research, development and demonstration (RD&D) activities on used fuel treatment, nuclear non-proliferation, forensics, and nuclear power sources used for space exploration missions conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

DOE Fffice of Nuclear Energy cybersecurity research, development and demonstration program plan

This document describes the Cybersecurity Research Development and Demonstration (RD&D) Program, established by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) to provide sciencebased methods and technologies necessary for cost-effective, cyber-secure digital instrumentation, control and communication in collaboration with nuclear energy stakeholders. It provides an overview of program goals, objectives, linkages to organizational strategies, management structure, and stakeholder and cross-program interfaces.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Electrification FY2020 Annual Progress Report

The Electric Drive Technologies (EDT) program’s mission is to conduct early-stage research and development on transportation electrification technologies that accelerate the development of cost-effective and compact electric traction drive systems that meet or exceed performance and reliability requirements of internal combustion engine (ICE)-based vehicles, thereby enabling electrification across all light-duty vehicle types.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry

Large, modern industrial facilities often incorporate thousands of digital assets in their operational technology. Regulated facilities, such as nuclear power plants (NPPs), maintain robust cybersecurity and configuration management programs that often use bills of materials (BOMs) for these assets, including make, model, and version of hardware, firmware, and software. However, these BOMs typically capture only first- or second-tier information provided by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Unfortunately, as indicated by the increasing number and sophistication of software supply chain attacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying all the potential vulnerabilities and risks in software applications. Software BOMs (SBOMs) provide detailed enumeration of components and dependencies within the product or devices, including firmware. SBOMs can be combined with vulnerability data sources and vendor vulnerability attestations to improve vulnerability management and enable rapid identification of affected components when new software vulnerabilities are discovered. Ideally, SBOMs are created by the OEM prior to installation. However, since this practice is not yet commonplace and since NPPs are typically slow to adopt new technology, most NPPs do not incorporate SBOMs into their asset or configuration management programs. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated by NPPs on existing digital assets to provide further insight into risk management decisions. This report provides an overview of the current SBOM ecosystem and recommends guidance on how to get started in a “crawl, walk, run” manner to develop and implement a sustainable SBOM program for digital assets in an NPP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Nuclear Reactor Digital Instrumentation and Control

As nuclear reactors transition from analog to digital technology, the benefits of enhanced operational capabilities and improved efficiencies are potentially offset by cyber risks. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that can be used by engineers and staff to characterize and reduce new cyber risks in digital instrumentation and control systems. CIE provides guidance that can be applied throughout the entire systems engineering lifecycle, from conceptual design to decommissioning. In addition to outlining the use of CIE in nuclear reactor applications, this chapter provides a brief primer on nuclear reactor instrumentation and control and the associated cyber risks in existing light water reactors as well as the digital technology that will likely be used in future reactor designs and applications.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Integrated Energy Systems Program Management Plan

In 2012, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) initiated the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technology Program, which includes the Crosscutting Technology Development (CTD) portfolio of subprograms, to conduct research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) to support existing, new and advanced reactor designs and fuel cycle technologies. This program plan describes the Integrated Energy Systems (IES) Program, an element of the CTD portfolio since 2016 that seeks to improve the economic competitiveness, efficiency and environmental performance of nuclear energy systems by expanding their potential application space beyond electricity and optimizing their utilization in the context of the larger U.S. electric and non-electric energy system.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2021

Fission Battery Initiative: Research and Development Plan

The Fission Battery Initiative has been established by the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) Nuclear Science and Technology Directorate [6] to define, focus, and coordinate research and development (R&D) of technologies that can fully achieve battery-like functionality for nuclear energy systems. The notion of a “fission battery” conveys a vision focused on realizing very simple “plug-and-play” nuclear systems that can be integrated into a variety of applications requiring affordable, reliable energy in the form of electricity and/or heat and function without operations and maintenance staff. In order to formalize the desired functionality, the initiative has adopted the following key attributes to be achieved: economic, standardized, installed, unattended and reliable

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

INL FY 2021 Laboratory Overview

The INL FY 2021 Laboratory Overview is an opportunity for INL to share its achievements and plans for the future with the entire Laboratory, stakeholders, and the public. This document outlines how INL will advance its clean energy and national security objectives in the future and highlights FY 2020 accomplishments across the Laboratory in science and technology, community outreach, and operations.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advancing Nuclear Energy to Support a Net-Zero Future

Seminar for the KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School (KINGS) in South Korea. The presentation will cover a brief introduction to INL, opportunities for advanced nuclear, and integrated energy systems.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain

The world has seen a number of high-profile maritime disasters in recent months and years, and has felt the impact of them. At the same time, the world has also seen a number of high-profile cyberattacks. It has felt their impact, as well. And, likely no sector has been more affected by the maritime and cyber incidents than the energy sector, as fuel prices often spike or trough, and access to energy resources can become an instant source of concern, tension, or even conflict. As energy sectors—in all their forms—continue to rely on the maritime domain or even increase that reliance, they must be mindful that traditional maritime threats—like piracy, theft, and weather events—are not the only threats they face today. Maritime cybersecurity concerns are among the most potentially disruptive to energy-sector interests and, yet, are among the least understood and least addressed. This paper identifies nine areas in which the energy sector faces harmful cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, to provide enough insight and examples to allow for action to be taken to reduce the risk of harm from these different vulnerabilities. The paper develops the example of offshore wind energy to model how to assess cyber considerations more fully. Ultimately, it concludes with a series of recommendations that offer policymakers, energy-sector actors, and security and law-enforcement professionals steps to minimize the exposure of the maritime energy sector to harmful cyberattacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗