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NASA NTRS1988

Empirical studies of design software: Implications for software engineering environments

The empirical studies team of MCC's Design Process Group conducted three studies in 1986-87 in order to gather data on professionals designing software systems in a range of situations. The first study (the Lift Experiment) used thinking aloud protocols in a controlled laboratory setting to study the cognitive processes of individual designers. The second study (the Object Server Project) involved the observation, videotaping, and data collection of a design team of a medium-sized development project over several months in order to study team dynamics. The third study (the Field Study) involved interviews with the personnel from 19 large development projects in the MCC shareholders in order to study how the process of design is affected by organizationl and project behavior. The focus of this report will be on key observations of design process (at several levels) and their implications for the design of environments.

Krasner, Herb↗

NASA NTRS2010

Product Lifecycle Management and the Quest for Sustainable Space Explorations

Product Lifecycle Management (PLM) is an outcome of lean thinking to eliminate waste and increase productivity. PLM is inextricably tied to the systems engineering business philosophy, coupled with a methodology by which personnel, processes and practices, and information technology combine to form an architecture platform for product design, development, manufacturing, operations, and decommissioning. In this model, which is being implemented by the Engineering Directorate at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Marshall Space Flight Center, total lifecycle costs are important variables for critical decision-making. With the ultimate goal to deliver quality products that meet or exceed requirements on time and within budget, PLM is a powerful concept to shape everything from engineering trade studies and testing goals, to integrated vehicle operations and retirement scenarios. This paper will demonstrate how the Engineering Directorate is implementing PLM as part of an overall strategy to deliver safe, reliable, and affordable space exploration solutions. It has been 30 years since the United States fielded the Space Shuttle. The next generation space transportation system requires a paradigm shift such that digital tools and knowledge management, which are central elements of PLM, are used consistently to maximum effect. The outcome is a better use of scarce resources, along with more focus on stakeholder and customer requirements, as a new portfolio of enabling tools becomes second nature to the workforce. This paper will use the design and manufacturing processes, which have transitioned to digital-based activities, to show how PLM supports the comprehensive systems engineering and integration function. It also will go through a launch countdown scenario where an anomaly is detected to show how the virtual vehicle created from paperless processes will help solve technical challenges and improve the likelihood of launching on schedule, with less hands-on labor needed for processing and troubleshooting.

Caruso, Pamela W.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Product Lifecycle Management and the Quest for Sustainable Space Exploration Solutions

Product Lifecycle Management (PLM) is an outcome of lean thinking to eliminate waste and increase productivity. PLM is inextricably tied to the systems engineering business philosophy, coupled with a methodology by which personnel, processes and practices, and information technology combine to form an architecture platform for product design, development, manufacturing, operations, and decommissioning. In this model, which is being implemented by the Engineering Directorate at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Marshall Space Flight Center, total lifecycle costs are important variables for critical decisionmaking. With the ultimate goal to deliver quality products that meet or exceed requirements on time and within budget, PLM is a powerful tool to shape everything from engineering trade studies and testing goals, to integrated vehicle operations and retirement scenarios. This paper will demonstrate how the Engineering Directorate is implementing PLM as part of an overall strategy to deliver safe, reliable, and affordable space exploration solutions. It has been 30 years since the United States fielded the Space Shuttle. The next generation space transportation system requires a paradigm shift such that digital tools and knowledge management, which are central elements of PLM, are used consistently to maximum effect. The outcome is a better use of scarce resources, along with more focus on stakeholder and customer requirements, as a new portfolio of enabling tools becomes second nature to the workforce. This paper will use the design and manufacturing processes, which have transitioned to digital-based activities, to show how PLM supports the comprehensive systems engineering and integration function. It also will go through a launch countdown scenario where an anomaly is detected to show how the virtual vehicle created from paperless processes will help solve technical challenges and improve the likelihood of launching on schedule, with less hands-on labor needed for processing and troubleshooting. Sustainable space exploration solutions demand that all lifecycle phases be optimized. Adopting PLM, which has been used by the automotive industry for many years, for aerospace applications provides a foundation for strong, disciplined systems engineering and accountable return on investment by making lifecycle considerations variables in an iterative decision-making process. This paper combines the perspectives of the founding father of PLM, along with the experience of Engineering leaders who are implementing these processes and practices real-time. As the nation moves from an industrial-based society to one where information is a valued commodity, future NASA programs and projects will benefit from the experience being gained today for the exploration missions of tomorrow.

Caruso, Pamela W.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Collective Intelligence and Three Aspects of Planning in Organizations: A NASA Example

For many complex sociotechnical systems, planning seems to require explicit coordination; certainly, in executing a plan the activities of different actors must be tightly coupled. However, distributing the needed planning information can be very burdensome and error prone, because different groups need different collections of information, updated or kept current on different time cycles. Further, the information needed to form successful plans is often highly distributed, and while feedback about the success of prior plans may exist, it may not be available to those in a position of using this to improve plans or to detect and resolve other problems in the system (Weick, 1995). Tools to support various aspects of planning have been developed, and can provide a huge benefit to the individuals working on that aspect. To be tractable, most solutions address a quite bounded slice of work, isolating it from the larger context. Prospective planning takes place over multiple, nested cycles of decision making. This builds a plan that specifies activities of different granularity. "Subplans" may specify multiple parallel activities by different groups and individuals, as well as sequential, nested actions by a single actor. Planning produces valuable, sharable, external, representations: in addition to prospective use, plans support retrospective assessment and also action in the present. Viewing planning in a larger context - both temporal and organizational -- enables noticing what one does not know and generating more systemic and effective solutions. Viewing a problem as one of collective intelligence invites thinking about the larger organizational context. Many approaches to supporting collective intelligence do not support execution of highly contingent actions, distributed across many players, and hence provide incomplete support for planning. However, CI technology maybe helpful in managing the processes of gathering information for decision making in planning and of distributing plan information to various actors, needed on various time cycles.

Billman, Dorrit↗

NASA NTRS2011

Product Lifecycle Management and the Quest for Sustainable Space Exploration Solutions

Caruso, Pamela W.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Bombardment History of the Moon: What We Think We Know and What We Don't Know

The absolute impace history of the moon and inner solar system can in principle be derived from the statistics of radiometric ages of shock-heated planetary samples (lunar or meteoritic), from the formation ages of specific impact craters on the moon or Earth; and from agedating samples representing geologic surface units on the moon (or Mars) for which crater densities have been determined. This impact history, however, is still poorly defined. The heavily cratered surface of the moon is a testimony to the importance of impact events in the evolution of terrestrial planets and satellites. Lunar impacts range in scale from an early intense flux of large objects that defined the surface geology of the moon, down to recent, smaller impacts that continually generate and rework the lunar regolith. Densities of larger craters on lunar surface units of dated age define a projectile flux over time that serves as the basis for estimating surface ages on other solid bodies, particularly Mars. The lunar cratering history may address aspects of Earth s evolution, such as the possible role of early intense impacts on the atmosphere and early life and possible periodicity in large impact events in the more recent past. But, much about the lunar impact history remains unknown.. On Earth approximately 172 impact craters up to ~300 km in diameter and up to ~2 Gyr in age are recognized. Although these data suggest greater relative numbers of younger craters, possibly suggesting a recent increase in projectile flux, both the diameters and especially the ages of most terrestrial crates are so poorly known that the differential terrestrial impact flux over time is uncertain. For the moon, densities of craters on some mare surfaces and crater ejecta deposits, for which we have measured or estimated formation ages, suggest an approximately constant lunar impact rate of larger projectiles over the past ~3.5 Gyr. However, the data are cumulative in nature and limited. Questions exist as to how accurately dated samples correlate with surfaces having measured crater densities. Studies of ages of many tiny impact-melt beads from Apollos 12 and 14 soils show a decrease in the number of beads with age from ~4 Gyr ago to ~0.4 Gyr ago, followed by a significant increase in beads with age <0.4 Gyr (2). These authors concluded that the projectile flux had decreased over time, followed by a significant flux increase more recently.

Bogard, Donald↗

NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Data Mining SIAM Presentation

This viewgraph document describes the data mining system developed at NASA Ames. Many NASA programs have large numbers (and types) of problem reports.These free text reports are written by a number of different people, thus the emphasis and wording vary considerably With so much data to sift through, analysts (subject experts) need help identifying any possible safety issues or concerns and help them confirm that they haven't missed important problems. Unsupervised clustering is the initial step to accomplish this; We think we can go much farther, specifically, identify possible recurring anomalies. Recurring anomalies may be indicators of larger systemic problems. The requirement to identify these anomalies has led to the development of Recurring Anomaly Discovery System (ReADS).

Srivastava, Ashok↗

NASA NTRS1999

The Role of Self-Organized Criticality in the Substorm Phenomenon and its Relation to Localized Reconnection in the Plasma Sheet

Recent observations of the magnetotail plasma sheet have shown it to be a dynamic and turbulent region. Research has found strong turbulence in the plasma sheet at approximately 20 Earth's Radius tailward of Earth; the turbulence is observed at all activity levels. The existence of strong turbulence in the plasma sheet in the region associated with substorm onset might be thought difficult to reconcile with the coherence and repeatability of the substorm cycle. We review a variety of evidence that strongly suggests the magnetotail is driven, through magnetic flux transfer, into a state of "self-organized criticality" (SOC). It is an important property of physical systems that evolve into SOC that they self-organize into a unique, global dynamic state. This global state is inevitable, and repeatable. In this state, however, small-spatiotemporal-scale system fluctuations are unpredictable and can be only described statistically. This is the basis, we think, for the global coherence and repeatability of the substorm phenomenon in the turbulent plasma sheet. At, or near, substorm onset the plasma sheet can be described by a global SOC state containing significant small scale turbulence. In several recent studies, "sandpile" models were driven into SOC and then shown to reproduce various measures of substorm activity. We discuss the plasma physical foundation of these sandpile models. The evolution of simple continuum plasma sheet models into SOC-like states of many small reconnection events in the turbulent plasma sheet under the will be demonstrated. We view the substorm phenomenon as an avalanche assumption that the plasma sheet is in a SOC state.

Klimas, A. J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Writing Good Risk Statements and Critical Thinking in Risk

The term risk is used ubiquitously in the space community, but more often than not it is used in a counterproductive way. Furthermore, risks are often written to convey some type of concern, but the risk statements are often more emotional in nature than technically substantive. In this talk, we will provide a rigorous view and definition of risk, along with some structured guidelines for writing risk statements centered on critical thinking, which will combine to provide effective risk management tools when dealing with complex space systems.

risk↗

NASA NTRS1988

Space-borne computing for the year 2000 and beyond

The influence and utilization of computers in space science investigations greatly enhances the ability to address difficult and complicated questions about the Universe. Space Science is wholly dependent on computers because the data acquired from instruments on the spacecraft are not only complicated in form but also voluminous. Athough a great deal of attention has been paid to develop efficient and powerful computing systems on-ground, research in the area of spaceborne computing is far from satisfactory. On-board processing of data will be important in future planetary missions where telemetry rates constrain the total amount of data which can be returned and decisions may have to be made in real time. Little thought has been given to a dynamic man-machine interface with regard to scientific real-time interactive control of flight experiments. Careful thinking is therefore essential to define appropriate spaceborne computing requirements for the future. It is imperative that powerful multiprocessing systems for on-board processing be experimentally impleneted and evaluated in selected application missions. The presentation addresses key issues and attempts to define the requirements for such processing with some of NASA's future missions in perspective. The resulting architectural and performance issues and possible developments are also addressed.

Iyer, Ravi K.↗

NASA NTRS2012

JPL Counterfeit Parts Avoidance

SPACE ARCHITECTURE / ENGINEERING: It brings an extreme test bed for both technologies/concepts as well as procedures/processes. Design and construction (engineering) always go together, especially with complex systems. Requirements (objectives) are crucial. More important than the answers are the questions/Requirements/Tools-Techniques/Processes. Different environments force architects and engineering to think out of the box. For instance there might not be gravity forces. Architectural complex problems have common roots: in Space and on Earth. Let us bring Space down on Earth so we can keep sending Mankind to the stars from a better world. Have fun being architects and engineers...!!! This time is amazing and historical. We are changing the way we inhabit the solar systems!

counterfeit parts control↗

NASA NTRS2013

Aviation Safety: Modeling and Analyzing Complex Interactions between Humans and Automated Systems

The on-going transformation from the current US Air Traffic System (ATS) to the Next Generation Air Traffic System (NextGen) will force the introduction of new automated systems and most likely will cause automation to migrate from ground to air. This will yield new function allocations between humans and automation and therefore change the roles and responsibilities in the ATS. Yet, safety in NextGen is required to be at least as good as in the current system. We therefore need techniques to evaluate the safety of the interactions between humans and automation. We think that current human factor studies and simulation-based techniques will fall short in front of the ATS complexity, and that we need to add more automated techniques to simulations, such as model checking, which offers exhaustive coverage of the non-deterministic behaviors in nominal and off-nominal scenarios. In this work, we present a verification approach based both on simulations and on model checking for evaluating the roles and responsibilities of humans and automation. Models are created using Brahms (a multi-agent framework) and we show that the traditional Brahms simulations can be integrated with automated exploration techniques based on model checking, thus offering a complete exploration of the behavioral space of the scenario. Our formal analysis supports the notion of beliefs and probabilities to reason about human behavior. We demonstrate the technique with the Ueberligen accident since it exemplifies authority problems when receiving conflicting advices from human and automated systems.

Muti-agent System↗

NASA NTRS2021

Advanced Air Mobility and Safety Management Systems

Our current air transportation system has underserved markets, including local, regional, intraregional, and urban transportation of both people and cargo. Recent advances in aviation technology such as small highly-automated vehicles, electric aircraft, and automated air traffic are enabling business opportunities in these markets. Advanced Air Mobility, or AAM, refers to a community effort to overcome the gaps in operational rules, safety analysis, and overall acceptance, so that these new operations will be possible. For full details, please see: https://www.nasa.gov/aam As we think about how we can safely introduce these new operations, fundamental questions about how the structure of Safety Management Systems can be applied to AAM, and how that structure can be used to help us overcome the necessary technical and societal obstacles arise. Two of these questions are: • How do we tailor the requirements and desired level of monitoring and assessment to achieve safety given the breadth of possible operations and the associated risk of those operations? • How do we aid innovation by rapidly evaluating the safety of novel operations without losing associated rigor? We assume that a Safety Management System that enables these future systems will incorporate knowledge of the acceptable level of risk, and will utilize data science to automate the core monitor, assess and mitigate functions that will allow us to respond to risks and hazards in time to prevent safety incidents. In 2018, the National Academies proposed an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that would advance these goals. (https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24962/in-time-aviation-safety-management-challenges-and-research-for-an) The National Academies made a clear distinction between in-time systems, in which hazards could be identified and risks mitigated in time to prevent incidents, and real-time systems, since many hazards and risks do not need real-time data and analysis to detect and mitigate.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

NASA NTRS1981

A three-ring circuit model of the magnetosphere

The magnetosphere is modeled by superimposing a dipole field, a uniform field and a perturbation field due to a simple current system. This current system comprises a ring current in the neutral line of the dipole plus uniform fields, together with vertical currents representing field-aligned currents to the neutral line. The current circuit is closed through two additional ring currents above and below the equatorial plane representing distributed adiabatic perpendicular currents. This system produces many magnetospheric features, among them a magnetopause, bending of magnetic field lines in the anti-solar direction, a magnetotail, and cusps in the day-side of the earth. The objective is to demonstrate that it is not necessary to think of the magnetic field topology as being caused by the flowing plasma carrying field lines. The primary physical problem is to derive the current system from the self-consistent interaction of the solar-wind and magnetospheric plasmas and fields.

Whipple, E. C., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA Platform for Autonomous Systems (NPAS)

NASA Platform for Autonomous Systems (NPAS) is a disruptive software platform and processes being developed by SSC Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL). Autonomous operations are critical for the success, safety and crew survival of NASA deep space missions beyond low Earth orbit, including Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway, and for the future of cost-effective ground mission operations. NPAS represents the embodiment of an innovative implementation for "thinking" autonomy in contrast to brute-force autonomy. It also uniquely addresses the requirements and integrates five primary functionalities for autonomous operations including: (1) Integrated System Health Management (ISHM), (2) autonomy, guided by health and system concepts of operations; (3) knowledge models of applications; (4) infrastructure to create, schedule, and execute mission plans; and (5) infrastructure to integrate distributed autonomous applications across networks.

Figueroa, Fernando↗

NASA NTRS1990

Do elliptical galaxies have thick disks?

The authors discuss new evidence which supports the existence of thick disks in elliptical/SO galaxies. Numerical simulations of weak interactions with thick disk systems produce shell structures very similar in appearance to those observed in many shell galaxies. The authors think this model presents a more plausible explanation for the formation of shell structures in elliptical/SO galaxies than does the merger model and, if correct, supports the existence of thick disks in elliptical/SO galaxies.

Thomson, R. C.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Measurements of Aircraft Wake Vortex Separation at High Arrival Rates and a Proposed New Wake Vortex Separation Philosophy

This paper presents data and a proposed new aircraft wake vortex separation standard that argues for a fundamental re-thinking of international practice. The current static standard, under certain atmospheric conditions, presents an unnecessary restriction on system capacity. A new approach, that decreases aircraft separation when atmospheric conditions dictate, is proposed based upon the availability of new instrumentation and a better understanding of wake physics.

Rutishauser, David↗