Terminal Repeller Unconstrained Subenergy Tunneling (TRUST) for Fast Global Optimization
A new method for unconstrained global function optimization, acronymed TRUST, is introduced.
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A new method for unconstrained global function optimization, acronymed TRUST, is introduced.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) uses a network of satellites to calculate the position of a receiver over time. This technology has revolutionized a wide range of safety-critical industries and leisure applications. These systems provide diverse benefits; supplementing the users existing navigation skills and reducing the uncertainty that often characterizes many route planning tasks. GPS applications can also help to reduce workload by automating tasks that would otherwise require finite cognitive and perceptual resources. However, the operation of these systems has been identified as a contributory factor in a range of recent accidents. Users often come to rely on GPS applications and, therefore, fail to notice when they develop faults or when errors occur in the other systems that use the data from these systems. Further accidents can stem from the over confidence that arises when users assume automated warnings will be issued when they stray from an intended route. Unless greater attention is paid to the role of trust and interaction in GPS applications then there is a danger that we will see an increasing number of these failures as positioning technologies become integral in the functioning of increasing numbers of applications.
NASA's Earth Observing System Data and Information System (EOSDIS) has been in operation since August 1994, managing most of NASA's Earth science data from satellites, airborne sensors, filed campaigns and other activities. Having been designated by the Federal Government as a project responsible for production, archiving and distribution of these data through its Distributed Active Archive Centers (DAACs), the Earth Science Data and Information System Project (ESDIS) is responsible for EOSDIS, and is legally bound by the Office of Management and Budgets circular A-130, the Federal Records Act. It must follow the regulations of the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) and National Archive and Records Administration (NARA). It must also follow the NASA Procedural Requirement 7120.5 (NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management). All these ensure that the data centers managed by ESDIS are trustworthy from the point of view of efficient and effective operations as well as preservation of valuable data from NASA's missions. Additional factors contributing to this trust are an extensive set of internal and external reviews throughout the history of EOSDIS starting in the early 1990s. Many of these reviews have involved external groups of scientific and technological experts. Also, independent annual surveys of user satisfaction that measure and publish the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), where EOSDIS has scored consistently high marks since 2004, provide an additional measure of trustworthiness. In addition, through an effort initiated in 2012 at the request of NASA HQ, the ESDIS Project and 10 of 12 DAACs have been certified by the International Council for Science (ICSU) World Data System (WDS) and are members of the ICSUWDS. This presentation addresses questions such as pros and cons of the certification process, key outcomes and next steps regarding certification. Recently, the ICSUWDS and Data Seal of Approval (DSA) organizations merged their Core Trustworthy Data Repositories Requirements and require that members be recertified every three years. Given the rigor with which NASA manages the ESDIS Project and the DAACs, the recertification through WDSDSA, while involving some additional work, is a relatively simple process.
A poster for the Pathways Student Showcase that includes a description of what Zero Trust Network Security is, the rough timeline for the initial stages of implementation here at KSC, who I am, and what I'm working on.
Deep neural networks are used increasingly for perception and decision-making in UAVs. For example, they can be used to recognize objects from images and decide what actions the vehicle should take. While deep neural networks can perform very well at complex tasks, their decisions may be unintuitive to a human operator. When a human disagrees with a neural network prediction, due to the black box nature of deep neural networks, it can be unclear whether the system knows something the human does not or whether the system is malfunctioning. This uncertainty is problematic when it comes to ensuring safety. As a result, it is important to develop technologies for explaining neural network decisions for trust and safety. This paper explores a modification to the deep neural network classification layer to produce both a predicted label and an explanation to support its prediction. Specifically, at test time, we replace the final output layer of the neural network classifier by a k-nearest neighbor classifier. The nearest neighbor classifier produces 1) a predicted label through voting and 2) the nearest neighbors involved in the prediction, which represent the most similar examples from the training dataset. Because prediction and explanation are derived from the same underlying process, this approach guarantees that the explanations are always relevant to the predictions. We demonstrate the approach on a convolutional neural network for a UAV image classification task. We perform experiments using a forest trail image dataset and show empirically that the hybrid classifier can produce intuitive explanations without loss of predictive performance compared to the original neural network. We also show how the approach can be used to help identify potential issues in the network and training process.
The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.
The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.
Trusted Space Autonomy is challenging in that space systems are complex artifacts deployed in a high stakes environment with complicated operational settings. Thus far these challenges have been met using the full arsenal of tools: formal methods, informal methods, testing, runtime techniques, and operations processes. Using examples from previous deployments of autonomy to the Remote Agent on DS-1, Autonomous Sciencecraft on EO-1, WATCH on MER, IPEX, AEGIS on MER, MSL, and M2020, and the M2020 Onboard planner, we discuss how each of these approaches have been used to enable successful deployment of autonomy. We next focus on relatively limited use of formal methods (both prior to deployment and runtime methods). From the needs perspective, formal methods represent the best chance for reliable autonomy as testing, informal methods, and operations accommodations do not scale well with increasing complexity of the autonomous system. However from the practice perspective, formal methods have been limited in their application due to difficulty in eliciting formal specifications and challenges in representing complex constraints such as metric time and resources. We discuss some of these challenges as well as the opportunity to extend formal and informal methods into runtime validation systems.
The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.
Disclosed are systems, techniques, and non-transitory storage media for predicting social media postings as being trusted news or a type of suspicious news. The systems, techniques, and non-transitory storage media are based on unique neural network architectures that learn from a combined representation including at least representations of social media posting content and a vector representation of communications among connected users.
The demand for renewable energy has increased over the last few years, and so has the demand for greater expectations within the energy market. This increasing trend has been accompanied by more significant usage of internet-connected devices (IoT), leading to critical electrical infrastructure being connected to the internet. Implementing internet connectivity with such devices and systems provides benefits such as improving the system's performance, facilitating irregularity and anomaly mitigation, and providing additional situational awareness for enhanced decision-making. However, enhancing the connected system with IoT introduces a drawback – a greater vulnerability to cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the electrical sector have occurred in the United States and Ukraine. These cyber-attacks highlight and expose vulnerabilities that a system inherits when connecting to the internet. These attacks left thousands of customers without electricity for hours until operators could regain control of the electric utility grid. Therefore, to address the vulnerabilities of an internet-connected power electronic device, this work focused on the hardware layer of the system. Implementing a cyber-control system inside the hardware layer can significantly reduce the possibility of an attacker patching malicious controller firmware into a photovoltaic grid-connected inverter, thus mitigating the likelihood that the inverter becomes inactive a cyber-attack scenario. With this mitigation technique, if a cyberattack is successful and an attacker gains control of the network, a cyber-defense technique is in place to mitigate the impact of the cyber-attack. This additional protection layer was developed based on an innovative concept known as Digital Twin (DT). A DT, in this case, replicates an Active-Neutral Point Clamped (ANPC) inverter and was designed using a hardware language known as VHDL (Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language) and applied to Field-Programmable-GateArray (FPGA). The DT is embedded within the FPGA and contained in a controller board, the UCB (Unified Controller Board), developed by the University of Arkansas electrical engineering team. This UCB also contains two Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) responsible for generating associated signals to control an authentic physical inverter. These DSP signals are received and processed by the FPGA that implements the DT of an ANPC; in other words, it simulates in realtime the expected output of an actual ANPC inverter using the signals from the DSP. When a new firmware is ready to be patched, the DT provides output signals simulating behavior that a real ANPC inverter would generate with the new firmware. The new firmware is tested to check if it meets all the operational requirements established using a Design-For-Trust technique (DFTr). If the new firmware fails in at least one of the DFT tests, it is considered malicious and must be rejected. This work is divided into sections, such as Background, which explains the pieces that were used and the strategy behind this work; Process and Procedure, which explains the methodology that was adopted to prove the reliability and effectiveness of this work; Results and Discussion, where the simulations and results are described and explained; followed by Conclusion and Future work section, which concludes this work and adds possible future projects to continue this work further.
Commercial buildings are at the heart of any community. Investments towards the health and performance of community buildings can support a wide range of critical community and individual benefits; however, many buildings have been left behind in these investments due to a spectrum of barriers, especially those located in underserved communities. This portfolio of work stands with the intent that if we can create solutions to support the hardest-to-reach commercial buildings in gaining equitable access to energy efficiency, zero energy, and zero carbon solutions, we can support all commercial buildings with these goals. To understand success and barriers, and identify new, innovative, and impactful solutions, NREL is taking a four-part approach to: 1. Develop a methodology for defining affordability in commercial buildings and understand its impact on underserved communities, 2. Work with trusted, local organizations to address barriers that impede access to cost-effective, holistic, building performance improvements, 3. Support minority-focused developer incubator programs for, and within, underserved communities, and 4. Identify overlapping value streams that support underserved community and utility needs.
In FY21, a test body with dimensions 2x2x4 inch made from 6061-T6 aluminum with several threaded holes for mounting accelerometers was used for testing. The test body used in FY22 was a 250mm x 250mm x 5mm etched plate made from 6061-T6 aluminum. The testbody weights around 850 grams. A picture of the plate can be seen in Figure 2.1 below.
The sensors in environments for fiber optic displacement gages (SEFOD) testbed is a collaboration between W-13, and E-14. Testbeds in this project are focused on characterization and propagation of the uncertainty in experimental techniques used by E-14 in WR-like environments. Discussions with SMEs identified instrumentation as the best candidates for single feature testbeds addressing experimental uncertainty sources. Previous work and student projects have addressed instrumentation uncertainty quantification of thermocouples, load cells, and accelerometers.
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The objective of this effort was to research the effects of pilot training, level of automation, and level of pilot distance from aircraft control on public acceptance and intention to use UAM.
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