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OB200-DV-1 Treatability Testing: Final Results

The Hanford Site in Washington state previously generated plutonium for nuclear weapons. During operations, radionuclide byproducts and chemical process fluids were intentionally and/or unintentionally released to the subsurface, resulting in more than 800 contaminated waste sites across the Central Plateau, where historical chemical separations and waste management activities took place. As the Hanford Site mission transitioned from operations to site cleanup, remediation of the vadose zone and groundwater became a priority. However, given the depth of the unsaturated zone contamination above the groundwater, the unique nature of the waste, and the continuing impacts on groundwater quality, technologies needed to be identified and evaluated for in situ remediation in the deep vadose zone (DVZ). A laboratory treatability study has been completed to evaluate site-relevant effectiveness for nine in situ technologies that may be used to treat continuing sources of contaminants in specific areas of the Central Plateau waste sites that are grouped into the 200-DV-1 Operable Unit (OU). The 200-DV-1 OU was established in 2010 to address 43 Central Plateau waste sites with complex DVZ remediation challenges. Eight of these technologies were identified through a prescreening effort that evaluated remedial technologies potentially applicable to DVZ contamination in the Central Plateau . These eight technologies were selected for further study based on site specific knowledge gaps about their effectiveness. A ninth technology was added to the treatability study based on new information from separate laboratory investigations (conducted following the prescreening effort) demonstrating the technology’s potential effectiveness (see Section 1.2 for more information) and value for inclusion in the treatability study.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

How DARHT Works - the World's Most Powerful X-ray Machine

The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory is an essential scientific tool that supports Stockpile Stewardship at the Laboratory. The World's most powerful x-ray machine, it's used to take high-speed images of mock nuclear devices - data that is used to confirm and modify advanced computer codes in assuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Cultural Resource Investigations for the Resumption of Transient Testing of Nuclear Fuels and Material at the Idaho National Laboratory

The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has a need to test nuclear fuels under conditions that subject them to short bursts of intense, high-power radiation called ‘transient testing’ in order to gain important information necessary for licensing new nuclear fuels for use in U.S. nuclear power plants, for developing information to help improve current nuclear power plant performance and sustainability, for improving the affordability of new generation reactors, for developing recyclable nuclear fuels, and for developing fuels that inhibit any repurposing into nuclear weapons. To meet this mission need, DOE is considering alternatives for re-use and modification of existing nuclear reactor facilities to support a renewed transient testing program. One alternative under consideration involves restarting the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) reactor located at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site in southeastern Idaho. This report summarizes cultural resource investigations conducted by the INL Cultural Resource Management Office in 2013 to support environmental review of activities associated with restarting the TREAT reactor at the INL. These investigations were completed in order to identify and assess the significance of cultural resources within areas of potential effect associated with the proposed action and determine if the TREAT alternative would affect significant cultural resources or historic properties that are eligible for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places. No archaeological resources were identified in the direct area of potential effects for the project, but four of the buildings proposed for modifications are evaluated as historic properties, potentially eligible for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places. This includes the TREAT reactor (building #), control building (building #), guardhouse (building #), and warehouse (building #). The proposed re-use of these historic properties is consistent with original missions related to nuclear reactor testing and is expected to result in no adverse effects to their historic significance. Cultural resource investigations also involved communication with representatives from the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes to characterize cultural resources of potential tribal concern. This report provides a summary of the cultural resources inventoried and assessed within the defined areas of potential effect for the resumption of transient testing at the INL. Based on these analyses, proposed activities would have no adverse effects on historic properties within the APEs that have been defined. Other archaeological resources and cultural resources of potential concern to the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and others that are located near the APEs are also discussed with regard to potential indirect impacts. The report concludes with general recommendations for measures to reduce impacts to all identified resources.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions, Calendar Year 2011

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NNSS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NNSS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. Radionuclides from the Fukushima nuclear power plant were detected at the NNSS in March 2011 and are discussed further in Section III. The NNSS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the EPA for use on the NNSS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide's concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2011, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NNSS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all air monitoring stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from less than 1% to a maximum of 12.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides about 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NNSS, dose to the public would be only a small fraction of the value measured on the NNSS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000024 mrem/yr, more than 400,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Plutonium environmental chemistry: mechanisms for the surface-mediated reduction of Pu(v/vi)

In recent decades, interest in plutonium mobility has increased significantly due to the need of the United States, as well as other nations, to deal with commercial spent nuclear fuel, nuclear weapons disarmament, and the remediation of locations contaminated by nuclear weapons testing and production. Although there is a global consensus that geologic disposal is the safest existing approach to dealing with spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste, only a few nations are moving towards implementing a geologic repository due to technical and political barriers. Understanding the factors that affect the mobility of plutonium in the subsurface environment is critical to support the development of such repositories. The importance of redox chemistry in determining plutonium mobility cannot be understated. While Pu(IV) is generally assumed to be immobile in the subsurface environment due to sorption or precipitation, Pu(V) tends to be mobile due to its relatively low effective charge and weak complex formation. This review highlights one particularly important aspect of plutonium behaviour at the mineral–water interface—the concept of surface-mediated reduction, which describes the reduction of plutonium on a mineral surface. It provides a conceptual model for and evidence supporting or refuting each proposed mechanism for surface-mediated reduction including (i) radiolysis at the mineral surface, (ii) electron transfer via ferrous iron or manganese in the mineral structure, (iii) electron shuttling due to the semiconducting properties of the mineral, (iv) disproportionation of Pu(V), (v) facilitation by proton exchange sites, (vi) stabilisation of Pu(IV) due to the increased concentration gradient within the electrical double layer, and (vii) a Nernstian favourability of Pu(IV) surface complexes and colloids. It also provides new perspectives on future research directions.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Isotopic Details of the Spent Catawba-1 MOX Fuel Rods at ORNL

The United States Department of Energy funded Shaw/AREVA MOX Services LLC to fabricate four MOX Lead Test Assemblies (LTA) from weapons-grade plutonium. A total of four MOX LTAs (including MX03) were irradiated in the Catawba Nuclear Station (Unit 1) Catawba-1 PWR which operated at a total thermal power of 3411 MWt and had a core with 193 total fuel assemblies. The MOX LTAs were irradiated along with Duke Energy s irradiation of eight Westinghouse Next Generation Fuel (NGF) LEU LTAs (ref.1) and the remaining 181 LEU fuel assemblies. The MX03 LTA was irradiated in the Catawba-1 PWR core (refs.2,3) during cycles C-16 and C-17. C-16 began on June 5, 2005, and ended on November 11, 2006, after 499 effective full power days (EFPDs). C-17 started on December 29, 2006, (after a shutdown of 48 days) and continued for 485 EFPDs. The MX03 and three other MOX LTAs (and other fuel assemblies) were discharged at the end of C-17 on May 3, 2008. The design of the MOX LTAs was based on the (Framatome ANP, Inc.) Mark-BW/MOX1 17 17 fuel assembly design (refs. 4,5,6) for use in Westinghouse PWRs, but with MOX fuel rods with three Pu loading ranges: the nominal Pu loadings are 4.94 wt%, 3.30 wt%, and 2.40 wt%, respectively, for high, medium, and low Pu content. The Mark-BW/MOX1 (MOX LTA) fuel assembly design is the same as the Advanced Mark-BW fuel assembly design but with the LEU fuel rods replaced by MOX fuel rods (ref. 5). The fabrication of the fuel pellets and fuel rods for the MOX LTAs was performed at the Cadarache facility in France, with the fabrication of the LTAs performed at the MELOX facility, also in France.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Special Analysis of the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report describes the methods and results of a special analysis (SA) of the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The purpose of the SA is to determine if the approved performance assessment (PA) and composite analysis (CA) (Shott et al., 2001) remain valid. The Area 3 RWMS PA and CA were prepared as a single document and received conditional approval on October 6, 1999. A conditional Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) for the Area 3 RWMS was issued on October 20, 1999. Since preparation of the approved PA and CA, new information and additional environmental monitoring data have been used to update the PA and CA. At the same time, continual advancements in computer processors and software have allowed improvement to the PA and CA models. Annual reviews of the PA and CA required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order DOE O 435.1 have documented multiple changes occurring since preparation of the PA and CA. Potentially important changes include: Development of a new and improved baseline PA and CA model implemented in the probabilistic GoldSim simulation platform. A significant increase in the waste inventory disposed at the site. Revision and updating of model parameters based on additional years of site monitoring data and new research and development results. Although changes have occurred, many important PA/CA issues remain unchanged, including the site conceptual model, important features, events, and processes, and the points of compliance. The SA is performed to document the current status of the PA/CA model and to quantitatively assess the impact of cumulative changes on the PA and CA results. The results of the SA are used to assess the validity of the approved PA/CA and make a determination if revision of the PA or CA is necessary. The SA was performed using the Area 3 RWMS, version 2.102, GoldSim model, the current baseline PA/CA model. Comparison of the maximum SA results with the PA performance objectives indicates that there continues to be a reasonable expectation of compliance. The resident exposure scenario was evaluated for compliance with the air pathway and all-pathways annual total effective dose (TED) performance objectives. The maximum mean air pathway TED, 7E-6 millisievert (mSv) at 1,000 years (y) has decreased relative to the approved PA and is significantly less than the 0.1 mSv limit. The maximum mean all-pathways annual TED, 7E-5 mSv at 1,000 y has increased but remains a small fraction of the 0.25 mSv limit. The SA maximum mean radon-222 (222Rn) flux density, 0.03 becquerel per square meter per second (Bq m-2 s-1), has increased relative to the PA results but is significantly less than the 0.74 Bq m-2 s-1 limit. The SA results continue to support a conclusion that the disposed waste inventory is protective of intruders and groundwater resources. The maximum mean intruder TED, 0.01 mSv for an acute construction scenario at the U-3ah/at disposal unit, was less than the 5 mSv performance measure. Site monitoring data and research results continue to support a conclusion that a groundwater pathway will not exist within the 1,000 y compliance period. Projected releases to the environment are a small fraction of the performance objectives. Cost-effective options for reducing releases further are unlikely to exist. Therefore, releases from the Area 3 RWMS are judged to be as low as reasonably achievable. Comparison of the maximum CA result with the 0.3 mSv CA dose constraint indicates that no action is required to reduce the dose from the Area 3 RWMS and all interacting sources of residual radioactive contamination. The SA maximum mean CA annual TED, 0.02 mSv at 1,000 y, has increased from the approved CA result but remains less than 10% of the dose constraint. The CA TED continues to be due predominantly to inhalation of plutonium-239 resuspended from soils contaminated by nuclear weapons tests conducted near the Area 3 RWMS. The SA results estimated with the Area 3 RWMS version 2.102 model indicate that changes to the PA and CA do not significantly alter the PA/CA results or conclusions. Although increases occur for the all-pathways annual TED, the 222Rn flux density, and the CA annual TED, all PA and CA results are a small fraction of the performance objectives or dose constraints. The same conclusion was reached for the approved PA and CA. The SA results continue to support a conclusion that there is a reasonable expectation of meeting all performance objectives and the CA dose constraint. There is no need to revise the DAS at this time. The SA results support a conclusion that the Area 3 RWMS PA and CA remain valid, and revision is not necessary at this time.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radionuclide gas transport through nuclear explosion-generated fracture networks

Underground nuclear weapon testing produces radionuclide gases which may seep to the surface. Barometric pumping of gas through explosion-fractured rock is investigated using a new sequentially-coupled hydrodynamic rock damage/gas transport model. Fracture networks are produced for two rock types (granite and tuff) and three depths of burial. The fracture networks are integrated into a flow and transport numerical model driven by surface pressure signals of differing amplitude and variability. There are major differences between predictions using a realistic fracture network and prior results that used a simplified geometry. Matrix porosity and maximum fracture aperture have the greatest impact on gas breakthrough time and window of opportunity for detection, with different effects between granite and tuff simulations highlighting the importance of accurately simulating the fracture network. In particular, maximum fracture aperture has an opposite effect on tuff and granite, due to different damage patterns and their effect on the barometric pumping process. From stochastic simulations using randomly generated hydrogeologic parameters, normalized detection curves are presented to show differences in optimal sampling time for granite and tuff simulations. In conclusion, seasonal and location-based effects on breakthrough, which occur due to differences in barometric forcing, are stronger where the barometric signal is highly variable.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Plasma Cleaning Research for Z

Z is a high-current pulsed-power generator located at Sandia National Laboratories. It is capable of delivering 100-ns, 30-MA current pulses to loads used for materials studies, weapons-effects simulation, and nuclear-fusion research. Under some conditions, a significant fraction of the current does not reach the load but is shunted across the inter-electrode vacuum gap that leads to the load. That undesirable current loss is thought to be due to excessive plasma generation and flow from the electrodes into the vacuum gap. Much past work suggests that this current loss may be reduced if contaminants on or near the surfaces of the electrodes are removed by plasma discharge cleaning. This report describes light-lab work performed in the past year to evaluate and understand plasma cleaning, and to develop the technology required for future tests on Z.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Summary of Booster Development and Qualification Report

This report outlines booster development work done at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 2007 to present. The booster is a critical link in the initiation train of explosive assemblies, from complex devices like nuclear weapons to conventional munitions. The booster bridges the gap from a small, relatively sensitive detonator to an insensitive, but massive, main charge. The movement throughout the explosives development community is to use more and more insensitive explosive components. With that, more energy is needed out of the booster. It has to initiate reliably, promptly, powerfully and safely. This report is divided into four sections. The first provides a summary of a collaborative effort between LANL, LLNL, and AWE to identify candidate materials and uniformly develop a testing plan for new boosters. Important parameters and the tests required to measure them were defined. The nature of the collaboration and the specific goals of the participating partners has changed over time, but the booster development plan stands on its own merit as a complete description of the test protocol necessary to compare and qualify booster materials, and is discussed in its entirety in this report. The second section describes a project, which began in 2009 with the Department of Defense to develop replacement booster formulations for PBXN-7. Replacement of PBXN-7 was necessary because it contained Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB), which was becoming unavailable to the DoD and because it contained Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), which was sensitive and toxic. A LANL-developed explosive, Diaminoazoxyfurazan (DAAF), was an important candidate. This project required any replacement formulation be a drop-in replacement in existing munitions. This project was timely, in that it made use of the collaborative booster development project, and had the additional constraint of matching shock sensitivity. Additionally it needed to be a safety improvement, and a performance improvement, especially at cold temperatures. The requirements of this project necessitated novel test development and a different approach to ranking booster qualities. Results of this project have been documented to the DoD and the relevant portions are included within. The third section of this booster report outlines testing related to main charge initiation merit. Initiability can be evaluated by looking at critical diameter, run distance, and shock sensitivity. Once a booster is initiated, it needs to be powerful enough to initiate the main charge symmetrically and evenly. Main charge initiability is evaluated directly by observing detonation wave symmetry, curvature, and first break out over the surface of a charge. Furthermore it must be insensitive to accidents and insults, and safe and reliable across a range of temperatures. These effects, tests, and results will be discussed individually in the context of DAAF and other explosives similarly tested. The last section provides a conclusion and summary of our experimental work and recommendations for the path forward. References and additional supporting documentation and results are provided in the appendices at the end of this report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Level-2 Milestone 3244: Deploy Dawn ID Machine for Initial Science Runs

This report documents the delivery, installation, integration, testing, and acceptance of the Dawn system, ASC L2 milestone 3244: Deploy Dawn ID Machine for Initial Science Runs, due September 30, 2009. The full text of the milestone is included in Attachment 1. The description of the milestone is: This milestone will be a result of work started three years ago with the planning for a multi-petaFLOPS UQ-focused platform (Sequoia) and will be satisfied when a smaller ID version of the final system is delivered, installed, integrated, tested, accepted, and deployed at LLNL for initial science runs in support of SSP mission. The deliverable for this milestone will be a LA petascale computing system (named Dawn) usable for code development and scaling necessary to ensure effective use of a final Sequoia platform (expected in 2011-2012), and for urgent SSP program needs. Allocation and scheduling of Dawn as an LA system will likely be performed informally, similar to what has been used for BlueGene/L. However, provision will be made to allow for dedicated access times for application scaling studies across the entire Dawn resource. The milestone was completed on April 1, 2009, when science runs began running on the Dawn system. The following sections describe the Dawn system architecture, current status, installation and integration time line, and testing and acceptance process. A project plan is included as Attachment 2. Attachment 3 is a letter certifying the handoff of the system to a nuclear weapons stockpile customer. Attachment 4 presents the results of science runs completed on the system.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

(U) Endpoint Energy and Scintillator Geometry Effects on the Swank Factor, Quantum Efficiency, and DQE(0) for High-Energy Radiography

High-energy radiography is used to image imploding materials to better understand weapon design and performance. The Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) is a new facility proposal that aims to collect radiographic images of nuclear material. As part of the facility design, we aim to optimize data quality and radiographic performance by investigating different detector designs. We addressed design decisions by simulating different scintillator designs using M CNP6 and calculated the quantum efficiency, Swank factor, and detective quantum efficiency at zero-frequency (DQE(O)). First, we investigated the effects of the x-ray endpoint energy on the detector response. We generated three x-ray spectra with endpoint energies of 20 MeV, 22 MeV, and 24 MeV. The three raw spectra were filtered using the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test facility (DARHT) line-of-sight materials along with 1) flat field filtration using 7 cm tungsten alloy in the bullnose and 2) an FTO with 4 plates. The scatter-to-direct radiation ratio was much larger for FTO with 4 plates (50-60%) compared to the flat field with 7 cm of bullnose material (8%). We used these filtered spectra to calculate the detector response for the original DARHT segmented scintillator design. We found that the endpoint energy and filtration had a negligible effect on the detector response. The quantum efficiency was 0.63, the Swank factor was 0.84, and the DQE(O) was 0.53 for all six spectra.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Applications of Ecological Engineering Remedies for Uranium Processing Sites, USA

The U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) is responsible for remediation of environmental contamination and long-term stewardship of sites associated with the legacy of nuclear weapons production during the Cold War in the United States. Protection of human health and the environment will be required for hundreds or even thousands of years at many legacy sites. USDOE continually evaluates and applies advances in science and technology to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of surface and groundwater remedies (USDOE 2011). This paper is a synopsis of ecological engineering applications that USDOE is evaluating to assess the effectiveness of remedies at former uranium processing sites in the southwestern United States. Ecological engineering remedies are predicated on the concept that natural ecological processes at legacy sites, once understood, can be beneficially enhanced or manipulated. Advances in tools for characterizing key processes and for monitoring remedy performance are demonstrating potential. We present test cases for four ecological engineering remedies that may be candidates for international applications.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Epidemiologic Study of One Million U.S. Radiation Workers and Veterans

The single most important question in radiation epidemiology is determining the level of health risks associated with radiation exposures that occur gradually over time. The study of one million early U.S. radiation workers and veterans has been designed to provide information on risk following chronic exposures by focusing on occupational groups with differing radiation exposure patterns, including intakes of radionuclides. The cost-efficient study builds on the investments made and foundations laid by investigators and government agencies over the past 30-40 years, which have established early worker cohorts that can now provide answers to questions on the lifetime human health risks associated with low-level radiation exposures. Within the overall goal of the epidemiologic study of one million U.S. radiation workers and veterans, this project had a total of nine specific aims which included studies of six populations for multiple endpoints including cancer overall mortality, leukemia and non-cancer mortality. The six populations included: Mound, Ohio, workers exposed to polonium, tritium and plutonium; nuclear power plant workers within the Landauer dosimetry and Nuclear Regulatory Commission data files; industrial radiographers; Mallinckrodt uranium workers; uranium workers who linked with the US Renal Data System; and nuclear weapons test participants. Over 400,000 workers and atomic veterans are included in these populations, with vital status being determined and analyses of all causes of death undertaken. A critical, integral component of the studies has been comprehensive evaluations of dosimetry involving, in many cases, complex dose reconstructions, and assessments of uncertainties. The work has also involved development of state-of-the art statistical approaches and modeling. All nine aims were accomplished successfully, resulting in publication of two NCRP documents, 13 literature papers, numerous Boice Reports in Health Physics News and many presentations of the work at scientific meetings. Furthermore, recommendations have been developed for an approach to integrate epidemiologic observations with radiation biology for risk assessment and biological models of radiation effect. The results of this project, as well as ongoing epidemiology studies of US radiation workers and veterans, are providing much-needed insights into complex issues regarding cancer and non-cancer health risks from low dose irradiation, how to apply a "dose and dose rate effectiveness factor" to scale the risks from the A-bomb survivor data to current occupational and environmental circumstances, and how to evaluate risk following intakes of radioactive substances. In addition to application to radiation workers, the results of the studies can provide guidance as society debates the role of nuclear energy and deals with nuclear waste, threats of terrorist attacks with nuclear/radiological devices, the remarkable increase in medical exposures to CT scans and nuclear imaging, and to NASA as radiation protection for astronauts on long-duration mission beyond low-Earth orbit is planned.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Nevada Test Site National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Calendar Year 2008

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is operated by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NTS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to under-ground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NTS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by winds) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium were also emitted to air at the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF), an NTS support complex in the city of North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR, 2008a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility (e.g., the NTS) to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation not related to NTS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements or from other man-made sources such as medical treatments. The NTS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NTS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration of each detected radionuclide at each of these locations is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR, 2008a). At any one location, if multiple radionuclides are detected then compliance with NESHAP is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide's concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2008, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, from both current and past NTS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was a maximum of 1.9 mrem/yr; well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all six pseudo-critical receptor stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61 (CFR, 2008a). Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 19 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the NTS boundary, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS. Potential dose to the public from NLVF was also very low at 0.00006 mrem/yr; more than 160,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2016 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2016 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports, developed by National Security Technologies, LLC Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2016, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 8% below average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 8% above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS cell covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 150 centimeters (cm) (5 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS. During 2016, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Forty-four percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter, which received 3 times the natural precipitation. All 2016 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs

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Nevada National Security Site 2015 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2015 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports developed by National Security Technologies, LLC. Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2015, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 0.9% above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 25% above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. The 1.8 inches of precipitation in September reached the lowest sensors at 180 cm on the Cell 5S and 5N covers, however the sensors on the floor do not indicate any signs of the precipitation percolating thru the waste to the floor. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 150 centimeters (cm) (5 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS. A second remedial revegetation trial was done on the southern portion of the North Cover. In March 2015 it was determined that germination occurred on both the mulched and non-mulched treatments that were irrigated, but that no germination occurred on the non-irrigated treatments. By June the seedlings observed in March were gone, possibly grazed by rabbits which were observed inside the rabbit-proof fence. In August the entire area was sprayed with the herbicide glyphosate in an attempt to minimize weed seed production. During 2015, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Thirty-one percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter, which received 3 times the natural precipitation. All 2015 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

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The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center Spallation Neutron Sources

The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) provides the scientific community with intense sources of neutrons, which can be used to perform experiments supporting civilian and national security research. These measurements include nuclear physics experiments for the defense program, basic science, and the radiation effect programs. This paper focuses on the radiation effects program, which involves mostly accelerated testing of semiconductor parts. When cosmic rays strike the earth's atmosphere, they cause nuclear reactions with elements in the air and produce a wide range of energetic particles. Because neutrons are uncharged, they can reach aircraft altitudes and sea level. These neutrons are thought to be the most important threat to semiconductor devices and integrated circuits. The best way to determine the failure rate due to these neutrons is to measure the failure rate in a neutron source that has the same spectrum as those produced by cosmic rays. Los Alamos has a high-energy and a low-energy neutron source for semiconductor testing. Both are driven by the 800-MeV proton beam from the LANSCE accelerator. The high-energy neutron source at the Weapons Neutron Research (WNR) facility uses a bare target that is designed to produce fast neutrons with energies from 100 keV to almost 800 MeV. The measured neutron energy distribution from WNR is very similar to that of the cosmic-ray-induced neutrons in the atmosphere. However, the flux provided at the WNR facility is typically 5×107 times more intense than the flux of the cosmic-ray-induced neutrons. This intense neutron flux allows testing at greatly accelerated rates. An irradiation test of less than an hour is equivalent to many years of neutron exposure due to cosmic-ray neutrons. The low-energy neutron source is located at the Lujan Neutron Scattering Center. It is based on a moderated source that provides useful neutrons from subthermal energies to ~100 keV. The characteristics of these sources, and ongoing industry program are described in this paper.

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