Site Constrained: Evaluation of D&D Impacts on Mission Critical Waste Management
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Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).
Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 AEC Working Paper on Population Density Around Nuclear Power-Plant Sites Adapted by J. Ft. Buchanan, 8 Water-Reactor Safety-Research Information Meeting by Wm. B. Cottrell, D. O. Hobson, and G. D. Whitman; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Burnout in Boiling Heat Transfer. Part I: Pool-Boiling Systems by A. E. Bergles; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 43 Radionuclide Behavior During Normal Operation of Liquid-Metal-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors. Part 1: Production by C. A. Erdman and A. B. Reynolds; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 60 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 1: AEC-Owned Facilities by M. B. Biles and F. E. Coffman, 71 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 2: AEC-Licensed Facilities by L. B. Higginbotham and J. T. Collins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 76 Incident at the Lucens Reactor by J. M. Miller, 79 IAEA Symposium on Experience from Operating and Fueling of Nuclear Power Reactors by William A. Pryor, 87 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto, 98 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Nov. 1. 1974, 101 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in September and October 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 104 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 110 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 119 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 121 Proposed Rule Changes as of Oct. 31, 1974; MISCELLANY: 97 ASTM—Euratom Symposium on Radiation Dosimetry: Developments and Standardization (Announcement), 118 Workshops on In-Pile Filter Testing (Announcement), 119 IAEA Symposium on Radiological Impacts from Releases from Nuclear Facilities into Aquatic Environments (Announcement).
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Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.
Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Core History and Nuclide Inventory of the Chernobyl Core at the Time of Accident by Gerald Kirchner and Cornelius C. Noack; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 6 Nonprescriptive Nuclear Safety Regulation: The Example of Loss of Offsite Power by M. W. Golay, V. P. Manno, and C. Vlahoplus, Jr., 20 Nuclear Power Safety Goals in Light of the Chernobyl Accident by C. Whipple and C. Starr; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Containment Loads from Severe Accidents—U.S. Program by W. Kerr and M. K. Dey; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 36 Safety Characteristics of Modern High-Temperature Reactors: Focus on German Designs by W. Kröger, H. Nickel, and R. Schulten; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 49 Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety by C. C. Congdon; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 58 Evaluation of Nonradiological Water Chemistry at Power Reactors by Harvey Zibulsky, James J. Kottan, Walter J. Pasciak, Mary Ann Castrogivanni, and Sujit Banerjee, 64 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 67 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 85 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 94 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 100 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 103 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1987; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 5 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 28 International Approach to Nuclear Safety (After Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl), 57 RPI Short Course on Modern Developments in Boiling Heat Transfer and Two-Phase Flow, 107 20th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference, 110 Third International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Power Plant Thermal Hydraulics and Operations, 108 The Authors, 111 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 28.
Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 259 Fifteenth Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting by E. G. Silver; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 284 Reliability Technology to Improve and/or Maintain Emergency Diesel Generator Performance by S. Karimian and J. H. Taylor, 293 A Noise Diagnostics System for Operator Advice by G. Hessel, P. Liewers, P. Schumann, W. Schmitt, and F.-P. Weiss; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 307 A Passive Containment System for Advanced Light-Water Reactors by O. B. Falls, Jr., and F. W. Kleimola; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 318 Data Base Construction for a Computerized Radiological Risk Investigation System by L. M. Hively, J. E. Nyquist, J. L. Bledsoe, and A. L. Sjoreen, 326 Erratum to "Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety," Vol. 29, No. 1; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 327 Operational Safety Experience and Passive Safety Testing at the Fast Flux Text Facility by Q. L. Baird, J. L. Rathbun, D. D. Stepnewski, R. L. Stover, and A. E. Waltar, 344 Backfilling of Independent Residual Heat Removal Systems in West Germany and Switzerland by G. Eckert and Y. Salomon, 353 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 356 Selected Safety-Related Events Compiled by G. A. Murphy, 363 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 384 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 390 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 395 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 400 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31,1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 283 International ENS/ANS Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety "NUCSAFE 88", 317 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 407 Second International Seminar on Small- and Medium-Sized Nuclear Reactors, 407 International Workshop on New Developments in Occupational Dose Control and ALARA Implementation at Nuclear Power Plants and Similar Facilities, 408 Fourth International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics (NURETH-4), 404 The Authors.
Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.
Hydrogen (along with other gases) is generated in process vessels and other components at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) due to the radiolysis of water and to the radiolysis and thermolysis of organics in WTP radioactive process wastes. In the absence of controls, the hydrogen may accumulate until a flammable or explosive concentration is reached. Once a buildup has occurred, ignition of the hydrogen causes an explosion that creates radioactive aerosols that could escape the confinement boundary and be released to the environment. Such a release could cause significant radiological exposures to a public receptor at the site boundary and to a co-located worker (CLW/) in the yard areas outside the physical facilities. Hydrogen explosion events therefore require evaluation as to the potential magnitude of their consequences. The WTP methodology for the evaluation of the potential radiological consequences due to hydrogen explosions in vessels and piping is a conservative approach that is defensible from a regulatory standpoint yet only results in the need for Safety controls for the most highly radioactive process vessels (generally those containing waste with significant quantities of solids). For WTP vessels with waste not containing significant quantities of solids, radiological dose consequences are sufficiently low such that neither Safety Class controls for the public receptor nor Safety Significant controls for the CLW are required. Similarly, the dose consequences for hydrogen explosions in piping and ancillary vessels are all very low to both receptors, again indicating that no Safety Class or Safety Significant controls are required. The WTP vessel and piping hydrogen explosion calculations are dependent on vessel and pipe sizes, hydrogen generation rates, operational requirements, and waste stream properties such as solids content, radioisotope concentration, and slurry density. Consequently, the WTP-specific results discussed above cannot be extrapolated directly to other facilities. (authors)
The Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for the management and completion of the River Protection Project (RPP) mission, which comprises both the Hanford Site tank farms operations and the completion and operation of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project. The RPP mission is to safely retrieve, treat, and immobilize Hanford's high-level and low-activity tank waste and close the tank farms to protect the Columbia River. The Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) Program is a major subset of the overall RPP mission, providing disposition of low-activity waste. The scope is to retrieve, treat, and immobilize the low-activity waste at the Low-Activity Waste Facility. DFLAW will begin operations no later than December 2023. The DFLAW Program overarches a suite of individual projects, activities, and infrastructure upgrades. The major projects and activities include multiple contractors under both ORP and the Richland Operations Office, underscoring the need for effective integration, coordination, and collaboration. The objectives of the DFLAW Program leadership team are to: - Effectively coordinate and integrate the projects that comprise the DFLAW Program - Manage the interfaces between the projects so that the integrated DFLAW Program is completed successfully - Ensure the DFLAW portfolio of projects operate as required without gaps or conflicts at the interfaces. DOE is accomplishing these objectives through a newly established leadership model that integrates the DOE and contractor work streams and promotes a teamwork model to enable collaborative success. Long considered one of the most formidable cleanup challenges at Hanford, the Department of Energy and its contractors are on the verge of achieving a cleanup commitment that has been decades in the making. DOE is preparing to vitrify (turn to glass) Hanford's chemical and radioactive tank waste using the DFLAW process. The Modified Consent Decree milestone for completing hot commissioning of the Hanford Site's Low- Activity Waste Facility is Dec. 31, 2023. While this milestone may seem distant under normal project management circumstances, it is a relatively short period of time for the operational and cultural transformation necessary to successfully begin treating tank waste at Hanford. Direct feed means separating the waste at a tank farm to remove the more radioactive portion (i.e., solids and cesium) so that the resulting low-activity (less radioactive) waste can be fed directly to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant's Low-Activity Waste Facility. Starting DFLAW will require a singular, intensive leadership focus, along with a sustained, collective commitment to excellence and teamwork by the Department and its contractors. Major upgrades to Hanford's infrastructure will occur prior to startup. Supporting DFLAW operations requires significant integration between the DFLAW facilities - the Waste Treatment Plant, Hanford's tank farms, effluent treatment facilities, disposal facilities - and between all of the site contractors to achieve success. (authors)
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The potential to accelerate the processing of low- and high-level tank waste by applying real-time monitoring (RTM) of chemical and physical properties has prompted research into the suitability of multiple analytical methods for that purpose. The broad variety of waste stream properties and the large number of analytes of interest (as evidenced by Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) and Process Control Limit (PCL) lists) lead to an overwhelming set of possible analytical scenarios. This report describes the use of Best Basis Inventory (BBI) data to find the most relevant analytical targets for the specific case of monitoring the blending of High Level Waste from multiple tanks prior to introduction into a vitrification facility. Campaigns for blending this waste to minimize the risk of exceeding WACs and PCLs have been proposed. However, the predicted compositions of the blended materials do not incorporate any uncertainties that may be associated with the representativeness of the waste layer samples or the laboratory analyses that generated the BBI data. Also, they do not include any uncertainty associated with the precision of collecting highly specific fractions of the layers during a blending campaign or any inhomogeneities that may exist in those layers. Monte Carlo methods are used to apply uncertainties to the compositions of the individual layers specified in the campaign recipes. The resulting variations in the compositions of the blended materials allow estimation of the risks of exceeding WACs and PCLs for each campaign. A critical subset of WACs/PCLs – NOx, NaK, AlFeZr, and S – are especially at risk of being exceeded in multiple campaigns. These analytes should be the focus of instrument development. We also have extracted the expected solid/supernate distribution for these analytes, which establishes important performance criteria for individual analytical methods. The BBI data also permits an understanding of the different chemical forms in which the analytes appear. Thus, the need to establish instrumental sensitivity to these forms can be gainfully addressed. Although concentrating on one specific application – the blending of tank waste - this approach should be generalizable for the analysis of other possible RTM applications for waste processing.
Among the Intermediate Level Waste materials in store and awaiting treatment and processing in the UK are quantities of magnesium hydroxide sludge. This sludge is a product of radioactive Magnox Swarf which arose from the de-canning of used magnox fuel element rods. As the Swarf was stored underwater, a corrosion reaction occurred over the course of time between the magnox and the water resulting in a magnesium hydroxide based sludge. The differing conditions and materials present in the various storage areas means that the sludge can range in consistency from that of a slurry through to a thick clay. Sludge test materials are required to underpin and validate the research and development equipment and processes that are to be used to treat the waste material. Necessary restrictions imposed on the sampling and testing of the radioactive waste means that the available data on the properties and behaviour of the sludge is limited. The raw materials used to create the sludge test materials are based upon magnesium hydroxide so that as far as possible the chemical behaviour will be similar to that of the waste material. The most representative sludge test material is manufactured by the corrosion of non-radioactive magnox or magnesium. However, time constraints make it impractical to supply this material in sufficient quantities for full scale validation trials. An alternative is to use sludge manufactured from commercially available magnesium hydroxide. The particle shape of commercially available materials differs from corrosion product magnesium hydroxide which means that properties such as the rheological behaviour cannot be replicated. Nevertheless, valuable trial data can be obtained, giving a greater degree of confidence in the waste treatment process than would be possible if only the more representative but less available corrosion product materials were to be used. Key test material parameters used in the trials have been identified as the particle size distribution and the sludge thickness (measured as yield shear strength). Other properties including cohesion, adhesion and rheological behaviour are also considered. The use of different mixers for sludge manufacture has the potential to affect the behavioural properties and a brief description of each of these mixers is included. The scale of mixing has been found to make a significant difference to the ageing. A chemical impurity in the commercially available materials has been successfully exploited, so that sludge mixed at comparatively low yield shear strengths can thicken into the consistency of clay. This aids manufacture and allows large quantities of thick material to be produced relatively easily. (authors)
A spacecraft life support system has been under development at NASA called the Trash Compaction Processing System that manages trash generated on human spaceflight missions. The trash composite typically includes components such as plastic pouches that contain wet food and drinks, used cotton clothing such as underwear and T-shirts, exercise clothing, used washcloths, expended deodorant containers, adhesive tapes, plastic bubble wrap, and other sundry items. The system uses compaction in combination with heat to turn the waste composite into a sturdy and well-defined shape, typically called a tile, which maintains structural integrity and makes the most efficient use of storage space. In addition to reducing the volume of the trash, the Trash Compaction Processing System removes water from the trash. The heating and removal of water from the trash renders it safe against microbial activity. This paper primarily focuses on work aimed at reducing the Equivalent System Mass of a Trash Compaction Processing System via a focus on improving the system’s thermal efficiency.
The Liquid Waste (LW) contractor at the Savannah River Site, Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC), supports the storage, processing, and safe disposition of legacy, radioactive liquid waste. The LW Tank Farms contain approximately 127 million liters (33.5 million gallons) of liquid waste within 43 active, underground waste tanks. To meet mission critical milestones for the closure of waste tanks and processing of 34 million liters (9 million gallons) of salt waste per year by the LW Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), an increase in Tank Farm operations, including waste tank transfers, is required. Waste is compiled in salt and sludge batches in the Tank Farms and transferred to SWPF and the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for treatment. All waste tank transfers, such as waste removal and batch compilation transfers, must be pre-evaluated to ensure Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requirements are met via Evaluated Transfer Approval Forms (ETAFs). Facility conditions and configurations may change as a result of a waste transfer. These changes must be reflected in the Tank Farms Emergency Response Datasheet (ERD), which contains data utilized for operation and emergency situations.
Mercury (Hg) in the Savannah River Site Liquid Waste System (LWS) originated from decades of canyon processing where it was used as a catalyst for dissolving the aluminum cladding of reactor fuel. Approximately 60 metric tons of mercury is currently present throughout the LWS. Mercury has long been a consideration in the LWS, from both hazard and processing perspectives. In February 2015, a Mercury Program Team was established at the request of the Department of Energy to develop a comprehensive action plan for long-term management and removal of mercury. Evaluation was focused in two Phases. Phase I activities assessed the Liquid Waste inventory and chemical processing behavior using a system-by-system review methodology, and determined the speciation of the different mercury forms (Hg+, Hg++, elemental Hg, organomercury, and soluble versus insoluble mercury) within the LWS. Phase II activities are building on the Phase I activities, and results of the LWS flowsheet evaluations will be summarized in three reports: Mercury Behavior in the Salt Processing Flowsheet (i.e. this report); Mercury Behavior in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Flowsheet; and Mercury behavior in the Tank Farm Flowsheet (Evaporator Operations). The evaluation of the mercury behavior in the salt processing flowsheet indicates, inter alia, the following: (1) In the assembled Salt Batches 7, 8 and 9 in Tank 21, the total mercury is mostly soluble with methylmercury (MHg) contributing over 50% of the total mercury. Based on the analyses of samples from 2H Evaporator feed and drop tanks (Tanks 38/43), the source of MHg in Salt Batches 7, 8 and 9 can be attributed to the 2H evaporator concentrate used in assembling the salt batches. The 2H Evaporator is used to evaporate DWPF recycle water. (2) Comparison of data between Tank 21/49, Salt Solution Feed Tank (SSFT), Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSSHT), and Tank 50 samples suggests that the total mercury as well as speciated forms in the assembled salt batches in Tanks 21/49 pass through the Actinide Removal Process (ARP) / Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) process to Tank 50 with no significant change in the mercury chemistry. (3) In Tank 50, Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) from ARP/MCU is the major contributor to the total mercury including MHg. (4) Speciation analyses of TCLP leached solutions of the grout samples prepared from Tank 21, as well as Tank 50 samples, show the majority of the mercury released in the solution is MHg.
The Hanford Site Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF) currently treats aqueous waste streams generated during site cleanup activities. When the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) begins operations, including Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) vitrification, a liquid secondary waste (LSW) stream from the WTP will need to be treated. The volume of effluent for treatment at the ETF will increase significantly. The powdered salt waste form produced by the ETF will be replaced by a stabilized solidified waste form for disposal in Hanford’s Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). Washington River Protection Solutions is implementing a Secondary Liquid Waste Immobilization Technology Development Plan to address the technology needs for a waste form and solidification process to treat the increased volume of waste planned for disposal at the IDF. Waste form testing to support this plan is composed of work in the near term to provide data as input to a performance assessment (PA) for Hanford’s IDF. In 2015, three Hanford Liquid Secondary Waste simulants were developed based on existing and projected waste streams. Using these waste simulants, fourteen mixes of Hanford Liquid Secondary Waste were prepared and tested varying the waste simulant, the water-to-dry materials ratio, and the dry materials blend composition.1 In FY16, testing was performed using a simulant of the EMF process condensate blended with the caustic scrubber—from the Low Activity Waste (LAW) melter—, processed through the ETF. The initial EMF-16 simulant will be based on modeling efforts performed to determine the mass balance of the ETF for the DFLAW.2 The compressive strength of all of the mixes exceeded the target of 3.4 MPa (500 psi) to meet the requirements identified as potential IDF Waste Acceptance Criteria in Table 1 of the Secondary Liquid Waste Immobilization Technology Development Plan.3 The hydraulic properties of the waste forms tested (hydraulic conductivity and water characteristic curves) were comparable to the properties measured on the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone waste form. Future testing should include efforts to first; 1) determine the rate and amount of ammonia released during each unit operation of the treatment process to determine if additional ammonia management is required, then; 2) reduce the ammonia content of the ETF concentrated brine prior to solidification, making the waste more amenable to grouting, or 3) manage the release of ammonia during production and ongoing release during storage of the waste form, or 4) develop a lower pH process/waste form thereby precluding ammonia release.
Tank 50H is required to operate a single rotating standard slurry pump for 4.5 hours prior to transfers to the Salt Solution Receipt Tanks (SSRTs) in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). This mixing time is required to adequately mix miscible and immiscible liquids within Tank 50H and meet the Saltstone Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). The miscible liquids are aqueous solutions of dissolved salts, while the immiscible liquids include organic droplets such as Isopar® L. To support the accelerated salt processing rates from the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), a desire to reduce the transfer time of Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) downstream of SWPF was identified. This document describes the analysis performed to reassess the technical basis for the 4.5 hour mixing requirement for Tank 50H.