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Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Data for training and testing radiation detection algorithms in an urban environment

The detection, identification, and localization of illicit nuclear materials in urban environments is of utmost importance for national security. Most often, the process of performing these operations consists of a team of trained individuals equipped with radiation detection devices that have built-in algorithms to alert the user to the presence nuclear material and, if possible, to identify the type of nuclear material present. To encourage the development of new detection, radioisotope identification, and source localization algorithms, a dataset consisting of realistic Monte Carlo-simulated radiation detection data from a 2 in. × 4 in. × 16 in. NaI(Tl) scintillation detector moving through a simulated urban environment based on Knoxville, Tennessee, was developed and made public in the form of a Topcoder competition. The methodology used to create this dataset has been verified using experimental data collected at the Fort Indiantown Gap National Guard facility. Realistic signals from special nuclear material and industrial and medical sources are included in the data for developing and testing algorithms in a dynamic real-world background.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Data Call to Support the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Final Report)

Based on conclusions of a recent pit disassembly and conversion (PDC) Alternatives Study, the plutonium facility at Los Alamos (TA-55-4, “PF-4”) may be a viable location for converting pits into a feed material for making mixed oxide fuel rods at Savannah River Site (SRS). The alternatives study was separate from the on-going effort to develop a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has decided to include the Los Alamos option in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis. An NNSA memorandum “Data Call to Support the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement” received on October 26, 2011 directed Los Alamos to gather data in support of this effort.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Recommendations for Radiological Data Assessment Implementation

Since thorough verification, validation, and data quality assessment (DQA) processes may delay incident commanders and elected and appointed officials from making key decisions, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) tasked Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop tools and guidance for the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) responders using research, discussions with select FSLTT responders, and the experiences of subject matter experts in incident response. This report provides NUSTL with recommendations on best practices for verification, validation, and data quality assessment for the data collected by responders during a radiological or nuclear event. The purpose of this report is to inform the development of a DQA toolkit aimed at the needs of data assessors during the response to a radiological incident.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DHS Regional Reachback: Rapid Expert Radiation Alarm Assistance.

Following assessments that attacks with radiological and nuclear weapons are possible, detection system deployments are being supported at national and local levels. Detection systems include both, highly sensitive but non-discriminating detectors, as well as detectors and algorithms capable of distinguishing and identifying gamma rays by energy. The latter systems, usually handheld systems based on sodium iodide detectors, also provide analysis of the specific radionuclides present and are referred to as radioisotope identifiers (RIIDs). Studies have shown that sodium iodide based RIIDs fall far short of 100% accurate identifications. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated the Regional Reachback (RRB) Program in 2006 to provide rapid expert interpretation of gamma spectroscopic data from radiation alarms from detection systems deployed by state and local authorities. With expert specialists on call 24/7, RRB provides an avenue for local and state authorities to verify routine results, interpret unknown identifications, and notify national response assets if needed. This paper will provide details of the RRE3 program, an outline of the analysis process, a description of the drills and training systems used to maintain specialists response performance, and examples of drills and incidents from the first full year of operation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises the four corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 05-20-02, Evaporation Pond • 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able • 05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area • 05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 19, 2010, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 106. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 106 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. The CAU includes land areas impacted by the release of radionuclides from groundwater pumping during the Radionuclide Migration study program (CAS 05-20-02), a weapons-related airdrop test (CAS 05-23-05), and unknown support activities at two sites (CAS 05-45-04 and CAS 05-45-05). The presence and nature of contamination from surface-deposited radiological contamination from CAS 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able, and other types of releases (such as migration and excavation as well as any potential releases discovered during the investigation) from the remaining three CASs will be evaluated using soil samples collected from the locations most likely containing contamination, if present. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the corrective action investigation for CAU 106 includes the following activities: • Conduct radiological surveys. • Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine internal dose rates and the presence of contaminants of concern. • If contaminants of concern are present, collect additional samples to define the extent of the contamination and determine the area where the total effective dose at the site exceeds final action levels (i.e., corrective action boundary). • Collect samples of investigation-derived waste, as needed, for waste management purposes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Leveraging graph clustering techniques for cyber‐physical system analysis to enhance disturbance characterisation

Abstract Cyber‐physical systems have behaviour that crosses domain boundaries during events such as planned operational changes and malicious disturbances. Traditionally, the cyber and physical systems are monitored separately and use very different toolsets and analysis paradigms. The security and privacy of these cyber‐physical systems requires improved understanding of the combined cyber‐physical system behaviour and methods for holistic analysis. Therefore, the authors propose leveraging clustering techniques on cyber‐physical data from smart grid systems to analyse differences and similarities in behaviour during cyber‐, physical‐, and cyber‐physical disturbances. Since clustering methods are commonly used in data science to examine statistical similarities in order to sort large datasets, these algorithms can assist in identifying useful relationships in cyber‐physical systems. Through this analysis, deeper insights can be shared with decision‐makers on what cyber and physical components are strongly or weakly linked, what cyber‐physical pathways are most traversed, and the criticality of certain cyber‐physical nodes or edges. This paper presents several types of clustering methods for cyber‐physical graphs of smart grid systems and their application in assessing different types of disturbances for informing cyber‐physical situational awareness. The collection of these clustering techniques provide a foundational basis for cyber‐physical graph interdependency analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber Friendly Fire

Cyber friendly fire (FF) is a new concept that has been brought to the attention of Department of Defense (DoD) stakeholders through two workshops that were planned and conducted by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and research conducted for AFRL by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. With this previous work in mind, we offer a definition of cyber FF as intentional offensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintentionally harms the mission effectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. Just as with combat friendly fire, a fundamental need in avoiding cyber FF is to maintain situation awareness (SA). We suggest that cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system's topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system (and that populate the nodes), the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive (and offensive) countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. A training implication is to raise awareness and understanding of these critical knowledge units; an approach to decision aids and/or visualizations is to focus on supporting these critical knowledge units. To study cyber FF, we developed an unclassified security test range comprising a combination of virtual and physical devices that present a closed network for testing, simulation, and evaluation. This network offers services found on a production network without the associated costs of a real production network. Containing enough detail to appear realistic, this virtual and physical environment can be customized to represent different configurations. For our purposes, the test range was configured to appear as an Internet-connected Managed Service Provider (MSP) offering specialized web applications to the general public. The network is essentially divided into a production component that hosts the web and network services, and a user component that hosts thirty employee workstations and other end devices. The organization's network is separated from the Internet by a Cisco ASA network security device that both firewalls and detects intrusions. Business sensitive information is stored in various servers. This includes data comprising thousands of internal documents, such as finance and technical designs, email messages for the organization's employees including the CEO, CFO, and CIO, the organization's source code, and Personally Identifiable client data. Release of any of this information to unauthorized parties would have a significant, detrimental impact on the organization's reputation, which would harm earnings. The valuable information stored in these servers pose obvious points of interest for an adversary. We constructed several scenarios around this environment to support studies in cyber SA and cyber FF that may be run in the test range. We describe mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches. Finally, we discuss possible future research directions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Risk and Work Configuration Management as a Function of Integrated Safety Management

National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), has established a work management program and corresponding electronic Facilities and Operations Management Information System (e-FOM) to implement Integrated Safety Management (ISM). The management of work scopes, the identification of hazards, and the establishment of implementing controls are reviewed and approved through electronic signatures. Through the execution of the program and the implementation of the electronic system, NSTec staff work within controls and utilize feedback and improvement process. The Integrated Work Control Manual further implements the five functions of ISM at the Activity level. By adding the Risk and Work Configuration Management program, NSTec establishes risk acceptance (business and physical) for liabilities within the performance direction and work management processes. Requirements, roles, and responsibilities are specifically identified in the program while e-FOM provides the interface and establishes the flowdown from the Safety Chain to work and facilities management processes to company work-related directives, and finally to Subject Matter Expert concurrence. The Program establishes, within the defined management structure, management levels for risk identification, risk mitigation (controls), and risk acceptance (business and physical) within the Safety Chain of Responsibility. The Program also implements Integrated Safeguards and Security Management within the NSTec Safety Chain of Responsibility. Once all information has been entered into e-FOM, approved, and captured as data, the information becomes searchable and sortable by hazard, location, organization, mitigating controls, etc.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Alternative to Solution Experiments for Nuclear Data Validation: Reflection and Interaction of Juxtaposed Uranium (RAIJU) Experiment Design

The need for solution experiments was thoroughly discussed at the recent NCERC (National Criticality Experiments Research Center) Futures Meeting in September 2022 for multiple applications including criticality safety, training, and nuclear data. However, this capability does not exist anywhere in the United States. NCERC, located at the Nevada National Security Site and operated by LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) is the only general-purpose critical experiments laboratory in the United States. However, solution experiments are not authorized at NCERC, and obtaining that authorization would be too time consuming and costly to happen in the foreseeable future. An alternative is needed – an experimental configuration with the homogeneity of liquid experiments, but without being a liquid. This project, Reflection and Interaction of Juxtaposed Uranium (RAIJU) will fill the gap in capability within LANL, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the international community and will support current and future nuclear material processing needs.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Quantifying Uncertainty to Improve Decision Making in Machine Learning

Data-driven modeling, including machine learning methods, continue to play an increasing role in society. Data-driven methods impact decision making for applications ranging from everyday determinations about which news people see and control of self-driving cars to high-consequence national security situations related to cyber security and analysis of nuclear weapons reliability. Although modern machine learning methods have made great strides in model induction and show excellent performance in a broad variety of complex domains, uncertainty remains an inherent aspect of any data-driven model. In this report, we provide an update to the preliminary results on uncertainty quantification for machine learning presented in SAND2017-6776. Specifically, we improve upon the general problem definition and expand upon the experiments conducted for the earlier re- port. Most importantly, we summarize key lessons learned about how and when uncertainty quantification can inform decision making and provide valuable insights into the quality of learned models and potential improvements to them.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Wireless Sensing and Communication Capability from In-Core to a Monitoring Center

Significant cost savings can be made if electrical cables can be replaced by wireless technology in current Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) and in advance reactor designs. Wireless technology can also provide in-core opportunities by significantly reducing the number of penetrations in the pressure vessel, cost and complexity of sensor installation and by increasing the efficiency of current and advanced reactors. Unlike other deployment scenarios for an industrial environment, operators need to have centralized control over all the networks. Centralized control will reduce implementation costs, provide single point control and enable monitoring of network devices, improve security, and enhance connectivity. Micro-sensors that can simultaneously monitor temperature and pressure within a fuel rod inside nuclear reactors will enable preventative actions during abnormal operating conditions. This ability could avert accidents and enable the expedient development of accident tolerant fuels. A novel micro-sensor suite (~ mm) to simultaneously measure multiple parameters such as temperature, strain, pressure, and neutron/gamma flux inside a fuel rod is being developed for use in reactors. The necessary communication architecture is also being developed to transmit measurement signals from the core to the plant's data cloud or control room. A three three-tier strategy has been developed to support wireless transmission of in-core measurements to the control room or to a secure cloud platform for control, analytics, and decision-making purposes. 1. In-core: data signal from in-core to outside of the pressure vessel within the containment building 2. Containment building: data signal from inside to the outside of the containment building and into the balance of the plant network 3. Balance of the plant network: information transmitted to the data cloud and control room This plan presents a wireless sensing and communication system for use within a reactor core and elsewhere. The communication technology is advantageous to compensate for network equipment failures and adverse data transmission conditions. Wireless technology will significantly increase the resiliency of the plants network system. The wireless system naturally provides multiple transmission path capability and data redundancy.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit 366 comprises the six corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 11-08-01, Contaminated Waste Dump No.1; (2) 11-08-02, Contaminated Waste Dump No.2; (3) 11-23-01, Radioactively Contaminated Area A; (4) 11-23-02, Radioactively Contaminated Area B; (5) 11-23-03, Radioactively Contaminated Area C; and (6) 11-23-04, Radioactively Contaminated Area D. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed July 6, 2011, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 366. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 366 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose (TED) at sample locations to the dose-based final action level (FAL). The TED will be calculated by summing the estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples collected from sample plots will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Based on historical documentation of the releases associated with the nuclear tests, it was determined that CASs 11-23-02, 11-23-03, and 11-23-04 will be investigated as one release site. The three test areas associated with these CASs are in close proximity; the devices tested were all composed of plutonium and enriched uranium; and the ground zeroes are all posted high contamination areas (HCAs). Because the device tested at CAS 11-23-01 was composed primarily of enriched uranium and the ground zero is not a posted HCA, the CAS will be investigated as a separate release. The DQO process also resulted in an assumption that TED within the HCAs and contaminated waste dumps exceeds the FAL and requires corrective action. A field investigation will be performed to define where TED exceeds the FAL and to determine whether other contaminants of concern are present at the site associated with other activities that took place at the site or from spills or waste discovered during the investigation. The presence and nature of contamination from other types of releases (such as migration and any potential releases discovered during the investigation) will be evaluated using soil samples collected from the locations most likely containing contamination, if present. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Graph-Based Impact Metric for Mitigating Lateral Movement Cyber Attacks

Most cyber network attacks begin with an adversary gain- ing a foothold within the network and proceed with lateral movement until a desired goal is achieved. The mechanism by which lateral movement occurs varies but the basic signa- ture of hopping between hosts by exploiting vulnerabilities is the same. Because of the nature of the vulnerabilities typ- ically exploited, lateral movement is very difficult to detect and defend against. In this paper we define a dynamic reach- ability graph model of the network to discover possible paths that an adversary could take using different vulnerabilities, and how those paths evolve over time. We use this reacha- bility graph to develop dynamic machine-level and network- level impact scores. Lateral movement mitigation strategies which make use of our impact scores are also discussed, and we detail an example using a freely available data set.

cyber security↗

Utility-Scale Solar, 2024 Edition: Empirical Trends in Deployment, Technology, Cost, Performance, PPA Pricing, and Value in the United States [Slides]

Berkeley Lab’s “Utility-Scale Solar, 2024 Edition” presents analysis of empirical plant-level data from the U.S. fleet of ground-mounted photovoltaic (PV), PV+battery, and concentrating solar-thermal power (CSP) plants with capacities exceeding 5 MWAC (PV plants of 5 MWAC or less, including residential rooftop systems, are covered separately in Berkeley Lab’s companion annual report, Tracking the Sun). Key findings from this year’s report include: -18.5 GWAC of new utility-scale PV capacity came online in 2023, bringing cumulative installed capacity to more than 80.2 GWAC across 47 states. Installed costs continued to fall in 2023. Relative to 2022, capacity-weighted averages decreased by 8% to -$\$1.43$/WAC (or $\$1.08$/WDC). Costs, based on a 7.1 GWAC sample of 76 plants completed in 2023, have fallen by 75% (averaging 10% annually) since 2010. Plant-level capacity factors vary widely, from 6% to 36% (on an AC basis), with a sample median of 24%. -Levelized cost of energy (LCOE) of new 2023 projects increased slightly to $\$46$/MWh prior to the application of tax credits but continued to fall to $\$31$/MWh when accounting for federal incentives. PPA prices have largely followed the decline in solar’s LCOE over time, but newly signed longer-term PPA prices have increased since 2021, to an average of $\$35$/MWh (levelized, in 2023 dollars). -Solar’s average energy and capacity value (i.e., ability to offset costs of other power generation sources) across the U.S. was $\$45$/MWh in 2023. Solar’s average market value was lowest in CAISO ($\$27$/MWh), the market with the greatest solar generation share, and highest in ERCOT ($\$67$/MWh). -Newer solar projects had greater market value in 2023 than their generation costs, yielding $\$1.1$ billion in benefits. Projects built in 2022 delivered on average $\$15$/MWh more market value than their costs in 2023. -Solar’s combined value from wholesale electricity markets, public health and climate damage reduction were greater than generation costs and incentives, yielding $\$13.7$ billion in net benefits in 2023. We estimate U.S. health benefits of $\$24$/MWh and reduced global climate damages of $\$101$/MWh. -Adding battery storage is one way to increase the value of solar. Deployment of 52 new PV+battery hybrid plants set a record with 5.3 GW installed in 2023. Our public data file tracks metadata and PPA prices from more than 100 PV+battery hybrid projects that are already online or that have secured offtake arrangements. -Looking ahead, a massive pipeline of at least 1,085 GW of solar capacity dominates the nation’s interconnection queues at the end of 2023. Nearly 571 GW, or 53%, of that total was paired with a battery – in CAISO it was a staggering 98%. Historically only 10% of the requested solar capacity is built. -For more information, and to explore related interactive data visualizations, go to utilityscalesolar.lbl.gov.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Authentication Without Secrets

This work examines a new approach to authentication, which is the most fundamental security primitive that underpins all cyber security protections. Current Internet authentication techniques require the protection of one or more secret keys along with the integrity protection of the algorithms/computations designed to prove possession of the secret without actually revealing it. Protecting a secret requires physical barriers or encryption with yet another secret key. The reason to strive for "Authentication without Secret Keys" is that protecting secrets (even small ones only kept in a small corner of a component or device) is much harder than protecting the integrity of information that is not secret. Promising methods are examined for authentication of components, data, programs, network transactions, and/or individuals. The successful development of authentication without secret keys will enable far more tractable system security engineering for high exposure, high consequence systems by eliminating the need for brittle protection mechanisms to protect secret keys (such as are now protected in smart cards, etc.). This paper is a re-release of SAND2009-7032 with new figures numerous edits.

Pierson, Lyndon G.↗

Situ: Identifying and Explaining Suspicious Behavior in Networks

Despite the best efforts of cyber security analysts, networked computing assets are routinely compromised, resulting in the loss of intellectual property, the disclosure of state secrets, and major financial damages. Anomaly detection methods are beneficial for detecting new types of attacks and abnormal network activity, but such algorithms can be difficult to understand and trust. Network operators and cyber analysts need fast and scalable tools to help identify suspicious behavior that bypasses automated security systems, but operators do not want another automated tool with algorithms they do not trust. Experts need tools to augment their own domain expertise and to provide a contextual understanding of suspicious behavior to help them make decisions. In this paper we present Situ, a visual analytics system for discovering suspicious behavior in streaming network data. Situ provides a scalable solution that combines anomaly detection with information visualization. The system's visualizations enable operators to identify and investigate the most anomalous events and IP addresses, and the tool provides context to help operators understand why they are anomalous. Finally, operators need tools that can be integrated into their workflow and with their existing tools. This paper describes the Situ platform and its deployment in an operational network setting. Furthermore, we discuss how operators are currently using the tool in a large organization's security operations center and present the results of expert reviews with professionals.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗