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At least 1,477 records · Page 82

Diffusive deposition of aerosols in Phebus containment during FPT-2 test

At present the lumped-parameter codes is the main tool to investigate the complex response of the containment of Nuclear Power Plant in case of an accident. Continuous development and validation of the codes is required to perform realistic investigation of the processes that determine the possible source term of radioactive products to the environment. Validation of the codes is based on the comparison of the calculated results with the measurements performed in experimental facilities. The most extensive experimental program to investigate fission product release from the molten fuel, transport through the cooling circuit and deposition in the containment is performed in PHEBUS test facility. Test FPT-2 performed in this facility is considered for analysis of processes taking place in containment. Earlier performed investigations using COCOSYS code showed that the code could be successfully used for analysis of thermal-hydraulic processes and deposition of aerosols, but there was also noticed that diffusive deposition on the vertical walls does not fit well with the measured results. In the CPA module of ASTEC code there is implemented different model for diffusive deposition, therefore the PHEBUS containment model was transferred from COCOSYS code to ASTEC-CPA to investigate the influence of the diffusive deposition modelling. Analysis was performed using PHEBUS containment model of 16 nodes. The calculated thermal-hydraulic parameters are in good agreement with measured results, which gives basis for realistic simulation of aerosol transport and deposition processes. Performed investigations showed that diffusive deposition model has influence on the aerosol deposition distribution on different surfaces in the test facility. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

When Spreadsheets Become Software - Quality Control Challenges and Approaches - 13360

As part of a preliminary waste acceptance criteria (PWAC) development, several commercial models were employed, including the Hydrologic Evaluation of Landfill Performance model (HELP) [1], the Disposal Unit Source Term - Multiple Species model (DUSTMS) [2], and the Analytical Transient One, Two, and Three-Dimensional model (AT123D) [3]. The results of these models were post-processed in MS Excel spreadsheets to convert the model results to alternate units, compare the groundwater concentrations to the groundwater concentration thresholds, and then to adjust the waste contaminant masses (based on average concentration over the waste volume) as needed in an attempt to achieve groundwater concentrations at the limiting point of assessment that would meet the compliance concentrations while maximizing the potential use of the landfill (i.e., maximizing the volume of projected waste being generated that could be placed in the landfill). During the course of the PWAC calculation development, one of the Microsoft (MS) Excel spreadsheets used to post-process the results of the commercial model packages grew to include more than 575,000 formulas across 18 worksheets. This spreadsheet was used to assess six base scenarios as well as nine uncertainty/sensitivity scenarios. The complexity of the spreadsheet resulted in the need for a rigorous quality control (QC) procedure to verify data entry and confirm the accuracy of formulas. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

FATE Unified Modeling Method for Spent Nuclear Fuel and Sludge Processing, Shipping and Storage - 13405

A unified modeling method applicable to the processing, shipping, and storage of spent nuclear fuel and sludge has been incrementally developed, validated, and applied over a period of about 15 years at the US DOE Hanford site. The software, FATE{sup TM}, provides a consistent framework for a wide dynamic range of common DOE and commercial fuel and waste applications. It has been used during the design phase, for safety and licensing calculations, and offers a graded approach to complex modeling problems encountered at DOE facilities and abroad (e.g., Sellafield). FATE has also been used for commercial power plant evaluations including reactor building fire modeling for fire PRA, evaluation of hydrogen release, transport, and flammability for post-Fukushima vulnerability assessment, and drying of commercial oxide fuel. FATE comprises an integrated set of models for fluid flow, aerosol and contamination release, transport, and deposition, thermal response including chemical reactions, and evaluation of fire and explosion hazards. It is one of few software tools that combine both source term and thermal-hydraulic capability. Practical examples are described below, with consideration of appropriate model complexity and validation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Rapid Radiochemical Analyses in Support of Fukushima Nuclear Accident - 13196

There is an increasing need to develop faster analytical methods for emergency response, including emergency soil and air filter samples [1, 2]. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) performed analyses on samples received from Japan in April, 2011 as part of a U.S. Department of Energy effort to provide assistance to the government of Japan, following the nuclear event at Fukushima Daiichi, resulting from the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011. Of particular concern was whether it was safe to plant rice in certain areas (prefectures) near Fukushima. The primary objectives of the sample collection, sample analysis, and data assessment teams were to evaluate personnel exposure hazards, identify the nuclear power plant radiological source term and plume deposition, and assist the government of Japan in assessing any environmental and agricultural impacts associated with the nuclear event. SRNL analyzed approximately 250 samples and reported approximately 500 analytical method determinations. Samples included soil from farmland surrounding the Fukushima reactors and air monitoring samples of national interest, including those collected at the U.S. Embassy and American military bases. Samples were analyzed for a wide range of radionuclides, including strontium-89, strontium-90, gamma-emitting radionuclides, and plutonium, uranium, americium and curium isotopes. Technical aspects of the rapid soil and air filter analyses will be described. The extent of radiostrontium contamination was a significant concern. For {sup 89,90}Sr analyses on soil samples, a rapid fusion technique using 1.5 gram soil aliquots to enable a Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) of <1 pCi {sup 89,90}Sr /g of soil was employed. This sequential technique has been published recently by this laboratory for actinides and radiostrontium in soil and vegetation [3, 4]. It consists of a rapid sodium hydroxide fusion, pre-concentration steps using iron hydroxide and calcium fluoride precipitations, followed by Sr-Resin separation and gas flow proportional counting. To achieve a lower detection limit for analysis of some of the Japanese soil samples, a 10 gram aliquot of soil was taken, acid-leached and processed with similar preconcentration chemistry. The MDA using this approach was ∼0.03 pCi/g (1.1 mBq/g)/, which is less than the 0.05-0.10 pCi/g {sup 90}Sr levels found in soil as a result of global fallout. The chemical yields observed for the Japanese soil samples was typically 75-80% and the laboratory control sample (LCS) and matrix spike (MS) results looked very good for this work Individual QC results were well within the ± 25% acceptable range and the average of these results does not show significant bias. Additional data for a radiostrontium in soil method for 50 gram samples will also be presented, which appears to be a significant step forward based on looking at the current literature, with higher chemical yields for even larger sample aliquots and lower MDA [5, 6, 7] Hou et al surveyed a wide range of separation methods for Pu in waters and environmental solid samples [8]. While there are many actinide methods in the scientific literature, few would be considered rapid due to the tedious and time-consuming steps involved. For actinide analyses in soil, a new rapid method for the determination of actinide isotopes in soil samples using both alpha spectrometry and inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry was employed. The new rapid soil method utilizes an acid leaching method, iron/titanium hydroxide precipitation, a lanthanum fluoride soil matrix removal step, and a rapid column separation process with TEVA Resin. The large soil matrix is removed easily and rapidly using these two simple precipitations with high chemical recoveries and effective removal of interferences. [9, 10] Vacuum box technology and rapid flow rates were used to reduce analytical time. Challenges associated with the mineral content in the volcanic soil will be discussed. Air filter samples were reported within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt using rapid techniques published previously. [11] The rapid reporting of high quality analytical data arranged through the U.S. Department of Energy Consequence Management Home Team was critical to allow the government of Japan to readily evaluate radiological impacts from the nuclear reactor incident to both personnel and the environment. SRNL employed unique rapid methods capability for radionuclides to support Japan that can also be applied to environmental, bioassay and waste management samples. New rapid radiochemical techniques for radionuclides in soil and other environmental matrices as well as some of the unique challenges associated with this work will be presented that can be used for application to environmental monitoring, environmental remediation, decommissioning and decontamination activities. (authors)

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An Updated Performance Assessment For A New Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility In West Texas - 12192

This Performance Assessment (PA) submittal is an update to the original PA that was developed to support the licensing of the Waste Control Specialists LLC Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) disposal facility. This update includes both the Compact Waste Facility (CWF) and the Federal Waste Facility (FWF), in accordance with Radioactive Material License (RML) No. R04100, License Condition (LC) 87. While many of the baseline assumptions supporting the initial license application PA were incorporated in this update, a new transport code, GoldSim, and new deterministic groundwater flow codes, including HYDRUS and MODFLOWSURFACT{sup TM}, were employed to demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives codified in the regulations and RML No. R04100, LC 87. A revised source term, provided by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality staff, was used to match the initial 15 year license term. This updated PA clearly confirms and demonstrates the robustness of the characteristics of the site's geology and the advanced engineering design of the disposal units. Based on the simulations from fate and transport models, the radiation doses to members of the general public and site workers predicted in the initial and updated PA were a small fraction of the criterion doses of 0.25 mSv and 50 mSv, respectively. In a comparison between the results of the updated PA against the one developed in support of the initial license, both clearly demonstrated the robustness of the characteristics of the site's geology and engineering design of the disposal units. Based on the simulations from fate and transport models, the radiation doses to members of the general public predicted in the initial and updated PA were a fraction of the allowable 25 mrem/yr (0.25 m sievert/yr) dose standard for tens-of-thousands of years into the future. Draft Texas guidance on performance assessment (TCEQ, 2004) recommends a period of analysis equal to 1,000 years or until peak doses from the more mobile radionuclides occur. The EPA National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants limits radionuclide doses through the air pathway to 10 mrem/yr. Gaseous radionuclide doses from the CWF and the FWF, due to decomposition gases, are a small fraction of the dose limit. The radon flux from the CWF and FWF were compared to the flux limit of 20 pCi/m{sup 2}-s from 40 CFR 192. Because of the thick cover system, the calculated radon flux was a very small fraction of the limit. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Vertical Extraction Process Implemented at the 118-K-1 Burial Ground for Removal of Irradiated Reactor Debris from Silo Structures - 12431

The primary objective of a remediation project is the safe extraction and disposition of diverse waste forms and materials. Remediation of a solid waste burial ground containing reactor hardware and irradiated debris involves handling waste with the potential to expose workers to significantly elevated dose rates. Therefore, a major challenge confronted by any remediation project is developing work processes that facilitate compliant waste management practices while at the same time implementing controls to protect personnel. Traditional burial ground remediation is accomplished using standard excavators to remove materials from trenches and other excavation configurations often times with minimal knowledge of waste that will be encountered at a specific location. In the case of the 118-K-1 burial ground the isotopic activity postulated in historic documents to be contained in vertical cylindrical silos was sufficient to create the potential for a significant radiation hazard to project personnel. Additionally, certain reported waste forms posed an unacceptably high potential to contaminate the surrounding environment and/or workers. Based on process knowledge, waste management requirements, historic document review, and a lack of characterization data it was determined that traditional excavation techniques applied to remediation of vertical silos would expose workers to unacceptable risk. The challenging task for the 118-K-1 burial ground remediation project team then became defining an acceptable replacement technology or modification of an existing technology to complete the silo remediation. Early characterization data provided a good tool for evaluating the location of potential high exposure rate items in the silos. Quantitative characterization was a different case and proved difficult because of the large diameter of the silos and the potential for variable density of attenuating soils and waste forms in the silo. Consequently, the most relevant information supporting job planning and understanding of the conditions was the data obtained from the gross gamma meter that was inserted into each casing to provide a rough estimate of dose rates in the tubes. No added value was realized in attempting to quantify the source term and/or associate the isotopic activity with a particular actual waste form (e.g., sludge). Implementing the WRM system allowed monitoring of worker and boundary exposure rates from a distance, maintaining compliance with ALARA principles. This system also provided the project team early knowledge of items being removed that had high exposure rates associated with them, thus creating an efficient method of acknowledging an issue and arriving at a solution prior to having an upset condition. An electronic dosimeter with telemetry capability replaced the excavator mounted AMP-100 system approximately half way through remediation of the silos. Much higher connectivity efficiency was derived from this configuration. Increasing the data feed efficiency additionally led to less interruption of the remediation effort. Early in system testing process a process handicap on the excavator operator was acknowledged. A loss of depth perception resulted when maneuvering the excavator and bucket using the camera feed to an in-cab monitor. Considerable practice and mock-up testing allowed this handicap to be overcome. The most significant equipment failures involved the cable connection to the camera mounted between the clamshell bucket jaws and the video splitter in the excavator cab. Rotation of the clamshell bucket was identified as the cause of cable connection failures because of the cyclic twisting motion and continuous mechanical jarring of the connection. In-cab vibration was identified as the culprit in causing connection failures of the video splitter. While these failures were repaired, substantial production time was lost. Ultimately, the decision was made to purchase a second cable and higher quality video splitter eliminate the down time. An engineering improvement for future operations would be inserting cable pig tails at more stressed cable connection points to facilitate rapid change out of the cable should that be required. Overall, the system performed better than expected in a safe and efficient manner. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Approaches to Quantify Potential Contaminant Transport in the Lower Carbonate Aquifer from Underground Nuclear Testing at Yucca Flat, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada - 12434

Quantitative modeling of the potential for contaminant transport from sources associated with underground nuclear testing at Yucca Flat is an important part of the strategy to develop closure plans for the residual contamination. At Yucca Flat, the most significant groundwater resource that could potentially be impacted is the Lower Carbonate Aquifer (LCA), a regionally extensive aquifer that supplies a significant portion of the water demand at the Nevada National Security Site, formerly the Nevada Test Site. Developing and testing reasonable models of groundwater flow in this aquifer is an important precursor to performing subsequent contaminant transport modeling used to forecast contaminant boundaries at Yucca Flat that are used to identify potential use restriction and regulatory boundaries. A model of groundwater flow in the LCA at Yucca Flat has been developed. Uncertainty in this model, as well as other transport and source uncertainties, is being evaluated as part of the Underground Testing Area closure process. Several alternative flow models of the LCA in the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU have been developed. These flow models are used in conjunction with contaminant transport models and source term models and models of contaminant transport from underground nuclear tests conducted in the overlying unsaturated and saturated alluvial and volcanic tuff rocks to evaluate possible contaminant migration in the LCA for the next 1,000 years. Assuming the flow and transport models are found adequate by NNSA/NSO and NDEP, the models will undergo a peer review. If the model is approved by NNSA/NSO and NDEP, it will be used to identify use restriction and regulatory boundaries at the start of the Corrective Action Decision Document Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) phase of the Corrective Action Strategy. These initial boundaries may be revised at the time of the Closure Report phase of the Corrective Action Strategy. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radioactive Waste Storage Facility at the Armenian NPP - 12462

We present a detailed contaminant transfer dynamics model for radionuclide in geosphere and biosphere medium. The model describes the transport of radionuclides using full equation for the processes of advection, diffusion, decay and sorption. The overall objective is to establish, from a post-closure radiological safety point of view, whether it is practical to convert an existing radioactive waste storage facility at Armenian NPP, to a waste disposal facility. The calculation includes: - Data sources for: the operational waste-source term; options for refurbishment and completion of the waste storage facility as a waste disposal facility; the site and its environs; - Development of an assessment context for the safety assessment, and identification of waste treatment options; - A description of the conceptual and mathematical models, and results calculated for the base case scenario relating to the release of contaminants via the groundwater pathway and also precipitation especially important for this site. The results of the calculations showed that the peak individual dose is < 7 E-8 Sv/y arising principally from I-129 after 700 years post closure. Other significant radionuclides, in terms of their contribution to the total dose are I-129, Tc-99 and in little C-14 (U- 234 and Po-210 are not relevant). The study does not explore all issues that might be expected to be presented in a safety case for a near surface disposal facility it mainly focuses on post- closure dose impacts. Most emphasis has been placed on the development of scenarios and conceptual models rather than the presentation and analyses of results and confidence building (only deterministic results are presented). The calculations suggest that, from a perspective the conversion of the waste-storage facility is feasible such that all the predicted doses are well below internationally recognized targets, as well as provisional Armenian regulatory objectives. This conclusion applies to the disposal of the ANPP present and future arising of L/ILW operating wastes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Implementation of a new gamma spectrometer on the MERARG loop: Application to the volatile fission products release measurement

The MERARG facility initially aims at the annealing of irradiated fuel samples to study the gaseous fission products release kinetics. In order to complete the evaluation of the source term potentially released during accidental situation, the MERARG experimental circuit has been enhanced with a new gamma spectrometer. This one is directly sighting the fuel and is devoted to the fission products release kinetics. Because of the specificities of the fuel measurements, it has been dimensioned and designed to match the specific requirements. The acquisition chain and the collimation system have been optimized for this purpose and a first set of two experiments have shown the good functioning of this new spectrometry facility. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

The SAVY 4000 Container Storage Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17313

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in the U.S. Defense Nuclear Safety Board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based storage container design, the SAVY-4000{sup R}. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is the first vented general use nuclear material container demonstrated to meet the requirements of DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is an innovative and creative design demonstrated by the fact that it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without torque wrenches or other tools; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas, yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates, and prevents release of material even in a 12 foot drop. Finally, it has been fire then drop tested and will reduce the risk to the public in the event of an earthquake/fire scenario. This will allow major nuclear facilities to credit the container towards source term Material at Risk (MAR) reduction. The container was approved for nuclear material storage in the TA-55 Plutonium Facility on March 15, 2011, and there are currently over 2000 SAVY-4000{sup R} containers available for use within the facility. A Safety Analysis Report was developed to demonstrate Manual 441.1-1 compliance and was approved April, 2014. The first four SAVY-4000{sup R} containers were packaged with plutonium on August 2, 2011. Key aspects of the SAVY-4000{sup R} vented storage container design will be discussed which include design description, qualification and testing, surveillance strategy, and the design life extension program as enhanced by surveillance activities with the intent to extend well beyond the current five year design life. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Hanford's Double-Shell Tank AY-102 Recovery Project - 17416

Since at least August 2012, Hanford Tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102) has been leaking from its primary tank into its secondary containment. A pumping plan was developed in 2013 to provide a path forward for recommended remediation actions to be implemented as part of the AY-102 Recovery Project. On March 21, 2014, the Washington State Department of Ecology issued Administrative Order No. 10618 requiring Washington River Protection Solutions and the United States Department of Energy to conduct actions related to and including the removal of waste from AY-102. The three parties agreed to resolve the appeal of the Administrative Order through a Settlement Agreement which addresses the remaining requirements and implements enforceable milestone dates, including initiation of waste retrieval by March 4, 2016 and completion of waste retrieval operations by March 4, 2017. The AY-102 Recovery Project was developed to address the Settlement Agreement requirements. While retrieval of waste from Single-Shell Tanks has been performed at Hanford for decades, retrieval from Double-Shell Tank AY-102 required adaptation of the existing technologies to a new environment on a larger scale than previously encountered. A significant number of obstructions and in-tank equipment limit accessibility to the high source term AY-102 waste and the location of the selected receiver tank required installation of an extensive, heavily-shielded above-ground transfer line. Despite countless challenges and obstacles encountered throughout, the project successfully completed system design, fabrication, installation, testing, and the first phase of operations within a highly compressed, aggressive schedule. Waste retrieval operations in AY-102 commenced on March 3, 2016 and the initial operating phase concluded on April 30. Additional sluicing capability was required to complete the mission and four Extended Reach Sluicers were installed to support the second operating phase, which began on December 8, 2016. As of December 31, 2016, approximately 97% of the original waste volume had been removed, resulting in an estimated remaining waste volume of about 75,000 liters. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Design, Fabrication and Start-up of Test Facilities for the LAWPS Full-Scale IX Column Test and Engineering Scale Test - 17418

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection's (ORP) primary mission is to retrieve and treat Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. Mixed radioactive waste is stored in 177 underground tanks at the Hanford Site as reported in DOE/ORP 2003-02, Environmental Impact Statement for Retrieval, Treatment, and Disposal of Tank Waste and Closure of the Single Shell Tanks at the Hanford Site, Richland WA, Inventory and Source Term Data Package. The 177 underground tanks are estimated to contain about 56 million gallons of waste. The Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) Project provides for the early production of immobilized low activity waste (ILAW) by feeding LAW directly from Tank Farms to the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant's (WTP's) LAW Facility, bypassing the Pretreatment Facility. Prior to the transfer of feed to the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility, tank supernatant waste will be pretreated in the LAWPS to meet the WTP LAW waste acceptance criteria. The LAWPS will also facilitate the return of secondary liquid wastes from the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility to the Tank Farms. In November of 2015 DOE's Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), awarded a contract to the AECOM Team to design, fabricate and operate two test platforms to generate performance data at two different scales and demonstrate technology maturation. The first platform models the ion exchange (IX) columns at full scale, and the second platform models the integrated flowsheet (cross flow filter (CFF) and IX) at 1/9. scale. Both test platforms underwent shakedown and start-up testing in August 2016 and moved into actual testing and NQA-1 data generation shortly thereafter. This paper covers the engineering design, procurement, construction, installation, and acceptance testing of the test platforms (which are now operational) under an aggressive fast track schedule, and initial test data as available. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tracking radioactivity content in the spent fuel pool in PWRS - 15150

Over the last decade, significant progress has been made in managing radioisotopes generated in the PWR primary systems. These include limiting the use of cobalt containing materials, along with improved fuel performance and zinc injection to passivate the corrosion layers to limit the accumulation of Co-58 and Co-60 on primary coolant surfaces. Attention here is directed to the spent fuel pool where accumulation of spent fuel and activated material represents a growing source of mobile radioactivity supplemented with periodic exchanges of water from the reactor cooling system. Characterization of this source is increasingly important to effective management of disposal options. This paper examines the radioactive resin source term as determined from routine sampling of the coolant and fuel pool liquids. Targeted resin stream sampling and radiochemical analyses conducted at Diablo Canyon serve to inform and provide context for this examination. This examination is supplemented with computer modelling using the DW James Consulting computer program, 3R-SCAN. At most operating plants daily reactor coolant samples are counted using gamma spectroscopy and recorded. These samples serve to track fuel performance and maintain water chemistry. A secondary use for this data is to maintain a day to day tracking of releases of radioisotopes important to waste disposal. Given the coolant concentrations, plant operating history, and corroborative mathematical models and sampling, accumulation of these radioisotopes in coolant cleanup system ion-exchangers can be predicted. Fuel pool sampling is less frequent, but at the same time, things change more slowly there. The fuel pool contains about ten times the volume of the reactor coolant but its cleanup system process rate is comparable to reactor coolant letdown, i.e. 5.047 - 8.833 liters per second [lps] (80-140 gallons per minute [gpm]). A spent fuel pool clean-up demineralizer flow rate is typically about 5.047 lps (80 gpm). Concentrations of longer lived radioisotopes in the spent fuel pool can be comparable to those in reactor coolant. Releases of corrosion products and fission products from the stored fuel occur at a low rate but given the overall inventory can be significant. Recognized scaling factor ratios, particularly those to Co-60, are skewed by the aging of the material in the pool. An additional consideration stems from refueling operations themselves. Prior to refueling, it is common practice to conduct a forced oxidation of the corrosion films within the reactor. This spikes the activity within the reactor coolant. Most of this activity is removed by the reactor coolant purification system prior to removing the reactor head. This paper examines the accumulation of activity in the fuel pool purification ion exchange resins and how it impacts the overall classification of those ion exchange resins. The following discussion focuses on the transport of nickel and cobalt isotopes particularly as it relates to determination of Ni-63 which has become increasingly prominent in disposal classification. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Impact of Dutch nuclear fuel cycle scenarios on radionuclide inventory intended for disposal - 15201

One of the main subjects of Dutch five-year research program into geological disposal of radioactive waste, OPERA, is the post-closure radiological safety assessment. Reliable estimates of the radionuclide inventory and matrix composition are an important input for the safety assessment. The amounts and categories of waste foreseen to be disposed in 2130 the Netherlands have been compiled by the Dutch waste management organisation COVRA. Additionally, NRG has made a characterisation of the waste (radionuclides and matrix). This reference inventory is based on the Dutch base nuclear energy scenario of operating the Dutch single reactor, the Borssele NPP, until its presently scheduled shut-down in 2033. However, changes in the presently adopted nuclear fuel cycle strategy in the Netherlands may impact both the quantities of generated radioactive waste and its composition, and therefore the source term of the radiological safety assessment. To get a grip on this uncertainty a set of alternative future fuel cycle scenarios in the Netherlands, which are in compliance with scenarios formulated in the Dutch vision documents, has been considered and evaluated. The scenarios have been analysed with the computer code DANESS, 'Dynamic Analysis of Nuclear Energy System Strategies'. The result of the DANESS analyses concerns the amount and type of the radioactive waste to be finally disposed in a deep geological repository. This also includes the inventories of the individual radionuclides that are relevant for the post-closure safety assessment to be performed in a subsequent stage of the OPERA program. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Vacuum drying of spent fuel storage canisters/casks - 'just how much water could be left in there, anyway?' - 15233

The process of moving spent fuel assemblies from wet storage in the spent fuel pool to dry storage in an inert gas environment within a canister or cask typically involves two main stages. In the first stage, the bulk of the water is removed by a draining or siphoning operation, conducted with pressure inside the canister maintained at 1.3 to 2 atm. This process removes most of the water in the cask cavity, but residual water can be left behind, in three main regions. The largest region, typically, is the bottom of the cavity below the end of the siphon tube. A second general class of locations, also located at the bottom of the cask cavity, consists of the 'dashpots' at the ends of the various non-fuel tubular structures within the fuel assemblies. For PWR assemblies, these are the control rod guide sleeve tubes and instrumentation thimbles. For BWR assemblies, these are the water rods of various designs and control blade ends in some configurations. A third class of locations consists of porous material within the cavity that can absorb water, such as thin ceramic neutron poison plates, and ostensibly intact fuel rods that nevertheless might have pinholes or fine cracks in the cladding that could allow pool water to creep inside the fuel rod. To remove residual water from these locations, the second stage of drying operations utilizes vacuum drying, by reducing the pressure sufficiently to convert the water to vapor that can then be pumped out of the canister cavity. In this operation, the cask cavity pressure is slowly reduced from the nominal condition of (1.3-2.0 atm (1000-1520 torr), to a final target pressure below 3 torr (0.004 atm). This is typically accomplished in three to five stages, with prescribed 'hold' points defined in procedures or in the Technical Specifications, to preclude sudden pressure spikes due to flashing of water to steam, or development of large local temperature gradients in the fuel rods or other cask internal components. This paper discusses the various locations in the system where residual water may 'hang up' in the cask, and presents a discussion of the physical basis for the effectiveness of vacuum drying for removing it. Results and conclusions based on realistic qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the transient heat transfer behavior of the system are presented, based on detailed modeling of a range of spent fuel canister designs and decay heat loads, most notably the 24P Dry Shielded Canisters (DSCs) stored at the Rancho Seco Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), the NAC-MPC modules at Maine Yankee, the 24P DSCs stored at Calvert Cliffs, and the Holtec HI-STORM modules at Hope Creek. The evaluations presented here show that ice formation within a spent fuel canister is highly unlikely, due to the availability of a large thermal source term in the form of the decay heat load of the spent fuel. The formation of ice is an operational concern, since it mainly affects operation of equipment external to the canister (i.e., the hoses, valves, and fittings of the vacuum drying equipment.) Evaluations are presented for quantifying the amount of residual water that could remain in the cask cavity, even after successful drying operations, since vacuum drying is a limit process, and by definition, cannot remove all of the water from the cavity, no matter how long the operation goes on, even if all of it is in vapor form. (authors)

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Toward a lean analysis for waste to support the decommissioning operation - 15321

All over the world, several nuclear facilities have been shut down few years ago and are now under dismantling or will be dismantled in the future. - Dismantling project takes place according to three major phases: - Study and definition of the dismantling scenario - Dismantling site operations - Decommissioning and final state characterization. Each step is lead in agreement with safety, security and waste management. This requires analytical tools appropriate to the radiological environment and aims. In the field of security, fissile products, explosives... will be researched and quantified while occupational safety requires quantification of radiological, carcinogenic, mutagenic and reprotoxic elements such as As, Se, Cr(IV)... or even asbestos in order to follow more and more strengthened rules. For waste management, radiological and chemical quantification are necessary but must be completed by determining physical and chemical properties such as reactivity, stability or dissolution of the waste... Required level of knowledge, analytical deadline, uncertainties, limits of detection and matrix varieties depend on the decommissioning phase. Setting up a dismantling scenario requires the most possible accurate knowledge of the initial source term present in the facility, in order to establish waste management flow-sheets, define dismantling intervention modes, and prepare the associated safety demonstrations. As history is often not sufficient, in-situ investigations and off-site laboratories are necessary to assign an initial waste and radiological inventory and propose some strategy operations. When a first scenario is chosen, more detailed samplings and analyses are required to fully prepare estimates of waste volumes and categories, and define and validate the waste recovery system that would be used during the dismantling operation. As the definition of the dismantling plan takes shape, data must be more and more accurate and reliable in order to define the waste outlet. The scaling factors for the waste must be defined in order to assure the refunding of the waste. This includes complete characterizations of various matrixes, with high precision, low detection limit in a limited time of few months, as sketchy data could lead to fix inappropriate plan Once site operations begin, it is necessary to control the safety operational conditions and waste production. Measurements requirement is under the safety threshold. Matrixes are often limited to filter. The most important factor is deadline, because operations delay is costly. Finally at the end of dismantling operations, analyses must be performed to demonstrate the successful clean-up of the work site. Analytical methods with low detection limit are required. Thus, characterization appears as a graded and iterative process and is a key issue for decommissioning and dismantling operations in term of efficiency and cost. In order to face this huge analytical demand, a strategy for sampling and characterization must be developed regarding the real needs. On site measurements are usually performed with existing hand-held instruments. A basic first level of knowledge is obtained without delay, feeding the dismantling scenario. On these bases, a sampling strategy permits to select some representative specimens to be more precise, and accurate analysis is performed on off-site laboratories introducing an additional difficulty: the sampling on the site and sub-sampling in the laboratory itself. Whatever the level of sampling, aliquots are small considering the dimension of the dismantling area. This step is crucial. Sampling strategy must be optimized according to objectives (scaling factors measurement, waste level). But in the particular case of high radioactive level waste, due to security manipulation constraints, the number and mass of samples collected are limited. At the opposite for low level waste, large number of samples is collected meaning that large analytical method capacity is necessary. Optimization of the analytical plan is critical. The analytical strategy (including control of sub-sampling, analysis sequence according to analytical capability and performances, especially for pure beta emitters) developed for real case will be detailed. (authors)

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Waste Management Approach for a Potential Future U.S. Closed Fuel Cycle - 16233

The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy has chartered an effort to develop technologies to enable safe and cost effective recycle of commercial used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the U.S. Part of this effort includes the evaluation of exiting waste management technologies for effective treatment of wastes in the context of current U.S. regulations and development of waste forms and processes with significant cost and/or performance benefits over those existing. This study summarizes the results of these ongoing efforts with a focus on the highly radioactive primary waste streams. The primary streams considered and the recommended waste forms include: - Tritium separated from either a low volume gas stream or a high volume water stream. The recommended waste form is low-water cement in high integrity containers. - Iodine-129 separated from off-gas streams in aqueous processing. There are a range of potentially suitable waste forms. As a reference case, a glass composite material (GCM) formed by the encapsulation of the silver Mordenite (AgZ) getter material in a low-temperature glass is assumed. A number of alternatives with distinct advantages are also considered including a fused silica waste form with encapsulated nano-sized AgI crystals. - Carbon-14 separated from LWR fuel treatment off-gases and immobilized as a CaCO{sub 3} in a cement waste form. - Krypton-85 separated from LWR and SFR fuel treatment off-gases and stored as a compressed gas. - An aqueous reprocessing high-level waste (HLW) raffinate waste which is immobilized by the vitrification process in one of three forms: a single phase borosilicate glass, a borosilicate based glass ceramic, or a multi-phased titanate ceramic [e.g., synthetic rock (Synroc)]. - An undissolved solids (UDS) fraction from aqueous reprocessing of LWR fuel that is either included in the borosilicate HLW glass or is immobilized in the form of a metal alloy in the case of glass ceramics or titanate ceramics. - Zirconium-based LWR fuel cladding hulls and stainless steel (SS) fuel assembly hardware that are washed and super-compacted for disposal or as an alternative Zr purification and reuse (or disposal as low-level waste, LLW) by reactive gas separations. - Electrochemical process salt HLW which is immobilized in a glass bonded Sodalite waste form known as the ceramic waste form (CWF). - Electrochemical process UDS and SS cladding hulls which are melted into an iron based alloy waste form. Mass and volume estimates for each of the recommended waste forms based on the source terms from a representative flowsheet are reported. (authors)

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