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ARIES 2022

An annual report of ARIES FY 2022 research highlights and capabilities, partner impacts, engagement and outreach, and messages from DOE and an External Advisory Board member.

clean energy↗

ARIES and PEGI Platform - Overview and Background

NREL's Power Electronic Grid Interface (PEGI) Workshop, held October 13, 2020, focused on the research challenges of operating power systems with ever-higher levels of inverter-based generation and power-electronic-based load. This presentation shares an overview of ARIES and the PEGI Platform.

ARIES↗

Cyber Threat Landscape for Distribution Systems

INL cyber analysts will present an overview of the current threat landscape for distribution systems. We will begin with examples of known attacks that have occurred recently to motivate the threat analysis and mitigation discussed in the remainder of the presentation. Examples may include the attacks affecting wind plants in Europe in Spring 2022, ransomware attacks on city utilities and commercial distribution systems, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) including the attacks on Ukrainian electric system in 2015 and 2016, as well as more recent evidence of other APT activity. We will present the end-to-end attack paths and discuss the various attacker skills, financing, motivations, and access that contributed to these attacks. In the second part of this presentation, we will discuss mitigating the cyber threats for distribution systems. We will discuss recent publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and explain their relevant context for distribution system security. Likely attacks to affect distribution systems, such as denial-of-service (DoS), ransomware, edge-device compromise, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) will be described. In addition to an overview of these kinds of attacks, we will provide examples of the various ways in which these attacks can start and what systems they can affect. Simple, cost-effective counter-measures to these attacks will be discussed and we will emphasize how these mitigations can reduce threats when properly applied and maintained.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Data-driven cyber attack detection and mitigation for decentralized wide-area protection and control in smart grids

Modern power systems have already evolved into complicated cyber physical systems (CPS), often referred to as smart grids, due to the continuous expansion of the electrical infrastructure, the augmentation of the number of heterogeneous system components and players, and the consequential application of a diversity of information and telecommunication technologies to facilitate the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) of the day-to-day power system operation. Because of the reliance on cyber technologies, WAMPAC, among other critical functions, is prone to various malicious cyber attacks. Successful cyber attacks, especially those sabotage the operation of Bulk Electric System (BES), can cause great financial losses and social panics. Application of conventional IT security solutions is indispensable, but it often turns out to be insufficient to mitigate sophisticated attacks that deploy zero-day vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics. To further improve the resilience of the operation of smart grids when facing cyber attacks, it is desirable to make the WAMPAC functions per se capable of detecting various anomalies automatically, carrying out adaptive activity adjustments in time and thus staying unimpaired even under attack. Most of the existing research efforts attempt to achieve this by adding novel functional modules, such as model-based anomaly detectors, to the legacy centralized WAMPAC functions. In contrast, this dissertation investigates the application of data-driven algorithms in cyber attack detection and mitigation within a decentralized architecture aiming at improving the situational awareness and self-adaptiveness of WAMPAC. First part of the research focuses on the decentralization of System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) with Multi-Agent System (MAS), within which the data-driven anomaly detection and optimal adaptive load shedding are further explored. An algorithm named as Support Vector Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree (SVMLDT) is proposed for the anomaly detection, which provides satisfactory detection accuracy as well as decision-making interpretability. The adaptive load shedding is carried out by every agent individually with dynamic programming. The load shedding relies on the load profile propagation among peer agents and the attack adaptiveness is accomplished by maintaining the historical mean of load shedding proportion. Load shedding only takes place after the consensus pertaining to the anomaly detection is achieved among all interconnected agents and it serves the purpose of mitigating certain cyber attacks. The attack resilience of the decentralized SIPS is evaluated using IEEE 39 bus model. It is shown that, unlike the traditional centralized SIPS, the proposed solution is able to carry out the remedial actions under most Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second part investigates the clustering based anomalous behavior detection and peer-assisted mitigation for power system generation control. To reduce the dimensionality of the data, three metrics are designed to interpret the behavior conformity of generator within the same balancing area. Semi-supervised K-means clustering and a density sensitive clustering algorithm based on Hierarchical DBSCAN (HDBSCAN) are both applied in clustering in the 3D feature space. Aiming to mitigate the cyber attacks targeting the generation control commands, a peer-assisted strategy is proposed. When the control commands from control center is detected as anomalous, i.e. either missing or the payload of which have been manipulated, the generating unit utilizes the peer data to infer and estimate a new generation adjustment value as replacement. Linear regression is utilized to obtain the relation of control values received by different generating units, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is adopted during the peer selection and 1-dimensional clustering is performed with the inferred control values, which are followed by the final control value estimation. The mitigation strategy proposed requires that generating units can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of the proposed solution in counteracting data availability and data integrity attacks targeting the generation controls. However, the strategy stays effective only if less than half of the generating units are compromised and it is not able to mitigate cyber attacks targeting the measurements involved in the generation control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber SHIELD Flyers

Fliers and introductory program power point documents. The goal of these documents are to provide renewable owner/operators with information about DOE funded programs being led by INL. Fliers and intro ppt's describe why renewable owner/operators should consider using INL programs under these projects. Cyber SHIELD - SOLAR Cyber SHIELD -WIND Cyber SHIELD - HYDRO

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Language-Theoretic Data Analysis to Support ICS Protocol Baselining

Critical infrastructure stakeholders need to baseline their systems to understand expected protocol communications. Baseline behaviors may vary based on operational context. Expected operations during a maintenance window, for example, may be different from normal operations. Furthermore, constructing system baselines for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is difficult and time-consuming. ICS processes generate artifacts expressed across heterogeneous data sources such as network traffic and device logs. This paper explores the hypothesis that such ICS artifacts form a language in the language-theoretic sense. From a theoretical perspective, the variety of implementations of ICS protocols and constrained environment of OT networks provide a rich application domain for language-theoretic approaches. We present several use cases related to the practical construction of system baselines: grammars for data fusion, language dialects for device fingerprinting, and security automata for system baselining

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

What Role Do Aggregators Play in Power System Security and Resilience? Preprint

Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.

aggregator↗

NREL Project CloudZero

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) CloudZero project is evaluating the ability to reliably and securely manage complex energy systems from the cloud, identifying major technical and regulatory barriers to cloud adoption, suggesting new security controls and best practices for cloud applications, and empowering industry to embrace the cloud, where appropriate.

cloud↗

CyberStrike STORMCLOUD

This presentation will be shared at the "Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G)" workshop at RE+ 2023. It provides an overview of the work INL and Sandia have done to develop CyberStrike STORMCLOUD, a training program was designed to enhance the ability of renewable energy and operators to prepare for a cyber incident impacting industrial control systems with specific considerations of the architectures and limitations of renewable energy.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

ARIES 2023

An annual report of ARIES FY 2023 research impacts and capabilities, partner engagements, and messages from DOE steering committee and an External Advisory Board members.

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems↗

S9 Presentations - CELR

Presentations have previously been cleared with limited new information being added.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Attack Surface of Renewable Energy Technologies

This slide deck presents an overview of the threat landscape for renewable energy technologies. It highlights he growing penetration of renewable resources and potential impact of an attack. Standard architectures are shared to highlight where vulnerabilities may exist and attack paths to reach critical infrastructure. We discuss threat actors and attack paths. Several recent events impacting renewable energy assets or companies are explained.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

CIE Update for NERC RSTC (March 2024)

This brief presentation provides a brief overview of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), explains public resources available for CIE application, and reviews current efforts to expand CIE knowledge and use. To be presented to the NERC Reliability and Security Technical Committee at their annual in-person meetings in San Diego, CA.

42 ENGINEERING↗