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At least 1,531 records · Page 85

Designing Flexibility into the Authorized Radioactive Contents of the 9982 Shipping Package

The 9982 radioactive material shipping package, or the 9982, differs from the others by allowing a multitude of radionuclides instead of a single defined set. While allowing flexibility, this requires more justification on why these contents would be worthwhile and why they would not cause various safety hazards when shipped together. The latter was covered through mass limit calculations, and the potential uses for the package are shown through comparison with historical shipments. Here, the mass limits were already calculated[1] and used to show three example shipments are suitable for the 9982 as well. Plutonium stored in 3013 containers[2], training sources shipped in 9977 packages[3], and americium standards shipped in 9978 packages[4] were all analyzed. The mass of each radionuclide and the corresponding mass limit were used to first determine if the listed content could be shipped. If so, the maximum allowed mass of such contents is also calculated in order to see if the 200-gram fissile limit for the 9982 would be violated if additional material was packed. The sum-of-the-fractions method produces contents that do not violate the mass limits or exceed the 200-gram fissile limit. These sets also serve as realistic examples of what may be shipped in the 9982. Well-founded example contents will help the approval of the package by showing its compatibility with previously shipped material. Unfounded hypothetical contents would not show the usefulness of having a wide variety of allowed radionuclides. More contents may be developed in order to incorporate other radionuclides that were not present in these three examples. The light elements will also need to be evaluated due to their exclusion currently preventing some materials from being allowed in the 9982.

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Development and evaluation of a multi-functional heat pump with embedded thermal storage

We developed and tested a novel multi-functional packaged vertical heat pump designed for multi-family buildings, capable of providing space cooling, space heating, water heating, and energy storage integration. The system employs a 3-speed scroll compressor and supports energy-efficient cooling and heating across different ambient conditions, while utilizing both indoor and outdoor air sources for water heating. Key performance metrics include an integrated energy efficiency ratio of 18.0 for cooling, a heating seasonal performance factor of 10.0, and a coefficient of performance (COP) of 2.1 for heating in cold climates down to −15 ˚C. Additionally, the system delivers an annual water heating COP greater than 4.0, with outstanding performance in combined space cooling and water heating modes, achieving a total COP of 8.8 by recovering condenser waste heat. The heat pump also demonstrated thermal energy storage capabilities, integrating with phase change material systems to store heating and cooling energy. Furthermore, this versatile system offers a promising solution for improving energy efficiency and sustainability in multi-family buildings, providing high-performance heating, cooling, and water heating across a range of climates.

COP↗

Payload Production for the Fire Testing of Primary Containment Vessels

One safety concern for the storage of nuclear or hazardous materials within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex is the pressure response behaviors of Primary Containment Vessels (PCVs) of a 9975 shipping package. Although there are many conservative estimates for the pressure response behavior of PCV in high temperature environments, these estimations remain unchecked by experiment. Conservative estimates frequently build in large safety margins which result in a reduced operating range and potentially unnecessary operation restrictions. In an attempt to alleviate some of these barriers, Nuclear & Criticality Safety Engineering (N&CSE) has requested the fire testing of primary containment vessels.

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Integrated Wash-Aid, Treatment, and Emergency Reuse System (IWATERS) for Strontium Contaminations - 17390

The Integrated Wash-Aid, Treatment, and Emergency Reuse System (IWATERS) is being developed to mitigate the release of radioactivity to the urban environment by disseminating, collecting, and processing decontamination wash water. Previously, IWATERS was designed for the treatment of surfaces contaminated with radioactive cesium. Experiments were performed to investigate the expansion of IWATERS for strontium contamination. Bench-scale tests were performed to investigate various counter-ions and chelators to promote ion exchange of strontium from building surfaces. Desorption results for Cs, Sr, and Eu from concrete aggregate and concrete, brick, and asphalt coupons using low- and high-pressure flow with Ca{sup 2+} and Ba{sup 2+} rich wash water are reported along with those from non-porous surfaces such as glass and vinyl siding. Several sorbents were tested for their ability to specifically separate Sr{sup 2+} from these high ionic strength wash waters. Alkali metal and alkaline earth salts were found to be effective counter-ions for decontamination of Sr{sup 2+}, which may facilitate the use of common sorbents, even if their K{sub d} values are <100 mL/g. In practice, low K{sub d} values require the use of large quantities of sorbent. Computer simulations were run using the GoldSim Contaminant Fate Module software package to optimize the efficiency of IWATERS for strontium and account for the technical limitations of the sorbents. This modeling allows greater flexibility to design the wash water recycling system for various end-user specifications including options from rain barrel designs for treating runoff from roofs and facades to larger options like drainage basins for larger-scale wash down activities. (authors)

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Investigation of INL Site Implementation of ARG-US

The Packaging Certification and Life Cycle Management department at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed a suite of monitoring systems collectively referred to here as ARG-US. ARG-US is used to provide necessary data for nuclear facility and system operation and maintenance. ARG-US has been previously demonstrated in hot cells, radioactive material (RAM) storage areas, and RAM shipment trucks. It has also been installed directly on RAM storage and shipment containers. ARG-US offers some unique advantages over other commercially available systems by using wireless data connections, battery power supplies, and customizable monitoring methods. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been tasked with investigating applications for ARG-US at INL site facilities, which are operated by several different contractors. The initial investigation scope centered on CPP-603 Wet & Dry Fuel Storage Facility in relation to the upcoming DOE Spent (SNF) Packaging Demonstration. The investigation has been led by the Used Fuel Management Department in the Nuclear Science and Technology Directorate. This investigation is expected to recommend processes or facilities at the INL site at which to implement ARG-US systems. INL has engaged local site technical and oversite representatives, security, nuclear safeguards, and program management to identify good candidates for ARG-US test implementations. INL has identified high-level goals for any INL site implementation of ARG-US: provide unique testing environments, prompt development of new monitoring methods/techniques for the ARG-US suite, and acquire useful monitoring for the user facility. To these ends, INL suggests 3 program areas for further investigation: CPP-603 Fuel Handling Cave (FHC), legacy mixed waste storage systems at Idaho Nuclear Technology & Engineering Center (INTEC) known as the “tank farm”, and periodic and emergency environmental monitoring. This progress report relates activities undertaken in this investigation, describes the preliminary areas of interest for limited scope ARG-US testing or implementation, and relays expected actions needed to complete the task scope. This report offers an opportunity to the program sponsor, technical leads at ANL, and INL site representatives to give feedback on the initial assessment and make recommendations on the forthcoming activities.

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Shaker Table Test

This report describes the Shaker Table Test conducted on September 12, 2018, at the Dynamic Certification Laboratories (DCL) in Sparks, Nevada. This report satisfies Milestone M3SF-19SN010202021 Shaker Table Test, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Work Package (Parent WBS # 1.08.01.02.02; Work Package #SF-19SN01020202). The Shaker Table Test is related to the Multi-Modal Transportation Test (MMTT) conducted in 2017. During the MMTT, accelerations and strains were measured on the transportation platform, ENsa UNiversal (ENUN) 32P dual-purpose rail cask, cradle, basket, and three surrogate 17x17 pressurized water reactor (PWR) assemblies (one from SNL, one from Spain and one from Korea).

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Hanford Single-Shell Tank and Double-Shell Tank Integrity Programs - 16390

Waste at Hanford is stored in 149 single-shell tanks and 28 double-shell tanks. Concerns related to aging radioactive waste storage facilities throughout the DOE complex led to Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) developing guidelines for structural integrity programs for tank systems. The committee of experts who developed these guidelines is commonly known as the Tank Structural Integrity Panel (TSIP). The DOE has subsequently adopted these guidelines, and requires site operators to have a program consistent with them. The Double-Shell Tank (DST) integrity is maintained with a variety of activities such as ultrasonic and visual inspections, chemistry controls, corrosion monitoring and structural analyses methods. In October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) determined that the primary tank of 241-AY-102 was leaking. WRPS contracted a panel of experts from industry and academia to provide advice and recommendations for the DST Integrity Program. The panel focused on three concerns: - No Early warning - Determine why the existing DST Integrity Program did not predict a primary tank failure or provide early warning of the pending failure. - Program improvements - Recommend activities to either predict a primary tank failure or increase the probability of early warning. - Forensic recommendations - The panel provided additional recommendations regarding forensic assessment of Tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102) to facilitate a conclusion on why the leak occurred. WRPS has prepared a response to the concerns of the panel coupled with recommendations for project action to strengthen the DST Integrity Program [4]. The purpose of this DST Integrity Improvement Plan is to translate the recommendations to specific project activities that are technically and practically responsive. To improve the understanding of the Single-Shell Tank (SST) integrity, WRPS, the Department of Energy-Office of River Protection tank operations contractor, developed an enhanced Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project (SSTIP) in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity, consisting of various subject matter experts in industry and academia, was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. This panel developed 33 recommendations in four main areas of interest: structural integrity, liner degradation, leak integrity and prevention, and mitigation of contamination migration. In late 2010, seventeen of these recommendations were used to develop the basis for the M-45-10-1 Change Package for the Hanford Federal Agreement and Compliance Order, also known as the Tri-Party Agreement. The change package identified two phases of work for SST integrity. The initial phase, which was completed in 2015, was focused on efforts to envelope the integrity of the tanks. It was divided into two primary areas of investigation: structural integrity and leak integrity. If necessary, based on the outcome from the initial work, a second phase would be focused on further definition of the integrity of the tanks and liners. The two combined phases are designed to support the formal integrity assessment of the Hanford SSTs in 2018 by an Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer. This paper will summarize the current status of the DST and SST Integrity Programs and discuss the ongoing efforts to improve these programs. (authors)

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National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2017

Report submitted to regulators (State of Nevada and EPA Region IV). Required to document compliance with 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since nuclear testing ended in 1992, radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2017, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 5.7% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2017 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the adjacent U.S. Air Force Nevada Test and Training Range; this individual received a dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.0000098 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

INL Site ARG-US Implementation – FY22 Activities and FY23 Plans

The Packaging Certification and Life Cycle Management program at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed a suite of monitoring systems collectively referred to here as ARG-US. ARG-US provides necessary data for nuclear facility and system operation and maintenance, and has been previously demonstrated in hot cells, radioactive material (RAM) storage areas, and RAM shipment trucks. It has also been installed directly on RAM storage and shipment containers. ARG-US offers some unique advantages over other commercially available systems by using wireless data connections, battery power supplies, and customizable monitoring methods. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been tasked with investigating applications for ARG-US at INL site facilities, which are operated by several different contractors. The initial investigation scope centered on CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility in relation to the upcoming Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Packaging Demonstration. The investigation has been led by the Used Fuel Management Department in INL’s Nuclear Science and Technology (NS&T) directorate. This investigation is expected to recommend INL site processes or facilities in which to implement ARG-US systems. INL has engaged local site technical and oversight representatives, security, nuclear safeguards, and program management personnel to identify good candidates for ARG-US test implementations. INL has identified the following high-level goals for any INL site implementation of ARG-US: provide unique testing environments, prompt development of new monitoring methods/techniques for the ARG-US suite, and acquire useful monitoring for the user facility. As a result, INL suggests three program areas for further investigation: CPP-603 Fuel Handling Cave (FHC), legacy mixed waste storage systems at Idaho Nuclear Technology & Engineering Center (INTEC) known as the “Tank Farm,” and periodic and emergency environmental monitoring. This progress report relates activities undertaken in this investigation, describes the preliminary areas of interest for limited scope ARG-US testing or implementation, and relays expected actions for completing the task scope. This report offers an opportunity to the program sponsor, technical leads at ANL, and INL site representatives to give feedback on the initial assessment and make recommendations on the forthcoming activities.

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Further Analyses of the Unburied Goiania Accident Packages - 19161

In 1987, in the city of Goiania, Brazil, a derelict teletherapy machine was disassembled by scavengers and Cs-137 was released in the environment, unleashing the biggest radiological accident in Brazil. During the 15 days before the accident was acknowledged, some contaminated materials were sold and delivered to recycling factories in a few cities in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil, in the form of metal scrap and recycled paper bales. The contaminated material was then collected, the metal scrap was conditioned in forty-three 200-liter drums, and the paper bales were stored in fifty 1.6 cubic meter steel boxes at the interim storage of the Nuclear and Energy Research Institute (IPEN), in the city of Sao Paulo, and there remained ever since. In 2017, 30 years later, initial analyses were performed at a sample of these boxes, checking for their activity, weight, and incongruences between the original values recorded at the time of collection and the measurement results 30 years later. The results indicated that none of the boxes checked were close to the clearance limit and that, without any sort of treatment, this radioactive waste should be stored for at least 150 years more. Visual inspection could not be performed at that time. Nowadays, some of the boxes were opened and samples from the contaminated material inside were taken for analysis. The main objective of this work is to report the results from the evaluation of the physical state of this material. After these analyses, the treatment options for volume reduction that were previously proposed were reviewed, and the method that best suits the current characteristics of the waste was chosen. (authors)

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Sampling and Analysis Plan for USDOE/NNSA Pantex Plant Groundwater Remedial Action Progress

This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) was originally developed as part of the Remedial Design Submittal Package required by the Interagency Agreement (IAG) for the United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (USDOE/NNSA) Pantex Plant. The SAP describes specifications for data collection, methods of sample collection and analysis, and requirements for quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) activities implemented during the life cycle of the program to ensure that data are of sufficient quality for their intended purpose (i.e., to support decision making regarding remediation of the groundwater beneath Pantex). The SAP was prepared according to United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance on preparation of Quality Assurance Project Plans (QAPPs) QA/R-5 (EPA, 2001) and is designed to be a stand-alone document that describes both field sampling activities as well as QA/QC activities. The SAP is incorporated by reference to the compliance plan provisions of Hazardous Waste Permit No. 50284, issued by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and was submitted as part of the Remedial Design/Remedial Action Work Plan submitted to EPA in accordance with the Interagency Agreement.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

M4FT-16LL080302052-Update to Thermodynamic Database Development and Sorption Database Integration

This progress report (Level 4 Milestone Number M4FT-16LL080302052) summarizes research conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) within the Argillite Disposal R&D Work Package Number FT-16LL08030205. The focus of this research is the thermodynamic modeling of Engineered Barrier System (EBS) materials and properties and development of thermodynamic databases and models to evaluate the stability of EBS materials and their interactions with fluids at various physico-chemical conditions relevant to subsurface repository environments. The development and implementation of equilibrium thermodynamic models are intended to describe chemical and physical processes such as solubility, sorption, and diffusion.

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Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-F-8:4 Fuel Storage Basin West Side Adjacent and Side Slope Soils

This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action, sampling activities, and compliance with cleanup criteria for the 118-F-8:4 Fuel Storage Basin West Side Adjacent and Side Slope Soils. The rectangular-shaped concrete basin on the south side of the 105-F Reactor building served as an underwater collection, storage, and transfer facility for irradiated fuel elements discharged from the reactor.

100F Area↗

In-situ Raman Instrumentation and Measurements in Supercritical Water Oxidation Systems

Due to the advent of recent advances in reactor designs and operational procedures, renewed attention has been given to a host of supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) technology applications. This includes resource recovery, water reclamation, and solid waste destruction. SCWO is often recognized as a “green technology” because of its ability to extract useful energy while producing benign products from environmentally challenging waste streams (e.g., wet organic wastes, pharmaceutical wastes, military wastes). The present work was motivated by NASA’s interests in solid waste management and water recovery for long-duration space missions. To that end, the main focus of this paper is to present work on characterizing the behavior of supercritical water oxidation systems utilizing state of the art laser Raman spectroscopy. The main benefit of Raman diagnostics is its ability to identify chemical composition and to measure concentrations of the compounds involved in the reaction. Two separate Raman systems for SCWO measurements that have been developed for this study will be described. The first system is a 2-D traversing system useful for making in-situ measurements in conditions where spatial gradients of species and temperature are important and has been successfully utilized in making species (ethanol, oxygen, water, nitrogen and carbon dioxide) concentrations and temperature measurements in ethanol hydrothermal jet flames. The second system is a packaged modular Raman probe unit for portable deployment to different reactors and is more suitable for relatively homogeneous systems such as a batch reactor. The design, development, and examples of obtained results from both systems will be presented for various reactant streams. Reaction rate and fuel conversion estimates from chemistry models will also be presented.

supercritical water oxidation↗

A Novel Mobile Examination and Remediation Facility for On-Site Remediation of Dry Storage Systems - 18389

Most of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in dry storage in the United States is safely and securely stored in dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters [1]. However, some of the SNF is stored in storage-only (i.e., non-transportable) packages, or packages that may become nonconforming for continued storage or transportation for a variety of reasons. Currently, the capability to remediate dry storage systems (DSSs) for SNF that are not transportable or that need to be repaired to maintain confinement boundary integrity during storage service does not exist without on-site access to a spent fuel pool. Hence, there is a potential future need for a mobile facility with remediation capabilities that can be used at multiple storage installations. These capabilities would permit needed repairs to an existing DSS to support continued storage or for the dry transfer of fuel to a new conveyance suitable for transport, if necessary. This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. A novel design concept for a Mobile Examination and Remediation Facility (MERF) is proposed with functions and capabilities to remediate a DSS. The proposed MERF would be a multi-purpose facility, remotely operated and computer-controlled with semi-automated equipment to allow trained operators to safely perform remediation activities while keeping worker radiation dose as low as reasonably achievable. It would include a shielded rotating platform with support towers and would use commercial off- the-shelf examination and repair equipment. A slip ring arrangement underneath the rotating platform would allow for the power supply without impeding the continuous rotation and would simplify cable management. The support towers would be mounted on the rotating platform, and each tower would have vertical and horizontal positioning capability for axial and radial tool location. The rotating platform would be attached to the main MERF structure. Capabilities would include visual, surface, and volumetric examinations to fully characterize physical conditions on canister surface before and after a repair; repair techniques, e.g., laser beam welding, friction stir welding, or cold spray, to perform needed remediation activities; and associated equipment for surface preparation such as cutting and grinding equipment. The proposed design would be simple, modular, robust, economically viable, and easily transportable and would have a small footprint. The modular design would present several advantages including compatibility with a variety of different DSSs, on-site assembly, and transportability; it also would be built in interchangeable sections to facilitate decontamination. Further, shielding would be supplemented through interface with the existing transfer cask and storage overpack. Robustness and canister stability would be achieved using pneumatic holders and steel support structures designed with vibration absorbers to reduce impacts and/or a 'pendulum' effect during a seismic event. Thus, the proposed MERF would be designed to: (i) minimize handling of an affected DSS to the extent practicable, (ii) provide radiation shielding and minimize dose to operators and the public during remediation activities, and (iii) enable examination, repair, and repackaging. This paper describes the proposed MERF design concept and capabilities, main components, equipment, different modes of operation, and operating procedures. Structural and safety assessments would need to be performed before final design, licensing, and deployment. The MERF is evaluated with respect to regulatory impact (first of a kind, prior experience), operational impact (safety, security, staffing, ongoing operations, constraints), worker dose (low, medium, high), cost (low, medium, high), schedule (duration, time sequence), and technology readiness level. (authors)

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Humidity data for 9975 shipping packages with cane fiberboard

The 9975 surveillance program is developing a technical basis to support extending the storage period of 9975 packages in K-Area Complex beyond the currently approved 15 years. A key element of this effort is developing a better understanding of degradation of the fiberboard assembly under storage conditions. This degradation is influenced greatly by the moisture content of the fiberboard, which is not well characterized on an individual package basis. Direct measurements of humidity and fiberboard moisture content have been made on two test packages with cane fiberboard and varying internal heat levels from 0 up to 19W. With an internal heat load, a temperature gradient in the fiberboard assembly leads to varying relative humidity in the air around the fiberboard. However, the absolute humidity tends to remain approximately constant throughout the package. The moisture content of fiberboard varies under the influence of several phenomena. Changes in local fiberboard temperature (from an internal heat load) can cause fiberboard moisture changes through absorption or evaporation. Fiberboard degradation at elevated temperature will produce water as a byproduct. And the moisture level within the package is constantly seeking equilibrium with that of the surrounding room air, which varies on a daily and seasonal basis. One indicator of the moisture condition within a 9975 package might be obtained by measuring the relative humidity in the upper air space, by inserting a humidity probe through a caplug hole. However, the data indicate that for the higher internal heat loads (15 and 19 watts), a large variation in internal moisture conditions produces little or no variation in the air space relative humidity. Therefore, this approach does not appear to be sensitive to fiberboard moisture variations at the higher heat loads which are of most interest to maintaining fiberboard integrity.

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Model Package Report: Plateau to River Groundwater Model Version 8.3

This model package report documents the groundwater flow component of the Plateau to River Groundwater Model (P2R Model), which is a groundwater flow and contaminant fate and transport (F&T) simulation model used to support remedial activities conducted by CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The objective of this report is to describe the modeling objectives, conceptualization, model implementation, calibration, sensitivity, uncertainty, configuration control, limitations, and future model enhancements of the groundwater flow component of the P2R Model.

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CASTOR V casks: quiver for damaged fuel rods

After the accident at Fukushima in 2011, 8 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Germany were shut down immediately and parliament decided a phase-out of nuclear energy by 2022. As prerequisite for a quick dismantling of the shut-down NPPs, all fuel has to be removed from the spent fuel pools as soon as possible. For over 20 years, spent fuel assemblies from German NPPs have already been stored in CASTOR dual purpose casks by GNS. Already more than 1200 CASTOR casks are stored in dry interim storage facilities worldwide, and there is an additional demand for several hundred more casks for the remaining spent fuel assemblies in Germany until the final phase-out. Furthermore the phase-out decision has triggered the demand for a complementary solution for the damaged fuel rods that have been collected separately in the pools for disposal after the NPP shut-down. In 2011, GNS started to develop a disposal concept for these damaged fuel rods. For that purpose, GNS designed 2 quivers for damaged fuel rods to fit into square tubes of the basket of the CASTOR V/19 (PWR) and the CASTOR V/52 (BWR) respectively. The customisable internal baskets of the quivers facilitate the disposal of a large variety of nuclear inventory. Furthermore, the quiver features a robust design and a welded closure system. This design has been affirmed by a series of tests and qualification processes, supervised by the German authorities. This first of its kind solution ensures the dry interim storage of damaged fuel rods. The package design approval for the quiver for CASTOR V/19 is expected for 2016. This presentation will focus on the design of the Quivers in combination with the CASTOR V casks and describe the challenges during the licensing procedures. We will show the components of the Quiver and explain their mechanical characteristics during accident conditions of transport as well as the drying and welding process necessary to enable the long term storage of the Quivers. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗