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Experience of Non-Technological Waste Solidification with Polymers at Radium Institute - 13530

In the run of scientific and production activities in Radium Institute there are generated the liquid radioactive wastes (LRW) of the most various compositions, which are partially processed (with the use of cementation technology) as accumulated and removed to the special-purpose enterprise ('Radon') for a long-term storage. The process of cementation has wide practical application including the use for a long time at Radium Institute for solidification of aqueous solutions. One of the problems appearing at laboratory waste processing consists in a presence of organic substances in aqueous solutions and high acid concentration. Solidification of such waste (water-organic) also runs into a number of serious difficulties due to organic liquid and cement incompatibility. In this connection, development of advanced technologies with using high-tech polymers seems to be quite justified. (authors)

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Alternative Liquid DSA Containers for Sludge Slurry Storage in the SRNL Shielded Cells

A pending revision of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) defines “DSA containers” for liquid sludge slurries as containers not susceptible to a flashing spray release in a fire and requires that a list of DSA containers be maintained. High Level Waste (HLW) samples are typically received from the Savannah River Site (SRS) tank farm after retrieval from the storage tanks. Glass bottles are preferred for long-term storage of radioactive liquid sludge slurry samples but are not on the DSA container list. An evaluation has been conducted to identify vessel lids for the glass bottles that would vent prior to pressurization and liquid superheating in a fire event. Low melting Field’s Metal eutectic alloy with a melting point of 62 °C has been identified as a preferred material of construction for vessel lids for this application because the material is resistant to puncture and is expected to have good chemical compatibility and radiation stability in the shielded cells environment. A test vessel was designed to evaluate the alloy and confirm that it would melt before the water in the vessel reaches the boiling point. The tests confirmed: 1) that the reported melting point of the alloy was accurate, 2) that a top fashioned from this material will melt creating an open atmosphere in the vessel headspace prior to sample boiling under moderate and fast heating rates, and 3) that nonuniform heating of the bottle from the bottom also results in melting of the alloy prior to boiling. Based on the results, neither an engulfing fire with standing or toppled bottles or a fire producing localized heat at the vessel bottom would result in flashing spray conditions.

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Panel Session 124: Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a System for Transportation of SNF/UNF

An audience of approximately 24 attended this panel session, which focused on the current challenges and status of establishing a transportation system for spent and used nuclear fuel (SNF/UNF), which includes planning efforts, continuing impacts, risk assessment, equipment (e.g., rail cars, handling equipment, and fuel storage systems), and transportation routing. Individual panelist presentations focused on: - Planning for removal of SNF and greater-than-Class C (GTCC) waste from the shut down Oyster Creek nuclear power plant site; - Scope and workshop conducted to better understand how the railroad carriers are likely to route shipments of SNF based on U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) route risk assessment regulatory requirements; - Atlas railcar design and fabrication project for producing new railcars for transporting SNF that are compliant with Association of American Railroads (AAR) Standard S-2043.

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Characterization of the SRNL-Washed tank 51 sludge batch 9 qualification sample

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) personnel have been requested to qualify the next sludge batch (Sludge Batch 9 – SB9) for processing at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). To accomplish this task, Savannah River Remediation (SRR) sent SRNL a 3-L sample of Tank 51H slurry to be characterized, washed, and then used in a lab-scale demonstration of the DWPF flowsheet (after combining with Tank 40H sludge). SRNL has washed the Tank 51H sample per the Tank Farm washing strategy as of October 20, 2015. A part of the qualification process is extensive radionuclide and chemical characterization of the SRNL-washed Tank 51H slurry. This report documents the chemical characterization of the washed slurry; radiological characterization is in progress and will be documented in a separate report. The analytical results of this characterization are comparable to the Tank Farm projections. Therefore, it is recommended that SRNL use this washed slurry for the ongoing SB9 qualification activities.

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Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure Evaluations for Removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report provides evaluations of the NPP site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure for removing SNF from 19 NPP sites and the Morris Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The material to be removed from the NPP sites includes both the SNF and the greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste)3 that is stored, or will be stored, at the sites. This report is an update of the report Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure Evaluations for Removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Maheras et al. 2021) and includes expansion of the site evaluations to include operating nuclear power plant (NPP) sites and to incorporate updated site inventory data. Figures that include the number of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies and metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) in a single figure have also been added to the report.

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Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: Characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste.

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TECHNOLOGY SUMMARY ADVANCING TANK WASTE RETREIVAL AND PROCESSING

This technology overview provides a high-level summary of technologies being investigated and developed by Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) to advance Hanford Site tank waste retrieval and processing. Technology solutions are outlined, along with processes and priorities for selecting and developing them.

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An Initial Evaluation of Characterization and Closure Options for Underground Pipelines within a Hanford Site Single-Shell Tank Farm - 13210

The Hanford Site includes 149 single-shell tanks, organized in 12 'tank farms,' with contents managed as high-level mixed waste. The Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order requires that one tank farm, the Waste Management Area C, be closed by June 30, 2019. A challenge to this project is the disposition and closure of Waste Management Area C underground pipelines. Waste Management Area C contains nearly seven miles of pipelines and 200 separate pipe segments. The pipelines were taken out of service decades ago and contain unknown volumes and concentrations of tank waste residuals from past operations. To understand the scope of activities that may be required for these pipelines, an evaluation was performed. The purpose of the evaluation was to identify what, if any, characterization methods and/or closure actions may be implemented at Waste Management Area C for closure of Waste Management Area C by 2019. Physical and analytical data do not exist for Waste Management Area C pipeline waste residuals. To develop estimates of residual volumes and inventories of contamination, an extensive search of available information on pipelines was conducted. The search included evaluating historical operation and occurrence records, physical attributes, schematics and drawings, and contaminant inventories associated with the process history of plutonium separations facilities and waste separations and stabilization operations. Scoping analyses of impacts to human health and the environment using three separate methodologies were then developed based on the waste residual estimates. All analyses resulted in preliminary assessments, indicating that pipeline waste residuals presented a comparably low long-term impact to groundwater with respect to soil, tank and other ancillary equipment residuals, but exceeded Washington State cleanup requirement values. In addition to performing the impact analyses, the assessment evaluated available sampling technologies and pipeline removal or treatment technologies. The evaluation accounted for the potential high worker risk, high cost, and schedule impacts associated with characterization, removal, or treatment of pipelines within Waste Management Area C for closure. This assessment was compared to the unknown, but estimated low, long-term impacts to groundwater associated with remaining waste residuals should the pipelines be left 'as is' and an engineered surface barrier or landfill cap be placed. This study also recommended that no characterization or closure actions be assumed or started for the pipelines within Waste Management Area C, likewise with the premise that a surface barrier or landfill cap be placed over the pipelines. (authors)

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Waste Management Processing Projects in the PRC - 16551

EnergySolutions continues to provide waste treatment solutions in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). In 2015 ES had completed installation of systems at two different Nuclear power sites (Haiyang, an AP-1000{sup TM} site and Yangjiang, a CPR1000 site). This paper discusses progress on these two projects, and provides new information regarding the operation of the systems. The Yangjiang project became operational in the fall of 2015 while the Haiyang project will be done is nearly done with commissioning and is waiting for reactor operations. Haiyang Project: In the Shandong Province on China's northeast coast, EnergySolutions, as part of a consortium with China Power Investment (CPI) and Yuanda Environmental Protection Engineering Company (a PRC state-owned company), has designed and constructed the site's Site Rad Waste Treatment Facility (SRTF). The SRTF provides solid waste processing services for up to 8 AP-1000s{sup TM}. The SRTF performs the following functions: 1. Five year storage for HICs containing spent resin and filters from the nuclear power plants' waste liquid systems (WLS); 2. Sorting and Compaction System for solid waste generated from Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operations. This system implements: a) Real time radiography to screen 200 liter waste drums for prohibited items, b) Pre-compaction, c) High Resolution Gamma Spectrophotometry (HRGS) for waste characterization, d) Supercompaction, e) Solidification of compacted drums inside overpack drums which are filled with 60 MPa compressive strength grout, and f) Automatic drum lidding which crimps the drum lid to the drum body. 3. Laundry services for NPP anti-contamination clothing. 4. At the nuclear islands, EnergySolutions is providing mobile liquid waste processing systems that utilize EnergySolutions Advanced Liquid Processing System ALPS{sup TM}/Advanced Injection Method System AIM{sup TM} processing systems to supplement the NPP's WLS system when radionuclide concentrations exceed release criteria. The spent resins and filters from the nuclear power plants are placed in EnergySolutions supplied HICs, dewatered using EnergySolutions Self Engaging Dewatering System (SEDS{sup TM}), and then placed in EnergySolutions 8-120B Type B cask for the transport of the HIC between the NPP and the SRTF and, ultimately, to a disposal site once it is ready for operations Yangjiang Project: EnergySolutions is providing liquid waste treatment system (TEU) and solid waste treatment system (TES) for Yangjiang units 3 and 4 for the China Nuclear Power Engineering Company (CNPEC). The Yangjiang site is located approximately 300 kilometers west of Hong Kong. The TEU system processes floor drain, chemical drain, and process drain tanks liquids to achieve a release concentration less than 37 Bq/l. The TES system receives spent resin and filters into HIC containers which are dewatered and subsequently transported to the Yangjiang sites QT building where they are stored for a period of up to 5 years or until a disposal site are available. TEU (Liquid waste treatment) consists of the following unit operations: - ALPS{sup TM}/AIM{sup TM} system, which includes two separate 8 vessel water treatment systems that consist of granular activated carbon (GAC), cation, anion ion and mixed bed media ion exchange (IX) columns; and: - A reverse osmosis system for final polishing, - TES (solid waste system), - SEDS (Self Engaging Dewatering System), - Shielding for the loading and storage of HICs, - Shielded transport container for the transfer of HIC to the QT building for storage, - Shielded transfer bell for the transport of spent filters from the NPP operating area to HIC. (authors)

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Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly – 24139

DOE manages over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), many of which are located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in onsite storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the Road-Ready Demonstration will first package Fort St. Vrain SNF currently in dry storage at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters (DOESCs). These DOESCs will in turn be loaded into another containment similar to commercial multi-purpose canisters. This multi-purpose canister will then be compatible with a transportation or storage system, such as a storage cask for interim storage or transportation package for offsite transport. These DOESCs will remain sealed over the course of their storage, transportation, and applicable disposal functions. The closure process for the DOESC will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and, if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussions on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly (LTA), this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOESCs are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds, both of which are performed by remotely operated and semiautomatic welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes the assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld attaches the vent plug to the vent socket via a butt joint. After the second weld is performed, the welds are helium leak tested using an evacuated envelope technique. The LTA was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes the fabrication and performance testing associated with the evacuated envelope technique. INL staff designed, fabricated, and tested the LTA at INL facilities. This testing included establishing technique and system sensitivities in accordance with ASME and American National Standards Institute N14.5 requirements. Forthcoming work will cover such areas as design optimization, process and personnel qualification, and implementation in Road-Ready Demonstration operations.

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Chemistry and Reactivity of Oxide Films on Aluminum Clad Test Reactor Fuels - 19294

This paper describes recent work performed to assess the degradation of aluminum spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) as part of an ongoing Department of Energy project. As part of a multi-task effort, this paper specifically describes efforts initiated in 2018 to better understand chemical phenomena and degradation in ASNF). In this paper experimental and modeling activities are described. The modeling effort presents initial results in two areas potentially influencing stability. Using an established electrolyte model based on experimental data, the solubility of aluminum as a function of temperature and pH was examined. This work describes interesting results for the minimum pH providing relevant data that was not available from the literature. It was found that solubility increases with temperature and that the minimum pH shifts to low pH with increase in temperature. The second area involves understanding the metallurgy of aluminum alloys during fuel drying. In this study, the temperature range from 100 deg. C to 300 deg. C was analyzed. Thermodynamic models predict that AA1100 will not experience significant phase changes while the more highly alloyed AA6061 and AA5052 may experience significant phase changes. These thermodynamic measurements establish a potential for phase changes during drying, however they do not predict the kinetics for such processes. Phase 1 of the experimental program has initiated and results are forthcoming. The test program will examine aluminum oxidation under anticipated dry storage conditions (temperature and humidity). Examination of localized corrosion due to tight crevices and galvanic contact (with stainless steel) will be included. Finally, water deliquescence will be assessed using thermogravimetric analysis with dynamic humidity profiles. (authors)

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Structure-property relationship of metal-organic frameworks (MOFs) and physisorbed off-gas radionuclides.

We report on the host-guest interactions between metal-organic frameworks (MOFs) with various profiles and highly polarizable molecules (iodine), with emphasis on identifying preferential sorption sites in these systems. Radioactive iodine 129I, along with other volatile radionuclides (3H, 14C, Xe and Kr), represents a relevant component in the off-gas resulted during nuclear fuel reprocessing. Due to its very long half-life, 15.7 x 106 years, and potential health risks in humans, its efficient capture and long-term storage is of great importance. The leading iodine capture technology to date is based on trapping iodine in silver-exchanged mordenite. Our interests are directed towards improving existent capturing technologies, along with developing novel materials and alternative waste forms. Herein we report the first study that systematically monitors iodine loading onto MOFs, an emerging new class of porous solid-state materials. In this context, MOFs are of particular interest as: (i) they serve as ideal high capacity storage media, (ii) they hold potential for the selective adsorption from complex streams, due to their high versatility and tunability. This work highlights studies on both newly developed in our lab, and known highly porous MOFs that all possess distinct characteristics (specific surface area, pore volume, pore size, and dimension of the window access to the pore). The materials were loaded to saturation, where elemental iodine was introduced from solution, as well as from vapor phase. Uptakes in the range of {approx}125-150 wt% I2 sorbed were achieved, indicating that these materials outperform all other solid adsorbents to date in terms of overall capacity. Additionally, the loaded materials can be efficiently encapsulated in stable waste forms, including as low temperature sintering glasses. Ongoing studies are focused on gathering qualitative information with respect to localizing the physisorbed iodine molecules within the frameworks: X-ray single-crystal analyses, in conjunction with high pressure differential pair distribution function (d-PDF) studies aimed to identify preferential sites in the pores, and improve MOFs robustness. Furthermore, durability studies on the iodine loaded MOFs and subsequent waste forms include thermal analyses, SEM/EDS elemental mapping, and leach-durability testing. We anticipate for this in-depth analysis to further aid the design of advanced materials, capable to address major hallmarks: safe capture, stability and durability over extended timeframes.

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Secondary Waste Form Development and Optimization—Cast Stone

Washington River Protection Services is considering the design and construction of a Solidification Treatment Unit (STU) for the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF) at Hanford. The ETF is a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-permitted, multi-waste, treatment and storage unit and can accept dangerous, low-level, and mixed wastewaters for treatment. The STU needs to be operational by 2018 to receive secondary liquid wastes generated during operation of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The STU to ETF will provide the additional capacity needed for ETF to process the increased volume of secondary wastes expected to be produced by WTP.

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System Analysis Support of Consent-Based Siting Efforts - 23400

To better enable informed decision-making regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring the development and application of system analysis tools capable of analyzing various system options for the management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. With these tools, integrated waste management system (IWMS) architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive nuclear waste management system that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). System analyses and assessments typically use these modeling and simulation tools to investigate things like the implications of changes in various assumptions and parameters such as acceptance rates, receipt logic, facility capacities and capabilities, use of standardized canisters, and different assumed system operation start dates. Some example system analysis results have been published previously. With the passage of the consolidated appropriations acts for fiscal years 2021 and 2022, Congress provided funding and direction for the DOE to move forward with interim storage to support near-term action in managing the nation’s SNF as an important component of an IWMS. Consent-based siting is a phased, adaptive, and collaborative approach to siting facilities that focuses on the needs and concerns of people and communities. Communities participate in the siting process by working carefully through a series of phases and steps with the DOE (as the implementing organization). Each step and phase helps a community determine whether and how hosting a facility to manage SNF is aligned to the community’s goals. By its nature, a consent-based siting process must be transparent, flexible, adaptive, and responsive to community concerns. Thus, the phases and steps are intended to serve as a guide, not a prescriptive set of instructions. System analysis research analysts interface with DOE’s consent-based siting for a federal interim storage program and can perform preliminary system analyses as requested to support various aspects of the consent-based siting team’s work. This paper provides an overview of IWM program’s system analysis activities that support the ongoing consent-based siting process. The questions that decision-makers, planners, communities, and stakeholders might have during the consent-based siting process are similar to questions that have been explored by system analysts previously. Specifically, this paper discusses work that will inform consent-based siting efforts in the areas of community impacts, cost estimates, various SNF acceptance rates by potential facilities, potential consolidated interim storage facility (CISF) capacities and configurations, and the implications of a CISF on the overall waste management system. It is expected that system analysis will continue to be performed to support the consent-based siting process in the future.

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Class 1 Permit Modification Notification Addition of Structures within Technical Area 54, Area G, Pad 11, Dome 375 Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, July 2012

The purpose of this letter is to notify the New Mexico Environment Department-Hazardous Waste Bureau (NMED-HWB) of a Class 1 Permit Modification to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit issued to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) in November 2010. The modification adds structures to the container storage unit at Technical Area (TA) 54 Area G, Pad 11. Permit Section 3.1(3) requires that changes to the location of a structure that does not manage hazardous waste shall be changed within the Permit as a Class 1 modification without prior approval in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40 (40 CFR), {section}270.42(a)(1). Structures have been added within Dome 375 located at TA-54, Area G, Pad 11 that will be used in support of waste management operations within Dome 375 and the modular panel containment structure located within Dome 375, but will not be used as waste management structures. The Class 1 Permit Modification revises Figure 36 in Attachment N, Figures; and Figure G.12-1 in Attachment G.12, Technical Area 54, Area G, Pad 11 Outdoor Container Storage Unit Closure Plan. Descriptions of the structures have also been added to Section A.4.2.9 in Attachment A, TA - Unit Descriptions; and Section 2.0 in Attachment G.12, Technical Area 54, Area G, Pad 11 Outdoor Container Storage Unit Closure Plan. Full description of the permit modification and the necessary changes are included in Enclosure 1. The modification has been prepared in accordance with 40 CFR {section}270.42(a)(l). This package includes this letter and an enclosure containing a description of the permit modification, text edits of the Permit sections, and the revised figures (collectively LA-UR-12-22808). Accordingly, a signed certification page is also enclosed. Three hard copies and one electronic copy of this submittal will be delivered to the NMED-HWB.

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Development of Treatment Process for Radioactive Wastewater Generated from Molybdenum-99 Study - 16415

Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) high acidic waste solution was securely stored at INER for numerous years. Until 2004, the procedures of waste solution draw-out and pressure-release were accompanied, along with construction of treatment facilities. In 2009, after simulated solution and small volume Mo-99 waste solution tests, the treatment procedure was determined. Then batch-scale treatment facilities were set up. The waste solution was preserved using the instrument, along with modification of some facilities simultaneously. Ultimately all of 12 tanks of Mo-99 inorganic waste solution stored in Building 014 were finished on July, 2012. And residential 5 tanks of those solution served in Building 015B were also completed on September, 2014. A practicable process has been developed for treating radioactive waste generated from Mo-99 study, and it can effectively remove radionuclides from a nitric acid solution. At first, after the waste was sucked from the bucket, the pH value was adjusted to about 10.0 through acid-alkali neutralization. Then, an adsorbent of natural zeolite powder was added to adsorb nuclides, and two adsorption columns filled with Cs-treat and Sr-treat adsorbents were used for removing nuclear species of Cs-137 and Sr-90. In this step, the nuclear species of Cs-137 and Sr-90 contained in the liquid waste are significantly reduced to a degree for manual operation allowable. Then, nitrate ion and mercury ion were removed through another procedure. As a result, the operations were safer and more efficient than other conventional methods. Additionally, the hazard of accidental leakage caused by corrosion of the bucket after long period of storage can be effectively prevented and potential pollution threats are also eliminated. (authors)

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Cameco Corporation's Approach to Legacy and Ongoing Waste Management Within the Fuel Services Division - 19124

Since 2011, a Fuel Services Division (FSD) employee has been dedicated to oversee divisional waste management with the goal of accelerating the recycle/disposal of accumulated legacy radioactive wastes stored at its Ontario operations in Blind River and Port Hope. The Blind River Refinery (BRR) and Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) were previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, becoming part of Cameco in 1988 and Cameco Fuel Manufacturing (CFM), previously known as Zircatec Precision Industries, becoming part of Cameco in 2006. Accumulated legacy radioactive waste is stored at each of the facilities. This radioactive waste has accumulated from operations beginning in the 1930's in Port Hope and the 1980's in Blind River. Due to minimal commercially available outlets for the disposal and/or treatment of these wastes, the waste was managed onsite by storage in underutilized space in buildings, trailers and/or in the secured yard. This relatively low-cost practice meant that over decades, the inventory increased at an unsustainable rate until available space became a limiting factor. During this time, the labelling, inventory records, characterization details and other history of many of the waste materials was not maintained adequately. Due to the volume of waste that had accumulated, campaigns to address these deficiencies in information were not considered feasible, sustaining the issue of accumulation of low-level radioactive waste. Since 2011, FSD has completed annual campaigns to address the accumulated legacy waste, which has included processing of material for decontamination to meet the unrestricted release criteria under the Canadian Nuclear Substance and Radiation Devices Regulations (NSRDR), disposal of marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) at a permitted landfill in the United States, processing of contaminated materials to reduce the volume of low-level radioactive waste and disposal at a designated facility in Port Hope. In addition FSD has undertaken significant changes to radioactive waste management practices at each of the facilities. Multiple characterization techniques, including visual observation, review of process and other historical records, laboratory analysis and radiation scanning have been utilized in campaign planning to identify the scope and appropriate waste management technique(s) to reduce the inventory of stored material. This divisional waste management program has resulted in a significant change to how radioactive waste is generated, inventoried, characterized and managed within FSD and has increased the visibility within the leadership team of the opportunities and challenges of waste management, such as alignment with decommissioning planning, project planning and budgeting. The heightened awareness has led to better financial and physical resource planning to execute waste projects with a current projected elimination of the legacy waste within FSD by 2025. (authors)

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Processing Plan for Potentially Reactive/Ignitable Remote Handled Transuranic Waste at the Idaho Cleanup Project - 12090

Remote Handle Transuranic (RH-TRU) Waste generated at Argonne National Laboratory - East, from the examination of irradiated and un-irradiated fuel pins and other reactor materials requires a detailed processing plan to ensure reactive/ignitable material is absent to meet WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria prior to shipping and disposal. The Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) approach to repackaging Lot 2 waste and how we ensure prohibited materials are not present in waste intended for disposal at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 'WIPP' uses an Argon Repackaging Station (ARS), which provides an inert gas blanket. Opening of the Lot 2 containers under an argon gas blanket is proposed to be completed in the ARS. The ARS is an interim transition repackaging station that provides a mitigation technique to reduce the chances of a reoccurrence of a thermal event prior to rendering the waste 'Safe'. The consequences, should another thermal event be encountered, (which is likely) is to package the waste, apply the reactive and or ignitable codes to the container, and store until the future treatment permit and process are available. This is the same disposition that the two earlier containers in the 'Thermal Events' were assigned. By performing the initial handling under an inert gas blanket, the waste can sorted and segregate the fines and add the Met-L-X to minimize risk before it is exposed to air. The 1-gal cans that are inside the ANL-E canister will be removed and each can is moved to the ARS for repackaging. In the ARS, the 1-gal can is opened in the inerted environment. The contained waste is sorted, weighed, and visually examined for non compliant items such as unvented aerosol cans and liquids. The contents of the paint cans are transferred into a sieve and manipulated to allow the fines, if any, to be separated into the tray below. The fines are weighed and then blended with a minimum 5:1 mix of Met-L-X. Other debris materials found are segregated from the cans into containers for later packaging. Recoverable fissile waste material (Fuel and fuel-like pieces) suspected of containing sodium bonded pieces) are segregated and will remain in the sieve or transferred to a similar immersion basket in the ARS. The fuel like pieces will be placed into a container with sufficient water to cover the recoverable fissile waste. If a 'reactive characteristic' is present the operator will be able to observe the formation of 'violent' hydrogen gas bubbles. When sodium bonded fuel-like pieces are placed in water the expected reaction is a non-violent reaction that does not meet the definition of reactivity. It is expected that there will be a visible small stream of bubbles present if there is any sodium-bonded fuel-like piece placed in the water. The test will be completed when there is no reaction or the expected reaction is observed..At that point, the fuel like pieces complete the processing cycle in preparation for characterization and shipment to WIPP. If a violent reaction occurs, the fuel-like pieces will be removed from the water, split into the required fissile material content, placed into a screened basket in a 1 gallon drum and drummed out of the hot cell with appropriate RCRA codes applied and placed into storage until sodium treatment is available. These 'violent' reactions will be evidenced by gas bubbles being evolved at the specimen surface where sodium metal is present. The operators will be trained to determine if the reaction is 'violent' or 'mild'. If a 'violent' reaction occurs, the sieve will be immediately removed from the water, placed in a 1 gallon paint can, canned in the argon cover gas and removed from the hot cell to await a future treatment. If the reaction is 'mild', the sieve will then be removed from the water; the material weighed for final packaging and allowed to dry by air exposure. Lot 2 waste cans can be opened, sorted, processed, and weighed while mitigating the potential of thermal events that could occur prior to exposing to air. Exposure to air is a WIPP compliance step demonstrating the absence of reactive or ignitable characteristics. (authors)

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