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At least 163 records · Page 9

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NASA NTRS2004

Usability Evaluation of a Flight-Deck Airflow Hazard Visualization System

Many aircraft accidents each year are caused by encounters with unseen airflow hazards near the ground, such as vortices, downdrafts, low level wind shear, microbursts, or turbulence from surrounding vegetation or structures near the landing site. These hazards can be dangerous even to airliners; there have been hundreds of fatalities in the United States in the last two decades attributable to airliner encounters with microbursts and low level wind shear alone. However, helicopters are especially vulnerable to airflow hazards because they often have to operate in confined spaces and under operationally stressful conditions (such as emergency search and rescue, military or shipboard operations). Providing helicopter pilots with an augmented-reality display visualizing local airflow hazards may be of significant benefit. However, the form such a visualization might take, and whether it does indeed provide a benefit, had not been studied before our experiment. We recruited experienced military and civilian helicopter pilots for a preliminary usability study to evaluate a prototype augmented-reality visualization system. The study had two goals: first, to assess the efficacy of presenting airflow data in flight; and second, to obtain expert feedback on sample presentations of hazard indicators to refine our design choices. The study addressed the optimal way to provide critical safety information to the pilot, what level of detail to provide, whether to display specific aerodynamic causes or potential effects only, and how to safely and effectively shift the locus of attention during a high-workload task. Three-dimensional visual cues, with varying shape, color, transparency, texture, depth cueing, and use of motion, depicting regions of hazardous airflow, were developed and presented to the pilots. The study results indicated that such a visualization system could be of significant value in improving safety during critical takeoff and landing operations, and also gave clear indications of the best design choices in producing the hazard visual cues.

Aragon, Cecilia R.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Improving Aviation Safety with information Visualization: A Flight Simulation Study

Many aircraft accidents each year are caused by encounters with invisible airflow hazards. Recent advances in aviation sensor technology offer the potential for aircraft-based sensors that can gather large amounts of airflow velocity data in real-time. With this influx of data comes the need to study how best to present it to the pilot - a cognitively overloaded user focused on a primary task other than that of information visualization. In this paper, we present the results of a usability study of an airflow hazard visualization system that significantly reduced the crash rate among experienced helicopter pilots flying a high fidelity, aerodynamically realistic fixed-base rotorcraft flight simulator into hazardous conditions. We focus on one particular aviation application, but the results may be relevant to user interfaces in other operationally stressful environments.

Aragon, Cecilia R.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia and Return to Flight of Space Shuttle Discovery

NASA has come a long way in our journey to reduce the risks of operating the Spse Shuttle system. The External Tank bipod Thermal Protection System has been redesigned to eliminate the proximate cause of the Columbia accident. In all areas, we have applied the collective knowledge and capabilities of our Nation to comply with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and to raise the bar beyond that. We have taken prudent technical action on potential threats to review and verify the material condition of all critical areas where failure could result in catastrophic loss of the crew and vehicle. We are satisfied that critical systems and elements should operate as intended-safely and reliably. While we will never eliminate all the risks from our human space flight programs, we have eliminated those we can and reduced, controlled, and/or mitigated others. The remaining identified risks will be evaluated for acceptance. Our risk reduction approach has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement long employed in aerospace systems engineering. The components of the hierarchy are, in order of precedence, to: design/redesign; eliminate the hazard/risk; reduce the hazard/risk; and control the hazard/risk and/or mitigate the consequence of the remaining hazard/risk through warning devices, special procedures/capabilities, and/or training. This proven approach to risk reduction has been applied to potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle and has guided us through the technical challenges, failures, and successes present in return to flight endeavors. This approach provides the structured deliberation process required to verify and form the foundation for accepting any residual risk across the entire Space Shuttle Program by NASA leadership.

Rudolphi, Michael U.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Development of a Methodology to Conduct Usability Evaluation for Hand Tools that May Reduce the Amount of Small Parts that are Dropped During Installation while Processing Space Flight Hardware

Foreign object debris (FOD) is an important concern while processing space flight hardware. FOD can be defined as "The debris that is left in or around flight hardware, where it could cause damage to that flight hardware," (United Space Alliance, 2000). Just one small screw left unintentionally in the wrong place could delay a launch schedule while it is retrieved, increase the cost of processing, or cause a potentially fatal accident. At this time, there is not a single solution to help reduce the number of dropped parts such as screws, bolts, nuts, and washers during installation. Most of the effort is currently focused on training employees and on capturing the parts once they are dropped. Advances in ergonomics and hand tool design suggest that a solution may be possible, in the form of specialty hand tools, which secure the small parts while they are being handled. To assist in the development of these new advances, a test methodology was developed to conduct a usability evaluation of hand tools, while performing tasks with risk of creating FOD. The methodology also includes hardware in the form of a testing board and the small parts that can be installed onto the board during a test. The usability of new hand tools was determined based on efficiency and the number of dropped parts. To validate the methodology, participants were tested while performing a task that is representative of the type of work that may be done when processing space flight hardware. Test participants installed small parts using their hands and two commercially available tools. The participants were from three groups: (1) students, (2) engineers / managers and (3) technicians. The test was conducted to evaluate the differences in performance when using the three installation methods, as well as the difference in performance of the three participant groups.

Miller, Darcy↗

NASA NTRS2013

Integrated Collision Avoidance System for Air Vehicle

Collision with ground/water/terrain and midair obstacles is one of the common causes of severe aircraft accidents. The various data from the coremicro AHRS/INS/GPS Integration Unit, terrain data base, and object detection sensors are processed to produce collision warning audio/visual messages and collision detection and avoidance of terrain and obstacles through generation of guidance commands in a closed-loop system. The vision sensors provide more information for the Integrated System, such as, terrain recognition and ranging of terrain and obstacles, which plays an important role to the improvement of the Integrated Collision Avoidance System.

Lin, Ching-Fang↗

NASA NTRS2016

Emerging Technologies for Airplane State Awareness and Prediction

Loss of control in flight (LOC-I) is consistently the leading cause of fatal aircraft accidents. A study of LOC accidents and incidents, commissioned by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) identified a growing trend in loss of Airplane State Awareness (ASA) by the flight crew. This has led to recommended safety enhancements that include flight deck technologies with the potential of enhancing flight crew awareness of airplane energy state. The goal of this research is to develop and evaluate technologies that predict and assess the future aircraft energy state and auto-flight configuration, and provide appropriate alerting to anticipated problematic auto-flight inputs, with the aim of enhancing pilots situational awareness.

Aircraft Safety↗

NASA NTRS2017

CAST Safety Enhancement Research on Airplane State Awareness and Prediction Technologies

Loss of control in flight (LOC-I) is the leading cause of fatal aircraft accidents. A study of LOC accidents and incidents, commissioned by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) identified a growing trend in loss of Airplane State Awareness (ASA) by the flight crew. This has led to recommended safety enhancements that include flight deck technologies for improving current and predicted energy state awareness. In this talk, we discuss recent CAST motivated efforts to develop new information systems for predicting and assessing the future aircraft energy state and auto-flight configuration. The outputs from these systems can serve multiple purposes, including improved pilot alerting for anticipating and recovering from problematic flight conditions, as well as higher level flight safety assurance for autonomous operations.

Schuet, Stefan↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Culture at the World’s Premier Multi-User Spaceport

NASA’s Agency-wide Safety Culture is implemented at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a unique strategy due an unparalleled approach in making human spaceflight history. Kennedy Space Center, the world’s premier multi-user spaceport, enables U.S. government and commercial space access, while providing the world a resource to allow the exploration of and the ability to work in space. A consistently healthy safety culture at KSC is imperative for mission success: desired achievements, protection of space flight hardware, and ultimately, the preservation of human life requires the support of a healthy safety culture. Emphasis on the NASA Agency-wide development of Safety Culture began with the conception of the NASA Agency Safety Culture Working Group. After the devastating loss of life and mission of the Space Shuttle Colombia, a broken safety culture was identified as an organizational cause by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Thus, the Agency Safety Culture Working Group was developed in 2009 to assess the status of the Agency’s Safety Culture, while addressing safety culture concerns at the NASA Center-level. A Five-factor model was developed to serve as the guiding principles for Safety Culture: 1) Reporting Culture, 2) Just Culture, 3) Flexible Culture, 4) Learning Culture, and 5) Engaged Culture. These five factors are included in the NASA Safety Culture logo, which was intentionally designed as a DNA double helix to prompt the permeation of safety into day-to-day work. KSC specifically implements the NASA Agency-wide Safety Culture principles in a tailored approach that is relevant to the diversity of work being performed. An emphasis is placed on the implementation to include safety at home, not exclusively at work. This emphasis is a KSC-specific element that has been intentionally added to promote a closed loop Safety Culture. To advertise the safety culture, various safety and health events are held throughout the calendar year, providing innovative speakers and engaging activities, while also promoting a wide range of curated safety initiatives. Development and continuous improvement of the KSC safety tracking database, allows for advanced tracking-to-closure, along with providing data sets used to identify areas of emphasis. Other safety initiatives rely solely on employee participation, such as the photo challenges; participants are encouraged to identify and capture themselves, coworkers, or family members participating in safe or healthy activities to share with others within the Center and at Agency levels. Fabrication of exclusive videos and graphics are utilized to advertise and inform employee of safety initiatives, upcoming safety events, and general dispersion of safety information. In addition, an anonymous Agency-wide Safety Culture Survey is advertised, administered, and analyzed at Kennedy Space Center, with the purpose of receiving basic feedback on Safety Culture perceptions to help prevent future incidents from occurring. Through these briefly identified means, and many other forms of employee engagement, Kennedy Space Center aims to maintain safety in the forefront, while creating an environment where everyone trusts that safety is a priority.

Larrin E. Moody↗

NASA NTRS1974

Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations

A number of the accidents/incidents with hydrogen in NASA operations are reviewed. The cause factors for the mishaps are reviewed and show that although few accidents occurred, the number could have been further reduced if the established NASA rules and regulations had been followed. Requirements for effective safety codes and areas of study for hydrogen safety information are included. The report concludes with a compilation of 96 hydrogen mishaps; a description of the accidents and their causes.

Ordin, P. M.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Investigation, Analysis, and Testing of Self-contained Oxygen Generators

Self Contained Oxygen Generators (SCOGs) have widespread use in providing emergency breathing oxygen in a variety of environments including mines, submarines, spacecraft, and aircraft. These devices have definite advantages over storing of gaseous or liquid oxygen. The oxygen is not generated until a chemical briquette containing a chlorate or perchlorate oxidizer and a solid metallic fuel such as iron is ignited starting a thermal decomposition process allowing gaseous oxygen to be produced. These devices are typically very safe to store, easy to operate, and have primarily only a thermal hazard to the operator that can be controlled by barriers or furnaces. Tens of thousands of these devices are operated worldwide every year without major incident. This report examines the rare case of a SCOG whose behavior was both abnormal and lethal. This particular type of SCOG reviewed is nearly identical to a flight qualified version of SCOG slated for use on manned space vehicles. This Investigative Report is a compilation of a NASA effort in conjunction with other interested parties including military and aerospace to understand the causes of the particular SCOG accident and what preventative measures can be taken to ensure this incident is not repeated. This report details the incident and examines the root causes of the observed SCOG behavior from forensic evidence. A summary of chemical and numerical analysis is provided as a background to physical testing of identical SCOG devices. The results and findings of both small scale and full scale testing are documented on a test-by-test basis along with observations and summaries. Finally, conclusions are presented on the findings of this investigation, analysis, and testing along with suggestions on preventative measures for any entity interested in the safe use of these devices.

Keddy, Christopher P.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Analyzing a Mid-Air Collision Over the Hudson River

On August 8, 2009, a private airplane collided with a sightseeing helicopter over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. All three people aboard the airplane, the pilot and two passengers, and all six people aboard the helicopter, the pilot and five passengers, were killed. The National Transportation Safety Board report on the accident identified inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, inadequate regulations, and errors by the pilots and an air traffic controller as causing or contributing to the accident. This paper presents the results of analyzing the accident using the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) approach to determining accident causation.

Brown, Sean↗

NASA NTRS1994

Decision Making in Action: Applying Research to Practice

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment: Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

NASA NTRS1994

Decision Making in Action: Applying Research to Practice

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. A similar observation has been made in nuclear power plants. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multidimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for spaceflight and training for offshore installations will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

NASA NTRS1994

Decision Making in Action

Orasanu, Judith↗

NASA NTRS1995

Decision Making in the Airplane

The Importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful In improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking In response to a problem, This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

NASA NTRS1997

Wings: A New Paradigm in Human-Centered Design

Many aircraft accidents/incidents investigations cite crew error as a causal factor (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group 1996). Human factors experts suggest that crew error has many underlying causes and should be the start of an accident investigation and not the end. One of those causes, the flight deck design, is correctable. If a flight deck design does not accommodate the human's unique abilities and deficits, crew error may simply be the manifestation of this mismatch. Pilots repeatedly report that they are "behind the aircraft" , i.e., they do not know what the automated aircraft is doing or how the aircraft is doing it until after the fact. Billings (1991) promotes the concept of "human-centered automation"; calling on designers to allocate appropriate control and information to the human. However, there is much ambiguity regarding what it mean's to be human-centered. What often are labeled as "human-centered designs" are actually designs where a human factors expert has been involved in the design process or designs where tests have shown that humans can operate them. While such designs may be excellent, they do not represent designs that are systematically produced according to some set of prescribed methods and procedures. This paper describes a design concept, called Wings, that offers a clearer definition for human-centered design. This new design concept is radically different from current design processes in that the design begins with the human and uses the human body as a metaphor for designing the aircraft. This is not because the human is the most important part of the aircraft (certainly the aircraft would be useless without lift and thrust), but because he is the least understood, the least programmable, and one of the more critical elements. The Wings design concept has three properties: a reversal in the design process, from aerodynamics-, structures-, and propulsion-centered to truly human-centered; a design metaphor that guides function allocation and control and display design; and a deliberate distinction between two fundamental functions of design, to complement and to interpret human performance. The complementary function extends the human's capabilities beyond his or her current limitations - this includes sensing, computation, memory, physical force, and human decision making styles and skills. The interpretive (or hermeneutic, Hollnagel 1991) function translates information, functionality, and commands between the human and the aircraft. The Wings design concept allows the human to remain aware of the aircraft through natural interpretation. It also affords great improvements in system performance by maximizing the human's natural abilities and complementing the human's skills in a natural way. This paper will discuss the Wings design concept by describing the reversal in the traditional design process, the function allocation strategy of Wings, and the functions of complementing and interpreting the human.

Schutte, Paul C.↗

NASA NTRS2013

An Examination of Aviation Accidents Associated with Turbulence, Wind Shear and Thunderstorm

The focal point of the study reported here was the definition and examination of turbulence, wind shear and thunderstorm in relation to aviation accidents. NASA project management desired this information regarding distinct subgroups of atmospheric hazards, in order to better focus their research portfolio. A seven category expansion of Kaplan's turbulence categories was developed, which included wake turbulence, mountain wave turbulence, clear air turbulence, cloud turbulence, convective turbulence, thunderstorm without mention of turbulence, and low altitude wind shear, microburst or turbulence (with no mention of thunderstorms).More than 800 accidents from flights based in the United States during 1987-2008 were selected from a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database. Accidents were selected for inclusion in this study if turbulence, thunderstorm, wind shear or microburst was considered either a cause or a factor in the accident report, and each accident was assigned to only one hazard category. This report summarizes the differences between the categories in terms of factors such as flight operations category, aircraft engine type, the accident's geographic location and time of year, degree of injury to aircraft occupants, aircraft damage, age and certification of the pilot and the phase of flight at the time of the accident.

Evans, Joni K.↗

NASA NTRS1981

Flight evaluation of a simple total energy-rate system with potential wind-shear application

Wind shears can create havoc during aircraft terminal area operations and have been cited as the primary cause of several major aircraft accidents. A simple sensor, potentially having application to the wind-shear problem, was developed to rapidly measure aircraft total energy relative to the air mass. Combining this sensor with either a variometer or a rate-of-climb indicator provides a total energy-rate system which was successfully applied in soaring flight. The measured rate of change of aircraft energy can potentially be used on display/control systems of powered aircraft to reduce glide-slope deviations caused by wind shear. The experimental flight configuration and evaluations of the energy-rate system are described. Two mathematical models are developed: the first describes operation of the energy probe in a linear design region and the second model is for the nonlinear region. The calculated total rate is compared with measured signals for many different flight tests. Time history plots show the tow curves to be almost the same for the linear operating region and very close for the nonlinear region.

Ostroff, A. J.↗