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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2014

Employing the radiological and nuclear risk assessment methods (RNRAM) for assessing radiological and nuclear detection architectures

The United States Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with implementing domestic nuclear detection efforts to protect the U.S. from radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO is also responsible for coordinating the development of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). DNDO utilizes a unique risk analysis tool to conduct a holistic risk assessment of the GNDA known as the Radiological and Nuclear Risk Assessment Methods (RNRAM). The capabilities of this tool will be used to support internal DNDO analyses and has also been used for other entities such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The model uses a probabilistic risk assessment methodology and includes the ability to conduct a risk assessment of the effectiveness of layered architectures in the GNDA against an attack by an intelligent, adaptive adversary. This paper overviews the basic structure, capabilities, and use of RNRAM as used to assess different architectures and how various risk components are calculated through a series of interconnected modules. Also highlighted is flexible structure of RNRAM which can accommodate new modules in order to examine a variety of threat detection architectures and concepts.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Review of Technologies that can Provide a 'Root of Trust' for Operational Technologies

The supply chain attack pathway is being increasingly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to sensitive networks and equipment (e.g., Critical Digital Assets). Cyber-attacks targeting supply chain generally aim to compromise the environments, products, or services of vendors and suppliers to inject, add, or substitute authentic software and hardware with malicious elements. These malicious elements are deemed to be authentic as they arise from the vendor or supplier (i.e., the supply chain). This research aims at providing a survey of technologies that have the potential to reduce exposure of sensitive networks and equipment to these attacks, thereby improving tamper resistance. The recent advances in the performance and capabilities of these technologies in recent years has increased their potential applications to reduce or mitigate exposure of the supply chain attack pathway. The focus being on providing an analysis of the benefits and disadvantages of smart cards, secure tokens, and elements to provide root of trust. This analysis provides evidence that these roots of trust can increase the technical capability of equipment and networks to authenticate changes to software and configuration thereby increasing resilience to some supply chain attacks, such as those related to logistics and ICT channels, but not development environment attacks.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Security Evaluation of Smart Cards and Secure Tokens: Benefits and Drawbacks for Reducing Supply Chain Risks of Nuclear Power Plants

The supply chain attack pathway is being increasingly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to sensitive networks and equipment (e.g., Critical Digital Assets). Cyber-attacks targeting supply chain generally aim to compromise the environments, products, or services of vendors and suppliers to inject, add, or substitute authentic software and hardware with malicious elements. These malicious elements are deemed to be authentic as they arise from the vendor or supplier (i.e., the supply chain). This research aims to leverage findings and assumptions made from the previous report to determine the security benefits and drawbacks of a smart card- based hardware root of trust. Smart cards can provide devices inside Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) with a secure environment to store keys in and perform sensitive operations such as digital signature generation. These abilities can be leveraged to increase supply chain cybersecurity by autonomously providing NPP Licensees with reports on device integrity, authenticity and measurements of executable and non-executable data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

DER Cybersecurity Detection and Response Suite

SAND2024-08475O The Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Cybersecurity Detection and Response Suite is a solution for distributed energy resource (DER) systems. The DER Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) solution that uses alerts from signature- and behavior-based Intrusion Detection Systems are intended to be deployed as bump-in-the-wire (BITW) devices in front of DER equipment. The fielded application would use multiple intrusion detection systems that report data to SOAR to respond to cyberattacks. The suite consists of two software components: • The proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) secures grid-edge photovoltaic smart inverters and other equipment in distributed energy resource systems. It is a distributed BITW solution; cyber and physical data are automatically processed using network inspection tools and custom machine learning algorithms to detect abnormal events and correlate cyber-physical events. • The Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response for Distributed Energy Resources (SOAR4DER) application ingests data from several intrusion detection systems to quickly block attacks and revert DER systems to good states. Using a collection of intrusion detection system technologies on a BITW device, it incorporates physical and cyber data to detect abnormal and potential malicious behaviors. Multiple SOAR playbooks then use the intrusion detection system data streams to automatically defend the system. SOAR4DER system testing showed detection and response times under 30 seconds for all adversary reconnaissance, denial-of-service attacks, malicious Modbus commands, brute-force logins, and machine-in-the-middle attacks. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Johnson, Jay↗
DOE OSTI2018

Anomaly Detection for Power System Generation Control based on Hierarchical DBSCAN

The generation level of a generator in power grid is under control of multiple control loops such as governor action, Automatic Generation Control (AGC), and manual control. These control loops are vulnerable to cyber attacks and could become potential targets for the malicious adversary. In this paper, we investigated the detection of abnormal generation controls induced by cyber attacks. One data-driven anomaly detection methodology is presented based on the behavior conformity of generation units located in the same balancing authority. A semi-supervised clustering algorithm with Hierarchical Density based Spatial Clustering of Application with Noise (HDBSCAN) is proposed for the detection model training. In our previous work, we obtained a synthetic dataset that covers scenarios including normal operation, generation control under ramp attack, switching attack, AGC integrity attacks, etc. and it is used to evaluate the proposed clustering algorithm. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm provides better detection accuracy than K-means clustering and can distinguish not only between normal and abnormal generation controls but also among various anomaly scenarios.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

Fault Tolerant Key Generation and Secure Spread Spectrum Communication

This study presents a secure information transmission system compromised of two main parts. The first component makes use of the principle of reciprocity in frequency-selective wireless channels to derive a pair of keys for two legitimate parties. The proposed key generation algorithm allows for two asynchronous transceivers to derive a pair of similar keys. Moreover, we apply a unique augmentation - called strongest path cancellation (SPC) - to the keys and have validated through simulation and real-world measurements that this technique significantly boosts the security level of the overall design. In the second part of the secure information transmission system, we introduce the concept of artificial noise to multi-carrier spread-spectrum (MC-SS) systems. The keys generated in the first part are used as spreading code sequences for MC-SS and artificial noise is added to further enhance the security of this communication setup. Two different attacks on our proposed system are evaluated. First, a passive adversary who follows the exact same steps as the legitimate users to detect confidential information is considered. In the second attack, we evaluate the design in presence of an adversary with significant blind detection capabilities.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Decision-Making in Complex Dynamical Systems of Systems With One Opposing Subsystem

Many complex dynamical systems consist of a large number of interacting subsystems that operate harmoniously and make decisions that are designed for the benefit of the entire enterprise. If, in an attempt to disrupt the operation of the entire system, one subsystem gets attacked and is made to operate in a manner that is adversarial with the others, then the entire system suffers, resulting in an adversarial decision-making environment among its subsystems. Such an environment may affect not only the decision-making process of the attacked subsystem but also possibly the other remaining subsystems as well. The disruption caused by the attacked subsystem may cause the remaining subsystems to either coalesce as a unified team making team-based decisions, or disintegrate and act as independent decision-making entities. The decision-making process in these types of complex systems of systems is best analyzed within the general framework of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. In this paper, we will develop an analysis that provides a theoretical basis for modeling the decision-making process in such complex systems. We show how cooperation among the subsystems can produce Noninferior Nash Strategies (NNS) that are fair and acceptable to all subsystems within the team while at the same time provide the subsystems in the team with the security of the Nash equilibrium against the opposing attacked subsystem. We contrast these strategies with the all Nash Strategies (NS) that would result if the operation of the entire system disintegrated and became adversarial among all subsystems as a result of the attack. An example of a system consisting of three subsystems with one opposing subsystem as a result of an attack is included to illustrate the results.

Talebi, Shahriar↗
DOE OSTI2021

Side-channel Leakage Assessment Metrics: A Case Study of GIFT Block Ciphers

Determination of an adequate level of security and providing subsequent mechanisms to achieve it, is one of the most pressing problems regarding embedded computing devices. While there are some solutions available for resource-rich computer systems, direct application of these solutions to resource-constrained environments are often unfeasible. The fundamental problem for such resource-constrained systems is the fact that current cryptographic algorithms utilize significant energy consumption and storage overhead. Both the cryptographic algorithm and its physical implementation affect the resilience of a cryptosystem against side-channel attacks. A side-channel attack represents a process that exploits leakages in order to extract sensitive information such as the key. This paper focuses on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) which is side-channel attack based on the power consumption leakage. In 2016 the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated the call for proposals of new cryptographic algorithms to strengthen the cryptographic defense of networked devices against cyberattacks and to protect the data created by those innumerable device. This work evaluates S-boxes used by NIST candidates PICCOLO, GIFT, and PRESENT, as well as several S-box variants that demonstrated sufficient weaknesses against classical cryptanalysis, for a quantitative comparison in terms of resiliency to CPA attack. Three well-known theoretical metrics are evaluated: transparency order (TO and RTO), nonlinearity, and signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio, aiming to characterize the resistance of these S-boxes against adversaries exploiting physical leakages. Experimental results from attacks on an 8- bit XMEGA were obtained via the ChipWhisperer platform and of all the S-boxes evaluated, GIFT64 with a PICCOLO S-box was found to be the most susceptible to CPA. Results showed that variations in TO and RTO were not sufficient to ensure practical CPA resistance and that among S-boxes with equal non-linearity there were no significant differences in the TO and SNR variants.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Side-channel Leakage Assessment Metrics: A Case Study of GIFT Block Ciphers

Determination of an adequate level of security and providing subsequent mechanisms to achieve it, is one of the most pressing problems regarding embedded computing devices. While there are some solutions available for resource-rich computer systems, direct application of these solutions to resource-constrained environments are often unfeasible. The fundamental problem for such resource-constrained systems is the fact that current cryptographic algorithms utilize significant energy consumption and storage overhead. Both the cryptographic algorithm and its physical implementation affect the resilience of a cryptosystem against side-channel attacks. A side-channel attack represents a process that exploits leakages in order to extract sensitive information such as the key. This paper focuses on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) which is side-channel attack based on the power consumption leakage. In 2016 the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated the call for proposals of new cryptographic algorithms to strengthen the cryptographic defense of networked devices against cyberattacks and to protect the data created by those innumerable device. This work evaluates S-boxes used by NIST candidates PICCOLO, GIFT, and PRESENT, as well as several S-box variants that demonstrated sufficient weaknesses against classical cryptanalysis, for a quantitative comparison in terms of resiliency to CPA attack. Three well-known theoretical metrics are evaluated: transparency order (TO and RTO), nonlinearity, and signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio, aiming to characterize the resistance of these S-boxes against adversaries exploiting physical leakages. Experimental results from attacks on an 8- bit XMEGA were obtained via the ChipWhisperer platform and of all the S-boxes evaluated, GIFT64 with a PICCOLO S-box was found to be the most susceptible to CPA. Results showed that variations in TO and RTO were not sufficient to ensure practical CPA resistance and that among S-boxes with equal non-linearity there were no significant differences in the TO and SNR variants.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Defending Against Adversarial Examples

Adversarial machine learning is an active field of research that seeks to investigate the security of machine learning methods against cyber-attacks. An important branch of this field is adversarial examples, which seek to trick machine learning models into misclassifying inputs by maliciously tampering with input data. As a result of the pervasiveness of machine learning models in diverse areas such as computer vision, health care, and national security, this vulnerability is a rapidly growing threat. With the increasing use of AI solutions, threats against AI must be considered before deploying systems in a contested space. Adversarial machine learning is a problem strongly tied to software security, and just like other more common software vulnerabilities, it exploits a weakness in software, like components of machine learning models. During this project, we attempted to survey and replicate several adversarial machine learning techniques with the goal of developing capabilities for Sandia to advise and defend against these threats. To accomplish this, we scanned state of the art research for robust defenses against adversarial examples and applied them to a machine learning problem.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Discovering the Most Severe K-Point Failure Based on Reinforcement Learning: Preprint

Smart devices are essential to ensure the stability of the power grid and resilience to intermittent energy production. However, smart devices can also be the target of cyber adversaries that may exploit false data injection attacks (FDIAs) to induce unstable grid conditions. A practical consideration of FDIA mitigation approaches is addressed here: given a finite available budget, for which smart device should cyber-threat mitigation be deployed first? In this work, this question is answered by identifying the so-called most-sensitive devices, i.e., the devices that, if compromised, can let an adversary induce the most serious grid instabilities. The method proposed utilizes an adversarial reinforcement learning (RL) framework to identify the k-mostsensitive smart devices (here, smart inverters). The adversarial agent can tamper with the compromised inverters' active and reactive operating power setup points, with the goal of maximizing voltage deviations. Numerical results show that the proposed RL method finds the optimal attack scenarios for 1-point failure and the near-optimal solution for the 2-point case. Additionally, the proposed RL method achieves an 8.8 speed-up ratio in running time compared to the brute force method for the 2-point case.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Security Assessment of an LBP16-Protocol-Based Computer Numerical Control Machine

Subtractive manufacturing systems, specifically, computer numerical control machines, have revolutionized the manufacturing industry. Computer numerical control machining is the preferred method for producing finished parts due to its efficiency, speed and suitability for high-volume production. Securing computer numerical control machines is a priority. Compromises or disruptions of these machines can result in significant downtime, loss of productivity and financial loss. This study examines the vulnerabilities and risks associated with computer numerical control machines, in particular, systems utilizing the LBP16 protocol for controller-machine communications. The study reveals that an adversary can execute cyber-physical attacks such as sabotage and denial of service. The potential security threats emphasize the importance of implementing robust security measures to mitigate the cyber risks to computer numerical control machines.

Forihat, Yahya [Virginia Commonwealth University, ↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Moving Target Defense Control Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems

This paper considers the problem of efficiently and securely controlling cyber-physical systems that are operating in uncertain, and adversarial environments. To mitigate sensor, actuator attacks, and performance loss due to such attacks, we formulate a secure control algorithm that consists of a proactive and a reactive defense mechanism. The proactive mechanism, which is based on the principles of moving target defense, utilizes a stochastic switching structure to dynamically and continuously alter the parameters of the system, while hindering the attacker's ability to conduct successful reconnaissance to the system. The unpredictability of the current actuator and sensor is optimized using an information entropy measure, which is induced by probabilistic switching. The reactive mechanism on the other side, detects potentially attacked components, namely sensors and actuators, by leveraging online data to compute an integral Bellman error. A rigorous mathematical framework is presented to guarantee the stability of the equilibrium point of the closed-loop system, and provide a quantified bound on the performance loss when utilizing both reactive and proactive mechanisms. Simulation results show the efficacy of the proposed approaches on a benchmark aircraft model.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Software-defined Networking for Energy Delivery Systems (SDN4EDS): An Architectural Blueprint (Final Report)

This is the initial version of a reference for suppliers and energy companies of all sizes to deploy networks based on software-defined networking technology (SDN) to improve reliability, reduce cyber security attack surface, and facilitate mitigation of adversarial behavior. It is a living document and will progress over the life cycle of the Software-Defined Networking for Energy Delivery Systems (SDN4EDS) project. Version 2 of this report provides information on the Red Team tabletop assessment performed against the initial reference architecture. Version 3 of this report updates the reference architecture with lessons learned from the Red Team tabletop assessment, as well as provides additional details for the use cases. It also provides information on the decision process that could be used by an organization when considering deploying SDN in their environment. The final version of this report consolidates all the interim reports generated by the project into a final report. It also draws from PNNL’s experience in deploying SDN to make recommendations on how SDN could be deployed in a utility environment, and provides rationale for those decisions allowing individual utilities to make risk-based and knowledge-based decisions on how to best deploy SDN in their own environment

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Software-defined Networking for Energy Delivery Systems (SDN4EDS): An Architectural Blueprint (Final Summary Report)

This is the initial version of a reference for suppliers and energy companies of all sizes to deploy networks based on software-defined networking technology (SDN) to improve reliability, reduce cyber security attack surface, and facilitate mitigation of adversarial behavior. It is a living document and will progress over the life cycle of the Software-Defined Networking for Energy Delivery Systems (SDN4EDS) project. Version 2 of this report provides information on the Red Team tabletop assessment performed against the initial reference architecture. Version 3 of this report updates the reference architecture with lessons learned from the Red Team tabletop assessment, as well as provides additional details for the use cases. It also provides information on the decision process that could be used by an organization when considering deploying SDN in their environment. The final version of this report consolidates all the interim reports generated by the project into a final report. It also draws from PNNL’s experience in deploying SDN to make recommendations on how SDN could be deployed in a utility environment, and provides rationale for those decisions allowing individual utilities to make risk-based and knowledge-based decisions on how to best deploy SDN in their own environment. This summary report provides a higher-level overview of the project reports. Readers interested in additional detail, including results of the Red Team assessments and the final configuration, are encouraged to read the full final report.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Retrieval Augmented Generation for Robust Cyber Defense

In cybersecurity, the ability to efficiently analyze and respond to vulnerabilities, weaknesses, attack patterns, and threat tactics is critical for effective defense strategies. With the increasing complexity and volume of cybersecurity data, traditional methods of querying and retrieving information are often inadequate. To address this challenge, we implemented Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems—CyRAG and GraphCyRAG—that integrate large language models (LLMs) with both structured data from relational databases and knowledge graphs such as Neo4j. CyRAG is designed to handle structured data, focusing on CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) and CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) entities to generate accurate and context-rich responses. In contrast, GraphCyRAG leverages Neo4j knowledge graphs to retrieve interconnected information from CVE, CWE, CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification), and ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) datasets. By utilizing Neo4j’s graph-based framework, GraphCyRAG enables deeper traversal of relationships between vulnerabilities and attack patterns, providing cybersecurity analysts with more comprehensive insights into potential attack vectors and mitigation strategies. Our preliminary results demonstrate that integrating knowledge graphs with RAG significantly enhances both the accuracy and depth of threat analysis, allowing for the retrieval of dynamic, real-time data and the generation of contextually aware responses. This approach helps analysts uncover hidden relationships between cyber entities, predict exploit paths, and prioritize mitigation efforts effectively. The integration of RAG with cybersecurity knowledge graphs represents a significant advancement in cybersecurity threat intelligence, enabling more informed decision-making and stronger defense strategies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2015

Computer-implemented security evaluation methods, security evaluation systems, and articles of manufacture

Computer-implemented security evaluation methods, security evaluation systems, and articles of manufacture are described. According to one aspect, a computer-implemented security evaluation method includes accessing information regarding a physical architecture and a cyber architecture of a facility, building a model of the facility comprising a plurality of physical areas of the physical architecture, a plurality of cyber areas of the cyber architecture, and a plurality of pathways between the physical areas and the cyber areas, identifying a target within the facility, executing the model a plurality of times to simulate a plurality of attacks against the target by an adversary traversing at least one of the areas in the physical domain and at least one of the areas in the cyber domain, and using results of the executing, providing information regarding a security risk of the facility with respect to the target.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗