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NASA NTRS2016

Exploration Mission Benefits From Logistics Reduction Technologies

Technologies that reduce logistical mass, volume, and the crew time dedicated to logistics management become more important as exploration missions extend further from the Earth. Even modest reductions in logistical mass can have a significant impact because it also reduces the packaging burden. NASA's Advanced Exploration Systems' Logistics Reduction Project is developing technologies that can directly reduce the mass and volume of crew clothing and metabolic waste collection. Also, cargo bags have been developed that can be reconfigured for crew outfitting, and trash processing technologies are under development to increase habitable volume and improve protection against solar storm events. Additionally, Mars class missions are sufficiently distant that even logistics management without resupply can be problematic due to the communication time delay with Earth. Although exploration vehicles are launched with all consumables and logistics in a defined configuration, the configuration continually changes as the mission progresses. Traditionally significant ground and crew time has been required to understand the evolving configuration and to help locate misplaced items. For key mission events and unplanned contingencies, the crew will not be able to rely on the ground for logistics localization assistance. NASA has been developing a radio-frequency-identification autonomous logistics management system to reduce crew time for general inventory and enable greater crew self-response to unplanned events when a wide range of items may need to be located in a very short time period. This paper provides a status of the technologies being developed and their mission benefits for exploration missions.

Broyan, James Lee, Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Five

Volume V of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in VolumeI. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia The contents include:. Appendix G.1 Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness; Appendix G.2 Appendix R, Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan; Appendix G.3 CAIB Charter, with Revisions; Appendix G.4 Group 1 Matrix Brief on Maintenance, Material, and Management; Appendix G.5 Vehicle Data Mapping(VDM) Team Final Report, Jun 13, 2003; Appendix G.6 SRB Working Group Presentation to CAIB; Appendix G. 7 Starfire Team Final Report, Jun 3, 2003; Appendix G.8 Using the Data and Observations from Flight STS-107, Executive Summary; Appendix G.9 Contracts, Incentives, and Safety/Technical Excellence; Appendix G.10 Detailed Summaries: Rogers Commission Report, ASAP Report, SIAT Report; Appendix G.11 Foam Application and Production Chart; Appendix G.12 Crew Survivability Report; and Appendix G.12 Aero/Aerothermal/ Thermal/Structures Team FinalReport, August 6, 2003.

CAIB (COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD)↗

NASA NTRS2010

Collective Intelligence and Three Aspects of Planning in Organizations: A NASA Example

For many complex sociotechnical systems, planning seems to require explicit coordination; certainly, in executing a plan the activities of different actors must be tightly coupled. However, distributing the needed planning information can be very burdensome and error prone, because different groups need different collections of information, updated or kept current on different time cycles. Further, the information needed to form successful plans is often highly distributed, and while feedback about the success of prior plans may exist, it may not be available to those in a position of using this to improve plans or to detect and resolve other problems in the system (Weick, 1995). Tools to support various aspects of planning have been developed, and can provide a huge benefit to the individuals working on that aspect. To be tractable, most solutions address a quite bounded slice of work, isolating it from the larger context. Prospective planning takes place over multiple, nested cycles of decision making. This builds a plan that specifies activities of different granularity. "Subplans" may specify multiple parallel activities by different groups and individuals, as well as sequential, nested actions by a single actor. Planning produces valuable, sharable, external, representations: in addition to prospective use, plans support retrospective assessment and also action in the present. Viewing planning in a larger context - both temporal and organizational -- enables noticing what one does not know and generating more systemic and effective solutions. Viewing a problem as one of collective intelligence invites thinking about the larger organizational context. Many approaches to supporting collective intelligence do not support execution of highly contingent actions, distributed across many players, and hence provide incomplete support for planning. However, CI technology maybe helpful in managing the processes of gathering information for decision making in planning and of distributing plan information to various actors, needed on various time cycles.

Billman, Dorrit↗

NASA NTRS1997

Coping with Irregular Operations: Implications for a Free Flight Environment

Irregular operations involve disruption of scheduled airline operations. They ate of concern to the carriers because they cost money, require personnel effort, and may harm customer good will. Irregular operations may result from aircraft system malfunctions that take planes out of service or result in cancellations, Might system problems or passenger medical emergencies that require diversions, local airport problems that may close down a runway, or weather systems that restrict flow into airports or regions. At the heart of responding to irregular operations is distributed decision making by members of airline operations centers, pilots, and the air traffic control system. Six U.S. carriers participated in a study in which we observed strategies used by operations center personnel to handle various classes of irregular operations. We focused on situations that are most disruptive to regular operations and are most difficult to cope with. We also sought to identify classes of events that would be most affected by changes in the air traffic management system. How a carrier deals with disruptions to its schedule reflects its philosophy and primary goals, as well as its resources. Size and type of operations (short or long-haul) determine which problems have priority. Each airline has different technological support tools to aid in flight planning and replanning, and some carriers have established contingency procedures for coping with various situations. We also examined differences in extent and type of interaction between ABC personnel and various elements of the air traffic system as they managed various problems: who interacts with AM what situations prompt interaction, how often these occur, and the outcomes and Perceived benefits. Use of the expanded NRP program was also studied, along with its advantages to the individual companies. We also examined the implications of the proposed change to a free flight environment on airline strategies for coping with irregular operations.

Orasanu, Judith↗

NASA NTRS2014

The ISS 2B PVTCS Ammonia Leak: An Operational History

In 2006, the Photovoltaic Thermal Control System (PVTCS) for the International Space Station's 2B power channel began leaking ammonia at a rate of approximately 1.5lbm/year (out of a starting approximately 53lbm system ammonia mass). Initially, the operations strategy was "feed the leak," a strategy successfully put into action via Extra Vehicular Activity during the STS‐134 mission. During this mission the system was topped off with ammonia piped over from a separate thermal control system. This recharge was to have allowed for continued power channel operation into 2014 or 2015, at which point another EVA would have been required. Without these periodic EVAs to refill the 2B coolant system, the channel would eventually leak enough fluid as to risk pump cavitation and system failure, resulting in the loss of the 2B power channel - the most critical of the Space Station's 8 power channels. In mid‐2012, the leak rate increased to approximately 5lbm/year. Once discovered, an EVA was planned and executed within a 5 week timeframe to drastically alter the architecture of the PVTCS via connection to a dormant thermal control system not intended to be utilized as anything other than spare components. The purpose of this rerouting of the TCS was to increase system volume and to isolate the photovoltaic radiator, thought to be the likely leak source. This EVA was successfully executed on November 1st, 2012 and left the 2B PVTCS in a configuration where the system was now being adequately cooled via a totally different radiator than what the system was designed to utilize. Unfortunately, data monitoring over the next several months showed that the isolated radiator was not leaking, and the system itself continued to leak steadily until May 9th, 2013. It was on this day that the ISS crew noticed the visible presence of ammonia crystals escaping from the 2B channel's truss segment, signifying a rapid acceleration of the leak from 5lbm/year to 5lbm/day. Within 48 hours of the crew noticing the leak, an EVA was in progress to replace the coolant pump - the only other replaceable leak source. This paper will explore the management of the 2B PVTCS leak from the operations perspective. It will discuss the methodology of performing the STS‐134 refill, the considerations and contingency plans which went into the architectural overhaul of the system in 2012, and the unprecedented effort which went into the EVA response to the visible leak of May 2013. In particular the paper will focus on the techniques utilized by flight controllers to monitor the system health and to respond to such instances as the rapid May 2013 leak by putting the electrical system in a safe configuration for loss of cooling, and will use recorded telemetry of these events to describe system response to EVA crew and ground actions. It will discuss the innovative design for redundancy of the integrated truss structure's cooling systems which allowed for this leak to be managed with minimal impact to other ISS operations and electrical services, contrasted against the real unintended operations consequences of utilizing the flexibility of the spacecraft's design in this manner. The paper will discuss how the training of the crew and flight controller personnel has adapted to the changing architecture of the power system and the unpredictable nature of the 2B leak.

Vareha, Anthony↗

NASA NTRS1995

Re-scheduling as a tool for the power management on board a spacecraft

The scheduling of events on board a spacecraft is based on forecast energy levels. The real time values of energy may not coincide with the forecast values; consequently, a dynamic revising to the allocation of power is needed. The re-scheduling is also needed for other reasons on board a spacecraft like the addition of new event which must be scheduled, or a failure of an event due to many different contingencies. This need of rescheduling is very important to the survivability of the spacecraft. In this presentation, a re-scheduling tool will be presented as a part of an overall scheme for the power management on board a spacecraft from the allocation of energy point of view. The overall scheme is based on the optimal use of energy available on board a spacecraft using expert systems combined with linear optimization techniques. The system will be able to schedule maximum number of events utilizing most energy available. The outcome is more events scheduled to share the operation cost of that spacecraft. The system will also be able to re-schedule in case of a contingency with minimal time and minimal disturbance of the original schedule. The end product is a fully integrated planning system capable of producing the right decisions in short time with less human error. The overall system will be presented with the re-scheduling algorithm discussed in detail, then the tests and results will be presented for validations.

Albasheer, Omar↗

NASA NTRS1991

Managing temporal relations in the MAESTRO scheduling system

A set of viewgraphs on managing temporal relations in the MAESTRO scheduling system are given. The viewgraphs present information on such topics as why scheduling is hard, managing temporal relations, constraints on the placement of a single activity, constraints between activities, soft constraints (such as preferences), and contingency handling.

Britt, Daniel L.↗

NASA NTRS1996

STS-77 Space Shuttle Mission Report

The STS-77 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities as well as the: Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) systems performance during the seventy-seventh flight of the Space Shuttle Program, the fifty-second flight since the return-to-flight, and the eleventh flight of the Orbiter Endeavour (OV-105). STS-77 was also the last flight of OV-105 prior to the vehicle being placed in the Orbiter Maintenance Down Period (OMDP). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated ET-78; three SSME's that were designated as serial numbers 2037, 2040, and 2038 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's that were designated BI-080. The RSRM's, designated RSRM-47, were installed in each SRB and the individual RSRM's were designated as 360TO47A for the left SRB, and 360TO47B for the right SRB. The STS-77 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VII, Appendix E. The requirement stated in that document is that each organizational element supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware (and software) evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. The primary objectives of this flight were to successfully perform the operations necessary to fulfill the requirements of Spacehab-4, the SPARTAN 207/inflatable Antenna Experiment (IAE), and the Technology Experiments Advancing Missions in Space (TEAMS) payload. Secondary objectives of this flight were to perform the experiments of the Aquatic Research Facility (ARF), Brilliant Eyes Ten-Kelvin Sorption Cryocooler Experiment (BETSCE), Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC), Get-Away-Special (GAS), and GAS Bridge Assembly (GBA). The STS-77 mission was planned as a 9-day flight plus 1 day, plus 2 contingency days, which were available for weather avoidance or Orbiter contingency operations. The sequence of events for the STS-77 mission is shown in Table 1, and the Space Shuttle Vehicle Management Office Problem Tracking List is shown in Table 11. The Government Fumished Equipment/Flight Crew Equipment (GFE/FCE) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table II. Appendix A lists the sources of data, both formal and informal, that were used to prepare this report. Appendix B provides the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used throughout the report. All times during the flight are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time (MET). The six-person crew for STS-77 consisted of John H. Casper, Col., U. S. Air Force, Commander; Curtis L. Brown, Jr., Lt. Col., U. S. Air Force, Pilot; Andrew S. W. Thomas, Civilian, Ph.D., Mission Specialist 1; Daniel W. Bursch, CDR., U. S. Navy, Mission Specialist 2; Mario Runco, Jr., Civilian, Mission Specialist 3; and Marc Gameau, Civilian, PhD, Mission Specialist 4.

Fricke, Robert W., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1996

STS-78 Space Shuttle Mission Report

The STS-78 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the seventy-eighth flight of the Space Shuttle Program, the fifty-third flight since the return-to-flight, and the twentieth flight of the Orbiter Columbia (OV-102). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated ET-79; three SSME's that were designated as serial numbers 2041, 2039, and 2036 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's that were designated BI-081. The RSRM's, designated RSRM-55, were installed in each SRB and the individual RSRM's were designated as 360L055A for the left SRB, and 360L055B for the right SRB. The STS-78 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume 7, Appendix E. The requirement stated in that document is that each organizational element supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware (and software) evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. The primary objective of this flight was to successfully perform the planned operations of the Life and Microgravity Spacelab experiments. The secondary objectives of this flight were to complete the operations of the Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment (OARE), Biological Research in Canister Unit-Block II (BRIC), and the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment II-Configuration C (SAREX-II). The STS-78 mission was planned as a 16-day, plus one day flight plus two contingency days, which were available for weather avoidance or Orbiter contingency operations. The sequence of events for the STS-78 mission is shown in Table 1, and the Space Shuttle Vehicle Management Office Problem Tracking List is shown in Table 2. The Government Furnished Equipment/Flight Crew Equipment (GFE/FCE) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table 3. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table 4. Appendix A lists the sources of data, both formal and informal, that were used to prepare this report. Appendix B provides the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used throughout the report. All times during the flight are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time (MET).

Fricke, Robert W., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Risk Management for Human Support Technology Development

NASA requires continuous risk management for all programs and projects. The risk management process identifies risks, analyzes their impact, prioritizes them, develops and carries out plans to mitigate or accept them, tracks risks and mitigation plans, and communicates and documents risk information. Project risk management is driven by the project goal and is performed by the entire team. Risk management begins early in the formulation phase with initial risk identification and development of a risk management plan and continues throughout the project life cycle. This paper describes the risk management approach that is suggested for use in NASA's Human Support Technology Development. The first step in risk management is to identify the detailed technical and programmatic risks specific to a project. Each individual risk should be described in detail. The identified risks are summarized in a complete risk list. Risk analysis provides estimates of the likelihood and the qualitative impact of a risk. The likelihood and impact of the risk are used to define its priority location in the risk matrix. The approaches for responding to risk are either to mitigate it by eliminating or reducing the effect or likelihood of a risk, to accept it with a documented rationale and contingency plan, or to research or monitor the risk, The Human Support Technology Development program includes many projects with independently achievable goals. Each project must do independent risk management, considering all its risks together and trading them against performance, budget, and schedule. Since the program can succeed even if some projects fail, the program risk has a complex dependence on the individual project risks.

jones, Harry↗

NASA NTRS2004

Managing Risk to Ensure a Successful Cassini/Huygens Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI)

I. Design: a) S/C designed to be largely single fault tolerant; b) Operate in flight demonstrated envelope, with margin; and c) Strict compliance with requirements & flight rules. II. Test: a) Baseline, fault & stress testing using flight system testbeds (H/W & S/W); b) In-flight checkout & demos to remove first time events. III. Failure Analysis: a) Critical event driven fault tree analysis; b) Risk mitigation & development of contingencies. IV) Residual Risks: a) Accepted pre-launch waivers to Single Point Failures; b) Unavoidable risks (e.g. natural disaster). V) Mission Assurance: a) Strict process for characterization of variances (ISAs, PFRs & Waivers; b) Full time Mission Assurance Manager reports to Program Manager: 1) Independent assessment of compliance with institutional standards; 2) Oversight & risk assessment of ISAs, PFRs & Waivers etc.; and 3) Risk Management Process facilitator.

risk managment↗

NASA NTRS1987

Automated load management for spacecraft power systems

An account is given of the results of a study undertaken by NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center to design and implement the load management techniques for autonomous spacecraft power systems, such as the Autonomously Managed Power System Test Facility. Attention is given to four load-management criteria, which encompass power bus balancing on multichannel power systems, energy balancing in such systems, power quality matching of loads to buses, and contingency load shedding/adding. Full implementation of these criteria calls for the addition of a second power channel.

Lollar, Louis F.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Initial Performance Evaluation of Flight Path Management Onboard Automation

Significant developments in automation are necessary to achieve safe and efficient operations in advanced aerial mobility related concepts. Urban Air Mobility (UAM) is rapidly growing, emerging field that poses a challenging use case with a tighter scale of operations compared to the traditional commercial transport paradigm. A large part of the challenge is the uncharted territory; as of this paper, no set of operational standards or guidelines for UAM operations have been established and automated en route operations for UAM level 4 (UML-4) have not been studied. Flight Path Management (FPM) automation provides a set of capabilities that are critical toward enabling airborne vehicles to achieve mission success while maintaining operational safety. An initial performance evaluation of FPM automation was conducted using a UAM-adapted version of the Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP), an onboard trajectory management capability developed over years of research targeting commercial transport operations, as its reference implementation. This paper describes the evaluation, including the approach and methodology for simulating FPM automation in UML-4, key results, future work, and conclusions.

flight path management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Initial Performance Evaluation of Flight Path Management Onboard Automation

flight path management↗

NASA NTRS2010

Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) Iteration 3.2

The Shuttle is a very reliable vehicle in comparison with other launch systems. Much of the risk posed by Shuttle operations is related to fundamental aspects of the spacecraft design and the environments in which it operates. It is unlikely that significant design improvements can be implemented to address these risks prior to the end of the Shuttle program. The model will continue to be used to identify possible emerging risk drivers and allow management to make risk-informed decisions on future missions. Potential uses of the SPRA in the future include: - Calculate risk impact of various mission contingencies (e.g. late inspection, crew rescue, etc.). - Assessing the risk impact of various trade studies (e.g. flow control valves). - Support risk analysis on mission specific events, such as in flight anomalies. - Serve as a guiding star and data source for future NASA programs.

Boyer, Roger L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Onboard Decision-Making for Nominal and Contingency sUAS Flight

This study presents an onboard decision-making architecture for small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS). The decision-maker is part of NASA's SAFE50 project that is working under the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) Technical Capability Level (TCL) 4 to provide autonomous point-to-point UAV flight in BVLOS, high-density urban environments. The decision-maker monitors various metrics to determine the safety and feasibility of the mission and categorizes flight states as Nominal, Off-Nominal, Alternate Land, and Land Now in a finite state machine. Changes in the monitored metrics serve as transitions in the state machine and trigger replanning. Navigation degradation and communication failure are simulated to show the feasibility of the decision-maker framework in appropriately switching the flight state.

Baculi, Joshua↗

NASA NTRS1987

Space station electric power system requirements and design

An overview of the conceptual definition and design of the space station Electric Power System (EPS) is given. Responsibilities for the design and development of the EPS are defined. The EPS requirements are listed and discussed, including average and peak power requirements, contingency requirements, and fault tolerance. The most significant Phase B trade study results are summarized, and the design selections and rationale are given. Finally, the power management and distribution system architecture is presented.

Teren, Fred↗

NASA NTRS1987

Space Station electric power system requirements and design

An overview of the conceptual definition and design of the Space Station Electric Power System (EPS) is given. Responsibilities for the design and development of the EPS are defined. The EPS requirements are listed and discussed, including average and peak power requirements, contingency requirements, and fault tolerance. The most significant Phase B trade study results are summarized, and the design selections and rationale are given. Finally, the power management and distribution system architecture is presented.

Teren, Fred↗