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Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗

Training for Aviation Decision Making: The Naturalistic Decision Making Perspective

This paper describes the implications of a naturalistic decision making (NDM) perspective for training air crews to make flight-related decisions. The implications are based on two types of analyses: (a) identification of distinctive features that serve as a basis for classifying a diverse set of decision events actually encountered by flight crews, and (b) performance strategies that distinguished more from less effective crews flying full-mission simulators, as well as performance analyses from NTSB accident investigations. Six training recommendations are offered: (1) Because of the diversity of decision situations, crews need to be aware that different strategies may be appropriate for different problems; (2) Given that situation assessment is essential to making a good decision, it is important to train specific content knowledge needed to recognize critical conditions, to assess risks and available time, and to develop strategies to verify or diagnose the problem; (3) Tendencies to oversimplify problems may be overcome by training to evaluate options in terms of goals, constraints, consequences, and prevailing conditions; (4) In order to provide the time to gather information and consider options, it is essential to manage the situation, which includes managing crew workload, prioritizing tasks, contingency planning, buying time (e.g., requesting holding or vectors), and using low workload periods to prepare for high workload; (5) Evaluating resource requirements ("What do I need?") and capabilities ("'What do I have?" ) are essential to making good decisions. Using resources to meet requirements may involve the cabin crew, ATC, dispatchers, and maintenance personnel; (6) Given that decisions must often be made under high risk, time pressure, and workload, train under realistic flight conditions to promote the development of robust decision skills.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Airline Operations Aid

C Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS), a NASA-developed expert systems program, is used by American Airlines for three purposes: as a rapid prototyping tool; to develop production prototypes; and to develop production application. An example of the latter is CLIPS' use in "Hub S1AAshing," a knowledge based system that recommends contingency plans when severe schedule reductions must be made. Hub S1AAshing has replaced a manual, labor intensive process. It saves time and allows Operations Control Coordinators to handle more difficult situations. Because the system assimilates much of the information necessary to facilitate educated decision making, it minimizes negative impact in situations where it is impossible to operate all flights.

Source record↗

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 4

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it will be necessary to prepare for the receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but specific detailed protocols for the handling and testing of returned samples must still be developed. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and to develop the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened a series of workshops in 2000-2001. The overall objective of the Workshop Series was to produce a Draft Protocol by which returned martian sample materials can be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This report also provides a record of the proceedings of Workshop 4, the final Workshop of the Series, which was held in Arlington, Virginia, June 5-7, 2001. During Workshop 4, the sub-groups were provided with a draft of the protocol compiled in May 2001 from the work done at prior Workshops in the Series. Then eight sub-groups were formed to discuss the following assigned topics: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing Environmental and Health/Monitoring and Safety Issues Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft Protocol Draft Protocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts This report provides the first complete presentation of the Draft Protocol for Mars Sample Handling to meet planetary protection needs. This Draft Protocol, which was compiled from deliberations and recommendations from earlier Workshops in the Series, represents a consensus that emerged from the discussions of all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the five Workshops of the Series. These discussions converged on a conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific analytical requirements. Discussions also identified important issues requiring attention, as well as research and development needed for protocol implementation.

Race Margaret S.↗

Wild2 approach maneuver strategy used for Stardust spacecraft (extended abstract)

Stardust, NASA's first dedicated sample return mission to a comet, successfully flew through the comet dust around Wold2 on January 2, 2004. The spacecraft flew within 236 km of the comet, meeting the mission requirement of 250+/- 50 km on flyby distance. Stardust collected dust particles and took several images of the comet while flying close to Wild2. The spacecraft will return to earth with the comet samples on January 15, 2006. To accomplish the above objective, a large Deep Space Maneuver (DSM#) was implemented during June 17 and 18, 2003 and a series of Trajectory Correction Maneuvers (TCMs) were also implemented during the 30 days prior to encounter. Both maneuver design and executions were influenced by number of factors including the small body ephemeris uncertainty, predictability of small forces arising from 3-axis attitude limit cycling and spacecraft slews. Maneuver design processes, including contingency plans, and maneuver performance characteristics, are discussed in this paper.

dust↗

Journal of Air Transportation, Volume 11, No. 2

The following topics were covered: How Do Airlines Perceive That Strategic Alliances Affect Their Individual Branding?; Airline Choice for Domestic Flights in Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area: An Application of the Conditional Logit Model; Consequences of Feeder Delays for the Success of A380 Operations; Inside the Mechanics of Network Development: How Competition and Strategy Reorganize European Air Traffic; The Opportunities and Threats of Turning Airports into Hubs; Another Approach to Enhance Airline Safety: Using System Safety Tools; A Simulation Based Approach for Contingency Planning for Aircraft Turnaround Activities in Airline Hubs; and The Council on Aviation Accreditation: Part One- Historical Foundation.

Bowen, Brent↗

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. In recent years, NASA has implemented several techniques to reduce the risk to the Shuttle from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it's role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of the effectivity of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, Justin L.↗

Inadvertent Earth Reentry Breakup Analysis for the New Horizons Mission

The New Horizons (NH) spacecraft was launched in January 2006 aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle, in a mission to explore Pluto, its moons, and other bodies in the Kuiper Belt. The NH spacecraft is powered by a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) which encases multiple General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) modules. Thus, a pre-launch vehicle breakup analysis for an inadvertent atmospheric reentry in the event of a launch failure was required to assess aerospace nuclear safety and for launch contingency planning. This paper addresses potential accidental Earth reentries analyzed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) which may arise during the ascent to parking orbit, resulting in a suborbital reentry, as well as a departure from parking orbit, resulting in an orbital reentry.

Ling, Lisa M.↗

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. An overview of significant MMOD impacts on the Payload Bay Door radiators, wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels and crew module windows will be presented, along with a discussion of the techniques NASA has implemented to reduce the risk from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the RCC regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it s role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, J. L.↗

Operational Experience with Long Duration Wildfire Mapping: UAS Missions Over the Western United States

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, United States Forest Service, and National Interagency Fire Center have developed a partnership to develop and demonstrate technology to improve airborne wildfire imaging and data dissemination. In the summer of 2007, a multi-spectral infrared scanner was integrated into NASA's Ikhana Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) (a General Atomics Predator-B) and launched on four long duration wildfire mapping demonstration missions covering eight western states. Extensive safety analysis, contingency planning, and mission coordination were key to securing an FAA certificate of authorization (COA) to operate in the national airspace. Infrared images were autonomously geo-rectified, transmitted to the ground station by satellite communications, and networked to fire incident commanders within 15 minutes of acquisition. Close coordination with air traffic control ensured a safe operation, and allowed real-time redirection around inclement weather and other minor changes to the flight plan. All objectives of the mission demonstrations were achieved. In late October, wind-driven wildfires erupted in five southern California counties. State and national emergency operations agencies requested Ikhana to help assess and manage the wildfires. Four additional missions were launched over a 5-day period, with near realtime images delivered to multiple emergency operations centers and fire incident commands managing 10 fires.

Hall, Philip↗

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Threat Mitigation Techniques for the Space Shuttle Orbiter

An overview of significant Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) impacts on the Payload Bay Door radiators, wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon panels and crew module windows will be presented, along with a discussion of the techniques NASA has implemented to reduce the risk from MMOD impacts. The concept of "Late Inspection" of the Nose Cap and Wing leading Edge (WLE) Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC) regions will be introduced. An alternative mated attitude with the International Space Station (ISS) on shuttle MMOD risk will also be presented. The significant threat mitigation effect of these two techniques will be demonstrated. The wing leading edge impact detection system, on-orbit repair techniques and disabled vehicle contingency plans will also be discussed.

Hyde, James L.↗

Contingency Operations of Americas Next Moon Rocket, Ares V

America has begun the development of a new space vehicle system which will enable humans to return to the moon and reach even farther destinations. The system is called Constellation: it has 2 earth-launch vehicles, Ares I and Ares V; a crew module, Orion; and a lander, Altair with descent and ascent stages. Ares V will launch an Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Altair into low earth orbit. Ares I will launch the Orion crew module into low earth orbit where it will rendezvous and dock with the Altair and EDS "stack". After rendezvous, the stack will contain four complete rocket systems, each capable of independent operations. Of course this multiplicity of vehicles provides a multiplicity of opportunities for off-nominal behavior and multiple mitigation options for each. Contingency operations are complicated by the issues of crew safety and the possibility of debris from the very large components impacting the ground. This paper examines contingency operations of the EDS in low earth orbit, during the boost to translunar orbit, and after the translunar boost. Contingency operations under these conditions have not been a consideration since the Apollo era and analysis of the possible contingencies and mitigations will take some time to evolve. Since the vehicle has not been designed, much less built, it is not possible to evaluate contingencies from a root-cause basis or from a probability basis; rather they are discussed at an effects level (such as the reaction control system is consuming propellant at a high rate). Mitigations for the contingencies are based on the severity of the off-nominal condition, the time of occurrence, recovery options, options for alternate missions, crew safety, evaluation of the condition (forensics) and future prevention. Some proposed mitigations reflect innovation in thinking and make use of the multiplicity of on-orbit resources including the crew; example: Orion could do a "fly around" to allow the crew to determine the condition and cause of a partially separated payload shroud. Other mitigations are really alternate missions; example, an engine out on during ascent resulted in insufficient propellant for the lunar mission, but the on-orbit vehicle stack is otherwise perfect and can pursue an alternate mission, such as a high ballistic trajectory to test the high-speed atmospheric reentry of Orion. Evaluation and presentation of contingency operations at this early stage of the development of the Ares V rocket will improve the design of the vehicle and lay the groundwork for the exhaustive contingency planning which must be done after the vehicle is built as preparations for operations.

Jaap, John↗

Atrial Fibrillation During an Exploration Class Mission

Background: A long-duration exploration class mission is fraught with numerous medical contingency plans. Herein, we explore the challenges of symptomatic atrial fibrillation (AF) occurring during an exploration class mission. The actions and resources required to ameliorate the situation, including the availability of appropriate pharmaceuticals, monitoring devices, treatment modalities, and communication protocols will be investigated. Challenges of Atrial Fibrillation during an Exploration Mission: Numerous etiologies are responsible for the initiation of AF. On Earth, we have the time and medical resources to evaluate and determine the causative situation for most cases of AF and initiate therapy accordingly. During a long-duration exploration class mission resources will be severely restricted. How is one to determine if new onset AF is due to recent myocardial infarction, pulmonary embolism, fluid overload, thyrotoxicosis, cardiac structural abnormalities, or CO poisoning? Which pharmaceutical therapy should be initiated and what potential side effects can be expected? Should anti-coagulation therapy be initiated? How would one monitor the therapeutic treatment of AF in microgravity? What training would medical officers require, and which communication strategies should be developed to enable the best, safest therapeutic options for treatment of AF during a long-duration exploration class mission? Summary: These questions will be investigated with expert opinion on disease elucidation, efficient pharmacology, therapeutic monitoring, telecommunication strategies, and mission cost parameters with emphasis on atrial fibrillation being just one illustration of the tremendous challenges that face a long-duration exploration mission. The limited crew training time, medical hardware, and drugs manifested to deal with such an event predicate that aggressive primary and secondary prevention strategies be developed to protect a multibillion-dollar asset like the International Space Station or a mission to the Moon or Mars. Learning Objectives: The audience will become familiar with the risks and challenges inherent to developing a therapeutic strategy for the treatment of atrial fibrillation during a long-term exploration class mission.

Lipset, Mark A.↗

Using Total Lightning Observations to Enhance Lightning Safety

Lightning is often the underrated threat faced by the public when it comes to dangerous weather phenomena. Typically, larger scale events such as floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes receive the vast majority of attention by both the general population and the media. This comes from the fact that these phenomena are large, longer lasting, can impact a large swath of society at one time, and are dangerous events. The threat of lightning is far more isolated on a case by case basis, although millions of cloud-to-ground lightning strikes hit this United States each year. While attention is given to larger meteorological events, lightning is the second leading cause of weather related deaths in the United States. This information raises the question of what steps can be taken to improve lightning safety. Already, the meteorological community s understanding of lightning has increased over the last 20 years. Lightning safety is now better addressed with the National Weather Service s access to the National Lightning Detection Network data and enhanced wording in their severe weather warnings. Also, local groups and organizations are working to improve public awareness of lightning safety with easy phrases to remember, such as "When Thunder Roars, Go Indoors." The impacts can be seen in the greater array of contingency plans, from airports to sports stadiums, addressing the threat of lightning. Improvements can still be made and newer technologies may offer new tools as we look towards the future. One of these tools is a network of sensors called a lightning mapping array (LMA). Several of these networks exist across the United States. NASA s Short-term Prediction Research and Transition Center (SPoRT), part of the Marshall Spaceflight Center, has access to three of these networks from Huntsville, Alabama, the Kennedy Space Center, and Washington D.C. The SPoRT program s mission is to help transition unique products and observations into the operational forecast environment. SPoRT has been collaborating with the Huntsville National Weather Service (NWS) Office since 2003 and has since included several other offices to better implement LMA observations into real-time applications. Much of that work has focused on the LMA s ability to detect intra-cloud lightning in addition to cloud-to-ground lightning strikes. Combined, these observations are called total lightning. With total lightning observations, NWS offices can enhance their situational awareness and improve severe weather warnings. Just as importantly, the observed intra-cloud flashes often precede the first cloud-to-ground strike by a few minutes. SPoRT and its partner NWS offices are working to develop visualizations and applications to better utilize these data. However, there is a drawback. The LMAs have a short range of no more than 200 km. This is being addressed with the next generation geostationary satellite, GOES-R, which will boast the Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM). SPoRT, in conjunction with NOAA s GOES-R Proving Ground, is working to prepare the end user community for the GLM era using the LMA observations as a demonstration tool. Working collaboratively with our NWS partners, SPoRT is working to determine how best to integrate these future observations to improve both severe storm warnings and lightning safety.

Stano, Geoffrey T.↗

Designing Mission Operations for the Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory Mission

The Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) mission has placed two orbiters in a low altitude polar orbit around the moon to study its internal structure. GRAIL mission to the Moon offered unique challenges to operatiotn: (1) operate twin-orbiters in parallel, (2) numerous maneuvers, (3) short, compact mission with six unique phases, and (4) detailed contingency planning required.

Orbital Period Reduction (OPR)↗

International Space Station (ISS) External Thermal Control System (ETCS) Loop A Pump Module (PM) Jettison Options Assessment

On December 11, 2013, the International Space Station (ISS) experienced a failure of the External Thermal Control System (ETCS) Loop A Pump Module (PM). To minimize the number of extravehicular activities (EVA) required to replace the PM, jettisoning the faulty pump was evaluated. The objective of this study was to independently evaluate the jettison options considered by the ISS Trajectory Operations Officer (TOPO) and to provide recommendations for safe jettison of the ETCS Loop A PM. The simulation selected to evaluate the TOPO options was the NASA Engineering and Safety Center's (NESC) version of Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II (POST2) developed to support another NESC assessment. The objective of the jettison analysis was twofold: (1) to independently verify TOPO posigrade and retrograde jettison results, and (2) to determine jettison guidelines based on additional sensitivity, trade study, and Monte Carlo (MC) analysis that would prevent PM recontact. Recontact in this study designates a propagated PM trajectory that comes within 500 m of the ISS propagated trajectory. An additional simulation using Systems Tool Kit (STK) was run for independent verification of the POST2 simulation results. Ultimately, the ISS Program removed the PM jettison option from consideration. However, prior to the Program decision, the retrograde jettison option remained part of the EVA contingency plan. The jettison analysis presented showed that, in addition to separation velocity/direction and the atmosphere conditions, the key variables in determining the time to recontact the ISS is highly dependent on the ballistic number (BN) difference between the object being jettisoned and the ISS.

Murri, Daniel G.↗