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At least 163 records · Page 9

Virtual Control Systems Environment (VCSE)

Will Atkins, a Sandia National Laboratories computer engineer discusses cybersecurity research work for process control systems. Will explains his work on the Virtual Control Systems Environment project to develop a modeling and simulation framework of the U.S. electric grid in order to study and mitigate possible cyberattacks on infrastructure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

On the Limits of EM Based Detection of Control Logic Injection Attacks In Noisy Environments

The difficulty in applying traditional security mechanisms in Industrial Control System (ICS) environments makes a large portion of these mission-critical assets vulnerable to cyber attacks. Therefore, there is a dire need for the development of novel security mechanisms specifically designed to protect such critical systems. Recently a lot of attention has been given to mechanisms that exploit the EM emanations of devices for defense purposes. Such practices may lead to the development of robust external and non-intrusive anomaly detection systems. Nevertheless, the majority of current work in the area neglects to consider the implications of real-life environments, particularly environmental noise. In this work, we explore the limits of EM-based anomaly detection towards identifying injection attacks in control logic software in noisy environments. Our study conducted upon both synthetically generated and real signals identified that indeed environmental noise might significantly degrade the accuracy of the anomaly detection process. Experiments done upon synthetic data indicated that assuming that signals are captured with high sampling rates, even minor code injections can be detected with above-90% accuracy in noisy environments where SNR is up to -2dB. This is true even if naive detection methods are considered. Moreover, experiments done using a real-life testbed attest that even single-instruction injections can be detected with near-perfect accuracy in relatively clean environments. Finally, noise-elimination techniques can drastically improve the reliability of the detection mechanism even in noisy environments.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Secure Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS) Considerations for Smart Grid Devices

In this paper, we examine some unique challenges associated with key management in the Smart Grid and concomitant research initiatives: 1) effectively model security requirements and their implementations, and 2) manage keys and key distribution for very large scale deployments such as Smart Meters over a long period of performance. This will set the stage to: 3) develop innovative, low cost methods to protect keying material, and 4) provide high assurance authentication services. We will present our perspective on key management and will discuss some key issues within the life cycle of a cryptographic key designed to achieve the following: 1) control systems designed, installed, operated, and maintained to survive an intentional cyber assault with no loss of critical function, and 2) widespread implementation of methods for secure communication between remote access devices and control centers that are scalable and cost-effective to deploy.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Systems and methods for control system security

A component security device may be disposed at an interface between a component and a cyber-physical system. The disclosed component security device may be physically and/or electrically coupled between the component and infrastructure of the cyber-physical system, such as a backplane, bus, and/or the like. The component security device may be configured to monitor the component, and selectively isolate the component from the cyber-physical system. Since the component security device is interposed at the interface of the component, the component security device may be capable of isolating the component regardless of whether the component has been compromised (e.g., regardless of whether the component is capable of complying with system commands).

Rieger, Craig G.↗

Building the Scientific Basis for Cyber Resilience of Critical Infrastructure

Rigorous methods and models are needed to quantify, measure, and increase the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure. An adversary may exploit vulnerabilities in the vital networks such as industrial control systems (ICS) associated with critical infrastructure (e.g., energy, financial, transportation, security), in order to achieve harmful consequences. In cyber systems, the number of vulnerabilities may be large, the attack surface changes over time, and the problem consists of both technical and non-technical factors (e.g., errors in software and human error). Given this complex and dynamic landscape, strategically mitigating risk is important, where “risk” considers both the probability of an event and the consequences if that event occurs. One way to decrease risk is to address consequences by ensuring that critical infrastructure is resilient. In this context, resilience is characterized by the magnitude and duration of a deviation from targeted performance levels, given a disruption. Increasing resilience decreases the consequences of a successful attack.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Security Evaluation of Two Intrusion Detection Systems in Smart Grid SCADA Environment

The increased complexity and interconnectivity of SCADA infrastructure in the power system have exposed it to the multitude of vulnerabilities. There is a growing emphasis towards developing an efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) to strengthen the security of the SCADA control system. This is a research-in-progress paper which presents the application of two anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (AIDS) in detecting the stealthy cyber-attack on the SCADA control system. We have applied the IDS tools Snort and Bro, in designing the IDS and later, compared their performances in terms of detection rate and latency in the alert packets with a motive of selecting better IDS for the SCADA security. Specifically, the timing-based rule is applied to identify the malicious packets based on the high temporal frequency in the network traffic. For the case study, we have implemented the SCADA based protection scheme which performs an autonomous protection to mitigate the system disturbances. We first implemented the stealthy cyber-attack which compromised the SCADA controller followed by data integrity attack on the system generator. Next, we perform the impact analysis during the attack followed by performance evaluation of IDS tools. Our experimental results show that the IDS tools are efficient in detecting cyber-attacks within an acceptable time frame for different sizes of network packets.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Role of reinforcement learning for risk-based robust control of cyber-physical energy systems

Critical infrastructures such as cyber-physical energy systems (CPS-E) integrate information flow and physical operations that are vulnerable to natural and targeted failures. Safe, secure, and reliable operation and control of CPS-E is critical to ensure societal well-being and economic prosperity. Automated control is key for real-time operations and may be mathematically cast as a sequential decision-making problem under uncertainty. Emergence of data-driven techniques for decision making under uncertainty, such as reinforcement learning (RL), have led to promising advances for addressing sequential decision-making problems for risk-based robust CPS-E control. However, existing research challenges include understanding the applicability of RL methods across diverse CPS-E applications, addressing the effect of risk preferences across multiple RL methods, and development of open-source domain-aware simulation environments for RL experimentation within a CPS-E context. This article systematically analyzes the applicability of four types of RL methods (model-free, model-based, hybrid model-free and model-based, and hierarchical) for risk-based robust CPS-E control. Problem features and solution stability for the RL methods are also discussed. We demonstrate and compare the performance of multiple RL methods under different risk specifications (risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking) through the development and application of an open-source simulation environment. Motivating numerical simulation examples include representative single-zone and multizone building control use cases. Finally, six key insights for future research and broader adoption of RL methods are identified, with specific emphasis on problem features, algorithmic explainability, and solution stability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Epistemology of voltage control in DER-rich power system

Despite the recent development of several scalable, robust, and resilient control approaches with superior convergence properties considering an increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), cognitive oversights often simplify several aspects of the cyber–physical power system in the controller development. Here, following the identification of the limitations of classical controller definitions, we justify alternative definitions of voltage control approaches classifiers considering three inter-disciplinary domains: (i) power system, (ii) optimization and decision-making, and (iii) networking and cyber-security, to develop a taxonomy for helping in real-world comparative performance analysis and deployability of these controllers. We observe that classical and introduced domain-based definitions together can better classify the control algorithms.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

SCADA Protocol Anomaly Detection Utilizing Compression (SPADUC) 2013

There is a significant need to protect the nation’s energy infrastructures from malicious actors using cyber methods. Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems may be vulnerable due to the insufficient security implemented during the design and deployment of these control systems. This is particularly true in older legacy SCADA systems that are still commonly in use. The purpose of INL’s research on the SCADA Protocol Anomaly Detection Utilizing Compression (SPADUC) project was to determine if and how data compression techniques could be used to identify and protect SCADA systems from cyber attacks. Initially, the concept was centered on how to train a compression algorithm to recognize normal control system traffic versus hostile network traffic. Because large portions of the TCP/IP message traffic (called packets) are repetitive, the concept of using compression techniques to differentiate “non-normal” traffic was proposed. In this manner, malicious SCADA traffic could be identified at the packet level prior to completing its payload. Previous research has shown that SCADA network traffic has traits desirable for compression analysis. This work investigated three different approaches to identify malicious SCADA network traffic using compression techniques. The preliminary analyses and results presented herein are clearly able to differentiate normal from malicious network traffic at the packet level at a very high confidence level for the conditions tested. Additionally, the master dictionary approach used in this research appears to initially provide a meaningful way to categorize and compare packets within a communication channel.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Securing Smart Manufacturing: Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks in CNC-Based Systems

As Industry 4.0 advances, the integration of computer numerical control (CNC) machines and advanced manufacturing technologies is transforming production into smart manufacturing systems that blend physical and digital processes as cyber-physical systems. However, this increased cyber-physical connectivity exposes manufacturing systems to cyber threats that can cause severe operational and financial disruptions. This paper presents a comparative study on cyber attacks and anomaly detection techniques in manufacturing, focusing on network traffic from CNC machines. The data extracted from network packets includes machine commands and control signals exchanged between the machine's interface and control system, crucial for maintaining operational integrity. We explore two types of cyber attacks, design modification and command injection, which pose substantial risks to CNC machine productivity and system integrity. Our investigation involves experiments on a real CNC system, highlighting the urgent need for effective detection mechanisms. To address these threats, we evaluate three anomaly detection methods: dynamic time warping (DTW), rolling average, and a deep learning, long short-term memory (LSTM) time-series-based autoencoder. Each is assessed for its effectiveness in identifying anomalous behaviors caused by the attacks. Our findings demonstrate the unique strengths and limitations of each detection technique, providing a deeper understanding of their applicability in realworld manufacturing environments. The comparative analysis indicates that while certain methods are highly effective against specific attack types, others offer broader applicability across different attacks. This study contributes to the accurate detection of anomalies in CNC machining processes, thereby enhancing the reliability and security of smart manufacturing systems against diverse cyber threats.

Williams, Bethanie [Tennessee Technological Univer↗

Forewarning of Failure in Complex Systems

As the critical infrastructures of the United States have become more and more dependent on public and private networks, the potential for widespread national impact resulting from disruption or failure of these networks has also increased. Securing the nation s critical infrastructures requires protecting not only their physical systems but, just as important, the cyber portions of the systems on which they rely. A failure is inclusive of random events, design flaws, and instabilities caused by cyber (and/or physical) attack. One such domain is failure in critical equipment. A second is aging bridges. We discuss the workings of such a system in the context of the necessary sensors, command and control and data collection as well as the cyber security efforts that would support this system. Their application and the implications of this computing architecture are also discussed, with respect to our nation s aging infrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The evolution of the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory in nuclear power research

The events at Three Mile Island in the United States brought about fundamental changes in the ways that simulation would be used in nuclear operations. The need for research simulators was identified to scientifically study human-centered risk and make recommendations for process control system designs. This paper documents the human factors research conducted at the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) since its inception in 2010 at Idaho National Laboratory. The facility’s primary purposes are to provide support to utilities for system upgrades and to validate modernized control room concepts. In the last decade, however, as nuclear industry needs have evolved, so too have the purposes of the HSSL. Thus, beyond control room modernization, human factors researchers have evaluated the security of nuclear infrastructure from cyber adversaries and evaluated human-in-the-loop simulations for joint operations with an integrated hydrogen generation plant. Lastly, our review presents research using human reliability analysis techniques with data collected from HSSL-based studies and concludes with potential future directions for the HSSL, including severe accident management and advanced control room technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Complex Failure Forewarning System - DHS Conference Proceedings

As the critical infrastructures of the United States have become more and more dependent on public and private networks, the potential for widespread national impact resulting from disruption or failure of these networks has also increased. Securing the nation s critical infrastructures requires protecting not only their physical systems but, just as important, the cyber portions of the systems on which they rely. A failure is inclusive of random events, design flaws, and instabilities caused by cyber (and/or physical) attack. One such domain, aging bridges, is used to explain the Complex Structure Failure Forewarning System. We discuss the workings of such a system in the context of the necessary sensors, command and control and data collection as well as the cyber security efforts that would support this system. Their application and the implications of this computing architecture are also discussed, with respect to our nation s aging infrastructure.

5th Annual University Network Summit↗

Load altering attack-tolerant defense strategy for load frequency control system

Cyber attacks are emerging threats to every information-oriented energy management system. By violating the cyber systems, the hacker can disrupt the security and stability due to the strong coupling between the cyber and physical facilities. In this paper, one type of cyber attacks designated as the load altering attack is studied for the power system frequency control, and corresponding defense strategies are proposed to improve the frequency control performance. Considering the difficulty of the application of model-based controller into large-scale power systems, a novel model-free defense framework is for the first time presented. Under this framework, both active defense and passive defense strategies are designed. The former assumes that the defender has the initiative to learn different attack scenarios. Adaptive defense strategies are implemented using the online attack identification information and off-line trained strategy pool. The latter assumes that the defender passively tolerates various attack scenarios via the pre-trained off-line strategy. Both approaches prove to be effective through validation based on the IEEE benchmark systems. The proposed defense framework and defense strategies can be extended to other energy control systems to enhance their attack tolerance capability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Virtualizing Industrial Control Networks for Cyber Resilience Experiments

Industrial control systems (ICS) networks are undergoing constant shifts to accommodate new security measures. It is challenging to test varying network configurations and security tools with physical systems as they typically include large, expensive equipment. Not only this, but researchers often do not have access to this type of equipment for development of new security tools and techniques. As a solution to these issues, this work presents a set of tools for utilizing GNS3 and Docker as a virtual ICS network. Additionally, the virtual network can be attached to physical devices including network switches, hardware simulations, and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). Two case studies showcase a relatively complex automatically generated network and an attack on a simple ICS network with an example mitigation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Towards Provable Security in Industrial Control Systems Via Dynamic Protocol Attestation

Industrial control systems (ICSs) increasingly rely on digital technologies vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber attackers can infiltrate ICSs and execute malicious actions. Individually, each action seems innocuous. But taken together, they cause the system to enter an unsafe state. These attacks have resulted in dramatic consequences such as physical damage, economic loss, and environmental catastrophes. This paper introduces a methodology that restricts actions using protocols. These protocols only allow safe actions to execute. Protocols are written in a domain specific language we have embedded in an interactive theorem prover (ITP). The ITP enables formal, machine-checked proofs to ensure protocols maintain safety properties. We use dynamic attestation to ensure ICSs conform to their protocol even if an adversary compromises a component. Since protocol conformance prevents unsafe actions, the previously mentioned cyber attacks become impossible. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methodology using an example from the Fischertechnik Industry 4.0 platform. We measure dynamic attestation's impact on latency and throughput. Our approach is a starting point for studying how to combine formal methods and protocol design to thwart attacks intended to cripple ICSs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗