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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

Protecting drinking water utilities from cyberthreats

Cyber-security challenges have the potential for becoming one of the defining issues of our time. Cyber-attacks have become an ever-increasing threat and the United States (US) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now ranks cyber-crime as one of its most important law enforcement activities. In addition to the general problems associated with cyber-crime, critical infrastructure (CI) related to energy production, manufacturing, water supply and other systems have come under attack. For example, drinking water utilities are increasingly incorporating computer technology into their routine operations and are therefore increasingly vulnerable to cyber- threats. Systems control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to manage automated physical processes essential to water treatment and distribution systems have become standard in medium to large drinking water utilities and in many small water systems. However, even with the application of standard information technology cybersecurity best practices these types of systems have proven to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In 2015, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responded to 25 cybersecurity incidents in the Water Sector and to 46 incidents in the Energy Sector. Comparatively, between 2014 and 2015, the reported number of Water Sector incidents actually increased by 78.6% (from 14 to 25). The DHS is in a collaborative partnership with the US Environmental Protection Agency to ensure cybersecurity in the Water Sector. As a result of this partnership a number of guidance documents and techniques have been developed to counter cyber-attacks and minimize cyber vulnerability. These approaches are documented along with a summary of common vulnerabilities. However, a new approach which has great promise in protecting drinking water systems against hacking and cyber-attacks, based on the concept of unidirectional gateways, is presented and discussed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Critical Need for Plutonium and Uranium Isotopic Standards with Lower Uncertainties

Certified reference materials (CRMs) traceable to national and international safeguards database are a critical prerequisite for ensuring that nuclear measurement systems are free of systematic biases. CRMs are used to validate measurement processes associated with nuclear analytical laboratories. Diverse areas related to nuclear safeguards are impacted by the quality of the CRM standards available to analytical laboratories. These include: nuclear forensics, radio-chronometry, national and international safeguards, stockpile stewardship, nuclear weapons infrastructure and nonproliferation, fuel fabrication, waste processing, radiation protection, and environmental monitoring. For the past three decades the nuclear community is confronted with the strange situation that improvements in measurement data quality resulting from the improved accuracy and precision achievable with modern multi-collector mass spectrometers could not be fully exploited due to large uncertainties associated with CRMs available from New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) that are used for instrument calibration and measurement control. Similar conditions prevail for both plutonium and uranium isotopic standards and for impurity element standards in uranium matrices. Herein, the current status of U and Pu isotopic standards available from NBL is reviewed. Critical areas requiring improvement in the quality of the nuclear standards to enable the U. S. and international safeguards community to utilize the full potential of modern multi-collector mass spectrometer instruments are highlighted.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Coupled flow accumulation and atmospheric blocking govern flood duration

Abstract We present a physically based Bayesian network model for inference and prediction of flood duration that allows for a deeper understanding of the nexus of antecedent flow regime, atmospheric blocking, and moisture transport/release mechanisms. Distinct scaling factors at the land surface and regional atmospheric levels are unraveled using this Bayesian network model. Land surface scaling explains the variability in flood duration as a function of cumulative exceedance index, a new measure that represents the evolution of the flood in the basin. Dynamic atmospheric scaling explains the cumulative exceedance index using the interaction between atmospheric blocking system and the synergistic model of wind divergence and atmospheric water vapor. Our findings underline that the synergy between a large persistent low-pressure blocking system and a higher rate of divergent wind often triggers a long-duration flood, even in the presence of moderate moisture supply in the atmosphere. This condition in turn causes an extremely long-duration flood if the basin-wide cumulative flow prior to the flood event was already high. Thus, this new land-atmospheric interaction framework integrates regional flood duration scaling and dynamic atmospheric scaling to enable the coupling of ‘horizontal’ (for example, streamflow accumulation inside the basin) and ‘vertical’ flow of information (for example, interrelated land and ocean-atmosphere interactions), providing an improved understanding of the critical forcing of regional hydroclimatic systems. This Bayesian model approach is applied to the Missouri River Basin, which has the largest system of reservoirs in the United States. Our predictive model can aid in decision support systems for the protection of national infrastructure against long-duration flood events.

Najibi, Nasser (ORCID:0000000205157192)↗
DOE OSTI2019

Current State-of-Practice in Dam Safety Risk Assessment

Dams provide significant benefits to the nation, serving as critical infrastructure to deliver water retention and control throughout the United States (US). Major cities could not function without the fresh water supply stored in dammed reservoirs, and many electrical systems rely on dependable hydroelectric power supply. Dams on rivers across the country protect communities against destructive flood impacts while providing navigable waters for transportation, irrigation for agriculture, and various opportunities for recreation. While dams provide many essential services, dam failure flooding can present significant risks to property and life. Over decades of experience, dam safety practices, including risk assessment, have evolved as engineering knowledge, scientific understanding, and technological advancements grow. This project summarizes the current state-of-practice in dam safety risk assessment.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2019

Current State-of-Practice in Dam Safety Risk Assessment

Dams provide significant benefits to the nation, serving as critical infrastructure to deliver water retention and control throughout the United States (US). Major cities could not function without the fresh water supply stored in dammed reservoirs, and many electrical systems rely on dependable hydroelectric power supply. Dams on rivers across the country protect communities against destructive flood impacts while providing navigable waters for transportation, irrigation for agriculture, and various opportunities for recreation. While dams provide many essential services, dam failure flooding can present significant risks to property and life. Over decades of experience, dam safety practices, including risk assessment, have evolved as engineering knowledge, scientific understanding, and technological advancements grow. This project summarizes the current state-of-practice in dam safety risk assessment.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2018

EPA and Idaho National Laboratory create first of its scale

Advancing the science and engineering of decontaminating water distribution systems and safely disposing of high-volumes of contaminated water are high priorities for the EPA. To help address these science gaps, EPA homeland security researchers have developed the first-of-its-scale Water Security Test Bed (WSTB). Water is an important component of everyday life. We rely on safe, clean water for our health and the health of the environment. Protecting this vital resource is critical to living safely and securely. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for working with water utilities to protect water systems from contamination and to clean up systems that become contaminated. Purposeful or inadvertent distribution system contamination can result in large amounts of infrastructure and water that must be cleaned. Water distribution systems contamination can be caused by, for example, natural disasters such as Superstorm Sandy or by individuals hoping to cause harm. The WSTB, constructed at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Idaho National Laboratory, replicates a section of a typical municipal drinking water system including a piping system with roughly 445 feet of pipe and two fire hydrants laid out in an “L” shape using 40-year-old, eight-inch cement mortar lined, ductile iron pipes, excavated after twenty years of use for water conveyance. Researchers built the WSTB above ground for easy access during experiments, and to facilitate fast leak detection. Over the next several years, EPA and partner researchers will conduct experiments using simulants of various biological, chemical, and radioactive materials that simulate high toxic versions of these agents. At this “full” sized system, researchers will demonstrate approaches to contamination detection, sensor and model testing, infrastructure decontamination, water treatment and cyber testing developed at lab and pilot scale. Researchers are also able to verify if laboratory results that were effective in controlled conditions are as effective in full-scale testing. Having the ability to conduct bench scale studies in a real world setting can help address specific research gaps, and help water researchers understand conditions in which real world drinking water systems operate.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

TA-III Sub-Area Plan: Overview & Summary

The TA-III / Remote Areas Sub-Area Plan is currently under development. Planning concepts being considered are: (1) Continue to use and preserve large tracts of land for large-scale mission-related testing, associated buffers, waste management, and open space; (2) Identify investments to protect, sustain, and recapitalize these specialized assets; (3) Identify opportunities to consolidate common functions in order to reduce operating costs; (4) Explore the potential to enhance employee support facilities and services for those who work in remote areas; and (5) Extend / fill critical gaps in telecommunication infrastructure to TA-III and remote areas.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Defense strategies for cloud computing multi-site server infrastructures

We consider cloud computing server infrastructures for big data applications, which consist of multiple server sites connected over a wide-area network. The sites house a number of servers, network elements and local-area connections, and the wide-area network plays a critical, asymmetric role of providing vital connectivity between them. We model this infrastructure as a system of systems, wherein the sites and wide-area network are represented by their cyber and physical components. These components can be disabled by cyber and physical attacks, and also can be protected against them using component reinforcements. The effects of attacks propagate within the systems, and also beyond them via the wide-area network.We characterize these effects using correlations at two levels using: (a) aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual site or network, and (b) first-order differential conditions on system survival probabilities that characterize the component-level correlations within individual systems. We formulate a game between an attacker and a provider using utility functions composed of survival probability and cost terms. At Nash Equilibrium, we derive expressions for the expected capacity of the infrastructure given by the number of operational servers connected to the network for sum-form, product-form and composite utility functions.

Rao, Nageswara S.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Planning for Seattle at the Convergence of Resilience and Energy

Grid reliability metrics obscure important temporal, spatial, and categorical considerations for increasing energy resilience. Systemwide or feeder-level outage metrics do not identify which kinds of services are affected by outages, where, and for how long. These outage metrics indicate the impacts of outages but cannot measure the consequences to customers that could result from those outages. The consequences of power outages for surrounding community members are caused by disruptions to electricity-dependent critical services, rather than to electricity itself. Power outages can decrease a community's access to healthcare, fuel, safe indoor temperatures, and provisions like food and water. This project developed critical service access, a new consequence-focused resilience metric that quantifies the relative access to critical services provided to households by distribution infrastructure during normal conditions and major disruptions. We use a spatially granular grid analysis that facilitates targeted resilience interventions; dividing feeders into isolatable sections and combining those sections with the critical service access metric allows us to identify where energy improvements like solar-plus-storage microgrids could create the most benefits for community members by protecting access to food, fuel, health, shelter, and public safety services. We identify locations in a South Seattle study area that could be high priorities for resilience investment and summarize their potential neighborhood-scale resilience benefits. This analysis was complemented by direct feedback from study area residents collect through a survey and focus groups. Results can help utilities understand how and where long power outages can create real consequences for customers, set strategic targets based on that understanding, and measure the potential benefits of energy resilience upgrades for more informed decisions.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2019

Defense strategies and expected capacity of high performance computing infrastructures

We consider high performance computing infrastructures consisting of multiple sites connected over a wide-area network. These sites house heterogeneous computing systems, network elements and local-area connections, and the wide-area network plays a critical, asymmetric role of providing the vital connectivity between them. We model this infrastructure as a recursive system of systems, wherein the basic systems at the finest levels are composed of discrete cyber and physical components. These components may be disabled by cyber and physical disruptions, and their reinforcements protect against them albeit at a cost. We utilize results from a game formulation based on (i) characterizing the disruptions between systems at each level of recursion using aggregate failure correlation functions, and within basic systems using the multiplier functions, and (ii) using utility functions expressed in terms of the number of basic system components attacked and reinforced. At Nash Equilibrium, we derive expressions for the expected capacity of the infrastructure given by the number of computing nodes that are operational and connected to the network.

Rao, Nageswara↗
DOE OSTI2019

Demonstration of the Cybersecurity Framework through Real-world Cyber Attack

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity, provides five concurrent and continuous functions to Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover from cyber threats and vulnerabilities to buildings. Based on the core architecture and security best practices defined in the CSF guidelines, we developed the CSF webtools. The CSF webtools provide actionable functions that can be easily adopted by a facility operator to enhance their critical infrastructure security. The essence is captured in a set of “how-to” instructions for the facility operators to adopt, adapt, and apply to their critical infrastructure facilities. When considered together, these functions provide a high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s cybersecurity risk management. The CSF webtools provide an easy to follow set of cybersecurity best practices, policies, and procedures to improve the cybersecurity posture of our nation’s buildings and other critical infrastructures. The CSF webtools are also designed to facilitate communication of cybersecurity activities and outcomes across the organization from the executive to operations levels. Finally, the CSF webtools allow the critical infrastructure operators to assess the overall cybersecurity maturity and posture. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the capabilities of the CSF webtools through an illustrative cyber-attack based on a real-world scenario.

cybersecurity framework, maturity model, critical ↗
DOE OSTI2025

NFPA Distributed Energy Resources Safety Training (DERST) For Emergency Responders

The National Fire Protection Association, with support from the Department of Energy, executed a multi-year initiative to develop, enhance, and disseminate Distributed Energy Resources Safety Training (DERST) tools for U.S. emergency responders. As Distributed Energy Resources (DER)—such as solar photovoltaics, battery energy storage systems (ESS), electric vehicles (EVs), and associated infrastructure—become increasingly prevalent, the NFPA identified a critical need for up-to-date standardized, accessible, and effective safety training tailored for the fire service and related public safety professionals. The project delivered a comprehensive suite of educational resources to improve responders’ abilities to safely manage DER-related incidents. This included: • Revised Modular Training Courses: Updated classroom-based DER safety courses, now modular and accessible nationwide through fire academies and the North American Fire Training Directors (NAFTD) network. • Live Burn Testing & Research: A full-scale controlled burn of a DER-equipped residential structure provided real-world data and insights, forming the basis for updated best practices. • A Gamified Simulation Tool – Firefighters Incident Response Simulation Tool (FIRST): A first-of-its-kind, multiplayer, scenario-based simulation using the Unreal Engine 5.0 to train responders in a realistic virtual, multi-DER incident environment. • Field Familiarization Software Tools & Prop Guide: Digital DER field familiarization evolutions software guide and a prop development manual to support field-based DER training exercises, enhancing responders' hands-on familiarity with DER infrastructure and collaboration on virtual incident responses. • National Dissemination Strategy: Strategic partnerships with NAFTD, Vector Solutions, and others enabled wide-scale distribution, with over 5,000 departments accessing resources and 1,100+ departments adopting the simulator in the first seven months. Also provided a web portal for easy access to all training and simulation programs developed under this grant for the U.S. responder community. Key findings from the project—particularly from the burn test—led to paradigm shifts in fire response tactics. For example, traditional approaches to garage fires may be hazardous if DERs are present, due to explosive off gassing and thermal runaway risks. The new training emphasizes scene assessment, stand-off approaches, thermal imaging verification, and careful post-incident cooling of DER components to prevent reignition. This initiative has had a significant national impact, raising awareness, enhancing preparedness, and supporting safer DER incident response practices. Significant engagement from the media, public safety organizations, and PBS coverage has further amplified the reach and adoption of NFPA’s DER safety training, tools, and simulations.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluation of the first version of the new RFPI system dedicated to PIP-II project accelerator

The Low-Level Radio Frequency (LLRF) control system is one of the most critical superconducting linac infrastructures responsible for the parameters of the beam acceleration. The LLRF system mainly focuses on the electromagnetic field parameters inside the cavity. While it incorporates fast feedback algorithms to optimize energy transfer to the passing particle beam it does not follow other cryomodule or cavity parameter changes. The Radio Frequency Protection Interlock (RFPI) system closely monitors various factors (like cryomodule vacuum, beamline vacuum, field emission probe current level, temperature, RF signal leakage, etc). Its simple but reliable logic has to provide an instant decision about the LLRF system or high-power amplifier output signal blocking in case of safety region excitation. This contribution presents a new version of the RFPI system which logic is implemented in the FPGA chip. The initial work on the prototype of the new system design resulted in the PoC (Proof of Concept) device. The PoC offers the possibility of various protection logic configurations, input signals parameters evaluation, and modularity aspects verification. The structure and test results from the device evaluation are summarized and discussed in this contribution.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Introduction to the Minitrack on Monitoring, Control, and Protection.

This minitrack is on topics related to the monitoring, control, and protection of electric power systems for real-time operations and short-term operations planning. This year the emphasis has been on recent developments in the area of large-scale dynamic research for power systems and on hybrid and distributed control concepts for decentralized command and control of existing critical energy infrastructures.

Eto, Joseph H↗
DOE OSTI2019

Data-driven cyber attack detection and mitigation for decentralized wide-area protection and control in smart grids

Modern power systems have already evolved into complicated cyber physical systems (CPS), often referred to as smart grids, due to the continuous expansion of the electrical infrastructure, the augmentation of the number of heterogeneous system components and players, and the consequential application of a diversity of information and telecommunication technologies to facilitate the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) of the day-to-day power system operation. Because of the reliance on cyber technologies, WAMPAC, among other critical functions, is prone to various malicious cyber attacks. Successful cyber attacks, especially those sabotage the operation of Bulk Electric System (BES), can cause great financial losses and social panics. Application of conventional IT security solutions is indispensable, but it often turns out to be insufficient to mitigate sophisticated attacks that deploy zero-day vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics. To further improve the resilience of the operation of smart grids when facing cyber attacks, it is desirable to make the WAMPAC functions per se capable of detecting various anomalies automatically, carrying out adaptive activity adjustments in time and thus staying unimpaired even under attack. Most of the existing research efforts attempt to achieve this by adding novel functional modules, such as model-based anomaly detectors, to the legacy centralized WAMPAC functions. In contrast, this dissertation investigates the application of data-driven algorithms in cyber attack detection and mitigation within a decentralized architecture aiming at improving the situational awareness and self-adaptiveness of WAMPAC. First part of the research focuses on the decentralization of System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) with Multi-Agent System (MAS), within which the data-driven anomaly detection and optimal adaptive load shedding are further explored. An algorithm named as Support Vector Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree (SVMLDT) is proposed for the anomaly detection, which provides satisfactory detection accuracy as well as decision-making interpretability. The adaptive load shedding is carried out by every agent individually with dynamic programming. The load shedding relies on the load profile propagation among peer agents and the attack adaptiveness is accomplished by maintaining the historical mean of load shedding proportion. Load shedding only takes place after the consensus pertaining to the anomaly detection is achieved among all interconnected agents and it serves the purpose of mitigating certain cyber attacks. The attack resilience of the decentralized SIPS is evaluated using IEEE 39 bus model. It is shown that, unlike the traditional centralized SIPS, the proposed solution is able to carry out the remedial actions under most Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second part investigates the clustering based anomalous behavior detection and peer-assisted mitigation for power system generation control. To reduce the dimensionality of the data, three metrics are designed to interpret the behavior conformity of generator within the same balancing area. Semi-supervised K-means clustering and a density sensitive clustering algorithm based on Hierarchical DBSCAN (HDBSCAN) are both applied in clustering in the 3D feature space. Aiming to mitigate the cyber attacks targeting the generation control commands, a peer-assisted strategy is proposed. When the control commands from control center is detected as anomalous, i.e. either missing or the payload of which have been manipulated, the generating unit utilizes the peer data to infer and estimate a new generation adjustment value as replacement. Linear regression is utilized to obtain the relation of control values received by different generating units, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is adopted during the peer selection and 1-dimensional clustering is performed with the inferred control values, which are followed by the final control value estimation. The mitigation strategy proposed requires that generating units can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of the proposed solution in counteracting data availability and data integrity attacks targeting the generation controls. However, the strategy stays effective only if less than half of the generating units are compromised and it is not able to mitigate cyber attacks targeting the measurements involved in the generation control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

The SURE House (Solar Decathlon 2015)

Coastal towns and cities across the Northeastern US, with their high population density, aged utility infrastructure, and unique geography, are increasingly vulnerable to climate change related storm events. In October 2012 superstorm Sandy highlighted the fragility of our current coastal building types and made clear the need for a new model of design and construction which works to understand and mitigate these weaknesses. Dramatic changes in public policy, championed by both The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) are driving the rebuilding of these shore communities, often resulting in costly renovations, un-sustainable neighborhood configurations and in direct conflict with concurrent government policies such as The American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The SURE HOUSE demonstrates a series of new design solutions to these conflicting public policies and environmental imperatives. At Stevens Institute of Technology, the 2015 Solar Decathlon started with the challenge: Can we design a home for coastal New Jersey that dramatically reduces its energy use while protecting itself from the realities of a changing, more extreme climate? The SURE HOUSE merges the iconic 20th century shore home with 21st century building science. Utilizing innovative renewable energy technologies, a ‘Passive House’ level building envelope, and rugged glass-fiber-composite materials to flood-proof the home, the SURE HOUSE is a high-performance, net-zero-energy home, armored against extreme weather, designed for the contemporary lifestyle of the Jersey Shore and other vulnerable coastal communities. SUSTAINABLE At Stevens, we recognize that energy use in the home and workplace is directly connected to the growing problem of climate change. Reducing our energy consumption by designing higher performing, compact homes that are both functional, comfortable and desirable is the first critical step towards a modern, sustainable architecture for New Jersey and beyond. This is what informed the architectural design of the house. Configured about a compact form, thickly insulated and air-sealed walls eliminate thermal bridging and minimize energy losses while advanced glazing brings in free solar heat during the winter months. As a result of these passive design strategies, the SURE HOUSE has a greatly reduced carbon footprint requiring 91% less energy than a typical New Jersey home. Photovoltaic (PV) arrays on both the rooftop and operable shutters easily provide energy in excess of the home’s modest demands. The Stevens team considers a truly sustainable home in the era of climate change, one that prioritizes low energy use, and integrates right-sized renewable generation to supply the home’s needs. Low consumption, low production. RESILIENT In October of 2012, Hurricane Sandy wreaked havoc along the east coast of the US. In New Jersey alone there was an estimated 29.4 billion dollars in damages, 346,000 homes affected, and almost two and a half million people left without power, in some cases for over 10 days. Recovery from this storm and associated flooding is ongoing to this day, as many New Jersey homeowners grapple with the large costs of rebuilding and struggle to adapt to complicated new home building regulations. Damage from this storm to Hoboken, the home of the Stevens Institute of Technology’s campus, and to the New Jersey shore was extensive and many students on the SURE HOUSE team were directly affected by this historic event. The Stevens design team recognizes that in a world of more frequent and stronger storms, the ability to absorb and adapt to change is more important than ever. Successfully weathering the next storm and its aftermath is one of the primary goals in the design of the SURE HOUSE prototype. The SURE HOUSE introduces unique ‘dry flood-proofing’ methods to residential construction. Innovative wall and floor flood-proofing, utilizing durable composite sheathing materials adapted from the boating industry, were developed by the student team to render the SURE House’s building envelope flood proof up to the FEMA AE 6/7 Zone (+ 6/7 feet of water above sea-level). Designed and fabricated utilizing glass-fiber composite materials, the custom storm shutter system serves to protect the large glazed openings of the home from both air-borne debris impact and water infiltration during a storm event while also providing deterrence from the vandalism that often occurs in the aftermath of a calamitous event. During extended power outages, a ‘resilient’ solar array is capable of supplying critical amounts of energy and hot water to the home, without the use of battery storage or grid infrastructure. PV Description AC GRID-TIED PV SYSTEM The SURE HOUSE solar system consists of two distinct arrays, the grid-tied rooftop array which produces AC Powerand the shutter-mounted array which converts DC power generated by the modules directly into usable heat for the domestic hot water (DHW). The roof-mounted AC grid-tied array is comprised of three strings, two 11 module strings connected to an SMA SB 5000TL-US-223 inverter and a single 10 module string equipped and an SMA SB 3000TL-US-22 central inverter. All modules for the rooftop AC array are LG MonoX 2804 watt solar panels, chosen for their durability and efficiency. Inverter sizing and string size are optimized to the electrical characteristics of the chosen PV modules and the desired energy production, see Appendix 5B. The SURE HOUSE is projected to produce 12,353 kWh per year to meet 6,157 kWh per year of estimated consumption. Solar modules for the two AC grid-tied sub arrays are mounted on the main roof surface of the SURE HOUSE with a 10 degree tilt angle using a partially-ballasted polyethylene roof mounting system made by Renusol, which is particularly suited to the corrosive salt air of a coastal environment. This method was chosen for its installation simplicity and to limit detrimental roof penetrations. The 10 degree tilt optimizes the energy generated per roof area at a lower price, see Appendix 5A, and ensures that there is minimal wind uplift. DC SOLAR ELECTRIC DOMESTIC HOT WATER The SURE HOUSE’s approach to sustainable and resilient domestic hot water (DHW) consists of a unique, custom engineered DC solar electric hot water system. Employing the use of Advanced Energy’s DC electric PV heater (DCPVH)5 to heat domestic water well beyond the draw temperature, the SURE HOUSE is able to obtain a remarkably high solar fraction of 75% or more. The custom modified 80 gallon Vaughn DHW tank acts as a large solar ‘battery’ that stores heat energy in the form of hot water at almost 150 degrees, harvesting energy when the sun is out for use later in the day or overnight. The system, which uses electricity rather than heated fluid, is distinct from traditional ‘solar thermal’ systems by eliminating the dangers and associated maintenance issues of fluid based systems. By forgoing the use of external fluid loops, overheated solar collectors and pipes are not an issue for the SURE HOUSE system which never needs any yearly or seasonal flushing. In weather conditions where the integrated DCPVH unit cannot produce enough hot water via solar energy alone, the Vaughn hot water tank comes factory made with an AC powered 2.6 COP heat pump and a AC heating coil that serve as back-up heating elements. The DCPVH is powered by a DC array consisting of 10 custom-made Solbian by PVilion 180 watt, monocrystalline, flexible solar modules6. The Solbian modules are directly mounted to the top half of the operable storm shutters on the south façade of the SURE HOUSE. The SURE HOUSE team worked closely with PVillion, a PV system designer specializing in flexible architectural photovoltaics, to design an adhesive system that works with the glass-fiber storm shutter surface in a reliable manner over an extended period. Because this system operates in DC-only mode and never connects to the municipal power grid, the system can continue to create hot water safely and effectively even during grid disruption events. This hot water, and the energy stored within it, could be used for a range of activities including washing and cooking to more elaborate hydronic heating systems as desired. See Appendix 6 for system engineering, sizing and modeling.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗