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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing grid reliability and resilience through novel DER control, total situational awareness and integrated distribution-transmission representation

High penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) can lead to overvoltage and thermal violations, miscoordination of protection devices and potential adverse control interactions. The challenges are exacerbated by a lack of operator situational awareness of behind-the-meter DERs, and T&D interactions. Furthermore, the large attack surface of a DER environment creates significant cyber security challenges. The motivation is to address these barriers. The main goal is to enable extreme levels of DERs in distribution systems while simultaneously enhancing their reliability and resiliency. This is achieved by a data-driven approach for operation, planning and control of distribution systems with total situational awareness and real-time DER control enabled by a network of edge intelligent devices, a cloud-based analytical platform, and secure communications.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Personal Resiliency Index

A plethora of information exists in literature focusing on different aspects of personal resilience. There are a number of questionnaires available to measure resilience in different aspects of an individual’s life, such as mental health. However, there is a lack of comprehensive information on the subject of personal resilience to natural and man-made disasters. A Personal Resiliency Index identifying four key areas of resilience related to natural and man-made disasters will help fill this gap by providing individuals an idea of where the stand comparatively to their peers on this topics. As an increasing amount of man-made disasters, natural disasters and pandemics occur, we realize that preparation is key.?“Crisis can be experienced at individual, group and mass levels and at local, regional, national or supra-national levels.” 1? Dr. Ron Fisher, the principal investigator has over 20 years’ critical infrastructure protection including developing vulnerability assessment methodology, risk and resiliency analyses and infrastructure interdependencies. Dr. Fisher and his team will research and develop a voluntary survey which evaluates the user’s personal resilience level to natural and man-made disasters. The research team is focusing on 4 main categories:? financial resilience, cyber security, physical and mental health, and emergency preparedness.?The web based application will?provide a resilience score for each of the categories and also a comprehensive personal resiliency score based on the voluntary survey. The application will also provide feedback to the user on actions to take to become more resilient to natural and man-made disasters. Through this effort, we will also be able to identify the areas where participants are excelling as well as opportunities for improvement in terms of resilience. This information will provide insight into areas of further investigation and identify potential areas of support needed for the general public to adopt strategies to become more resilient. 1 Lynott, William. “Surviving a Natural (or Man-Made) Disaster: How to Prepare for and Bounce Back? from a Crisis in Your Business | 2018-02-01 | NOLN.” Home Page, NOLN, 1 Feb. 2018, https://www.noln.net/articles/2683-surviving-a-natural-or-man-made-disaster-how-to-prepare-for-and-bounce-back-from-a-crisis-in-your-business.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

West Virginia University Industrial Assessment Center (Final Progress Report)

The Industrial Assessment Center at West Virginia University has been successful in workforce development, and in generation of energy savings for manufacturing facilities during the period 2016 to 2021. Graduate and undergraduate students have benefited from energy assessment experience and most of them have found good positions as energy engineers and analysts in the industrial sector. Several peer reviewed research papers in archival journals as well as conference papers on the topic of energy engineering and assessment have been published. The implemented energy savings for manufacturing facilities have been significant in the areas of lighting, compressed air, process heating, steam, HVAC, chillers and cooling towers, and motors. In addition, water use reduction, smart manufacturing applications to save energy, cyber security evaluation, energy management, productivity improvements and waste reduction opportunities that lead to energy intensity reductions have been explored. The students have obtained an opportunity to interact with energy efficiency and productivity improvement professionals at various conferences and workshops and their research has generated important results. In summary, the West Virginia University Industrial Assessment Center (WVU-IAC) has fulfilled its mission in regard to workforce development, energy efficiency for manufacturing facilities, and laid a strong platform enhancing sustainability through reductions in carbon emissions achieved through energy efficiency and energy management initiatives and reductions in water usage and waste reduction. During the project period (2016-2021) the WVU-IAC has made numerous energy efficiency, water use reduction, waste reduction, and productivity improvement recommendations, a significant number of them having been implemented by the manufacturing facilities. The research adds significant understanding to the area of energy efficiency, water and waste reduction, and productivity improvement. The technical effectiveness and economic feasibility of the methods and techniques investigated and demonstrated through this project have been exemplary, resulting in significant recommended and implemented resource savings and reductions in carbon emissions. The project has been of significant benefit to the public owing to replication of results within the industrial sector, thus reducing operating costs for businesses that result in increase of growth and employment, as well as community benefits in terms of reductions in carbon emissions.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2023

Envisioning the Future Renewable and Resilient Energy Grids—A Power Grid Revolution Enabled by Renewables, Energy Storage, and Energy Electronics

Today’s power grids are facing tremendous challenges because of the ever-increasing power demand, system complexity, infrastructure cost, knowledge base, and policy and regulatory issues to achieve supply–demand power balance and resiliency with respect to more frequent extreme weather events and cyberattacks. It is particularly challenging when the transition toward 100% intermittent renewable energy sources is considered. Many countries are calling for building up more transmission and distribution lines to increase power delivery capacities. This article is an attempt to answer two urgent questions: Is more transmission and distribution infrastructure really needed to meet the increasing power demand? What kind of future grid infrastructure should we envision and build? This article attempts to answer these questions and proposes the concept of community-centric asynchronous renewable and resilient energy grids. By clearly differentiating the concepts of grid resilience and reliability, the importance of building resilient power electronics’ devices and robust system-level control algorithms to achieve 100% renewable energy integrated resilient grids is presented. To identify the shortcomings and propose advancements, power electronics’ technologies are categorized using the proposed concepts of natural source frequencies (NSf), energy storage, direct energy conversion/control and fault protection (DeCaFp), and high-efficiency energy consumption and buffering (heECaB) technology. The ability of networked microgrids to greatly reduce power outages and power system restoration time is demonstrated by leveraging robust decentralized and centralized control algorithms, identified through a comprehensive literature review. Future research areas are proposed to further enhance grid stability, controllability, cybersecurity, and protection against faults in the presence of 100% renewable sources by leveraging the advanced capabilities of NSf, DeCaFp, and heECaB devices and system-level control algorithms.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Sovereign Credit Rating Processes Adapted to Critical Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment

United States critical infrastructure entities are increasingly targeted by motivated and capable threat actors and must be prepared to assess and treat a diverse range of cyber risks. Consequently, this necessitates some form of analytical process to evaluate risks and inform cyber security investment decisions. A potential solution for structuring cyber risk evaluation exists within the field of sovereign credit ratings – where agencies employ mature approaches that integrate quantitative and qualitative data to produce a singular value of assessment. Adapting such approaches, we present a novel criterion and methodology for measuring and communicating the likelihood element of cyber risk. The methodology is composed of three sequential phases: a quantitative baseline organized by distinct capability frames, a bounded qualitative adjustment per frame, and a greater-bounded qualitative adjustment spanning the entire process. The process culminates in publication of a cyber capability rating that communicates a critical infrastructure entity’s ability and willingness to mitigate discontinuous function due to cyberattack.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Improving the Cyber Resiliency and Security Posture of Public Power (Final Report)

The key objective of Improving the Cyber Resiliency and Security Posture of Public Power (Project) was to develop a culture of cyber resiliency and security within the public power community. The relative smaller size and unique structure of community-owned electric utilities can sometimes present challenges in immediate recognition of threats and the escalation of potential incidents. The Project offered targeted education, coordination, capability building, and resources to help the public power community better understand, install, and implement cyber and physical resiliency and security systems. The American Public Power Association (APPA) accelerated efforts to develop resources for and with the public power community to understand and implement resiliency, cybersecurity and cyber-physical solutions, including refining and improving the adoption of advanced control concepts. The Project consisted of four major multi-pronged tasks which included: 1) Advance cyber resiliency and security assessments; 2) Conduct, evaluate, and use the results of onsite vulnerability assessments; 3) Research, evaluate, deploy, and integrate both commercial and pre-commercial security technologies; and 4) Research, evaluate, and implement information sharing mechanisms.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Artificial Intelligence for (AI) Nuclear Security: Expert Perspectives on AI Priorities for the Office of International Nuclear Security

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform nuclear security operations, offering opportunities to enhance effectiveness while simultaneously introducing new challenges. As AI technologies rapidly evolve, agencies across the United States Government (USG) are researching, implementing, and evaluating various AI models and systems. Given the broad capabilities and applications of these technologies, it is essential for each agency to identify and articulate those areas where it can make meaningful contributions aligned with its mission and expertise. To address this need for strategic focus, in late Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025), the Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) established an AI Task Force (AITF) to gather input from subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding the most appropriate role INS could serve in researching, evaluating, or implementing AI for nuclear security. The AITF engaged 15 experts from national laboratories with backgrounds in cyber security, physical security, transport security, insider threat mitigation, nuclear engineering, human-systems engineering, and AI/ML development. This white paper summarizes the insights gathered from these SMEs and presents a potential roadmap for INS engagement with AI technologies. The recommendations outlined here are intended to inform INS leadership as they make strategic decisions about resource allocation and program direction in this rapidly evolving technological domain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Foundations of Rigorous Cyber Experimentation

This report presents the results of the “Foundations of Rigorous Cyber Experimentation” (FORCE) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project. This project is a companion project to the “Science and Engineering of Cyber security through Uncertainty quantification and Rigorous Experimentation” (SECURE) Grand Challenge LDRD project. This project leverages the offline, controlled nature of cyber experimentation technologies in general, and emulation testbeds in particular, to assess how uncertainties in network conditions affect uncertainties in key metrics. We conduct extensive experimentation using a Firewheel emulation-based cyber testbed model of Invisible Internet Project (I2P) networks to understand a de-anonymization attack formerly presented in the literature. Our goals in this analysis are to see if we can leverage emulation testbeds to produce reliably repeatable experimental networks at scale, identify significant parameters influencing experimental results, replicate the previous results, quantify uncertainty associated with the predictions, and apply multi-fidelity techniques to forecast results to real-world network scales. The I2P networks we study are up to three orders of magnitude larger than the networks studied in SECURE and presented additional challenges to identify significant parameters. The key contributions of this project are the application of SECURE techniques such as UQ to a scenario of interest and scaling the SECURE techniques to larger network sizes. This report describes the experimental methods and results of these studies in more detail. In addition, the process of constructing these large-scale experiments tested the limits of the Firewheel emulation-based technologies. Therefore, another contribution of this work is that it informed the Firewheel developers of scaling limitations, which were subsequently corrected.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber physical attack detection

A cyber-security threat detection system and method stores physical data measurements from a cyber-physical system and extracts synchronized measurement vectors synchronized to one or more timing pulses. The system and method synthesizes data integrity attacks in response to the physical data measurements and applies alternating parametrized linear and non-linear operations in response to the synthesized data integrity attacks. The synthesis renders optimized model parameters used to detect multiple cyber-attacks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber physical attack detection

A cyber-security threat detection system and method stores physical data measurements from a cyber-physical system and extracts synchronized measurement vectors synchronized to one or more timing pulses. The system and method synthesize data integrity attacks in response to the physical data measurements and applies alternating parameterized linear and non-linear operations in response to the synthesized data integrity attacks. The synthesis renders optimized model parameters used to detect multiple cyber-attacks.

Ferragut, Erik M.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Assessing Energy Infrastructure Devices for Vulnerabilities

Industrial control systems prove to be vital to the health and security of the nation in our critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes the most foundational systems to support modern civilization which includes water and wastewater systems, communications, and the electricity we use to name a few sectors. However, these devices' overall composition remains largely unknown and are untested from a cyber security perspective. As part of the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, I analyzed one such energy infrastructure device to better understand how it functions, what hardware and software components are present within it, and assess it for security vulnerabilities. To achieve this, I reverse engineered binary files using Ghidra to understand system functionality and learned more about how to collaborate with other researchers on a shared Ghidra project. I learned more about how web sockets function and how to interact with them through Python to test if they are secure or not. This work led me to assess possible vulnerabilities in this device and provide a better understanding of its composition and function, which are essential to INL's mission of securing our nation's energy infrastructure.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Assessment of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Cybersecurity Initiative

Recent cyber-attacks on industrial control systems, and inadvertent exposure of nuclear plant systems to cyber-exploits underscore the need for plant operators to adopt and deploy cyber-security defense solutions made for industrial control systems. Of increasing concern is the fact that international cyber hackers are beginning to target critical infrastructure, and because these more modern controls systems depend on advanced use of digital systems, they are more vulnerable than ever before to cyber-attacks. Traditional cyber defense strategies and products that have been available for decades are tailored for use on IT or corporate networks but can cause interruptions and catastrophic damage when deployed on industrial control system networks. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy established the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program to provide private companies pursuing innovative nuclear energy technologies with access to the technical support necessary to move toward commercialization. One of these GAIN small business vouchers was awarded to Dragos, Inc. to enable collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the Dragos Platform on a production nuclear reactor test bed, hence laying the path for future commercial adoption. The vision was to provide a guide for industrial operators on implementing an industrial monitoring solution and to show how these solutions can be deployed without causing safety and reliability issues. This report documents the results of the collaboration between ORNL and Dragos, Inc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Survey of Cyber Threats and Security Controls Analysis for Urban Air Mobility Environments

Since the cyber threat landscape changes daily, cybersecurity needs to be an ongoing activity for every organization within the UAM environments. This paper will provide information on identified cyber threats and controls associated with an instance of the Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environment. The MITRE ATT&CK model and framework and the selection of cyber threats and the National Institute of Standards and Technology publications for security control identification and cybersecurity risk identification will be leveraged for analysis.

Cyber Threats↗
DOE OSTI2024

ARCADE (Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment)

SAND2025-11780O ARCADE (Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment) software performs cybersecurity experiments on Defensive Cyber Security Architectures (DCSA) for Distributed Control Systems (DCSs). The application is integrated into a cohesive environment that performs cyber risk analyses and reduces costs. ARCADE can investigate the entire cyber-attack surface of a DCS from the physics of control, down to the firmware of individual components with automated efficiency. ARCADE has five major functional components: the Data Broker system, the virtualization environment, the cyber-attack simulator, the cyber-physical analysis system, and the physics simulator. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Valme, Romuald↗
DOE OSTI2025

Deny-by-Default Network Port Security: SPaRC Technical Bulletin #002

Operational Technology (OT) networks [e.g., industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems] have unique cyber security challenges due to their decades long service life, high availability requirements, and limited visibility. OT networks often take credit for being “air gapped” (i.e. disconnected from the Internet) and all devices within the OT network can “talk” to each other—even if they should not. This SPaRC Technical Bulletin describes how the unique limitations of OT networks can become strengths when it comes to cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2023

Towards generic memory forensic framework for programmable logic controllers

A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a microprocessor-based controller that is used to automate physical processes in critical infrastructure and various other industries and manufacturing sectors. Initially, PLCs were completely isolated from the Internet, and cyber security was not incorporated at the time of development. The introduction of industry 4.0 and the evolution of ICS systems to communicate over public IP addresses from the Internet enhanced productivity and efficiency, but Internet connectivity exposed the systems and their vulnerabilities, which led to an increase in cyber attacks. When a system is sabotaged/compromised, security analysts need to get to the root cause of the attack as quickly as possible to recover the system. To do so, memory forensic analysis is critical to provide a unique insight into the run-time memory activities and extract a reliable source of evidence. In this paper, we analyze the memory structure of the Schneider Electric Modicon M221 PLC. To build a memory profile, we reverse engineer the communication protocol and conduct differential analysis to gain knowledge about the structure of the memory and the low-level representation of control logic instructions. We then identify dynamic and static memory regions by modifying different project fields and conducting differential analysis, which allows us to identify boundaries of critical memory structures and extract important forensic artifacts that can be found in the memory. The Python implementation of the memory profile can help reduce the time and effort required for manual analysis in case of cyber incident or system failure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗