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At least 163 records · Page 9

Quantum Technologies for UAS (QTech)

Harness the power of quantum technologies to assure the availability of UAS communications against disruptions. Make use of quantum computing (e.g. quantum optimization) and quantum communication (e.g. quantum key distribution) to address the availability cybersecurity challenge. Our approach is three-fold: (1) Utilize quantum optimization algorithms to design robust network with routing redundancy that can respond adaptively to dynamically changing real-time environment and disruptions, (2) Utilize quantum optimization algorithms resource allocation for detection, localization, and tracking of mobile communication disruption agents, (3) Utilize quantum key distribution (QKD) to execute secure key sharing in high data rate optical communication and/or anti-jamming protocols for secure RF communication.

Quantum Computing↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Edge ML for CAN bus intrusion detection in AVs

Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are revolutionizing transportation, but their reliance on interconnected cyber-physical systems exposes them to unprecedented cybersecurity risks. This study addresses the critical challenge of detecting real-time cyber intrusions in self-driving vehicles by leveraging a dataset from the Udacity self-driving car project. We simulate four high-impact attack vectors, Denial of Service (DoS), spoofing, replay, and fuzzy attacks, by injecting noise into spatial features (e.g., bounding box coordinates) to replicate adversarial scenarios. We develop and evaluate two lightweight neural network architectures (NN-1 and NN-2) alongside a logistic regression baseline (LG-1) for intrusion detection. The models achieve exceptional performance, with NN-2 attaining an AUC score of 93.15% and 93.15% accuracy, demonstrating their suitability for edge deployment in AV environments. Through explainable AI techniques, we uncover unique forensic fingerprints of each attack type, such as spatial corruption in fuzzy attacks and temporal anomalies in replay attacks, offering actionable insights for feature engineering and proactive defense. Visual analytics, including confusion matrices, ROC curves, and feature importance plots, validate the models' robustness and interpretability. This research sets a new benchmark for AV cybersecurity, delivering a scalable, field-ready toolkit for Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and policymakers. By aligning intrusion fingerprints with SAE J3061 automotive security standards, we provide a pathway for integrating machine learning into safety-critical AV systems. Our findings underscore the urgent need for security-by-design AI, ensuring that AVs not only drive autonomously but also defend autonomously. This work bridges the gap between theoretical cybersecurity and life-preserving engineering, offering a leap toward safer, more secure autonomous transportation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Extreme Scale Computing to Secure the Nation

Since the dawn of modern electronic computing in the mid 1940's, U.S. national security programs have been dominant users of every new generation of high-performance computer. Indeed, the first general-purpose electronic computer, ENIAC (the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), was used to calculate the expected explosive yield of early thermonuclear weapons designs. Even the U. S. numerical weather prediction program, another early application for high-performance computing, was initially funded jointly by sponsors that included the U.S. Air Force and Navy, agencies interested in accurate weather predictions to support U.S. military operations. For the decades of the cold war, national security requirements continued to drive the development of high performance computing (HPC), including advancement of the computing hardware and development of sophisticated simulation codes to support weapons and military aircraft design, numerical weather prediction as well as data-intensive applications such as cryptography and cybersecurity U.S. national security concerns continue to drive the development of high-performance computers and software in the U.S. and in fact, events following the end of the cold war have driven an increase in the growth rate of computer performance at the high-end of the market. This mainly derives from our nation's observance of a moratorium on underground nuclear testing beginning in 1992, followed by our voluntary adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) beginning in 1995. The CTBT prohibits further underground nuclear tests, which in the past had been a key component of the nation's science-based program for assuring the reliability, performance and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons. In response to this change, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program in response to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires, 'in the absence of nuclear testing, a progam to: (1) Support a focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; (2) Predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems of the aging of the stockpile; (3) Refurbish and re-manufacture weapons and components, as required; and (4) Maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent, now and in the future'. This program continues to fulfill its national security mission by adding significant new capabilities for producing scientific results through large-scale computational simulation coupled with careful experimentation, including sub-critical nuclear experiments permitted under the CTBT. To develop the computational science and the computational horsepower needed to support its mission, SBSS initiated the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, later renamed the Advanced Simulation & Computing (ASC) program (sidebar: 'History of ASC Computing Program Computing Capability'). The modern 3D computational simulation capability of the ASC program supports the assessment and certification of the current nuclear stockpile through calibration with past underground test (UGT) data. While an impressive accomplishment, continued evolution of national security mission requirements will demand computing resources at a significantly greater scale than we have today. In particular, continued observance and potential Senate confirmation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) together with the U.S administration's promise for a significant reduction in the size of the stockpile and the inexorable aging and consequent refurbishment of the stockpile all demand increasing refinement of our computational simulation capabilities. Assessment of the present and future stockpile with increased confidence of the safety and reliability without reliance upon calibration with past or future test data is a long-term goal of the ASC program. This will be accomplished through significant increases in the scientific bases that underlie the computational tools. Computer codes must be developed that replace phenomenology with increased levels of scientific understanding together with an accompanying quantification of uncertainty. These advanced codes will place significantly higher demands on the computing infrastructure than do the current 3D ASC codes. This article discusses not only the need for a future computing capability at the exascale for the SBSS program, but also considers high performance computing requirements for broader national security questions. For example, the increasing concern over potential nuclear terrorist threats demands a capability to assess threats and potential disablement technologies as well as a rapid forensic capability for determining a nuclear weapons design from post-detonation evidence (nuclear counterterrorism).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) (Final Technical Report)

Electric grids have historically been susceptible to both physical attacks and environmental hazards but the implementation of smart grids, remote management, and self-healing networks, has now made the grid vulnerable to cyber attacks. To address risks introduced by routable connectivity, utilities must establish dynamic solutions to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber security threats and vulnerabilities. In response to the evolving threat landscape U.S. Department of Energy-Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DOE CESER) initiated the Cybersecurity for the OT Environment (CyOTE) pilot program, a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) effort designed to leverage U.S. intelligence capabilities to prevent, detect, or mitigate a cyber attack on utility operational technology (OT) networks. As part of the CyOTE pilot, The Southern Company (Southern Company or Southern) researched, evaluated and deployed emerging Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technologies and cyber security monitoring architectures to provide previously unrealized network visibility and situational awareness through deep packet inspection and data analytics. This Final Scientific/Technical Report documents the objectives, methodology, lessons learned, and results of Southern Company’s participation in the CyOTE pilot from December 2018 to September 2023.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗

Bayesian Attack Model (BAM)

The Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) is an analytical tool designed to enhance the comprehension of adversarial activity in OT environments. BAM leverages both expert cybersecurity insights and historical data to characterize the likelihood of adversarial behavior given anomalous observable events.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Design and Operations

Pursuant to the National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy published in 2022, INL is leading the development of philosophy and practices to identify and mitigate the inherent risks of digital technology by including cybersecurity as a core element of engineering risk management. This presentation will provide an overview of why we need CIE and what it is, a discussion of the major implications of CIE for electric power systems design and operations, and an update on significant milestones and resources from the CIE program.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Enabling Secure and Resilient XFC: A Software/Hardware-Security Co-Design Approach

Extremely fast charging (XFC) has the potential to reduce the charging time of battery electric vehicles (BEV) to be equivalent to the filling time of internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV), thus eliminating one of the few advantages ICEV still poses for light- and heavy-duty vehicles. Enabling XFC will, however, require coordination and cooperation between the grid, charging stations, and the vehicles themselves, which leads to an inevitable increase in the attack surface for all systems combined. In securing the overall system, we must not only embrace traditional cybersecurity, which is chiefly concerned with communications and the operation of digital systems, but also cyber-physical systems security as the proper operation of XFC is critically dependent on systems’ abilities to know about (sense) and interact with (actuate) the physical world. The project team consists of academic and industry researchers with backgrounds in cybersecurity, cyber-physical systems security, learning in adversarial environments, transportation security, grid security and resilience, wireless power transfer, converter design, and battery management systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Intrinsic Security Design for Tomorrow’s Energy Systems

With the introduction of smart devices and rise in distributed, networked energy systems, diligent focus on cybersecurity for an evolving grid is crucial. Watch this video to learn more about what NREL is doing to mitigate threats to today’s energy infrastructure and provide a pathway to a more secure and resilient energy future.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cybersecurity threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is a critical discipline that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfil and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Cybersecurity↗

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Standards Development [Final Report]

Currently, the solar industry is operating with little application-specific guidance on how to protect and defend their systems from cyberattacks. This 3-year Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office-funded project helped advance the distributed energy resource (DER) cybersecurity state-of-the-art by (a) bolstering industry awareness of cybersecurity concepts, risks, and solutions through a webinar series and (b) developing recommendations for DER cybersecurity standards to improve the security performance of DER products and networks. Drafting DER standards is a lengthy, consensus-based process requiring effective leadership and stakeholder participation. This project was designed to reduce standard and guide writing times by creating well-researched recommendations that could act as a starting place for national and international standards development organizations. Working within the SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup, the team produced guidance for DER cybersecurity certification, communication protocol standards, network architecture s, access control, and patching. The team also led subgroups within the IEEE P 1547.3 Guide for Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources Interconnected with Electric Power Systems committee and pushed a draft to ballot in October 2021.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Engineering Controls Database

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

Source record↗

Cybersecurity through Real-Time Distributed Control Systems

Critical infrastructure sites and facilities are becoming increasingly dependent on interconnected physical and cyber-based real-time distributed control systems (RTDCSs). A mounting cybersecurity threat results from the nature of these ubiquitous and sometimes unrestrained communications interconnections. Much work is under way in numerous organizations to characterize the cyber threat, determine means to minimize risk, and develop mitigation strategies to address potential consequences. While it seems natural that a simple application of cyber-protection methods derived from corporate business information technology (IT) domain would lead to an acceptable solution, the reality is that the characteristics of RTDCSs make many of those methods inadequate and unsatisfactory or even harmful. A solution lies in developing a defense-in-depth approach that ranges from protection at communications interconnect levels ultimately to the control system s functional characteristics that are designed to maintain control in the face of malicious intrusion. This paper summarizes the nature of RTDCSs from a cybersecurity perspec tive and discusses issues, vulnerabilities, candidate mitigation approaches, and metrics.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The Science DMZ: A Network Design Pattern for Data-Intensive Science

The ever-increasing scale of scientific data has become a significant challenge for researchers that rely on networks to interact with remote computing systems and transfer results to collaborators worldwide. Despite the availability of high-capacity connections, scientists struggle with inadequate cyberinfrastructure that cripples data transfer performance, and impedes scientific progress. The Science DMZ paradigm comprises a proven set of network design patterns that collectively address these problems for scientists. We explain the Science DMZ model, including network architecture, system configuration, cybersecurity, and performance tools, that creates an optimized network environment for science. We describe use cases from universities, supercomputing centers and research laboratories, highlighting the effectiveness of the Science DMZ model in diverse operational settings. In all, the Science DMZ model is a solid platform that supports any science workflow, and flexibly accommodates emerging network technologies. As a result, the Science DMZ vastly improves collaboration, accelerating scientific discovery.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Consequence-Driven Cybersecurity for High-Power Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

Cybersecurity of high-power charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) is critical to the safety, reliability, and consumer confidence in this publicly accessible technology. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities in high-power EV charging infrastructure may also present risks to broader transportation and energy-infrastructure systems. Here, this paper details a methodology used to analyze and prioritize high-consequence events that could result from cybersecurity sabotage to high-power charging infrastructure. The highest prioritized events are evaluated under laboratory conditions for the severity of impact and the complexity of cybersecurity manipulation. Mitigation solutions and strategies are presented to secure the vulnerabilities that potentially lead to high-consequence events. These mitigations can be immediately implemented by industry or executed during the design stage.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗