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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Processing of Rare Earth Elements and Critical Minerals from Acid Mine Drainage Feedstocks

Ongoing work by the project team identified a process for extracting rare earths and critical mineral (REE/CM) concentrates from acid mine drainage from coal mines, a major stream pollutant. The process removes harmful metals and separates REE/CM into economically attractive concentrates. This project explored the processing of those concentrates into individually separated, high purity metals, suitable for domestic manufacturers. The team brought unique experience in working with AMD-based feedstocks since the inception of USDOE’s coal-based REE/CM program in 2016. The project team has pioneered the recovery of rare earth/critical minerals (REE/CM) from acid mine drainage (AMD). This environmentally beneficial strategy will incentivize AMD treatment while recovering materials critical to the Nation’s defense and advanced manufacturing industries. In addition, the project will investigate the co-production of five high purity CMs from AMD, namely Co, Mn, Li, Cr, Ge. This team’s upstream and midstream recovery and processing technology has been demonstrated at the continuous, small scale pilot scale. In conjunction with the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, the team is constructing a full-scale, integrated, 500 gpm AMD treatment plant coupled with an REE/CM facility that will produce 21 tons REE/CM per year. Commissioning is scheduled for September 2021. This will provide feedstock for the team’s proprietary downstream processes that met the project objective: production of individually separated, high purity (ISHP) REE/CM oxides and their further processing to elemental metals (REM). To facilitate entry into the U.S. market, we have teamed up with companies that would use our products to strengthen their domestic supply chains and grow REE/CM based manufacturing in the U.S. They include Rockwell Automation, Rivian, Endress+Hauser, Inc., Northrop Grumman and Hela Novel Metals.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sequim Bay Underwater UXO (SBU2) Prototype Demonstration Site: Field Operations Summary, 2019

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has identified more than 400 underwater sites that are potentially contaminated with munitions. Many of these sites are in shallow water (0–35 m deep) where the munitions pose a threat to human health and the environmental. To address this challenge, the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) held a workshop in 2018 to establish the requirements and framework for developing a series of underwater unexploded ordnance (UXO) Standardized Demonstration sites (“test beds”) to support the evaluation of sensors, equipment, and technologies to detect UXO. Sequim Bay in Washington State was evaluated as a potential test bed and was determined to meet initial qualifying criteria with respect to environmental setting, and operational, logistical, and facilities support provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Weapons Research Services Division: Overview and Strategy 2024

Weapons Research Services are the principal stewards of data, information, and knowledge for the Weapons program. Empower the NNSA weapons mission through excellence in data stewardship, knowledge access, information assurance, and mission software. Lead the digital transformation of NNSA’s Weapons program data, information, and knowledge towards a more agile future.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Emulation Modeling for Development of Cyber-Defense Capabilities for Satellite Systems

The objective of this project was to develop a novel capability to generate synthetic data sets for the purpose of training Machine Learning (ML) algorithms for the detection of malicious activities on satellite systems. The approach experimented with was to a) generate sparse data sets using emulation modeling and b) enlarge the sparse data using Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). We based our emulation modeling on the Open Source NASA Operational Simulator for Small Satellites (NOS3) developed by the Katherine Johnson Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) program in West Virginia. Significant new capabilities on NOS3 had to be developed for our data set generation needs. To expand these data sets for the purpose of training ML, we experimented with a) Extreme Learning Machines (ELMs) and b) Wasserstein-GANs (WGAN-GP).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

First Report of the Nuclear Data Subcommittee of the Nuclear Science Advisory Committee

Accurate, reliable nuclear data is essential for the success of Federal missions such as nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, homeland security, national defense, space exploration, clean energy generation, and scientific research. Data access is also key to innovative commercial developments such as new medicines, automated industrial controls, energy exploration, energy security, nuclear reactor design, and isotope production. The United States Nuclear Data Program (USNDP) is the domestic custodian of nuclear data. In its April 2022 meeting, the DOE/NSF Nuclear Science Advisory Committee was charged with preparing two reports on nuclear data. In this first report, we review recent accomplishments of the USNDP and discuss complementary and collaborative international efforts. Detailed descriptions of nuclear data needs for basic science, nonproliferation, national security, nuclear energy together with medical and space applications are also presented. Lastly, a set of specific cross-cutting nuclear data needs with relevance for multiple applications areas are also identified for further discussion in a follow-on report planned for release at the end of January 2023.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Request for Proposal: MSI Workforce Program Funding Opportunity

Los Alamos National Laboratory is a multidisciplinary research institution engaged in strategic science on behalf of national security. The Laboratory strives to enhance national security and make the world safer through research and advances in innovative science and technology. The Lab inspires the talent of its workforce and the region to solve problems related to defense, energy, environment, infrastructure, health, and global security concerns. LANL currently employs 11,700 and anticipates hiring 1000 plus people this year. The LANL mission is critical to meeting military requirements to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent is modern, responsive, and resilient. LANL is designated by NNSA as the nation’s Plutonium Center of Excellence. LANL has an experienced and skilled workforce, high-hazard nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure, and unique plutonium processing, fabrication, and experimental capabilities.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Sequential Perturbation-based FDIA Detection using DERs for Unbalanced Distribution System

The power distribution system with its reliance on automated monitoring and control infrastructure makes it a complicated cyber-physical system and vulnerable to various cyber-attacks. This paper proposes a moving target defense inspired false data injection attack (FDIA) detection mechanism for an unbalanced distribution system. In the proposed grid diagnosis service framework, the distribution system operator judiciously manipulates power outputs of a subset of inverter-based distribution energy resources (DERs) to create secret low magnitude voltage perturbations which are inconsequential to the normal operation of the grid. A mixed-integer-linear-programming algorithm is developed to select the optimal set of DERs that can create a voltage perturbation signal of the required magnitude at each sensor location at a minimum cost. Then, a sequential detector is applied that detects for the FDIA as measurements are received from individual sensors. The performance of the proposed perturbation-based FDIA detection framework is demonstrated via simulation of the IEEE 123 bus test system.

Attack Detection↗
DOE OSTI2022

Machine Learning Modeling Pipeline for Extracting Nuclear Proliferation Events of Interest from Open Data Sources (U)

In FY2020, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and the Sanghani Center for Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University entered a collaboration funded by Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development. The project’s mission was to take the first steps toward developing a demonstration prototype system that uses multiple machine learning and data analytics methods on largescale open data sources to identify new, developing, and/or undeclared nuclear programs. Given the SRNL team’s on-site perspective of events culminating in the DOE’s decision to pursue the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), the team targeted the identification of events and indicators in retrospective datasets that pointed to the activity of “fissile core fabrication at the Savannah River Site” prior to the official announcement in May of 2018. A preliminary modeling pipeline was developed in FY20 that showed the datasets contained adequate signal for continuation of efforts. In FY21, a modular demonstration prototype modeling pipeline has continued in development for two text-based data sources: a broad internet archive (Webhose Ltd.) and a decahose Twitter database (i.e., a global sampling of one in every ten Tweets). The techniques that have been developed rely on graph theory and anomaly detection to identify contextual shifts in key words and phrases at various points in time such that indicators of events of interest could be identified and subsequently, events could be extracted from the corpuses. The foundational concept behind the approaches is that contextual shifts in key words and phrases can act as indicators of events of interest. Both datasets have proven successful in extracting events of interest related to pit production at the Savannah River Site prior to the official announcement. In addition, the pipelines have generated a wide range of events broadly summarized as: the awarding of DOE contracts at major sites, DOE investments in various programs, accidents at DOE national laboratories, speculations about the fate of pit production in the DOE complex, domestic and international shipments and receipts of nuclear materials at DOE sites, termination of non-proliferation agreements with Russia, termination of MOX, new weapons development approvals/testing, nuclear posture reviews, major DOE cleanup/production milestones, political opinions, and nuclear watch groups’ opinions, among many others.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) Assessment Prioritization Project

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Infrastructure Security Division (CISA ISD) manages a diverse portfolio of assessments across the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors. These assessments—ranging in type, scope, and complexity—are essential for identifying vulnerabilities and strengthening national security. However, the wide variation in assessment offerings and the increasing demand for limited resources have highlighted the need for a transparent, structured approach to prioritizing assessment activities. To address this challenge, CISA ISD partnered with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to review current assessment methodologies, analyze existing prioritization practices, and develop a comprehensive, national-security-focused prioritization framework. This report summarizes the project’s approach, key findings, and actionable recommendations for enhancing ISD’s assessment program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Research Reactor

The nuclear industry recognizes the difficulties involved in developing effective managerial and leadership skills in a highly technical and proficient workforce such as that found in nuclear facilities. Implementing an insider threat mitigation program (ITMP) within the nuclear industry is a complex and ongoing process that demands a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, an organization’s security culture, and rigorous regulatory requirements yet also accounts for facility characteristics, physical security, material flow, and activities involving nuclear material. Given the high-consequence nature of research reactor operations, even minor lapses can lead to safety, security, and reputational risks. An effective ITMP requires a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates behavioral analysis, robust vetting procedures, continuous monitoring, and cross-disciplinary coordination. It must also promote a culture of vigilance and accountability at all levels up to and including executive leadership but be flexible enough to adapt to evolving global threats and technological advances. Insider threat mitigation is not a one-time effort but rather a sustained commitment to excellence in safety and security. Establishing a culture in which personnel proactively report incidents and issues that could affect nuclear safety and security is vital to maintaining a safe and secure operational environment. This document was developed to guide senior management and research reactor organizations in creating comprehensive programs to effectively manage and mitigate insider threat behaviors and actions. It focuses on the key pillars of an effective ITMP, including the national legal framework, security culture, preventive and protective measures, cyber security, and performance evaluation. By using a systematic approach during implementation, facilities can foster environments conducive to insider threat detection and support long-term program sustainability. The document also provides strategies for improving communication across all levels of an organization, helping to eliminate barriers that hinder the development of robust ITMPs and enhance overall security culture. In today’s organizations, the concept of leveraging safety and security culture lessons to facilitate knowledge transfer is rapidly evolving to expedite insider threat management and security culture improvements. This document outlines the rationale for evaluating an ITMP based on national customs, culture, and stakeholders. The elements are all germane to reliability and trustworthiness and relate to security concerns that states may encounter. The document focuses not only on individual perceptions regarding security issues and capability building but also on team building and how to resolve concerns. The implementers of a facility’s ITMP may zero in on indicators of insider threats within their enterprise. This material will benefit organizations when it is applied using a systematic and structured approach as demonstrated throughout the document.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

History and State of the Art in Advanced Thermal Protection Systems

This report documents the current state of the art of thermal protection systems (TPS) relevant to missile application materials and MTCR control language. The information is intended to provide data on current TPS for determining the current state of development and identifying potential research directions. Various vehicle configurations and types of TPS are described, including the evolution of materials and systems. Vehicle configurations such as high drag rocket and capsule systems and low-drag air-breathers are discussed. TPS are complex, transitioning from often very low temperatures to temperatures exceeding 3000°C and heat fluxes of up to 30,000 W/cm 2 . They can take the form of blankets, sheets, tiles and fabricated rigid structures, and can be made from high temperature capable alloys, refractory metals, ceramics, ceramic matrix composites, ultra-high temperature ceramics, carbon-carbon composites or ablative carbonaceous materials. Current state of the art in TPS is based on materials any systems developed for the initial space program. TPS was upgraded to the point of the Space Shuttle development and has stagnated since them.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2026

American Made Infrastructure: Evolution of Federal Incentives and Requirements

Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB) represent the latest evolution of a multi-year legislative trajectory responding to national security concerns about foreign control – and particularly FEOC control – of energy infrastructure. Beginning with Executive Order 14017 (February 2021), which initiated comprehensive federal review of critical supply chain vulnerabilities in semiconductors, battery energy storage systems, and critical minerals, policymakers have progressively expanded restrictions on foreign participation. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2019 established precedent for component-level prohibitions on foreign information and communications technology procurement, while NDAA 2024 extended these restrictions to six major People’s Republic of China (PRC) battery manufacturers. Complementary measures such as the Build America, Buy America (BABA) Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) introduced domestic content thresholds and FEOC eligibility criteria for federal funding programs. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) 2022 further operationalized FEOC restrictions through electric vehicle tax credit requirements, creating a scalable framework for excluding foreign-controlled components. Recent executive actions and state-level policies have reinforced this trajectory, reflecting sustained alignment across federal and state governments. Collectively, these developments demonstrate a bipartisan policy approach that pairs incentives for advanced energy deployment with safeguards designed to prevent subsidizing adversaries or entities that present foreign-sourcing risk.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Weapons and the Atmospheric Test Era

The era of atmospheric testing defies a simple description. Beginning with the goal of proving fission, the United States’ test program grew in complexity as scientists explored thermonuclear reactions, met the military demand for a variety of weapons for an increasing number of delivery platforms, and reacted to the ever-growing public fear of fallout. And, of course, political considerations were always present, first in the prosecution of World War II and later in the Cold War. To understand the atmospheric test program, then, is to understand how science, politics, and the public shaped our society in ways that are still difficult to fully understand.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Xyce Case Study

With the elimination of underground nuclear testing and declining defense budgets, science-based stockpile stewardship requires increased reliance on high performance modeling and simulation of weapon systems. Today's weapon systems are comprised of various electrical components and systems. As a result, there is a need for tools that will allow the use of massively parallel modeling and simulation techniques on high performance computers in existing and future weapons' electrical systems models. The Xyce Parallel Electronic Simulator is a SPICE (Simulation Program with Integrated Circuit Emphasis)- compatible circuit simulator designed to run on large-scale parallel computing platforms, though it can also execute efficiently on a variety of architectures including single processor workstations. As a mature platform for large-scale parallel circuit simulation, Xyce supports standard capabilities available in commercial simulators, in addition to various devices and models specific to Sandia's needs. Specifically, Xyce aids in the design and verification of electrical and electronic circuits and systems prior to weapons' manufacturing and deployment.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Xyce Case Study

With the elimination of underground nuclear testing and declining defense budgets, science-based stockpile stewardship requires increased reliance on high performance modeling and simulation of weapon systems. Today's weapon systems are comprised of various electrical components and systems. As a result, there is a need for tools that will allow the use of massively parallel modeling and simulation techniques on high performance computers in existing and future weapons' electrical systems models. The Xyce Parallel Electronic Simulator is a SPICE (Simulation Program with Integrated Circuit Emphasis)- compatible circuit simulator designed to run on large-scale parallel computing platforms, though it can also execute efficiently on a variety of architectures including single processor workstations. As a mature platform for large-scale parallel circuit simulation, Xyce supports standard capabilities available in commercial simulators, in addition to various devices and models specific to Sandia's needs. Specifically, Xyce aids in the design and verification of electrical and electronic circuits and systems prior to weapons' manufacturing and deployment.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗