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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

An Elementary Overview of the Selection of Materials for Service in Oxygen-Enriched Environments

The process for selecting materials for use in oxygen or oxygen-enriched environments is one that continues to be investigated by many industries due to the importance to those industries of oxygen systems. There are several excellent resources available to assist oxygen systems design engineers and end-users, with the most comprehensive being ASTM MNL-36, Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems: Handbook for Design, Operation and Maintenance, 2nd Edition. ASTM also makes available several standards for oxygen systems. However, the ASTM publications are extremely detailed, and typically designed for professionals who already possess a working knowledge of oxygen systems. No notable resource exists, whether an ASTM or other organizational publication, which can be used to educate engineers or technicians who have no prior knowledge of the nuances of oxygen system design and safety. This paper will fill the void for information needed by organizations that design or operate oxygen systems. The information in this paper is not new information, but is a concise and easily understood summary of selecting materials for oxygen systems. This paper will serve well as an employee s first introduction to oxygen system materials selection, and probably the employee s first introduction to ASTM.

Davis, Samuel Eddie↗
NASA NTRS2015

Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data Associated with the Technical Challenges of the System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies Project

The Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies (SSAT) Project asked the AvSP Systems and Portfolio Analysis Team to identify SSAT-related trends. SSAT had four technical challenges: advance safety assurance to enable deployment of NextGen systems; automated discovery of precursors to aviation safety incidents; increasing safety of human-automation interaction by incorporating human performance, and prognostic algorithm design for safety assurance. This report reviews incident data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) for system-component-failure- or-malfunction- (SCFM-) related and human-factor-related incidents for commercial or cargo air carriers (Part 121), commuter airlines (Part 135), and general aviation (Part 91). The data was analyzed by Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) part, phase of flight, SCFM category, human factor category, and a variety of anomalies and results. There were 38 894 SCFM-related incidents and 83 478 human-factorrelated incidents analyzed between January 1993 and April 2011.

Withrow, Colleen A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Assessment of the State-of-the-Art of System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies

Since its initiation, the System-wide Safety Assurance Technologies (SSAT) Project has been focused on developing multidisciplinary tools and techniques that are verified and validated to ensure prevention of loss of property and life in NextGen and enable proactive risk management through predictive methods. To this end, four technical challenges have been listed to help realize the goals of SSAT, namely (i) assurance of flight critical systems, (ii) discovery of precursors to safety incidents, (iii) assuring safe human-systems integration, and (iv) prognostic algorithm design for safety assurance. The objective of this report is to provide an extensive survey of SSAT-related research accomplishments by researchers within and outside NASA to get an understanding of what the state-of-the-art is for technologies enabling each of the four technical challenges. We hope that this report will serve as a good resource for anyone interested in gaining an understanding of the SSAT technical challenges, and also be useful in the future for project planning and resource allocation for related research.

Roychoudhury, Indranil↗
NASA NTRS1971

Unified hatch system

Special hatch sealing mechanism design increases safety, reliability, and convenience. Adaptations are possible for oceanographic and high-speed aircraft design, or for any system where quick-opening pressure hatch is required. In normal mode, hatching mechanism is manually operated from either side.

Hart, R. J.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Investigating pyrolysis/incineration as a method of resource recovery from solid waste

Pyrolysis/incineration (P/I) is a physicochemical method for the generation of recoverable resources from solid waste materials such as inedible plant biomass (IPB), paper, plastics, cardboard, etc. P/I permits the collection of numerous gases with a minimal amount of solid residue. Pyrolysis, also known as starved air incineration, is usually conducted at relatively high temperatures (greater than 500 deg C) in the absence of oxygen. Incineration is conducted at lower temperatures in the presence of oxygen. The primary purpose of this study was to design, construct, and test a model P/I. The system design includes safety requirements for temperature and pressure. The objectives of this study were: (1) to design and construct a P/I system for incorporation with the Hybrid Regenerative Water Recovery System; (2) to initiate testing of the P/I system; (3) to collect and analyze P/I system data; (4) to consider test variables; and (5) to determine the feasibility of P/I as an effective method of resource recovery. A P/I system for the recovery of reuseable resources from solid waste materials was designed, constructed, and tested. Since a large amount of inedible plant biomass (IPB) will be generated in a space-based habitat on the lunar surface and Mars, IPB was the primary waste material tested in the system. Analysis of the effluent gases was performed to determine which gases could be used in a life support system.

Robertson, Bobby J.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Autonomous Flight Safety System

Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is an independent flight safety system designed for small to medium sized expendable launch vehicles launching from or needing range safety protection while overlying relatively remote locations. AFSS replaces the need for a man-in-the-loop to make decisions for flight termination. AFSS could also serve as the prototype for an autonomous manned flight crew escape advisory system. AFSS utilizes onboard sensors and processors to emulate the human decision-making process using rule-based software logic and can dramatically reduce safety response time during critical launch phases. The Range Safety flight path nominal trajectory, its deviation allowances, limit zones and other flight safety rules are stored in the onboard computers. Position, velocity and attitude data obtained from onboard global positioning system (GPS) and inertial navigation system (INS) sensors are compared with these rules to determine the appropriate action to ensure that people and property are not jeopardized. The final system will be fully redundant and independent with multiple processors, sensors, and dead man switches to prevent inadvertent flight termination. AFSS is currently in Phase III which includes updated algorithms, integrated GPS/INS sensors, large scale simulation testing and initial aircraft flight testing.

Ferrell, Bob↗
NASA NTRS2011

Structural Design Requirements and Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware: For Human Spaceflight

This document establishes the structural requirements for human-rated spaceflight hardware including launch vehicles, spacecraft and payloads. These requirements are applicable to Government Furnished Equipment activities as well as all related contractor, subcontractor and commercial efforts. These requirements are not imposed on systems other than human-rated spacecraft, such as ground test articles, but may be tailored for use in specific cases where it is prudent to do so such as for personnel safety or when assets are at risk. The requirements in this document are focused on design rather than verification. Implementation of the requirements is expected to be described in a Structural Verification Plan (SVP), which should describe the verification of each structural item for the applicable requirements. The SVP may also document unique verifications that meet or exceed these requirements with NASA Technical Authority approval.

Bernstein, Karen S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN and C) Design Overview and Flight Test Results from NASA's Max Launch Abort System (MLAS)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Engineering and Safety Center designed, developed and flew the alternative Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as risk mitigation for the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort system already in development. The NESC was tasked with both formulating a conceptual objective system design of this alternative MLAS as well as demonstrating this concept with a simulated pad abort flight test. Less than 2 years after Project start the MLAS simulated pad abort flight test was successfully conducted from Wallops Island on July 8, 2009. The entire flight test duration was 88 seconds during which time multiple staging events were performed and nine separate critically timed parachute deployments occurred as scheduled. This paper provides an overview of the guidance navigation and control technical approaches employed on this rapid prototyping activity; describes the methodology used to design the MLAS flight test vehicle; and lessons that were learned during this rapid prototyping project are also summarized.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Why Didn't They Just Follow the Procedure?

It is often said that to err is human and that procedures are in place to prevent people from making mistakes. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. And while it's true that good procedures can help avoid error, it's also the case that procedures have their own limitations. This talk highlights the limits of procedures and the resilience people bring to operations. It discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure, and it proposes an approach to the design of procedures that supports the human operator.

operations↗
NASA NTRS2020

Latching Safety Critical Signals in Pyrotechnic Circuits

In recent designs of safety-critical pyro control circuitry, latching circuits, used to store the state of control signals, have been found to have sensitivity to noise that could lead to inadvertent firing. This technical bulletin describes the sensitive circuit, and provides best practice recommendations to improve the design.

Latching Safety↗
NASA NTRS1994

Implementing Software Safety in the NASA Environment

Until recently, NASA did not consider allowing computers total control of flight systems. Human operators, via hardware, have constituted the ultimate safety control. In an attempt to reduce costs, NASA has come to rely more and more heavily on computers and software to control space missions. (For example. software is now planned to control most of the operational functions of the International Space Station.) Thus the need for systematic software safety programs has become crucial for mission success. Concurrent engineering principles dictate that safety should be designed into software up front, not tested into the software after the fact. 'Cost of Quality' studies have statistics and metrics to prove the value of building quality and safety into the development cycle. Unfortunately, most software engineers are not familiar with designing for safety, and most safety engineers are not software experts. Software written to specifications which have not been safety analyzed is a major source of computer related accidents. Safer software is achieved step by step throughout the system and software life cycle. It is a process that includes requirements definition, hazard analyses, formal software inspections, safety analyses, testing, and maintenance. The greatest emphasis is placed on clearly and completely defining system and software requirements, including safety and reliability requirements. Unfortunately, development and review of requirements are the weakest link in the process. While some of the more academic methods, e.g. mathematical models, may help bring about safer software, this paper proposes the use of currently approved software methodologies, and sound software and assurance practices to show how, to a large degree, safety can be designed into software from the start. NASA's approach today is to first conduct a preliminary system hazard analysis (PHA) during the concept and planning phase of a project. This determines the overall hazard potential of the system to be built. Shortly thereafter, as the system requirements are being defined, the second iteration of hazard analyses takes place, the systems hazard analysis (SHA). During the systems requirements phase, decisions are made as to what functions of the system will be the responsibility of software. This is the most critical time to affect the safety of the software. From this point, software safety analyses as well as software engineering practices are the main focus for assuring safe software. While many of the steps proposed in this paper seem like just sound engineering practices, they are the best technical and most cost effective means to assure safe software within a safe system.

Wetherholt, Martha S.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

To Create Safety Is Human

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations, are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Changing the Narrative About the Human Role in Accidents

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Do People Do?

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spacecraft Fire Safety Technology Development Plan For Exploration Missions

To date, NASA’s spaceflight operations in the past 5 decades have been limited to a narrow range of conditions from a fire safety perspective. The currently anticipated missions outside of low earth orbit will substantially expand this parameter space to include, extended durations, dormancy intervals, increased oxygen concentrations, partial gravity conditions and the presence of surface dust. All of these changes can have significant impacts on fire safety system design and operations. The overall state of understanding is discussed in this paper along with the identification of the needs for spacecraft fire safety technology development. These needs have been assembled into a roadmap maintained by the Environmental Control and Life Support System Capability Leadership Team that has evolved as the exploration mission concepts have changed. This roadmap continues to communicate the spacecraft fire safety needs for exploration and guide technology development efforts. This paper summarizes the major recent developments in our understanding of spacecraft fire behavior and mitigation. A review of the major technology development needs and discussion of their objectives, status, and future plans is presented. The plan for transitioning knowledge, hardware, and modeling capability resulting from these development efforts to specific exploration vehicle programs and missions is also discussed.

Fire safety↗
NASA NTRS2002

Application of Function-Failure Similarity Method to Rotorcraft Component Design

Performance and safety are the top concerns of high-risk aerospace applications at NASA. Eliminating or reducing performance and safety problems can be achieved with a thorough understanding of potential failure modes in the designs that lead to these problems. The majority of techniques use prior knowledge and experience as well as Failure Modes and Effects as methods to determine potential failure modes of aircraft. During the design of aircraft, a general technique is needed to ensure that every potential failure mode is considered, while avoiding spending time on improbable failure modes. In this work, this is accomplished by mapping failure modes to specific components, which are described by their functionality. The failure modes are then linked to the basic functions that are carried within the components of the aircraft. Using this technique, designers can examine the basic functions, and select appropriate analyses to eliminate or design out the potential failure modes. The fundamentals of this method were previously introduced for a simple rotating machine test rig with basic functions that are common to a rotorcraft. In this paper, this technique is applied to the engine and power train of a rotorcraft, using failures and functions obtained from accident reports and engineering drawings.

Roberts, Rory A.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Deriving Function-failure Similarity Information for Failure-free Rotorcraft Component Design

Performance and safety are the top concerns of high-risk aerospace applications at NASA. Eliminating or reducing performance and safety problems can be achieved with a thorough understanding of potential failure modes in the design that lead to these problems. The majority of techniques use prior knowledge and experience as well as Failure Modes and Effects as methods to determine potential failure modes of aircraft. The aircraft design needs to be passed through a general technique to ensure that every potential failure mode is considered, while avoiding spending time on improbable failure modes. In this work, this is accomplished by mapping failure modes to certain components, which are described by their functionality. In turn, the failure modes are then linked to the basic functions that are carried within the components of the aircraft. Using the technique proposed in this paper, designers can examine the basic functions, and select appropriate analyses to eliminate or design out the potential failure modes. This method was previously applied to a simple rotating machine test rig with basic functions that are common to a rotorcraft. In this paper, this technique is applied to the engine and power train of a rotorcraft, using failures and functions obtained from accident reports and engineering drawings.

Roberts, Rory A.↗