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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Facility to Alleviate Salt Technology Risks (FASTR): Preliminary Design Report with Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

The Facility to Alleviate Salt Technology Risks (FASTR) is a versatile, high-temperature (>600°C) molten chloride salt test facility designed to enable a variety of testing to advance the Generation 3 (Gen 3) Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) molten salt technology. FASTR includes a salt preparation system and a forced flow test loop with a suite of instrumentation. The FASTR loop is capable of 725°C operation, flow rates of 3–7 kg/s, includes heated and cooled sections, and swappable components to enable testing of future vendor-supplied hardware. The salt preparation system supplies large batches (e.g., 200 kg) of clean salt for use in the FASTR forced convection loop. This report summarizes the planned design and capabilities of FASTR. In addition, a failure modes and effects analysis of the system is reported.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2015

SU-E-T-128: Applying Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to a Risk-Based Quality Management for Stereotactic Radiosurgery in Brazil

Purpose: The goal of the present work was to evaluate the process maps for stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) treatment at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil and apply the FMEA technique to evaluate similarities and differences, if any, of the hazards and risks associated with these processes. Methods: A team, consisting of professionals from different disciplines and involved in the SRS treatment, was formed at each center. Each team was responsible for the development of the process map, and performance of FMEA and FTA. A facilitator knowledgeable in these techniques led the work at each center. The TG100 recommended scales were used for the evaluation of hazard and severity for each step for the major process “treatment planning”. Results: Hazard index given by the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is found to range from 4–270 for various processes and the severity (S) index is found to range from 1–10. The RPN values > 100 and severity value ≥ 7 were chosen to flag safety improvement interventions. Number of steps with RPN ≥100 were found to be 6, 59 and 45 for the three centers. The corresponding values for S ≥ 7 are 24, 21 and 25 respectively. The range of RPN and S values for each center belong to different process steps and failure modes. Conclusion: These results show that interventions to improve safety is different for each center and it is associated with the skill level of the professional team as well as the technology used to provide radiosurgery treatment. The present study will very likely be a model for implementation of risk-based prospective quality management program for SRS treatment in Brazil where currently there are 28 radiotherapy centers performing SRS. A complete FMEA for SRS for these three radiotherapy centers is currently under development.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Failure Mode Identification of Insulin Drug Products – Impact of Relevant Stress Conditions on the Quality of the Drug

Fast-acting insulin drug products (DPs) are carried and administered by diabetic patients to maintain their blood glucose level throughout the day, exposing the DPs to stress conditions. Apidra, Novolog, and Humalog insulin DPs were tested under various stress conditions. Dynamic light scattering (DLS), and size exclusion chromatography (SEC) were used to monitor the stability and aggregation. Thermal stress alone did not influence the stability. However, 24 hr exposure to vigorous mechanical stress shifted the DLS size peaks of Novolog and Humalog from 5 ± 1 nm to > 50.9 ± 25.6 nm, and the SEC native protein peak areas decreased 52% for Novolog and 18.4% for Humalog. Combined stress accelerated protein aggregation more drastically. Novolog and Humalog size shifted (>75 nm) after 3 hr and the peak area decreased > 97.9% after 6 hr exposure, indicating that high temperature accelerated the aggregation triggered by agitation. Soluble aggregates were captured by DLS early on compared to SEC. Apidra was comparably stable indicating DP formulation plays a critical role in stability. Here this study provides a greater understanding of potential failure modes patients and care givers may encounter while handling insulin DPs.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS2003

Independent Review of the Failure Modes of F-1 Engine and Propellants System

The F-1 is the powerful engine, that hurdled the Saturn V launch vehicle from the Earth to the moon on July 16,1969. The force that lifted the rocket overcoming the gravitational force during the first stage of the flight was provided by a cluster of five F-1 rocket engines, each of them developing over 1.5 million pounds of thrust (MSFC-MAN-507). The F-1 Rocket engine used RP-1 (Rocket Propellant-1, commercially known as Kerosene), as fuel with lox (liquid Oxygen) as oxidizer. NASA terminated Saturn V activity and has focused on Space Shuttle since 1972. The interest in rocket system has been revived to meet the National Launch System (NLS) program and a directive from the President to return to the Moon and exploration of the space including Mars. The new program Space Launch Initiative (SLI) is directed to drastically reduce the cost of flight for payloads, and adopt a reusable launch vehicle (RLV). To achieve this goal it is essential to have the ability of lifting huge payloads into low earth orbit. Probably requiring powerful boosters as strap-ons to a core vehicle, as was done for the Saturn launch vehicle. The logic in favor of adopting Saturn system, a proven technology, to meet the SLI challenge is very strong. The F-1 engine was the largest and most powerful liquid rocket engine ever built, and had exceptional performance. This study reviews the failure modes of the F-1 engine and propellant system.

Ray, Paul↗
NASA NTRS2011

Common Cause Failure Modes

High technology industries with high failure costs commonly use redundancy as a means to reduce risk. Redundant systems, whether similar or dissimilar, are susceptible to Common Cause Failures (CCF). CCF is not always considered in the design effort and, therefore, can be a major threat to success. There are several aspects to CCF which must be understood to perform an analysis which will find hidden issues that may negate redundancy. This paper will provide definition, types, a list of possible causes and some examples of CCF. Requirements and designs from NASA projects will be used in the paper as examples.

Wetherholt, Jon↗
NASA NTRS1980

Cycles till failure of silver-zinc cells with completing failures modes: Preliminary data analysis

One hundred and twenty nine cells were run through charge-discharge cycles until failure. The experiment design was a variant of a central composite factorial in five factors. Preliminary data analysis consisted of response surface estimation of life. Batteries fail under two basic modes; a low voltage condition and an internal shorting condition. A competing failure modes analysis using maximum likelihood estimation for the extreme value life distribution was performed. Extensive diagnostics such as residual plotting and probability plotting were employed to verify data quality and choice of model.

Sidik, S. M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification and Validation of Progressive Damage and Failure Analysis Methods for Intralaminar Failure Modes in Thermoplastic Composites

Current progressive damage and failure analysis (PDFA) methods were developed around thermoset material systems and their physical behavior. However, the applicability of these analysis methods has not been evaluated for use in modeling thermoplastic material systems. As part of the Hi-Rate Composite Aircraft Manufacturing (HiCAM) Project sponsored by NASA, intralaminar failure characterization was completed on a thermoplastic material system, AS4D/PEKK-FC, with off-axis tension (OAT) and off-axis compression (OAC) testing. The experiments were able to capture matrix non-linear shear behavior and the failure envelope of the material system. Two PDFA methods, LS-DYNA MAT299 and NASA’s CompDam-DGD, were then employed to simulate individual coupon behavior and simulation results were compared to published verification and validation guidelines from the CMH-17 crashworthiness working group. The results found that the two modeling methods provided suitable representation of material behavior of thermoplastics.

PDFA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification and Validation of Progressive Damage and Failure Analysis Methods for Intralaminar Failure Modes in Thermoplastic Composites

Current progressive damage and failure analysis (PDFA) methods were developed around thermoset material systems and their physical behavior. However, the applicability of these analysis methods has not been evaluated for use in modeling thermoplastic material systems. As part of the Hi-Rate Composite Aircraft Manufacturing (HiCAM) Project sponsored by NASA, intralaminar failure characterization was completed on a thermoplastic material system, AS4D/PEKK-FC, with off-axis tension (OAT) and off-axis compression (OAC) testing. The experiments were able to capture matrix non-linear shear behavior and the failure envelope of the material system. Two PDFA methods, LS-DYNA MAT299 and NASA’s CompDam-DGD, were then employed to simulate individual coupon behavior and simulation results were compared to published verification and validation guidelines from the CMH-17 crashworthiness working group. The results found that the two modeling methods provided suitable representation of material behavior of thermoplastics.

PDFA↗
DOE OSTI2023

An assessment of spall failure modes in laser powder bed fusion fabricated stainless steel 316L with low-volume intentional porosity

Here, this paper reports on spall failure and damage modes in Laser Powder Bed Fusion fabricated Stainless Steel 316L (SS316L) with intentional levels of low-volume (1–5 vol. %) porosity and pore sizes of 200, 350, and 500 μm. The fabricated specimens were subjected to uniaxial-strain plate-impact loading at ~4.5 GPa, to initiate incipient spall failure. Analysis of velocimetry profiles measured using multi-probe photon-Doppler velocimetry coupled with post-mortem analysis of soft-recovered samples reveals local suppression of spall failure (termed as spall-dominated) as a function of porosity, as the failure mechanism transitions from spall-centered tensile stress dominated to a pore-centered microstructure-dominated damage mode involving void/crack nucleation and growth at pre-existing pores. The critical porosity level where the suppression of spall failure is first observed, as well as the spall location, is dependent on both the volume fraction and the size of the initially fabricated pores. In samples of 500 μm pore size, the suppression of spall failure is observed with as little as 1 vol. % porosity, while samples with smaller pores (200 μm) still experience spall-centered tensile stress dominated failure with higher levels (5 vol. %) of porosity. In the case of pore-centered microstructure-dominated failure, spall damage can occur but the spall plane is shifted toward the rear free surface, or more generally in areas further away from the region with pores. Highly heterogeneous deformation twinning, shear banding, grain rotation, and cracking are observed in the vicinity of pre-existing pores and expected spall failure sites.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRS1990

Fundamental aspects and failure modes in high-temperature composites

Fundamental aspects and attendant failure mechanisms for high-temperature composites are summarized. These include in situ matrix behavior, load transfer, limits on matrix ductility to survive a given number of cyclic loadings, fundamental parameters which govern thermal stresses, vibration stresses and impact resistance, as well as their attendant failure mechanisms and failure sequences. The resulting guidelines are presented in terms of simple equations which are suitable for the preliminary assessment of the merits of a particular high-temperature composite in a specific application.

Chamis, C. C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗