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Failure reports for flight model-1 of the thematic mapper are summarized showing the symptom and cause of failure as well as the corrective action taken. Each report is keyed to the major subsystem against which the failure occurred. Requests for deviation/waiver are listed by number, description, and current status. Copies of engineering proposals are included.
Over the past decade, the goal of reducing the fatal accident rate of large transport aircraft has resulted in research aimed at the problem of aircraft loss-of-control. Starting in 1999, the NASA Aviation Safety Program initiated research that included vehicle dynamics modeling, system health monitoring, and reconfigurable control systems focused on flight regimes beyond the normal flight envelope. In recent years, there has been an increased emphasis on adaptive control technologies for recovery from control upsets or failures including damage scenarios. As part of these efforts, NASA has developed the Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) flight facility to allow flight research and validation, and system testing for flight regimes that are considered too risky for full-scale manned transport airplane testing. The AirSTAR facility utilizes dynamically-scaled vehicles that enable the application of subscale flight test results to full scale vehicles. This paper describes the modeling and simulation approach used for AirSTAR vehicles that supports the goals of efficient, low-cost and safe flight research in abnormal flight conditions. Modeling of aerodynamics, controls, and propulsion will be discussed as well as the application of simulation to flight control system development, test planning, risk mitigation, and flight research.
An investigation has been completed in the Langley 20-foot free-spinning tunnel on a l/18-scale model of the Ryan X-13 airplane to determine its spin, recovery, and tumbling characteristics, and to determine the minimum altitude from which a belly landing could be made in case of power failure in hovering flight. Model spin tests were conducted with and without simulated engine rotation. Tests without simulated engine rotation indicated two types of spins: one, a slightly oscillatory flat spin; and the other, a violently oscillatory spin. Tests with simulated engine rotation indicated that spins to the left were fast rotating and steep and those to the right were slow rotating and flat. The optimum technique for recovery is reversal of the rudder to against the spin and simultaneous movement of the ailerons to full with the spin followed by movement of the elevators to neutral after the spin rotation ceases. Tumbling tests made on the model indicated that although the Ryan X-13 airplane will not tumble in the ordinary sense (end-over-end pitching motion), it may instead tend to enter a wild gyrating'motion. Tests made to simulate power failure in hovering flight by dropping the model indicated that the model entered what appeared to be a right spin. An attempt should be made to stop this motion immediately by moving the rudder to oppose the rotation (left pedal), moving the ailerons to with the spin (stick right), and moving the stick forward after the spin rotation ceases to obtain flying speed for pullout. The minimum altitude required for a belly landing in case of power failure in hovering flight was indicated to be about 4,200 feet.
Some of the conceptual issues associated with pilot aiding systems are discussed and an implementation of one component of such an aiding system is described. It is essential that the format and content of the information the aiding system presents to the crew be compatible with the crew's mental models of the task. It is proposed that in order to cooperate effectively, both the aiding system and the flight crew should have consistent information processing models, especially at the point of interface. A general information processing strategy, developed by Rasmussen, was selected to serve as the bridge between the human and aiding system's information processes. The development and implementation of a model-based situation assessment and response generation system for commercial transport aircraft are described. The current implementation is a prototype which concentrates on engine and control surface failure situations and consequent flight emergencies. The aiding system, termed Recovery Recommendation System (RECORS), uses a causal model of the relevant subset of the flight domain to simulate the effects of these failures and to generate appropriate responses, given the current aircraft state and the constraints of the current flight phase. Since detailed information about the aircraft state may not always be available, the model represents the domain at varying levels of abstraction and uses the less detailed abstraction levels to make inferences when exact information is not available. The structure of this model is described in detail.
Space life performance data on 57 Goddard Space Flight Center spacecraft are analyzed from the standpoint of determining an appropriate reliability model and the associated reliability parameters. Data from published NASA reports, which cover the space performance of GSFC spacecraft launched in the 1960-1970 decade, form the basis of the analyses. The results of the analyses show that the time distribution of 449 malfunctions, of which 248 were classified as failures (not necessarily catastrophic), follow a reliability growth pattern that can be described with either the Duane model or a Weibull distribution. The advantages of both mathematical models are used in order to: identify space failure rates, observe chronological trends, and compare failure rates with those experienced during the prelaunch environmental tests of the flight model spacecraft.
In August of 1999, Boeing Corporation (Boeing) engineers began investigating failures of optical fiber being used on International Space Station flight hardware. Catastrophic failures of the fiber were linked to a defect in the glass fiber. Following several meetings of Boeing and NASA engineers and managers, Boeing created and led an investigation team, which examined the reliability of the cable installed in the U.S. Lab. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Components Technologies and Radiation Effects Branch (GSFC) led a team investigating the root cause of the failures. Information was gathered from: regular telecons and other communications with the investigation team, investigative trips to the cable distributor's plant, the cable manufacturing plant and the fiber manufacturing plant (including a review of build records), destructive and non-destructive testing, and expertise supplied by scientists from Dupont, and Lucent-Bell Laboratories. Several theories were established early on which were not able to completely address the destructive physical analysis and experiential evidence. Lucent suggested hydrofluoric acid (HF) etching of the glass and successfully duplicated the "rocket engine" defect. Strength testing coupled with examination of the low strength break sites linked features in the polyimide coating with latent defect sites. The information provided below explains what was learned about the susceptibility of the pre-cabled fiber to failure when cabled as it was for Space Station and the nature of the latent defects.
This study investigated the Shuttle Program s belief that Space Transportation System (STS) wiring damage occurrences are random, that is, a constant occurrence rate. Using Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA)-derived data for STS Space Shuttle OV-103, wiring damage was observed to increase over the vehicle s life. Causal factors could include wiring physical deterioration, maintenance and inspection induced damage, and inspection process changes resulting in more damage events being reported. Induced damage effects cannot be resolved with existent data. Growth analysis (using Crow-AMSAA, or CA) resolved maintenance/inspection effects (e.g., heightened awareness) on all wire damages and indicated an overall increase since Challenger Return-to-Flight (RTF). An increasing failure or occurrence rate per flight cycle was seen for each wire damage mode; these (individual) rates were not affected by inspection process effects, within statistical error.
An improved methodology for quantitatively evaluating failure risk of spaceflight systems to assess flight readiness and identify risk control measures is presented. This methodology, called Probabilistic Failure Assessment (PFA), combines operating experience from tests and flights with analytical modeling of failure phenomena to estimate failure risk. The PFA methodology is of particular value when information on which to base an assessment of failure risk, including test experience and knowledge of parameters used in analytical modeling, is expensive or difficult to acquire. The PFA methodology is a prescribed statistical structure in which analytical models that characterize failure phenomena are used conjointly with uncertainties about analysis parameters and/or modeling accuracy to estimate failure probability distributions for specific failure modes. These distributions can then be modified, by means of statistical procedures of the PFA methodology, to reflect any test or flight experience. State-of-the-art analytical models currently employed for designs failure prediction, or performance analysis are used in this methodology. The rationale for the statistical approach taken in the PFA methodology is discussed, the PFA methodology is described, and examples of its application to structural failure modes are presented. The engineering models and computer software used in fatigue crack growth and fatigue crack initiation applications are thoroughly documented.
An improved methodology for quantitatively evaluating failure risk of spaceflights systems to assess flight readiness and identify risk control measures is presented. This methodology, called Probabilistic Failure Assessment (PFA), combines operating experience from tests and flights with analytical modeling of failure phenomena to estimate failure risk. The PFA methodology is of particular value when information on which to base an assessment of failure risk, including test experience and knowledge of parameters used in analytical modeling, is expensive or difficult to acquire. The PFA methodology is a prescribed statistical structure in which analytical models that characterize failure phenomena are used conjointly with uncertainties about analysis parameters and/or modeling accuracy to estimate failure probability distributions for specific failure modes. These distributions can then be modified, by means of statistical procedures of the PFA methodology, to reflect any test or flight experience. State-of-the-art analytical models currently employed for design, failure prediction, or performance analysis are used in this methodology. The rationale for the statistical approach taken in the PFA methodology is discussed, the PFA methodology is described, and examples of its application to structural failure modes are presented. The engineering models and computer software used in fatigue crack growth and fatigue crack initiation applications are thoroughly documented.
To find failure events and their likelihoods in flight-critical systems, we investigate the use of an advanced black-box stress testing approach called adaptive stress testing. We analyze a trajectory predictor from a developmental commercial flight management system which takes as input a collection of lateral waypoints and en-route environmental conditions. Our aim is to search for failure events relating to inconsistencies in the predicted lateral trajectories. The intention of this work is to find likely failures and report them back to the developers so they can address and potentially resolve shortcomings of the system before deployment. To improve search performance, this work extends the adaptive stress testing formulation to be applied more generally to sequential decision-making problems with episodic reward by collecting the state transitions during the search and evaluating at the end of the simulated rollout. We use a modified Monte Carlo tree search algorithm with progressive widening as our adversarial reinforcement learner. The performance is compared to direct Monte Carlo simulations and to the cross-entropy method as an alternative importance sampling baseline. The goal is to find potential problems otherwise not found by traditional requirements-based testing. Results indicate that our adaptive stress testing approach finds more failures and finds failures with higher likelihood relative to the baseline approaches.
The presentation provides background information pertinent to the MPS GH2 Flow Control Valve Poppet failure which occurred on the Space Shuttle Endeavour during STS-126 flight. The presentation provides general MPS system operating information which is pertinent to understanding the failure causes and affects. The presentation provides additional background information on the operating environment in which the FCV functions and basic design history of the flow control valve. The presentation provides an overview of the possible flight failure modes and a brief summary of the flight rationale which was developed for this failure event. This presentation is an introductory presentation to 3 other speakers at the conference who will be speaking on M&P aspects of the investigation, non destructive inspection techniques development, and particle impact testing.
Engineers at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center have received a patent on an emergency flight-control method implemented by a propulsion-controlled aircraft (PCA) system. Utilizing the preexisting auto-throttle and engine-pressure-ratio trim controls of the airplane, the PCA system provides pitch and roll control for landing an airplane safely without using aerodynamic control surfaces that have ceased to function because of a primary-flight-control-system failure. The installation of the PCA does not entail any changes in pre-existing engine hardware or software. [Aspects of the method and system at previous stages of development were reported in Thrust-Control System for Emergency Control of an Airplane (DRC-96-07), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (March 2001), page 68 and Emergency Landing Using Thrust Control and Shift of Weight (DRC-96-55), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 26, No. 5 (May 2002), page 58.]. Aircraft flight-control systems are designed with extensive redundancy to ensure low probabilities of failure. During recent years, however, several airplanes have exhibited major flight-control-system failures, leaving engine thrust as the last mode of flight control. In some of these emergency situations, engine thrusts were successfully modulated by the pilots to maintain flight paths or pitch angles, but in other situations, lateral control was also needed. In the majority of such control-system failures, crashes resulted and over 1,200 people died. The challenge lay in creating a means of sufficient degree of thrust-modulation control to safely fly and land a stricken airplane. A thrust-modulation control system designed for this purpose was flight-tested in a PCA an MD-11 airplane. The results of the flight test showed that without any operational control surfaces, a pilot can land a crippled airplane (U.S. Patent 5,330,131). The installation of the original PCA system entailed modifications not only of the flight-control computer (FCC) of the airplane but also of each engine-control computer. Inasmuch as engine-manufacturer warranties do not apply to modified engines, the challenge became one of creating a PCA system that does not entail modifications of the engine computers.
Partial failures of aircraft primary flight control systems and structural damages to aircraft during flight have led to catastrophic accidents with subsequent loss of lives (e.g. DC-10, B-747, C-5, B-52, and others). Following the DC-10 accident at Sioux City, Iowa in 1989, the National Transportation Safety Board recommended 'Encourage research and development of backup flight control systems for newly certified wide-body airplanes that utilize an alternate source of motive power separate from that source used for the conventional control system.' This report describes the concept of a propulsion controlled aircraft (PCA), discusses pilot controls, displays, and procedures; and presents the results of a PCA piloted simulation test and evaluation of the B747-400 airplane conducted at NASA Ames Research Center in December, 1996. The purpose of the test was to develop and evaluate propulsion control throughout the full flight envelope of the B747-400 including worst case scenarios of engine failures and out of trim moments. Pilot ratings of PCA performance ranged from adequate to satisfactory. PCA performed well in unusual attitude recoveries at 35,000 ft altitude, performed well in fully coupled ILS approaches, performed well in single engine failures, and performed well at aft cg. PCA performance was primarily limited by out-of-trim moments.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has undertaken a task to relate long duration, space flight hardware performance to specific product assurance requirements established during the hardware development process. This paper describes the approach that JPL is using to correlate in-flight and ground test hardware failures to critical product assurance practices implemented on a given flight project. The first step in this effort has been to collect, and convert into a convenient format, in-flight problem, failure, and anomaly data. A characterization of a subset of this anomaly data base, focusing on anomaly causes, time dependence, and subsystem affected is presented.
Artificial intelligence techniques were used along with statistical hpyothesis testing and modern control theory, to help the pilot cope with the issues of information, knowledge, and capability in the event of a failure. An intelligent flight control system is being developed which utilizes knowledge of cause and effect relationships between all aircraft components. It will screen the information available to the pilots, supplement his knowledge, and most importantly, utilize the remaining flight capability of the aircraft following a failure. The list of failure types the control system will accommodate includes sensor failures, actuator failures, and structural failures.
Federal Aviation Administration will certainly require the Heavy Lift Rotorcraft to be operated under Category A performance and operations requirements. Because of the weight, no operation will be allowed except Category A according to FAA Part 29.1(c). This means that any where along the flight path, the aircraft must be able to land safely following an engine failure or continue flight. A repeatable flight profile must be developed and executed to ensure that the aircraft can be safely landed or flown away depending on its location on the flight profile. This means that there will be no Height-Velocity testing required as is currently required for Part 29 Category B. Since all the configurations shown to date are different than existing rotorcraft, each type would have to develop their individual requirements under existing special conditions FAA Part 21.17(b). This means the FAA will take the opportunity to negotiate additional requirements or change requirements to ensure safety. For example, since the tiltrotor did not fit normal rotorcraft category, new rules were negotiated between the applicant and the FAA. As a result of this negotiation, performance requirements for Category A were increased. The rules were written in terms of guaranteed performance instead of Category A requirements. Detailed discussion will follow later. The proposed tiltrotor would likely follow along with the current tiltrotor rules with the possibility of increase Category A performance requirements. Compounding with addition of wing and auxiliary thrust to both the tandem and coaxial rotor would result in new special condition aircraft. To my knowledge, no compound tandem or compound coaxial rotor has ever been certified by FAA.
Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) that have survived a long service time under pressure generally must be recertified before service is extended. Flight certification is dependent on the reliability analysis to quantify the risk of stress rupture failure in existing flight vessels. Full certification of this reliability model would require a statistically significant number of lifetime tests to be performed and is impractical given the cost and limited flight hardware for certification testing purposes. One approach to confirm the reliability model is to perform a stress rupture test on a flight COPV. Currently, testing of such a Kevlar49 (Dupont)/epoxy COPV is nearing completion. The present paper focuses on a Bayesian statistical approach to analyze the possible failure time results of this test and to assess the implications in choosing between possible model parameter values that in the past have had significant uncertainty. The key uncertain parameters in this case are the actual fiber stress ratio at operating pressure, and the Weibull shape parameter for lifetime; the former has been uncertain due to ambiguities in interpreting the original and a duplicate burst test. The latter has been uncertain due to major differences between COPVs in the database and the actual COPVs in service. Any information obtained that clarifies and eliminates uncertainty in these parameters will have a major effect on the predicted reliability of the service COPVs going forward. The key result is that the longer the vessel survives, the more likely the more optimistic stress ratio model is correct. At the time of writing, the resulting effect on predicted future reliability is dramatic, increasing it by about one "nine," that is, reducing the predicted probability of failure by an order of magnitude. However, testing one vessel does not change the uncertainty on the Weibull shape parameter for lifetime since testing several vessels would be necessary.
The performance of the orthogonal series generalized likelihood ratio (OSGLR) test in detecting and isolating commercial aircraft control surface and actuator failures is evaluated. A modification to incorporate age-weighting which significantly reduces the sensitivity of the algorithm to modeling errors is presented. The steady-state implementation of the algorithm based on a single linear model valid for a cruise flight condition is tested using a nonlinear aircraft simulation. A number of off-nominal no-failure flight conditions including maneuvers, nonzero flap deflections, different turbulence levels and steady winds were tested. Based on the no-failure decision functions produced by off-nominal flight conditions, the failure detection and isolation performance at the nominal flight condition was determined. The extension of the algorithm to a wider flight envelope by scheduling on dynamic pressure and flap deflection is examined. Based on this testing, the OSGLR algorithm should be capable of detecting control surface failures that would affect the safe operation of a commercial aircraft. Isolation may be difficult if there are several surfaces which produce similar effects on the aircraft. Extending the algorithm over the entire operating envelope of a commercial aircraft appears feasible.