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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1981

Distributed processing on the Space Shuttle - A case study

A Power Extension Package (PEP) has been designed to provide additional electrical power and energy during Shuttle sortie missions. The considered investigation was conducted to determine the most suitable allocation of PEP monitoring and control functions between the Orbiter's existing (centralized) Systems Management General Purpose Computer and an embedded PEP processor. PEP monitoring and control functions are examined, and a configuration definition is considered, taking into account the 'functional migration' process, function allocation criteria, and candidate functional configurations. A trade study is conducted, giving attention to an assessment of four candidate configurations. Assessment factors are related to cost, development risk, aspects of reliability and safety, PEP design complexity, PEP/STS integration complexity, flight operations, and launch/landing site operations. A thorough (subjective) assessment of the PEP system life cycle indicates substantial benefits from a distributed processing approach.

Schoonmaker, P. B.↗
NASA NTRS1970

Evaluation of nonmetallic thermal protection materials for the manned space shuttle. Volume 1, task 1: Assessment of technical risks associated with utilization of nonmetallic thermal protection system

Technical problems of design and flight qualification of the proposed classes of surface insulation materials and leading edge materials were reviewed. A screening test plan, a preliminary design data test plan and a design data test plan were outlined. This program defined the apparent critical differences between the surface insulators and the leading edge materials, structuring specialized screening test plans for each of these two classes of materials. Unique testing techniques were shown to be important in evaluating the structural interaction aspects of the surface insulators and a separate task was defined to validate the test plan. In addition, a compilation was made of available information on proposed material (including metallic TPS), previous shuttle programs, pertinent test procedures, and other national programs of merit. This material was collected and summarized in an informally structured workbook.

Wilkinson, W. H.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Radiation-Related Risk Analysis for Atmospheric Flight Civil Aviation Flight Personnel

Human data on low dose rate radiation exposure and consequent effects are not readily available, and this fact generates groundtruth concerns for all risk assessment techniques for possible health effects induced by the space radiation environment, especially for long term missions like those foreseen now and in the near future. A large amount of such data may be obtained through civil aviation flight personnel cohorts, in the form of epidemiological studies on delayed health effects induced by the cosmic-ray generated atmospheric radiation environment, a high- LET low dose and low dose rate ionizing radiation with its typical neutron component, to which flight personnel are exposed all throughout their work activity. In the perspective of worldwide studies on radiation exposure of the civil aviation flight personnel, all the available results from previous studies on flight personnel radiation exposure have been examined in various ways (i.e. literature review, meta-analysis) to evaluate possible significant associations between atmospheric ionizing radiation environment and health risks, and to assess directions for future investigations. The physical characteristics of the atmospheric ionizing radiation environment make the results obtained for atmospheric flight personnel relevant for space exploration.

DeAngelis, G.↗
NASA NTRS2024

The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office - In Service of Space Safety

Since the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office’s (ODPO) founding in 1979 at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, it has been at the forefront of orbital debris research, modeling, and policy development. The ODPO has worked in collaboration with NASA and other U.S. government missions since the 1980s to mitigate the growth of the orbital debris environment and protect the population of the Earth. Two main products from the ODPO, the Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) and the Debris Assessment Software (DAS), are frequently among the top three most-downloaded software packages from the NASA Software Catalog. These products are provided free of charge to the public in furtherance of the goal to ensure that new space missions, in compliance with NASA’s orbital debris mitigation requirements, are developed, operated, and disposed of responsibly. In addition to these external-facing software tools, the ODPO maintains high-fidelity internal tools for reentry simulation (the Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool, ORSAT), short-term risk assessment for robotic and human spaceflight missions (the Satellite Breakup Risk Assessment Module, SBRAM), among others. Using data from the ORDEM model, as well as using the Meteoroid Environment Model (MEM) developed by the Meteoroid Environment Office (MEO) at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) team uses the BUMPER code to assess penetration risk to space vehicles in Earth orbit and beyond. This paper will discuss the services that the ODPO and HVIT provide, from mission concept development through end-of-mission, for NASA-related and commercial missions.

Chris Ostrom↗
NASA NTRS2008

Career Excess Mortality Risk from Diagnostic Radiological Exams Required for Crewmembers Participating in Long Duration Space Flight

NASA requires astronauts to undergo diagnostic x-ray examinations as a condition for their employment. The purpose of these procedures is to assess the astronaut s overall health and to diagnose conditions that could jeopardize the success of long duration space missions. These include exams for acceptance into the astronaut corps, routine periodic exams, as well as evaluations taken pre and post missions. Issues: According to NASA policy these medical examinations are considered occupational radiological exposures, and thus, are included when computing the astronaut s overall radiation dose and associated excess cancer mortality risk. As such, astronauts and administrators are concerned about the amount of radiation received from these procedures due to the possibility that these additional doses may cause astronauts to exceed NASA s administrative limits, thus disqualifying them from future flights. Methods: Radiation doses and cancer mortality risks following required medical radiation exposures are presented herein for representative male and female astronaut careers. Calculation of the excess cancer mortality risk was performed by adapting NASA s operational risk assessment model. Averages for astronaut height, weight, number of space missions and age at selection into the astronaut corps were used as inputs to the NASA risk model. Conclusion: The results show that the level of excess cancer mortality imposed by all required medical procedures over an entire astronaut s career is approximately the same as that resulting from a single short duration space flight (i.e. space shuttle mission). In short the summation of all medical procedures involving ionizing radiation should have no impact on the number of missions an astronaut can fly over their career. Learning Objectives: 1. The types of diagnostic medical exams which astronauts are subjected to will be presented. 2. The level of radiation dose and excess mortality risk to the average male and female astronaut will be presented.

Dodge, C. W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Predictive Modeling to Assess and Address Challenges and Limitations Associated with Clinical Care and Decision Support in Deep Space

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a method for assessing and integrating the risk of failure in a multivariate system. While it is often applied by engineers designing complex machines, it could also be applied to humans to assess the probability of a health “failure” treating diseases as the multiple “variables” and the human as the “complex machine.” The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) was developed to apply PRA to assess medical risk for exploration spaceflight and inform the design of medical systems for space flight. The NASA engineering community utilizes event-driven and fault tree probabilistic techniques to classify risk in the space flight environment by leveraging the inherent knowledge of complex space flight system design and testing to quantify risk. However, in harmonizing the risk of human space flight, answering the question of “How do we balance astronaut health, performance and resource risks with other engineering risks on exploration space missions?” remains a profoundly challenging and largely qualitative practice. The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) is one aspect of the Human Research Program’s efforts to represent space fight human health and performance risks quantitatively.

L Mcintyre↗
NASA NTRS2005

Cost Modeling for low-cost planetary missions

This presentation will provide an overview of the JPL parametric cost models used to estimate flight science spacecrafts and instruments. This material will emphasize the cost model approaches to estimate low-cost flight hardware, sensors, and instrumentation, and to perform cost-risk assessments. This presentation will also discuss JPL approaches to perform cost modeling and the methodologies and analyses used to capture low-cost vs. key cost drivers.

cost model↗
NASA NTRS2008

Validation of Procedures for Monitoring Crewmember Immune Function - Short Duration Biological Investigation

Validation of Procedures for Monitoring Crew Member Immune Function - Short Duration Biological Investigation (Integrated Immune-SDBI) will assess the clinical risks resulting from the adverse effects of space flight on the human immune system and will validate a flightcompatible immune monitoring strategy. Immune system changes will be monitored by collecting and analyzing blood, urine and saliva samples from crewmembers before, during and after space flight.

Sams, Clarence↗
NASA NTRS2010

Launch Pad Flame Trench Refractory Materials

The launch complexes at NASA's John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the "V11 receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for Constellation Program ground operations to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls following Space Shuttle launches have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact ground operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is developing an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from industry surveys, trade studies, life cycle cost analysis, and preliminary testing that have been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials.

Calle, Luz M.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Getting to the Heart of Cardiovascular Risk Assessment in Astronauts for Exploration Class Missions

Since the beginning of manned spaceflight, NASA has recognized the potential risk of cardiovascular decrements due to stressors in the space environment. Of particular concern is the effect of space radiation on cardiovascular disease since astronauts will be exposed to higher levels of galactic cosmic rays outside the Earth's protective magnetosphere. To date, only a few studies have examined the effects of heavy ion radiation on cardiovascular disease, and at lower, space-relevant doses, the association between radiation exposure and cardiovascular pathology is more varied and unclear. Furthermore, other spaceflight conditions such as microgravity, circadian shifts, and confinement stress pose unique challenges in estimating the health risks that can be attributed to exposure to ionizing radiations. In this work, we review age, cause of mortality, and radiation exposure amongst early NASA astronauts in selection groups and discuss the limitations of assessing such a cohort when attempting to characterize the risk of space flight, including stressors such as space radiation and microgravity exposure, on cardiovascular health. METHODS: NASA astronauts in selection groups 1-7 were chosen and the comparison population was white men of the same birth cohort as drawn from data from the CDC Wonder Database and CDC National Center for Health Statistics Life Tables. Cause of death information was obtained from the Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health program and deceased astronauts were classified based on ICD-10 codes: ischemic heart disease (IHD), stroke, cancer, acute occupational events, non-NASA accidents, and other/unknown. Expected years of life left and expected age at death were calculated for the cohort. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: There were 32 deaths in this early astronaut population, 12 of which were due to accidents or acute occupational events that impacted lifespan considerably. The average age at death from these causes is 30 years lower than the average expected ~70 years of age in the general population. Remarkably, all 41 living early astronauts outlived our calculated expected age at death for members of their birth cohort; furthermore, 13 of the 20 deceased astronauts who did not die in NASA/non-NASA accidents exceeded this age. There was no difference in IHD between the astronaut cohort and the comparison population; therefore, it is not possible to associate IHD mortality with radiation in that astronaut cohort. As NASA looks toward future exploration-class missions, early astronaut cohorts provide a convenient option for assessing these risks and for developing mitigation strategies. However, many challenges still exist when assessing such limited evidence, including small cohort size, health and lifestyle confounders (such as smoking and drinking), the high accident mortality rate, and the fact that many of these astronauts are still alive, outliving many of their birth-cohort peers. Future analysis should include a longitudinal study, monitoring cases as they occur in the cohort. As this cohort is currently followed-up over time, and as more IHD cases are anticipated in a population of this age, this type of study is not as resource-intensive as would normally be the case.

Elgart, S. R.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Piloted Evaluation of Modernized Limited Authority Control Laws in the NASA-Ames Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS)

The UH-60 BLACK HAWK was designed in the 1970s, when the US Army primarily operated during the day in good visual conditions. Subsequently, the introduction of night-vision goggles increased the BLACK HAWK'S mission effectiveness, but the accident rate also increased. The increased accident rate is strongly tied to increased pilot workload as a result of a degradation in visual cues. Over twenty years of research in helicopter flight control and handling qualities has shown that these degraded handling qualities can be recovered by modifying the response type of the helicopter in low speed flight. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation initiated a project under the National Rotorcraft Technology Center (NRTC) to develop modern flight control laws while utilizing the existing partial authority Stability Augmentation System (SAS) of the BLACK HAWK. This effort resulted in a set of Modernized Control Laws (MCLAWS) that incorporate rate command and attitude command response types. Sikorsky and the US Army Aeroflightdynamics Directorate (AFDD) conducted a piloted simulation on the NASA-Ames Vertical h4otion Simulator, to assess potential handling qualities and to reduce the risk of subsequent implementation and flight test of these modern control laws on AFDD's EH-60L helicopter. The simulation showed that Attitude Command Attitude Hold control laws in pitch and roll improve handling qualities in the low speed flight regime. These improvements are consistent across a range of mission task elements and for both good and degraded visual environments. The MCLAWS perform better than the baseline UH-60A control laws in the presence of wind and turbulence. Finally, while the improved handling qualities in the pitch and roll axis allow the pilot to pay more attention to the vertical axis and hence altitude performance also improves, it is clear from pilot comments and altitude excursions that the addition of an Altitude Hold function would further reduce workload and improve overall handling qualities of the aircraft.

Sahasrabudhe, Vineet↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS2015

Integrated Medical Model Overview

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project represents one aspect of NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) to quantitatively assess medical risks to astronauts for existing operational missions as well as missions associated with future exploration and commercial space flight ventures. The IMM takes a probabilistic approach to assessing the likelihood and specific outcomes of one hundred medical conditions within the envelope of accepted space flight standards of care over a selectable range of mission capabilities. A specially developed Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) maintains evidence-based, organizational knowledge across a variety of data sources. Since becoming operational in 2011, version 3.0 of the IMM, the supporting iMED, and the expertise of the IMM project team have contributed to a wide range of decision and informational processes for the space medical and human research community. This presentation provides an overview of the IMM conceptual architecture and range of application through examples of actual space flight community questions posed to the IMM project.

Spae Adaptation Syndrome↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2016

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2019

Current NASA In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) Strategic Vision

Perform development to TRL 5/6 through ground demonstration in relevant environment. Perform component/subscale subsystem flight demonstrations on small/mid-size landers. Assess and characterize water in volatiles in lunar polar shadowed regions and craters. Reduce risk of ISRU for mission critical consumables through Integrated End-to-End Flight Demonstrations (pilot scale). Establish initial Human Mission Scale production capability to promote sustainable operations and as anchor for commercial involvement. Identify and characterize polar region environment and resources/volatiles for Science and future Exploration/Commercial applications. Provide ground-truth physical, mineral, and water/volatile resource characteristic information at multiple locations to provide geological context for science-focused theories of volatile placement and initial mining assessments.Test technologies and processes to reduce risk of future extraction/mining systems. Quantify concentration and lateral/vertical distribution of resources/volatiles. Utilize ISRU capabilities to Extend and Enhance Human Lunar Exploration Missions. Provide oxygen (and fuel) to enable reusable human lunar lander (10+ MT/yr O2)Process carbon-based crew waste/trash into gases and propellants; can reduce logistics while minimizing public perception issues (alternative is conversion to radiation shielding). Scavenge unused propellants and hardware from spent landers. Metal extraction from regolith as feedstock for in situ and in space manufacturing demonstrations. Civil engineering and construction aimed at future outpost/infrastructure build-up. Develop and Demonstrate ISRU for Human Mars Missions. ISRU for propellant production (10-15 MT/yr); Liquefy, store, transfer, and refuel ascent vehicle. Use Moon for operational experience and mission validation for Mars: Pre-deployment & remote activation and operation without crew. Storing and transferring mission consumables Landing crew with empty tanks with ISRU propellants already made and waiting. Support/Promote Commercialization of Space. Large scale polar ice mining (100+ MT/yr water)O2/H2 propulsion for landers/cis-lunar transportation with surface and in space depots. In situ construction and energy expansion at mining and human outpost site(s). ISRU Ground Development. Develop and advance ISRU technologies to enable acquisition of resources and processing into mission consumables. Utilize Multi-center collaboration with a portfolio that includes internal NASA work, external contracts, and collaborative agreements/partnerships. Where appropriate, develop lunar ISRU components and subsystems with a Mars-forward application. Engage industry through public-private partnerships to lay the foundation for long-term lunar and space economic development. Spin-in/spin-out technologies for terrestrial applications and industry (mining, oil & gas, alternative energy, construction). Flight Demonstration Path to Operational ISRU. Utilize small demonstrations with near off-the-shelf hardware to obtain critical information quickly on lunar resources and operations. Demonstrate critical technologies and processes that interact with lunar materials and environments. Perform 'pilot plant' demonstrations at architecture relevant scales and durations to reduce the risk for ISRU-provided products for critical human mission applications.

In-situ Resource Utilization↗
NASA NTRS2010

Assessment, Planning, and Execution Considerations for Conjunction Risk Assessment and Mitigation Operations

An operational Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) concept is the real-time process of assessing risk posed by close approaches and reacting to those risks if necessary. The most effective way to completely mitigate conjunction risk is to perform an avoidance maneuver. The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has implemented a routine CARA process since 2005. Over this period, considerable experience has been gained and many lessons have been learned. This paper identifies and presents these experiences as general concepts in the description of the Conjunction Assessment, Flight Dynamics, and Flight Operations methodologies and processes. These general concepts will be tied together and will be exemplified through a case study of an actual high risk conjunction event for the Aura mission.

Frigm, Ryan C.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Assessment of Medical Risks and Optimization of their Management using Integrated Medical Model

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project is a software-based technique that will identify and quantify the medical needs and health risks of exploration crew members during space flight and evaluate the effectiveness of potential mitigation strategies. The IMM Project employs an evidence-based approach that will quantify probability and consequences of defined in-flight medical risks, mitigation strategies, and tactics to optimize crew member health. Using stochastic techniques, the IMM will ultimately inform decision makers at both programmatic and institutional levels and will enable objective assessment of crew health and optimization of mission success using data from relevant cohort populations and from the astronaut population. The objectives of the project include: 1) identification and documentation of conditions that may occur during exploration missions (Baseline Medical Conditions List [BMCL), 2) assessment of the likelihood of conditions in the BMCL occurring during exploration missions (incidence rate), 3) determination of the risk associated with these conditions and quantify in terms of end states (Loss of Crew, Loss of Mission, Evacuation), 4) optimization of in-flight hardware mass, volume, power, bandwidth and cost for a given level of risk or uncertainty, and .. validation of the methodologies used.

Fitts, Mary A.↗