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DOE OSTI2023

Fuel performance evaluation of two high burnup PWR core designs during normal operation, control rod withdrawal, and control rod ejection scenarios

There is interest among utilities to extend the current, 18-month operating cycle to 24 months. Economically, this extension would require greater than 5 % enrichment and peak rod average discharge burnup levels above 62 GWd/MTU. A notable challenge of increasing enrichment is the resulting additional excess reactivity encountered during the early stages of fuel life. To accommodate, burnable absorbers beyond soluble boron are introduced into the fuel system. In high burnup fuels, the possibilities of cladding lift-off and fuel melting increase due, in part, to increased rod internal pressures and limited fuel thermal conductivity, respectively. This work collaboratively employs PARCS, RELAP5-3D, and BISON to compare the fuel performance of two high burnup fuel candidates with higher than 5 % enrichment. Here, the fuel performance parameters were compared to current NRC guidance. The results demonstrate an annular fuel design with homogenously blended gadolinium as a burnable absorber operates with greater safety margins during normal operation, allowing for additional operational flexibility. During normal operation, the core design utilizing Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber pins contained fuel pins which reached plenum pressures above 15.5 MPa by the end of the first fuel cycle and fuel pins experienced cladding hoop strains above 1 %. In the Gd core design, only two observed pins experienced plenum pressures above 15.5 MPa and no pins exceeded 1 % cladding hoop strain. During the control rod withdrawal scenario, plenum pressures for pins in both designs marginally exceeded system pressure, however neither experienced excessive hoop strain. The Gd core design experienced a maximum fuel temperature of 2418 K, which is significantly higher than the Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber design at 2157 K, but still within regulatory guidance. We predicted that the fuel in both could return to service after the CRW event. We also predicted that cladding would not fail during the Control Rod Ejection in either core design. Generally, the Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber core design performed with greater safety margin with regards to temperature during normal operation and the transient events. However, the Gd core design performed with greater safety margin regarding plenum pressure and hoop strain limits during normal operation and both transient events.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Two‐Dimensional (2D) or Quasi‐2D Superstructures from DNA‐Coated Colloidal Particles

Abstract This contribution describes the synthesis of colloidal di‐patch particles functionalized with DNA on the patches and their assembly into colloidal superstructures via cooperative depletion and DNA‐mediated interactions. The assembly into flower‐like Kagome, brick‐wall like monolayer, orthogonal packed single or double layers, wrinkled monolayer, and colloidal honeycomb superstructures can be controlled by tuning the particles’ patch sizes and assembly conditions. Based on these experimental results, we generate an empirical phase diagram. The principles revealed by the phase diagram provide guidance in the design of two‐dimensional (2D) materials with desired superstructures. Our strategy might be translatable to the assembly of three‐dimensional (3D) colloidal structures.

Liu, Mingzhu↗

DOE OSTI2021

Two‐Dimensional (2D) or Quasi‐2D Superstructures from DNA‐Coated Colloidal Particles

Liu, Mingzhu↗

DOE OSTI2023

Status Report on Regulatory Criteria Applicable to the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)

Although the interest in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in nuclear energy is increasing rapidly, at present their implementation is limited. This rapid increase in interest is not surprising considering that implementing AI and ML technology would allow for continuous monitoring, facilitate the implementation of predictive maintenance with optimized staffing plans, enable automation and autonomy opportunities that could drastically reduce fixed operation and maintenance costs, and provide training for operations and maintenance. Other industries are using AI for construction, and in the nuclear arena AI could provide great benefit in decommissioning activities. The ability of AI and ML to operate in real time vastly increases their potential impact. Before AI can be used in design, operations, or as a regulatory tool, the specifics on the regulations applicable to the use of AI for nuclear power applications need to be established. The difficulty is that the specific use cases will dictate the applicability of regulations. For example, even within the application domain associated with operations, the regulations might vary if the AI is used to create a virtual reference for plant operations or is used for training, optimization of maintenance intervals, prioritization of maintenance activities, etc. Different still is if the AI is to be used for design or setting technical specifications, which will introduce additional requirements. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing reviews are based on an applicant’s design meeting its performance assessment based on (1) safety goals and objectives, (2) deterministic and/or probabilistic analysis of accident scenarios, and (3) quantitative assessment of design alternatives against the safety goals and objectives using accepted engineering tools, methodologies, and performance criteria. The current regulatory framework does not explicitly address AI or autonomous control. However, as implementing AI technology will require the use of a digital platform, it must meet the requirements of an instrumentation and control (I&C) system. The regulatory requirements for AI, which will be incorporated into the I&C system, will be very dependent on how it is used (i.e., its functionality, safety classification, etc.). The licensing process is primarily risk-based with the identification of components and systems as nonsafety, important to safety, or safety related. A risk-informed approach allows further gradation of components and systems based on risk metrics such as core damage frequency or large early release fractions. Thus, the use cases and the risk categorization of impacted systems and components will determine the regulatory requirements. Regardless of how AI is used it presents new opportunities for risk-informing operating, maintenance, and regulatory decisions. Trustworthiness, transparency, and the ability to validate and verify the results will be paramount in showing that the systems and plant still meet their performance requirements. This report describes the results of research to identify regulatory implications of AI technologies and their uses. Specifically, this report reviews current regulatory guidance relevant to the application of AI for design (including design changes or new designs including advanced reactors), construction, operations, training, maintenance, research, testing, and as a regulatory tool. AI can be automated at different levels from purely informative purposes to autonomous controls. The focus of this review included determination of constraints on the application of AI technology, identification of any regulatory gaps or uncertainties, and clarification of anticipated technical basis information likely to be important for regulatory acceptance of these technologies. Currently, any use of AI at nuclear power plants is focused on nonsafety-related applications. The NRC and other regulatory bodies are evaluating providing guidance to address gaps rather than create new regulations to address the use of AI and ML. This approach seems to be the best to encourage AI development without adding regulatory uncertainty.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) for a Commercial Fuel Debundling Facility in the United States

The concept of fuel debundling proposes that all non-fuel components of a fuel assembly be removed prior to beginning the recycling process. It was introduced to reduce the quantity of and cost of disposing high level radioactive waste during recycling in the United States. However, nuclear material accountancy and control programs could also benefit from fuel debundling due to a reduction in self-shielding material for individual fuel rods compared to a fuel assembly. Current NRC regulations and guidance point to an independent fuel debundling facility with a material-possession-only license as the best option for implementing this concept into a used fuel recycling scheme in the United States. This allows the facility to comply only with simple NMAC requirements under Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 74 without the need to submit an NMAC plan to the NRC, exempting it from more tedious and complex NMAC requirements. However, a recycling facility may desire a Pu mass estimate from measurements of each individual fuel rod to improve accountancy into the dissolver. Many technologies and methodologies were considered for performing NMAC in an independent fuel debundling facility in the United States. Few were able to meet anticipated throughput demands of up to 3,300 rods/day and achieve measurement uncertainties suitable for input accountancy for a recycling facility. The best option was a combination of passive gamma-ray spectroscopy and neutron coincidence counting to meet all requirements for the proposed Fuel Debundling Detector (FUDD). Follow-on work will include a full uncertainty analysis to inform what assumptions can be made to meet input accountancy objectives before beginning experimental activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing Cloud Cybersecurity: Prescriptive Controls for Operational Technology

This whitepaper provides strategic insights and recommendations into security cloud-based solutions for electric utilities, encompassing operational technology (OT), virtual power plants (VPP), distributed energy resources (DERs), applications, networks, and data storage as they transition to and leverage cloud infrastructure through managed service providers (MSPs) and cloud service providers (CSPs). Principles derived from established frameworks serve as a foundation for best practices across cybersecurity projects and remove the constraints of settling on a single framework. For organizations that prefer not to integrate a specific framework altogether, elements of the proposed approach could be adopted or tailored to best fit defined requirements and expected functionalities. The Cirrus assessment, a utility cloud feasibility tool, and the roadmap it provides serve as a precursor to this paper, which seeks to be a valuable resource for defining next steps following cloud technology integration feasibility appraisal. With its comprehensive approach to adoption, the Cirrus framework offers strategic guidance on responsibly preparing for or deploying a utility cloud solution. The previously published whitepaper, “Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration,” details the guiding strategy, research, and deployment of cloud solutions within electric and interconnected grid systems. Before implementing the controls suggested in this document, it is recommended that stakeholders complete Cirrus's cloud integration assessment and pair the results with their unique cybersecurity controls to form a comprehensive cloud-based utility cybersecurity plan. The Cirrus outcome will consider a series of future architectures for the grid before and after the energy transition and evaluate the arguments for and against cloud applications for each electric and interconnected grid layer. This document is a companion to the original whitepaper, "Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration" to further identify and recommend security controls based on Cirrus’s cloud integration assessment output. The following whitepaper outlines the cybersecurity controls that secure cloud-service models pertinent to the electric sector using the predefined categories identify, protect, detect, and respond and recover. The objective is to outline prescriptive security controls based on the type of architecture and data stored in the cloud. The focus includes dissecting the shared responsibility model and elucidating what on-premises Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) entail. A pivotal consideration in this context is allocating responsibility for foundational cybersecurity aspects—having used Cirrus for the cloud integration assessment. The ensuing controls detailed herein also represent a checklist of controls necessary for a secure cloud transition, equipping utilities with the knowledge to navigate this digital transformation with confidence and strategic foresight in a safe and responsible manner.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Controlling magnetostructural transition and magnetocaloric effect in multi-component transition-metal-based materials

Proper coupling between structural and magnetic transitions is critical for the emergence and control of magnetocaloric effects in solids. We examine the influence of minor substitutional doping (replacing Mn by Cr and Al by Sn) and interstitial doping with B on the magnetic, structural, and magnetocaloric properties of recently discovered Mn 0.5 Fe 0.5 NiSi 0.94 Al 0.06 alloy exhibiting a giant magnetocaloric effect near room temperature. We demonstrate that magnetocaloric properties of the base compound can be controlled and, in some cases, improved by chemical substitutions. First-principles computations elucidate how small changes in the composition affect properties in this family of compounds and, thus, provide useful guidance for the selection of suitable doping elements for such materials. Here the magnetic-field-induced entropy change measured for Mn 0.5 Fe 0.5 NiSi 0.94 Al 0.06 B 0.005 is –22 J/kg K near room temperature for the applied magnetic field of 2 T, and it is among the highest known values for this class of materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy (Final Project Report)

This project establishes a Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy with the objective of designing and operating a cyber-physical testbed for wind energy farms (WEFs) that enables comprehensive cybersecurity research. The testbed incorporates a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system connected to turbine models via industrial-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs). It supports side-channel data acquisition, implementation and analysis of various cyberattack scenarios, and development of attack detection, mitigation, and best-practice guidance tailored to wind energy systems. During the project, the team expanded the number and fidelity of mathematical turbine models (MTMs), integrated these models with SCADA infrastructure, and deployed a scaled physical turbine and associated sensors. High-resolution operational and side-channel data streams were collected and used to refine machine-learning (ML)-based attack detection systems and to extend the WindCRAFT framework to multi-turbine threat scenarios. The project demonstrated a realistic, scalable environment for evaluating cyber threats, validated attack detection approaches using enriched datasets, and identified new multi-turbine and inter-turbine communication attack vectors. The resulting testbed, models, and security mechanisms provide a foundation for ongoing R&D and deployment of cyber-resilient offshore wind energy systems.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2026

A transfer learning approach to energy-efficient control of small and medium-sized commercial buildings

Model-free reinforcement learning (RL) provides a data-driven and adaptive approach to optimize building energy use while satisfying occupant comfort. This powerful tool does not need any prior knowledge about the environment and system it is optimizing and can adapt its policy based on the changes in captures. Like any other data-driven tool, it faces high training costs due to the extensive agent-environment interactions required to capture long-term building dynamics and user comfort. Transfer learning, particularly policy distillation, offers a promising way to accelerate training by leveraging pretrained RL agents in different building and system types. Here, this study investigates online student distillation, in which the student model updates its neural network weights using outputs from teacher models. The work introduces a student distillation strategy designed for efficient knowledge transfer, along with a teacher selection method that ensures high-quality guidance. The approach is validated using a highly calibrated whole building energy model for a small/medium commercial building test facility. Results show substantial reductions in training time and data requirements while surpassing the performance of ASHRAE Guideline 36, an advanced rule-based control strategy. The distilled RL model required 45% less data and achieved 20% higher cumulative rewards than a state-of-the-art RL model, with faster convergence and lower energy consumption. These outcomes demonstrate that effective transfer learning enables a scalable and data-efficient energy management solution for commercial buildings.

ASHRAE guideline 36↗

DOE OSTI2020

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Visual feedback and guided balance training in an immersive virtual reality environment for lower extremity rehabilitation

Balance training is essential for physical rehabilitation procedures, as it can improve functional mobility and enhance cognitive coordination. However, conventional balance training methods may have limitations in terms of motivation, real-time objective feedback, and personalization, which a virtual reality (VR) setup may provide a better alternative. In this work, we present an immersive VR training environment for lower extremity balance rehabilitation with real-time guidance and feedback. The VR training environment immerses the user in a 3D ice rink model where a virtual coach (agent) leads them through a series of balance poses, and the user controls a trainee avatar with their own movements. Here we developed two coaching styles: positive-reinforcement and autonomous-supportive, and two viewpoints of the trainee avatar: first-person and third-person. The proposed environment was evaluated in a user study with healthy, non-clinical participants (n = 16, 24.4 ± 5.7 years old, 9 females). Our results show that participants showed stronger performance in the positive-reinforcement style compared to the autonomous-supportive style. Additionally, in the third-person viewpoint, the participants exhibited more stability in the positive-reinforcement style compared to the autonomous-supportive style. For viewpoint, participants exhibited stronger performance in the first-person viewpoint compared to third-person in the autonomous-supportive style, while they were comparable in the positive-reinforcement style. We observed no significant effects on the foot height and number of mistakes. Furthermore, we report the analysis of user performance with balance training poses and subjective measures based on questionnaires to assess the user experience, usability, and task load. The proposed VR balance training could offer an interactive, adaptive, and engaging environment and open new potential research directions for lower extremity rehabilitation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Case Study: Applying the INL Resilience Framework to Iowa Lakes Electric Cooperative Distributed Wind Systems

Traditional metrics and evaluation methods for resiliency are not sufficient to evaluate the effect that distributed wind systems will have, particularly in light of the challenges described above. While the concept of resiliency is not new, its application to the electric grid is neither standardized nor well-defined, and there is little to no guidance on how to evaluate resilience specifically for distributed wind systems. To fill this gap, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), as part of the multi-laboratory Microgrids, Infrastructure Resilience, and Advanced Controls Launchpad (MIRACL) project, has developed a resilience framework for electric energy delivery systems (EEDS). The framework provides detailed steps for evaluating resiliency in the planning, operational, and future stages, and encompasses five core functions of resilience. It allows users to evaluate the resilience of distributed wind, taking into consideration the resilience of the wind systems themselves, as well as the effect they have on the resiliency of any systems they are connected to. In this study, we evaluate the resilience of the distributed wind systems at Iowa Lakes Electric Cooperative to cybersecurity hazards. We show that the wind resource can benefit the overall system resilience during some hazards. We show that the practices in place make the wind subsystems resilient against some cybersecurity hazards but that there are still significant risks associated with other cybersecurity hazards

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Securing Digital Energy Infrastructure: Procurement, Contracting, and Supply Chain Risk Management Guidance

Recognizing the scale of this industry challenge, the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Grid Deployment Office (GDO) and Cybersecurity Energy Security & Emergency Response office have launched a multi-year BESS supply chain security initiative to identify consequence-driven approaches to addressing BESS supply chain security and provide resources to support prioritization of supply chain security efforts associated with the procurement of BESS equipment and services. This guide is one element of the supporting resources to be provided and sets forth a framework and guidance for procurement bidding, selection, risk analysis, and agreements stakeholders can implement to mitigate cybersecurity risks across the entirety of battery system component ecosystem, including the interconnected software and hardware required for control and monitoring BESSs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2024

Controlling radioisotope proportions when randomly sampling from Dirichlet distributions in PyRIID

As machine learning models for radioisotope quantification become more powerful, likewise the need for high-quality synthetic training data grows as well. For problem spaces that involve estimating the relative isotopic proportions of various sources in gamma spectra it is necessary to generate training data that accurately represents the variance of proportions encountered. In this report, we aim to provide guidance on how to target a desired variance of proportions which are randomly when using the PyRIID Seed Mixer, which samples from a Dirichlet distribution. We provide a method for properly parameterizing the Dirichlet distribution in order to maintain a constant variance across an arbitrary number of dimensions, where each dimension represents a distinct source template being mixed. We demonstrate that our method successfully parameterizes the Dirichlet distribution to target a specific variance of proportions, provided that several conditions are met. This allows us to follow a principled technique for controlling how random mixture proportions are generated which are then used downstream in the synthesis process to produce the final, noisy gamma spectra.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2025

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous Aerial Power Plant Inspection in GPS-denied Environments

Inspection of coal-fired power plants is frequently dangerous, includes difficult places to reach, and can turn expensive due to the downtimes and cost of inspection crew. Robotic systems have shown capabilities to address some of these issues, but most of the current robotic inspection technology in power plants is designed for specific components. Conversely, recent advances in machine vision have empowered aerial platforms for long-range, remotely-controlled, GPS-based inspections of industrial plants. This capability has led to wide spread utilization of aerial robots (commonly termed Drones, UVS or UAS) platforms for inspection in less challenging environments where both collision avoidance, and GPS reception are not significant issues. The challenge in adapting airborne technology for power plant inspection lies in internal structures and the complex network of piping, and distribution systems, which impose significant risks for collision and can hinder the reception and transmission of GPS signals. The current state of the art in aerial inspection technology within the energy sector is controlled via radio control, and utilizes GPS-based navigation, for inspection of large-scale plants such as offshore platforms and wind turbine parks. Nevertheless, close-range and autonomous inspection in the GPS-denied environments of power plants has not yet been achieved, as it requires precise guidance and navigation with real-time situational awareness and obstacle avoidance capabilities. This endeavor introduced the use of rotary wing flying robots, due to their station keeping and vertical take-off capabilities for power plant components inspection. To enable close quarter inspection two methods were used. One method uses the 3D CAD (Three-dimensional Computer-Aided Design) model of the asset to inspect to generate the UAV’s inspection path. To acquire, analyze and process the 3D model, first, the STL file is produced to obtain surface points and vectors normal to the surface. Later, by introducing other variables such as wall offset and a controlled trajectory between each outline and each subsequent layer, the flight path is generated. The proposed framework will generate a path that will pass as close as desired from the surface and navigate in intricate environments. A second method, use advanced manufacturing techniques such as CNC (Computer Numerical Control) and additive manufacturing. Once the inspection flight path is obtained, vision-based navigation systems are employed to have the UAV autonomously tracking the provided trajectory. Finally, Artificial Intelligence-enabled developments are in charge of detecting cracks and corrosion in structural components of power plants. The proposed methods are validated in simulations, laboratory and industrial setups, where it is shown that the developed systems acting together enable close-quarter autonomous aerial inspection and mapping in power plant assets. The system can be further improved by adding more sensors to navigate in different GPS-denied environments, with non-homogeneous lighting conditions, dust and in general situations where vision-based systems may fail.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

DOE OSTI2024

Identifying a list of Salmonella serotypes of concern to target for reducing risk of salmonellosis

There is an increasing awareness in the field of Salmonella epidemiology that focusing control efforts on those serotypes which cause severe human health outcomes, as opposed to broadly targeting all Salmonella , will likely lead to the greatest advances in decreasing the incidence of salmonellosis. Yet, little guidance exists to support validated, scientific selection of target serotypes. The goal of this perspective is to develop an approach to identifying serotypes of greater concern and present a case study using meat- and poultry-attributed outbreaks to examine challenges in developing a standardized framework for defining target serotypes.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗