Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Human spaceflight operations”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2022

Information Fusion and Data Analytics for Human Lunar Exploration (CIF REPORT: Detailed PI Write-up)

The Information Fusion & Data Analytics (IFDA) project commenced in FY20, continued through FY21, and its final platform development phase continues in FY22. The objective remains the fusion and rapid accessibility of large quantities of disparate sourced human spaceflight data. IFDA is a platform tailored for NA (S&MA) to develop highly advanced operational data integration and analysis techniques. IFDA leverages the JSC ER7 modeling, simulation,and data fusion capabilities to collect, warehouse, and augment data human exploration data integration and analysis techniques. The IFDA project’s integrated data visualizations have been demonstrated in two validation scenarios in FY21, and provided the architecture and platform basis for development of a full-scale data analysis suite and storage solution useful to all JSC organizations engaged in real time operations and safety tasks. Scenarioand prototypical development including the construction of a full scale data analysis suite and storage solution, useful to all JSC organizations engaged in real time operations and safety tasks, is central to IFDA Phase 3 and provides a demonstrable pathway for the Digital Transformation Program. IFDA Phase 3 is focused on data provider, data utilizer, and SME hands-on workshops that will conclude the Dem / Valphase and deliver a program-ready data integration tool as a product.

information fusion↗
NASA NTRS2022

Information Fusion & Analytics for Human Lunar Exploration

The Information Fusion & Data Analytics (IFDA) project commenced in FY20, continued through FY21, and its final platform development phase continues in FY22. The objective remains the fusion and rapid accessibility of large quantities of disparate sourced human spaceflight data. IFDA is a platform tailored for NA (S&MA) to develop highly advanced operational data integration and analysis techniques. IFDA leverages the JSC ER7 modeling, simulation,and data fusion capabilities to collect, warehouse, and augment data human exploration data integration and analysis techniques. The IFDA project’s integrated data visualizations have been demonstrated in two validation scenarios in FY21, and provided the architecture and platform basis for development of a full-scale data analysis suite and storage solution useful to all JSC organizations engaged in real time operations and safety tasks. Scenarioand prototypical development including the construction of a full scale data analysis suite and storage solution, useful to all JSC organizations engaged in real time operations and safety tasks, is central to IFDA Phase 3 and provides a demonstrable pathway for the Digital Transformation Program. IFDA Phase 3 is focused on data provider, data utilizer, and SME hands-on workshops that will conclude the Dem / Valphase and deliver a program-ready data integration tool as a product.

information fusion↗
NASA NTRS2004

Nutritional status changes in humans during a 14-day saturation dive: the NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations V project

Ground-based analogs of spaceflight are an important means of studying physiologic and nutritional changes associated with space travel, and the NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations V (NEEMO) is such an analog. To determine whether saturation diving has nutrition-related effects similar to those of spaceflight, we conducted a clinical nutritional assessment of the NEEMO crew (4 men, 2 women) before, during, and after their 14-d saturation dive. Blood and urine samples were collected before, during, and after the dive. The foods consumed by the crew were typical of the spaceflight food system. A number of physiologic changes were observed, during and after the dive, that are also commonly observed during spaceflight. Hemoglobin and hematocrit were lower (P < 0.05) after the dive. Transferrin receptors were significantly lower immediately after the dive. Serum ferritin increased significantly during the dive. There was also evidence indicating that oxidative damage and stress increased during the dive. Glutathione peroxidase and superoxide dismutase decreased during and after the dive (P < 0.05). Decreased leptin during the dive (P < 0.05) may have been related to the increased stress. Subjects had decreased energy intake and weight loss during the dive, similar to what is observed during spaceflight. Together, these similarities to spaceflight provide a model to use in further defining the physiologic effects of spaceflight and investigating potential countermeasures.

Diving/physiology↗
NASA NTRS2025

Humans to Mars, but How Many? Trade Space Analyses for Mars Mission Crew Size

Missions to Mars will differ from previous human spaceflight missions in that the crew of astronauts will be required to operate in an Earth-independent manner due to the long communication delays. Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number and composition of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk that crew sizes may be too small to meet primary mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, that crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise of the Mission Control Central (MCC) team NASA currently relies upon. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) developed a methodology for assessing the trade space of factors that affect the number of crew for Mars missions based on human performance and expertise modeling. This methodology includes the consideration of results from three human performance models developed using the Improved Performance Research and Integration Tool (IMPRINT) modeling platform as well as a custom-built model on expertise trained within the crew based on NASA’s crew qualification and responsibilities matrix (CQRM). We present example model results and discuss implications on trade space analyses for Mars mission crew size.

Mars Mission↗
NASA NTRS2011

Readiness for First Crewed Flight

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to develop a generic framework for evaluating whether any given program has sufficiently complete and balanced plans in place to allow crewmembers to fly safely on a human spaceflight system for the first time (i.e., first crewed flight). The NESC assembled a small team which included experts with experience developing robotic and human spaceflight and aviation systems through first crewed test flight and into operational capability. The NESC team conducted a historical review of the steps leading up to the first crewed flights of Mercury through the Space Shuttle. Benchmarking was also conducted with the United States (U.S.) Air Force and U.S. Navy. This report contains documentation of that review.

Schaible, Dawn M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Effect of Different Operations Modes on Science Capabilities During the 2010 Desert-RATS Test: Insights from the Geologist Crewmembers

The 2010 Desert RATS field test utilized two Space Exploration Vehicles (prototype planetary rovers) and four crewmembers (2 per rover) to conduct a geologic traverse across northern Arizona while testing continuous and twice-per-day communications paired with operation modes of separating and exploring individually (Divide & Conquer) and exploring together (Lead & Follow), respectively. This report provides qualitative conclusions from the geologist crewmembers involved in this test as to how these modes of communications and operations affected our ability to conduct field geology. Each mode of communication and operation provided beneficial capabilities that might be further explored for future Human Spaceflight Missions to other solar system objects. We find that more frequent interactions between crews and an Apollo-style Science Team on the Earth best enables scientific progress during human exploration. However, during multiple vehicle missions, this communication with an Earth-based team of scientists, who represent "more minds on the problem", should not come at the exclusion of (or significantly decrease) communication between the crewmembers in different vehicles who have the "eyes on the ground". Inter-crew communications improved when discussions with a backroom were infrequent. Both aspects are critical and cannot be mutually exclusive. Increased vehicle separation distances best enable encounters with multiple geologic units. However, seemingly redundant visits by multiple vehicles to the same feature can be utilized to provide improved process-related observations about the development and modification of the local terrain. We consider the value of data management, transfer, and accessibility to be the most important lesson learned. Crews and backrooms should have access to all data and related interpretations within the mission in as close to real-time conditions as possible. This ensures that while on another planetary surface, crewmembers are as educated as possible with respect to the observations and data they will need to collect at any moment.

Bleacher, Jacob E.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Psychophysiological Monitoring of Aerospace Crew State

As next-generation space exploration missions necessitate increasingly autonomous systems, there is a critical need to better detect and anticipate crewmember interactions with these systems. The success of present and future autonomous technology in exploration spaceflight is ultimately dependent upon safe and efficient interaction with the human operator. Optimal interaction is particularly important for surface missions during highly coordinated extravehicular activity (EVA), which consists of high physical and cognitive demands with limited ground support. Crew functional state may be affected by a number of variables including workload, stress, and motivation. Real-time assessments of crew state that do not require a crewmember’s time and attention to complete will be especially important to assess operational performance and behavioral health during flight. In response to the need for objective, passive assessment of crew state, the aim of this work is to develop an accurate and precise prediction model of human functional state for surface EVA using multi-modal psychophysiological sensing. The psychophysiological monitoring approach relies on extracting a set of features from physiological signals and using these features to classify an operator’s cognitive state. This work aims to compile a non-invasive sensor suite to collect physiological data in real-time. Training data during cognitive and more complex functional tasks will be used to develop a classifier to discriminate high and low cognitive workload crew states. The classifier will then be tested in an operationally relevant EVA simulation to predict cognitive workload over time. Once a crew state is determined, further research into specific countermeasures, such as decision support systems, would be necessary to optimize the automation and improve crew state and operational performance.

Wusk, Grace C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C Dempsey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗
NASA NTRS2005

The Importance of Multilateral Safety Requirements for Human Spaceflight

The International Space Station (ISS) Program initially implemented safety requirements in a series of bilateral agreements between NASA and each International Partner. As the program matured and multilateral processes began to be developed, the differences between these bilaterally agreed requirement sets became more significant. Efforts to develop multilateral safety requirements were hampered for many reasons including assessment of national standards used in the bilateral agreements, requirements baselines for existing contracts, and resource limitations to address requirements changes late in the development and operations phases. To avoid similar requirements issues in the future, international safety requirements need to be developed for human spaceflight. This paper will provide the background of the ISS bilateral Safety and Mission Assurance requirements and processes, describe the activities to develop multilateral safety requirements and processes, and give examples of issues that were encountered. Further, the paper will make recommendations regarding the development of international safety requirements for human spaceflight and the safety topics to be addressed.

Pido, Kelle↗
NASA NTRS2015

NASA Conjunction Assessment Organizational Approach and the Associated Determination of Screening Volume Sizes

NASA is committed to safety of flight for all of its operational assets Performed by CARA at NASA GSFC for robotic satellites Focus of this briefing Performed by TOPO at NASA JSC for human spaceflight he Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) was stood up to offer this service to all NASA robotic satellites Currently provides service to 70 operational satellites NASA unmanned operational assets Other USG assets (USGS, USAF, NOAA) International partner assets Conjunction Assessment (CA) is the process of identifying close approaches between two orbiting objects; sometimes called conjunction screening The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) a USAF unit at Vandenberg AFB, maintains the high accuracy catalog of space objects, screens CARA-supported assets against the catalog, performs OD tasking, and generates close approach data.

Conjunction↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗
NASA NTRS2024

Assessing the Number of Crew for Mars Against Trade Space Parameters

Missions to Mars will differ from all previous human spaceflight missions in that the onboard crew of astronauts will be required to operate in an Earth-independent manner given the long communication delays on Mars missions. Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number and composition of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk in that crew sizes may be too small to meet primary mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, the crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise in the Mission Control Central (MCC) team on which NASA has come to rely. We present a framework for trade space analysis along with results from human-performance models developed in IMPRINT. We discuss the implications of model results on the trade space for number of crew for missions to Mars. This work was funded by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) with support from NASA’s Human Research Program (HRP).

Donna Dempsey↗
NASA NTRS1999

Sleep and Circadian Rhythms in Four Orbiting Astronauts

INTRODUCTION The study of human sleep and circadian rhythms in space has both operational and scientific significance. Operationally, U.S. Spaceflight is moving away from brief missions with durations of less than one week. Most space shuttle missions now last two weeks or more, and future plans involving space stations, lunar bases and interplanetary missions all presume that people will be living away from the gravity and time cues of earth for months at a time. Thus, missions are moving away from situations where astronauts can "tough it out" for comparatively brief durations, to situations where sleep and circadian disruptions are likely to become chronic, and thus resistant to short term pharmacological or behavioral manipulations. As well as the operational significance, there is a strong theoretical imperative for studying the sleep and circadian rhythms of people who are removed from the gravity and time cues of earth. Like other animals, in humans, the Circadian Timekeeping System (CTS) is entrained to the correct period (24h) and temporal orientation by various time cues ("zeitgebers"), the most powerful of which is the alternation of daylight and darkness. In leaving Earth, astronauts are removing themselves from the prime zeitgeber of their circadian system -- the 24h alternation of daylight and darkness.

Monk, Timothy H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Humans to Mars, but How Many? Using Imprint Human Performance Models to Inform Crew Size

HUMANS TO MARS, BUT HOW MANY? USING IMPRINT HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELS TO INFORM CREW SIZE Missions to Mars will differ from previous human spaceflight missions in that the onboard crew of astronauts will be required to operate in an Earth-independent manner due to long communication delays. Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number and composition of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk that crew sizes may be too small to meet primary mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, that crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise of the Mission Control Central (MCC) team NASA currently relies upon. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing a methodology for assessing the trade space of factors that affect the number of crew for future missions. This methodology includes the consideration of results from three human performance models developed using the Improved Performance Research and Integration Tool (IMPRINT) modeling platform as well as a custom-built model on expertise trained within the crew. The custom-built crew expertise model results will be presented in the training sub-tag. Here we present results of the three IMPRINT models. Two of these models were built using IMPRINT’s Operations Model capability, with detailed task networks for specific systems and scenarios allowing for a comprehensive mental workload analysis on certain crew positions. The third model was built using IMPRINT’s Force Model capability, allowing for a higher-level manpower analysis based on crew engagement in activities performed over a longer Mars transit scenario, and how those activities may be impacted by unplanned events and new tasking unique to the Mars mission. Differences between the models will be presented, as well as examples of model results and a discussion of how those results may inform future Mars mission manpower requirements, system design, and operating procedures.

Donna L Dempsey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Humans to Mars, but How Many? Using Training Requirements Modeling to Inform Crew Size

Missions to Mars will differ from previous human spaceflight missions in that the onboard crew of astronauts will be required to operate in an Earth-independent manner due to the long communication delays. Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number and composition of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk that crew sizes may be too small to meet primary mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, that crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise of the Mission Control Central (MCC) team NASA currently relies upon. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing a methodology for assessing the trade space of factors that affect the number of crew for future missions. This methodology includes the consideration of results from three human performance models developed using the Improved Performance Research and Integration Tool (IMPRINT) modeling platform as well as a custom-built model on expertise trained within the crew. The IMPRINT results will be presented in the modeling and simulation sub-tag. Here we present results of a model based on NASA’s crew qualification and responsibility matrix (CQRM), a tool used to identify the crew qualifications for each area of responsibility (operation, system, and payload) for a mission. The model outputs an optimized allocation of training assignments along with a flight-assigned CQRM that can be used to consider the expertise that can be trained within a crew of a given size. We discuss the CQRM model result implications on the trade space for Mars mission crew size.

Mars↗