Overview of Human Research Program (HRP) Sponsored Sensorimotor Research for the Human Landing System
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sensorimotor↗
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NASA's Human Research Program: Evolving Collaborations to Enable the Future of Human Spaceflight
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Jancy C McPhee↗
Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Exploration Measures in Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) Campaign 6
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Suzanne T Bell↗
We Train AI, Why Not Humans, Too? An Exploration of Human-AI Team Training for Future Workplace Viability & Integration [SLIDES]
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Lancaster, Caitlin Marie↗
We Train AI, Why Not Humans, Too? An Exploration of Human-AI Team Training for Future Workplace Viability
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Lancaster, Caitlin Marie↗
On the role of exchange of power and information signals in control and stability of the human-robot interaction
A human's ability to perform physical tasks is limited, not only by his intelligence, but by his physical strength. If, in an appropriate environment, a machine's mechanical power is closely integrated with a human arm's mechanical power under the control of the human intellect, the resulting system will be superior to a loosely integrated combination of a human and a fully automated robot. Therefore, we must develop a fundamental solution to the problem of 'extending' human mechanical power. The work presented here defines 'extenders' as a class of robot manipulators worn by humans to increase human mechanical strength, while the wearer's intellect remains the central control system for manipulating the extender. The human, in physical contact with the extender, exchanges power and information signals with the extender. The aim is to determine the fundamental building blocks of an intelligent controller, a controller which allows interaction between humans and a broad class of computer-controlled machines via simultaneous exchange of both power and information signals. The prevalent trend in automation has been to physically separate the human from the machine so the human must always send information signals via an intermediary device (e.g., joystick, pushbutton, light switch). Extenders, however are perfect examples of self-powered machines that are built and controlled for the optimal exchange of power and information signals with humans. The human wearing the extender is in physical contact with the machine, so power transfer is unavoidable and information signals from the human help to control the machine. Commands are transferred to the extender via the contact forces and the EMG signals between the wearer and the extender. The extender augments human motor ability without accepting any explicit commands: it accepts the EMG signals and the contact force between the person's arm and the extender, and the extender 'translates' them into a desired position. In this unique configuration, mechanical power transfer between the human and the extender occurs because the human is pushing against the extender. The extender transfers to the human's hand, in feedback fashion, a scaled-down version of the actual external load which the extender is manipulating. This natural feedback force on the human's hand allows him to 'feel' a modified version of the external forces on the extender. The information signals from the human (e.g., EMG signals) to the computer reflect human cognitive ability, and the power transfer between the human and the machine (e.g., physical interaction) reflects human physical ability. Thus the information transfer to the machine augments cognitive ability, and the power transfer augments motor ability. These two actions are coupled through the human cognitive/motor dynamic behavior. The goal is to derive the control rules for a class of computer-controlled machines that augment human physical and cognitive abilities in certain manipulative tasks.
Kazerooni, H.↗
Human System Risk Management for Space Flight
This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.
Davis, Jeffrey↗
Wings: A New Paradigm in Human-Centered Design
Many aircraft accidents/incidents investigations cite crew error as a causal factor (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group 1996). Human factors experts suggest that crew error has many underlying causes and should be the start of an accident investigation and not the end. One of those causes, the flight deck design, is correctable. If a flight deck design does not accommodate the human's unique abilities and deficits, crew error may simply be the manifestation of this mismatch. Pilots repeatedly report that they are "behind the aircraft" , i.e., they do not know what the automated aircraft is doing or how the aircraft is doing it until after the fact. Billings (1991) promotes the concept of "human-centered automation"; calling on designers to allocate appropriate control and information to the human. However, there is much ambiguity regarding what it mean's to be human-centered. What often are labeled as "human-centered designs" are actually designs where a human factors expert has been involved in the design process or designs where tests have shown that humans can operate them. While such designs may be excellent, they do not represent designs that are systematically produced according to some set of prescribed methods and procedures. This paper describes a design concept, called Wings, that offers a clearer definition for human-centered design. This new design concept is radically different from current design processes in that the design begins with the human and uses the human body as a metaphor for designing the aircraft. This is not because the human is the most important part of the aircraft (certainly the aircraft would be useless without lift and thrust), but because he is the least understood, the least programmable, and one of the more critical elements. The Wings design concept has three properties: a reversal in the design process, from aerodynamics-, structures-, and propulsion-centered to truly human-centered; a design metaphor that guides function allocation and control and display design; and a deliberate distinction between two fundamental functions of design, to complement and to interpret human performance. The complementary function extends the human's capabilities beyond his or her current limitations - this includes sensing, computation, memory, physical force, and human decision making styles and skills. The interpretive (or hermeneutic, Hollnagel 1991) function translates information, functionality, and commands between the human and the aircraft. The Wings design concept allows the human to remain aware of the aircraft through natural interpretation. It also affords great improvements in system performance by maximizing the human's natural abilities and complementing the human's skills in a natural way. This paper will discuss the Wings design concept by describing the reversal in the traditional design process, the function allocation strategy of Wings, and the functions of complementing and interpreting the human.
Schutte, Paul C.↗
Human Integration Design Processes (HIDP)
The purpose of the Human Integration Design Processes (HIDP) document is to provide human-systems integration design processes, including methodologies and best practices that NASA has used to meet human systems and human rating requirements for developing crewed spacecraft. HIDP content is framed around human-centered design methodologies and processes in support of human-system integration requirements and human rating. NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard, is a two-volume set of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Agency-level standards established by the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, directed at minimizing health and performance risks for flight crews in human space flight programs. Volume 1 of NASA-STD-3001, Crew Health, sets standards for fitness for duty, space flight permissible exposure limits, permissible outcome limits, levels of medical care, medical diagnosis, intervention, treatment and care, and countermeasures. Volume 2 of NASASTD- 3001, Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, focuses on human physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations and defines standards for spacecraft (including orbiters, habitats, and suits), internal environments, facilities, payloads, and related equipment, hardware, and software with which the crew interfaces during space operations. The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems, specifies the Agency's human-rating processes, procedures, and requirements. The HIDP was written to share NASA's knowledge of processes directed toward achieving human certification of a spacecraft through implementation of human-systems integration requirements. Although the HIDP speaks directly to implementation of NASA-STD-3001 and NPR 8705.2B requirements, the human-centered design, evaluation, and design processes described in this document can be applied to any set of human-systems requirements and are independent of reference missions. The HIDP is a reference document that is intended to be used during the development of crewed space systems and operations to guide human-systems development process activities.
Boyer, Jennifer↗
Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation
The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.
artemis↗
Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation
The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.
artemis↗
Data Mining of Historical Human Data to Assess the Risk of Injury due to Dynamic Loads
The NASA Occupant Protection Group is charged with ensuring crewmembers are protected during all dynamic phases of spaceflight. Previous work with outside experts has led to the development of a definition of acceptable risk (DAR) for space capsule vehicles. The DAR defines allowable probability rates for various categories of injuries. An important question is how to validate these probabilities for a given vehicle. One approach is to impact test human volunteers under projected nominal landing loads. The main drawback is the large number of subject tests required to attain a reasonable level of confidence that the injury probability rates would meet those outlined in the DAR. An alternative is to mine existing databases containing human responses to impact. Testing an anthropomorphic test device (ATD) at the same human‐exposure levels could yield a range of ATD responses that would meet DAR. As one aspect of future vehicle validation, the ATD could be tested in the vehicle's seat and suit configuration at nominal landing loads and compared with the ATD responses supported by the human data set. This approach could reduce the number of human‐volunteer tests NASA would need to conduct to validate that a vehicle meets occupant protection standards. METHODS: The U.S. Air Force has recorded hundreds of human responses to frontal, lateral, and spinal impacts at many acceleration levels and pulse durations. All of this data are stored on the Collaborative Biomechanics Data Network (CBDN), which is maintained by the Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB). The test device for human occupant restraint (THOR) ATD was impact tested on WPAFB's horizontal impulse accelerator (HIA) matching human‐volunteer exposures on the HIA to 5 frontal and 3 spinal loading conditions. No human injuries occurred as a result of these impact conditions. Peak THOR response variables for neck axial tension and compression, and thoracic‐spine axial compression were collected. Maximal chest deflection was determined from motion capture video of the impact test. HIC‐ 15 and BRIC were calculated from head acceleration responses. Given the number of human subjects for each test condition a confidence interval of injury probability will be obtained. RESULTS: Results will be discussed in terms of injury‐risk probability estimates based on the human data set evaluated. Also, gaps in the data set will be identified. These gaps could be one of two types. One is areas where additional THOR testing would increase the comparable human data set, thereby improving confidence in the injury probability rate. The other is where additional human testing would assist in obtaining information on other acceleration levels or directions. DISCUSSION: The historical human data showed validity of the THOR ATD for supplemental testing. The historical human data are limited in scope, however. Further data are needed to characterize the effects of sex, age, anthropometry, and deconditioning due to spaceflight on risk of injury
Wells, Jesica↗
Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation
The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.
Human-Rating↗
The Importance of HRA in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks
Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.
Hamlin, Teri↗
NASA Human Health and Performance Strategy
In May 2007, what was then the Space Life Sciences Directorate, issued the 2007 Space Life Sciences Strategy for Human Space Exploration. In January 2012, leadership and key directorate personnel were once again brought together to assess the current and expected future environment against its 2007 Strategy and the Agency and Johnson Space Center goals and strategies. The result was a refined vision and mission, and revised goals, objectives, and strategies. One of the first changes implemented was to rename the directorate from Space Life Sciences to Human Health and Performance to better reflect our vision and mission. The most significant change in the directorate from 2007 to the present is the integration of the Human Research Program and Crew Health and Safety activities. Subsequently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate underwent a reorganization to achieve enhanced integration of research and development with operations to better support human spaceflight and International Space Station utilization. These changes also enable a more effective and efficient approach to human system risk mitigation. Since 2007, we have also made significant advances in external collaboration and implementation of new business models within the directorate and the Agency, and through two newly established virtual centers, the NASA Human Health and Performance Center and the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation. Our 2012 Strategy builds upon these successes to address the Agency s increased emphasis on societal relevance and being a leader in research and development and innovative business and communications practices. The 2012 Human Health and Performance Vision is to lead the world in human health and performance innovations for life in space and on Earth. Our mission is to enable optimization of human health and performance throughout all phases of spaceflight. All HHPD functions are ultimately aimed at achieving this mission. Our activities enable mission success, optimizing human health and productivity in space before, during, and after the actual spaceflight experience of our crews, and include support for ground-based functions. Many of our spaceflight innovations also provide solutions for terrestrial challenges, thereby enhancing life on Earth. Our strategic goals are aimed at leading human exploration and ISS utilization, leading human health and performance internationally, excelling in management and advancement of innovations in health and human system integration, and expanding relevance to life on Earth and creating enduring support and enthusiasm for space exploration.
Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
NASA Human Health and Performance Strategy
In May 2007, what was then the Space Life Sciences Directorate, issued the 2007 Space Life Sciences Strategy for Human Space Exploration. In January 2012, leadership and key directorate personnel were once again brought together to assess the current and expected future environment against its 2007 Strategy and the Agency and Johnson Space Center goals and strategies. The result was a refined vision and mission, and revised goals, objectives, and strategies. One of the first changes implemented was to rename the directorate from Space Life Sciences to Human Health and Performance to better reflect our vision and mission. The most significant change in the directorate from 2007 to the present is the integration of the Human Research Program and Crew Health and Safety activities. Subsequently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate underwent a reorganization to achieve enhanced integration of research and development with operations to better support human spaceflight and International Space Station utilization. These changes also enable a more effective and efficient approach to human system risk mitigation. Since 2007, we have also made significant advances in external collaboration and implementation of new business models within the directorate and the Agency, and through two newly established virtual centers, the NASA Human Health and Performance Center and the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation. Our 2012 Strategy builds upon these successes to address the Agency's increased emphasis on societal relevance and being a leader in research and development and innovative business and communications practices. The 2012 Human Health and Performance Vision is to lead the world in human health and performance innovations for life in space and on Earth. Our mission is to enable optimization of human health and performance throughout all phases of spaceflight. All HH&P functions are ultimately aimed at achieving this mission. Our activities enable mission success, optimizing human health and productivity in space before, during, and after the actual spaceflight experience of our crews, and include support for ground-‐ based functions. Many of our spaceflight innovations also provide solutions for terrestrial challenges, thereby enhancing life on Earth. Our strategic goals are aimed at leading human exploration and ISS utilization, leading human health and performance internationally, excelling in management and advancement of innovations in health and human system integration, and expanding relevance to life on Earth and creating enduring support and enthusiasm for space exploration.
Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
Prospects for Future Human Space Flight Missions to Near-Earth Asteroids
The forthcoming Near-Earth Object (NEO) Surveyor space telescope is a foundational asset designed to complete NASA’s congressionally-mandated goal of cataloging ≥90% of NEOs ≥140 meters in size as soon as practical, and discover Earth impactors far in advance. NEO Surveyor is also critical to near-Earth asteroid (NEA) exploration because it will find suitable low-Δv NEAs for robotic and human missions, often on Earth-like orbits with long synodic periods. Such NEAs have usually not been detected until imminent Earth launch opportunities because they were not observable until close to Earth. Discovering them far enough in advance to deploy missions requires a deep-space infrared survey telescope such as NEO Surveyor. In addition to posing hazards and being scientifically important, NEAs contain resources, such as water (OH), that could be utilized off-Earth. They also offer unique opportunities for the most ambitious human voyages ever undertaken. The Apollo program forever changed humanity’s perspective by showing us Earthrise from our Moon through human eyes. Crewed missions to NEAs will forever change our perspective again by showing us Earth as a distant point of light in the heavens as seen from an asteroid by astronauts. Planetary defense endeavors to understand asteroid and comet impact risks and develop mitigation capabilities. NEA exploration is synergistic in multiple ways. NEO Surveyor will discover and help characterize Earth impactors and accessible NEAs. Heavy-lift launch is highly enabling for both human NEA missions and planetary defense. Reconnaissance missions for planetary defense can also characterize NEAs prior to crewed missions. In situ resource utilization (ISRU) systems may be applicable to deflecting or destroying hazardous NEAs. NEA characterization data critically inform planetary defense efforts and indicate NEA types suitable for human exploration or ISRU. In 2010, NASA performed the Near-Earth Object (NEO) Human Space Flight (HSF) Accessible Targets Study (NHATS), creating an automated online system monitoring mission accessibility of NEAs 2 . NHATS database NEAs meet criteria that require less total mission Δv and/or round-trip mission duration than the Martian surface or even Mars orbit. There are currently 4,658 NHATS NEAs, and many rival or exceed lunar orbit/surface accessibility. Thus, NHATS NEAs could be explored by humans prior to attempting a Mars mission. Human missions to NEAs would test human-rated spacecraft systems with less cost and risk than Mars missions. Thus, human missions to NEAs are compelling in their own right while also providing prudent preparation for more demanding Mars missions. Lunar missions can offer similar opportunities, but they differ from NEA missions in important ways. Lunar missions pose less demanding psychological challenges to crew and ground staff. Earth light-time delay for communications is significantly longer during NEA missions. NEA missions are available that require more propulsion system consumables than lunar missions but less than Mars missions. In this paper, we summarize NEA accessibility for human missions, discuss motivations for such missions, survey knowledge about NEAs that informs future human missions, present exemplar mission opportunities to the currently known NHATS NEAs, and describe future work towards enabling human NEA missions.
Near-Earth asteroids↗
Human-Robot Interaction in High Vulnerability Domains
Future NASA missions will require successful integration of the human with highly complex systems. Highly complex systems are likely to involve humans, automation, and some level of robotic assistance. The complex environments will require successful integration of the human with automation, with robots, and with human-automation-robot teams to accomplish mission critical goals. Many challenges exist for the human performing in these types of operational environments with these kinds of systems. Systems must be designed to optimally integrate various levels of inputs and outputs based on the roles and responsibilities of the human, the automation, and the robots; from direct manual control, shared human-robotic control, or no active human control (i.e. human supervisory control). It is assumed that the human will remain involved at some level. Technologies that vary based on contextual demands and on operator characteristics (workload, situation awareness) will be needed when the human integrates into these systems. Predictive models that estimate the impact of the technologies on the system performance and the on the human operator are also needed to meet the challenges associated with such future complex human-automation-robot systems in extreme environments.
workload↗