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At least 163 records · Page 9

Gasbuggy Site Assessment and Risk Evaluation

The Gasbuggy site is in northern New Mexico in the San Juan Basin, Rio Arriba County (Figure 1-1). The Gasbuggy experiment was designed to evaluate the use of a nuclear detonation to enhance natural gas production from the Pictured Cliffs Formation, a tight, gas-bearing sandstone formation. The 29-kiloton-yield nuclear device was placed in a 17.5-inch wellbore at 4,240 feet (ft) below ground surface (bgs), approximately 40 ft below the Pictured Cliffs/Lewis shale contact, in an attempt to force the cavity/chimney formed by the detonation up into the Pictured Cliffs Sandstone. The test was conducted below the southwest quarter of Section 36, Township 29 North, Range 4 West, New Mexico Principal Meridian. The device was detonated on December 10, 1967, creating a 335-ft-high chimney above the detonation point and a cavity 160 ft in diameter. The gas produced from GB-ER (the emplacement and reentry well) during the post-detonation production tests was radioactive and diluted, primarily by carbon dioxide. After 2 years, the energy content of the gas had recovered to 80 percent of the value of gas in conventionally developed wells in the area. There is currently no technology capable of remediating deep underground nuclear detonation cavities and chimneys. Consequently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must continue to manage the Gasbuggy site to ensure that no inadvertent intrusion into the residual contamination occurs. DOE has complete control over the 1/4 section (160 acres) containing the shot cavity, and no drilling is permitted on that property. However, oil and gas leases are on the surrounding land. Therefore, the most likely route of intrusion and potential exposure would be through contaminated natural gas or contaminated water migrating into a producing natural gas well outside the immediate vicinity of ground zero. The purpose of this report is to describe the current site conditions and evaluate the potential health risks posed by the most plausible contaminant exposure scenario, drilling of natural gas wells near the site. The results of this risk evaluation will guide DOE's future surveillance and monitoring activities in the area to ensure that site conditions are adequately protective of human health. This evaluation is not a comprehensive risk assessment for the site; it is intended to provide assurance that DOE's monitoring approach can detect the presence of site-related contamination at levels well below those that would pose an unacceptable risk to human health.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Detection and response to unauthorized access to a communication device

A communication gateway consistent with the present disclosure may detect unauthorized physical or electronic access and implement security actions in response thereto. A communication gateway may provide a communication path to an intelligent electronic device (IED) using an IED communications port configured to communicate with the IED. The communication gateway may include a physical intrusion detection port and a network port. The communication gateway may further include control logic configured to evaluate physical intrusion detection signal. The control logic may be configured to determine that the physical intrusion detection signal is indicative of an attempt to obtain unauthorized access to one of the communication gateway, the IED, and a device in communication with the gateway; and take a security action based upon the determination that the indication is indicative of the attempt to gain unauthorized access.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

241-AY-102 Leak detection pit drain line visual inspection - 15678

In October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS) determined that waste had leaked into the annulus of Tank 241-AY-102. WRPS conducted an extensive review of Tank AY-102 and increased both inspection and monitoring of the tank; however, the precise cause and location of the leak could not be determined. In parallel with the leak in the primary tank, the Tank AY-102 leak detection pit (LDP) was accumulating water through the drain system external to the secondary tank liner. Liquid collecting in the LDP is suspected to be from water intrusion and collects at a rate such that the LDP must be pumped routinely. Following a routine pumping event on June 20, 2013, elevated radiation dose rates were noted on the transfer hose and surface contamination readings were found on the transfer pump when it was removed from the Tank AY-102 LDP. These two field readings suggested that tank waste from a secondary liner breach could be leaking into the LDP. As a result, WRPS initiated a plan to ascertain the integrity of the secondary tank liner including a robotic inspection of the LDP. To perform the robotic visual inspection, a custom robotic crawler with a deployment device was designed, built, and operated by IHI Southwest for WRPS to inspect the 6 in (152 mm) leak detection pit drain line. To ensure success when deployed in the field, the inspection equipment was demonstrated at both the IHI facility in Denver, Colorado, and the Hanford Site using full scale piping mockups. On November 20, 2013 WRPS inspected the 6 in (152 mm) diameter drain line. The deployment device successfully attached to the drain line, and the crawler entered the drain line and traversed to within approximately 7 ft (2.1 m) of the central sump located under the center of the tank before losing traction. Crawler performance was satisfactory, and the quality of the camera image and lighting provided sufficient detail to document the current condition of the visible regions of the pipe. The inspection showed that the majority of the drain line was dry. Two wet areas were observed, a portion of the line nearest the LDP and a portion near the center of the tank. The portion nearest the LDP was under water prior to pumping on November 14, 2013. Although sediment and debris were seen during the inspection, it is believed to be construction debris and corrosion products. No material was found in the inspection that looked like tank waste or the material seen in the Tank AY-102 annulus (i.e., no greenish or yellowish deposits or dark fluids, dried salt deposits, or crystalline material). The contamination levels seen on the crawler were consistent with past values seen on LDP pumping equipment. Sampling and analysis of the recovered residues from the crawlers did not find material consistent with tank waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dust-Tolerant Intelligent Electrical Connection System

Faults in wiring systems are a serious concern for the aerospace and aeronautic (commercial, military, and civilian) industries. Circuit failures and vehicle accidents have occurred and have been attributed to faulty wiring created by open and/or short circuits. Often, such circuit failures occur due to vibration during vehicle launch or operation. Therefore, developing non-intrusive fault-tolerant techniques is necessary to detect circuit faults and automatically route signals through alternate recovery paths while the vehicle or lunar surface systems equipment is in operation. Electrical connector concepts combining dust mitigation strategies and cable diagnostic technologies have significant application for lunar and Martian surface systems, as well as for dusty terrestrial applications. The dust-tolerant intelligent electrical connection system has several novel concepts and unique features. It combines intelligent cable diagnostics (health monitoring) and automatic circuit routing capabilities into a dust-tolerant electrical umbilical. It retrofits a clamshell protective dust cover to an existing connector for reduced gravity operation, and features a universal connector housing with three styles of dust protection: inverted cap, rotating cap, and clamshell. It uses a self-healing membrane as a dust barrier for electrical connectors where required, while also combining lotus leaf technology for applications where a dust-resistant coating providing low surface tension is needed to mitigate Van der Waals forces, thereby disallowing dust particle adhesion to connector surfaces. It also permits using a ruggedized iris mechanism with an embedded electrodynamic dust shield as a dust barrier for electrical connectors where required.

Lewis, Mark↗

Stewardship of very large digital data archives

This paper addresses the problems foreseen by the author in stewarding the very large digital data archives that will accumulate during the mission of the Earth Orbiting Satellite (EOS). It focuses on the function of 'shepherding' archived digital data into an endless future. Stewardship entails a great deal more than storing and protecting the archive. It also includes all aspects of providing meaningful service to the community of users (scientists) who will want to access the data. The complete steward will be required to do the following: (1) provide against loss due to physical phenomena; (2) assure that data is not 'lost' due to storage technology obsolescence; (3) maintain data in a current formatting methodology with the additional requirement of being able to reconstitute the data to its original, as-received format; (4) secure against loss or pollution of data due to accidental, misguided, or willful software intrusion; (5) prevent unauthorized electronic access to the data, including unauthorized placement of data into the archive; (6) index the data in a metadatabase so that all anticipatable queries can be served without searching through the data itself; (7) provide responsive access to the metadatabase; (8) provide appropriately responsive access to the data; (9) incorporate additions and changes to the archive (and to the metadatabase) in a timely way; and (10) deliver only copies of data to clients - retain physical custody of the 'official' data. Items 1 through 4 are discussed in this paper.

Savage, Patric↗

Review of Intrusion Detection Methods and Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

Recent trends in the growth of distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric grid and newfound malware frameworks that target internet of things (IoT) devices is driving an urgent need for more reliable and effective methods for intrusion detection and prevention. Cybersecurity intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are responsible for detecting threats by monitoring and analyzing network data, which can originate either from networking equipment or end-devices. Creating intrusion detection systems for PV/DER networks is a challenging undertaking because of the diversity of the attack types and intermittency and variability in the data. Distinguishing malicious events from other sources of anomalies or system faults is particularly difficult. New approaches are needed that not only sense anomalies in the power system but also determine causational factors for the detected events. In this report, a range of IDS approaches were summarized along with their pros and cons. Using the review of IDS approaches and subsequent gap analysis for application to DER systems, a preliminary hybrid IDS approach to protect PV/DER communications is formed in the conclusion of this report to inform ongoing and future research regarding the cybersecurity and resilience enhancement of DER systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Performance Assessment Results for the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility - 19134

In 2014, the US DOE Office of River Protection and its contractors began to develop a performance assessment for the near-surface disposal of low-level and mixed low-level waste at the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility. The Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility is a doubly-lined landfill that was constructed between 2004 and 2006 to be the disposal facility for the vitrified low-activity waste containers that will be produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The disposal facility is also expected to receive solid secondary waste produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant and other solid wastes from site activities. The constructed facility is awaiting authorization to receive waste. Although no waste destined for the facility is currently being generated, operations cannot begin until the facility has received a Disposal Authorization Statement from US DOE and a permit modification from the State of Washington Department of Ecology. Both the Disposal Authorization Statement and permit modification require a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for the next 1,000 to 10,000 years. Based on the analyses presented in the Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment, US DOE issued a conditional Disposal Authorization Statement for the facility in June 2018. Demonstrating the long-term performance of the facility to be protective of human health and the environment was evaluated under the requirements of US DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Computer simulations were performed to evaluate whether or not the disposal facility would comply with the performance objectives specified in the order. The evaluation was performed using numerical models to simulate source term releases from vitrified and cement-based waste forms. Source term releases were subsequently transported through an air pathway and a groundwater pathway to a point of compliance 100 meters from the disposed of waste. In addition, an analysis evaluating the consequences of an inadvertent intrusion into the waste was also performed. In accordance with US DoE's technical standard for performance assessments, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate that the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility, together with the engineered features of the waste forms and natural features of the selected site, provides a reasonable expectation that the low-level waste and mixed low-level waste disposal will meet the radiological performance objectives established by US DOE. Post-closure doses to future members of the public were evaluated after the time of closure and included a 100-year period of institutional controls that limited exposure immediately following closure of the facility. Calculated doses to a future member of the public from the air pathway were below the 100 μSv/yr dose performance objective. Calculated doses to a future member of the public from all exposure pathways, including the air pathway and the groundwater pathway, were below the 250 μSv/yr dose performance objective. Doses following an inadvertent intrusion into the facility after the institutional control period were below the 5 mSv acute dose performance measure and the 1 mSv/yr chronic dose performance measure. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review: Safe and sustainable groundwater supply in China

Exploitation of groundwater has greatly increased since the 1970s to meet the increased water demand due to fast economic development in China. Correspondingly, the regional groundwater level has declined substantially in many areas of China. Water sources are scarce in northern and northwestern China, and the anthropogenic pollution of groundwater has worsened the situation. Groundwater containing high concentrations of geogenic arsenic, fluoride, iodine, and salinity is widely distributed across China, which has negatively affected safe supply of water for drinking and other purposes. In addition to anthropogenic contamination, the interactions between surface water and groundwater, including seawater intrusion, have caused deterioration of groundwater quality. The ecosystem and geo-environment have been severely affected by the depletion of groundwater resources. Land subsidence due to excessive groundwater withdrawal has been observed in more than 50 cities in China, with a maximum accumulated subsidence of 2–3 m. Groundwater-dependent ecosystems are being degraded due to changes in the water table or poor groundwater quality. This paper reviews these changes in China, which have occurred under the impact of rapid economic development. The effects of economic growth on groundwater systems should be monitored, understood and predicted to better protect and manage groundwater resources for the future.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Update to the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20124

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)

The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗

National‐Scale Assessment of Total Gaseous Mercury Isotopes Across the United States

Abstract With the 2011 promulgation of the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the successful negotiation by the United Nations Environment Program of the Minamata Convention, emissions of mercury (Hg) have declined in the United States. While the declines in atmospheric Hg concentrations in North America are encouraging, linking the declines to changing domestic and global source portfolios remains challenging. To address these research gaps, the U.S. Geological Survey initiated the first national‐scale effort to establish a baseline of total gaseous mercury stable isotope values at 31 sites distributed across the United States. Results indicated that unique Hg sources, such as Hg evasion from an elemental Hg contaminated site or free tropospheric intrusions in high altitude sites, were distinguishable from background atmospheric values. Minor gradients were observed across the nation, with regions of heavy industrial activity demonstrating lower δ 202 Hg, but no consistent changes in other isotopes such as Δ 199 Hg and Δ 200 Hg were observed. Furthermore, δ 202 Hg was impacted by foliar uptake and senescence but trends varied between forested regions in the northeastern and midwestern United States. These data demonstrate regional emission sources and other environmental variables can impact total gaseous Hg (TGM) isotope values, highlighting the need to characterize atmospheric Hg isotopes over larger geographical areas to evaluate changes related to national and international Hg regulations.

Tate, Michael T.↗

Inertial Centrifugal-Based Pre-filter for Spacecraft Life Support Systems

The intrusion of planetary dust inside space vehicles on future Lunar missions may lead to performance compromises of the cabin air-filtration system. The evasive character of the fine planetary dust, in particular lunar dust, could enable the dust to make its way through the seals and barriers of the EVA hatches and become airborne in the cabin. This can result in performance and capacity overload of the high efficiency filter media and particle separation systems. Adequate pre-filtration can substantially reduce the load on the higher efficiency components leading to smaller dust loads during surge and nominal dust loading conditions, thereby protecting and extending the life of these components. A particle separation concept, based on centrifugal separation, is being investigated for its application as a pre-filter. The concept has previously been proposed for application in the aircraft engine industry, as means of capturing corrosive dust and salt deposits that may harm the engine. The technique has the advantages of being passive, integrable to HVAC and space vehicle architecture, and has the potential for high degree of particle separation with proper fluid dynamic design. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and particle tracing modeling were used to arrive at an initial design for rapid prototyping and testing. If feasible, the concept can be integrated to the Scroll Filter System which is being developed by NASA to address the filtration demands on long during spaceflight and surface missions. This paper will describe the modeling results of this concept.

Life Support Systems↗

Inertial Centrifugal-Based Pre-filter for Spacecraft Life Support Systems

The intrusion of planetary dust inside space vehicles on future Lunar missions may lead to performance compromises of the cabin air-filtration system. The evasive character of the fine planetary dust, in particular lunar dust, could enable the dust to make its way through the seals and barriers of the EVA hatches and become airborne in the cabin. This can result in performance and capacity overload of the high efficiency filter media and particle separation systems. Adequate pre-filtration can substantially reduce the load on the higher efficiency components leading to smaller dust loads during surge and nominal dust loading conditions, thereby protecting and extending the life of these components. A particle separation concept, based on centrifugal separation, is being investigated for its application as a pre-filter. The concept has previously been proposed for application in the aircraft engine industry, as means of capturing corrosive dust and salt deposits that may harm the engine. The technique has the advantages of being passive, integrable to HVAC and space vehicle architecture, and has the potential for high degree of particle separation with proper fluid dynamic design. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and particle tracing modeling were used to arrive at an initial design for rapid prototyping and testing. If feasible, the concept can be integrated to the Scroll Filter System which is being developed by NASA to address the filtration demands on long during spaceflight and surface missions. This paper will describe the modeling results of this concept.

Life Support Systems↗

2018 Technology Innovation Program Heartbeat

Heartbeat responds to this problem by focusing instead on the physical behavior of the device being protected, under the hypothesis that malware infection will produce a measurable change in the power consumption state of a device that can be picked up by an outside detector. All code execution uses power, so the execution of malware—especially polymorphic variants—will leave a trace on a power consumption record. The Heartbeat system collects power trace measurements directly from the hardware and so is invisible to malware and resilient to internet service interruption. By collecting power measurement data only during the periodic invocation of a single or of several system functions, Heartbeat will address several challenges that plague current anomaly-based intrusion detection systems and is operational-context agnostic.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

High Solids Performance Testing in a Scaled TSCR System

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) project is a technology demonstration that will pretreat Hanford tank waste supernatant in support of the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) mission. The TSCR system employs two key separation technologies: dead-end filtration (DEF) and ion exchange (IX) using crystalline silicotitanate (CST) media. DEF will be used to remove undissolved solids from tank waste to protect the functionality of the IX columns and the IX system will remove Cs-137 from tank waste. The separation technologies (DEF and IX) used in TSCR are technically mature and have also been successfully deployed at the Savannah River site in a similar facility known as the Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) system. While testing with simulants and real waste has been successfully performed under conditions expected during the initial operation of TSCR, test data is absent for assessing off normal high solids loading that may be in the TSCR waste feed. Normal TSCR treatment operations are expected to handle wastes with solids content on the order of 200 ppm, and off normal solids loading could be much larger than the nominal level. The testing program described in this report was conducted to understand the consequence of operating the TSCR system at elevated solids loadings up to the high-solids limit of 15,000 ppm [i.e., 1.5-wt%] identified in the TSCR design basis. Although the system is not required to make throughput above the nominal solids loading, the testing was intended to provide important information related to potential off normal operations. At off normal levels near the high-solids limit, there are potential implications for TSCR performance in the areas of throughput, DEF pressure drop, filter backflush frequency, and IX column pressure drop. In addition, intrusion of solids into the IX column was postulated to impact the Cs-137 loading behavior by promoting channeling or flow maldistribution in the column; since the magnitude of the postulated effect was unknown, assessing it was also of interest. The testing was performed using representative waste simulants and a prototypic, integrated TSCR system designed and assembled specifically to conduct the high solids performance assessment. Overall, the scaled TSCR testing demonstrated that full-scale unit operations can succeed in fulfilling their processing objectives in the presence of solids up to 3,000 ppm, but there are potential performance challenges to filtration operations at solids loadings as low as ~500 ppm. The severity of the challenge is likely to be dependent on the type and size distribution of solids, of which the current testing only examined a single type and size distribution. To provide some flexibility for future full-scale operations, the results of the testing suggest two possible risk reduction strategies that can be implemented without any changes in TSCR design or configuration. One option would be to enact an administrative limit on the solids loading to protect TSCR from feeds that are likely to require a high DEF swap frequency. Another option is to permit operation of the DEFs at differential pressures greater than 2 psid before swapping filters. The selection of a higher differential pressure target is not anticipated to adversely impact DEF backflushing efficacy and would reduce both swap frequency and the amount of waste sent to AP-108.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CPS Testbed Architectures for WAMPAC using Industrial Substation and Control Center Platforms and Attack-Defense Evaluation

Advanced persistent threats and cyberattacks can impact wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) system operation. Many cyber-physical system (CPS) testbeds have been developed for attack-defense experimentation and attack-resiliency tools evaluation for WAMPAC, but they are limited to a simulation-and-emulation based environment. This paper presents a quasi-realistic CPS attack-defense testbed-based framework for WAMPAC applications using the industrial substation and control center platforms such as eTerra integrated with the hardware-in-the-loop CPS smart grid testbed available at Iowa State University. The proposed framework includes various combinations of industry-grade substation and control center platforms, communication topologies, real-time digital simulators, and a novel cyber-physical distributed intrusion-and-anomaly detection system (D-IADS) for WAMPAC applications. The D-IADS includes a master at the control center and geographically distributed sensor devices at each substation. Each D-IADS sensor deployed at a substation or control center network monitors ingress and egress traffic, detect intrusions, and dispatch alerts to the D-IADS master. The D-IADS master centrally monitors and analyze the alerts and controls D-IADS sensors. We considered an EMP60 synthetic CPS grid as a case study to demonstrate the framework and proposed D-IADS for WAMPAC applications against cyberattack vectors such as Man-in-the-Middle DNP3 attack, denial-of-service, and data-integrity attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗