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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1983

Biomedical results of the Space Shuttle orbital flight test program

On July 4, 1982, the Space Shuttle Columbia landed at Edwards Air Force Base, CA, thus successfully completing the fourth and last in a series of Orbital Flight Tests (OFT) of the Space Transportation System (STS). The primary goal of medical operations support for the OFT was to assure the health and well-being of flight personnel during all phases of the mission. To this end, crew health status was evaluated preflight, inflight, and postflight. Biomedical flight test requirements were completed in the following areas: physiological adaptation to microgravity, cabin acoustical noise, cabin atmospheric evaluation, radiation dosimetry, crew exercise equipment evaluation, and a cardiovascular deconditioning countermeasure assessment.

Pool, S. L.↗
NASA NTRS1984

NASA's approach to flight confidence

NASA's confidence in the flight readiness of aerospace hardware and software is achieved by a thorough integration of safety activities into every program facet, from concept through the mission. This involves technical and administrative personnel, organizations that specify requirements, design, manufacturing, test and the operators. Reviews by inhouse and external specialists form an integral part of the assurance process. Examples of safety issues and their resolution for some power and propulsion functions are given (lithium cells, autoignition/fretting in high pressure oxygen environments, ignition sources from auxiliary power unit, and low thrust rocket engines). Finally, some comments on NASA's integrated safety activities and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's role in the NASA review and assessment process all of which provides added confidence in achieving a high level of mission safety and success.

Roth, G. L.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗
NASA NTRS1984

The First Spacelab Mission

The role of the mission manager in coordinating the payload with the space transportation system is studied. The establishment of the investigators working group to assist in achieving the mission objectives is examined. Analysis of the scientific requirements to assure compatibility with available resources, and analysis of the payload in order to define orbital flight requirements are described. The training of payload specialists, launch site integration, and defining the requirements for the operation of the integrated payload and the payload operations control center are functions of the mission manager. The experiences gained from the management of the Spacelab One Mission, which can be implemented in future missions, are discussed. Examples of material processing, earth observations, and life sciences advances from the First Spacelab Mission are presented.

Craft, H.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Qualification of Engineering Camera for Long-Duration Deep Space Missions

Qualification and verification of advanced electronic packaging and interconnect technologies, and various other types of hardware elements for the Mars Exploration Rover s Spirit and Opportunity (MER)/Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) flight projects, has been performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware (engineering camera) under extreme cold temperatures has been performed with reference to various Mars-related project requirements. The flight-like packages, sensors, and subassemblies have been selected for the study to survive three times the total number of expected diurnal temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware, including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations, and mission phases. Qualification has been performed by subjecting above flight-like hardware to the environmental temperature extremes, and assessing any structural failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Engineering camera packaging designs, charge-coupled devices (CCDs), and temperature sensors were successfully qualified for MER and MSL per JPL design principles. Package failures were observed during qualification processes and the package redesigns were then made to enhance the reliability and subsequent mission assurance. These results show the technology certainly is promising for MSL, and especially for longterm extreme temperature missions to the extreme temperature conditions. The engineering camera has been completely qualified for the MSL project, with the proven ability to survive on Mars for 2010 sols, or 670 sols times three. Finally, the camera continued to be functional, even after 2010 thermal cycles.

Ramesham, Rajeshuni↗
NASA NTRS1996

Integrating International Space Station payload operations

The payload operations support for the International Space Station (ISS) payload is reported on, describing payload activity planning, payload operations control, payload data management and overall operations integration. The operations concept employed is based on the distribution of the payload operations responsibility between the researchers and ISS partners. The long duration nature of the ISS mission dictates the geographical distribution of the payload operations activities between the different national centers. The coordination and integration of these operations will be assured by NASA's Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC). The prime objective of the POIC is the achievement of unified operations through communication and collaboration.

Noneman, Steven R.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Radiation Hardness Assurance for Space Systems

The space radiation environment can lead to extremely harsh operating conditions for on-board electronic box and systems. The characteristics of the radiation environment are highly dependent on the type of mission (date, duration and orbit). Radiation accelerates the aging of the electronic parts and material and can lead to a degradation of electrical performance; it can also create transient phenomena on parts. Such damage at the part level can induce damage or functional failure at electronic box, subsystem, and system levels. A rigorous methodology is needed to ensure that the radiation environment does not compromise the functionality and performance of the electronics during the system life. This methodology is called hardness assurance. It consists of those activities undertaken to ensure that the electronic piece parts placed in the space system perform to their design specifications after exposure to the space environment. It deals with system requirements, environmental definitions, part selection, part testing, shielding and radiation tolerant design. All these elements should play together in order to produce a system tolerant to.the radiation environment. An overview of the different steps of a space system hardness assurance program is given in section 2. In order to define the mission radiation specifications and compare these requirements to radiation test data, a detailed knowledge of the space environment and the corresponding electronic device failure mechanisms is required. The presentation by J. Mazur deals with the Earth space radiation environment as well as the internal environment of a spacecraft. The presentation by J. Schwank deals with ionization effects, and the presentation by T. Weatherford deals with Single particle Event Phenomena (SEP) in semiconductor devices and microcircuits. These three presentations provide more detailed background to complement the sections 3 and 4. Part selection and categorization are discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents the organization of the hardness assurance within a project. Section 7 discusses emerging radiation hardness assurance issues.

Poivey, Christian↗
NASA NTRS1993

Kennedy Space Center processing of Shuttle small payloads

There are many steps involved in preparing a payload for a mission into space on the Space Shuttle. Operations at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are the last of those steps for the hardware before the payload is launched. To assure a successful and efficient KSC processing flow, a great deal of planning between the Robert H. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and KSC personnel is required before the payload arrives at KSC. After arrival, pre-flight operations occur between payload personnel, GSFC personnel, and KSC personnel for integration of the payload into its carrier (if required), in preparation for installation into a Orbiter. Once installed into an Orbiter, final test(s), checkout, and close-out of the payload is performed by GSFC and KSC personnel before launch. Mission support varies depending on the payload flying, but once the mission is complete and the Orbiter has returned to KSC, post-flight operations begin. This usually involves a reverse flow of the pre-flight operations. KSC operations conclude when the payload, its ground support equipment (GSE), and personnel depart KSC. A list of lessons learned is generated at the end of each payload flow, to avoid repeating the same mistakes (if any) for the next payload or for multiple repeat flights of the same payload. Always monitored are planned changes that may affect the payloads, GSE, KSC facilities, payload personnel, GSFC personnel, and/or KSC personnel.

Haddad, Michael E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Safety, Reliability, and Mission Assurance Digital Future

The evolution from “document-centric” to “data-centric” and “model-centric” information leveraging structured data and model-based approaches is at the heart of digital engineering transformational efforts underway across industry and government. It is these approaches that pave the way for data lakes, Authoritative Sources of Truth (ASOTs), and systems- of-systems interoperability and the corresponding transformational benefits thereof. Such benefits include increased data availability, data access equity, data traceability, real-time analytics, batch analytics, and (most importantly) acceleration of the time-to-value and time-to-insights associated with engineering products and analyses. The longer-term benefits of reusability, customization and traceability are even more promising. For Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA), and Mission Success (SMS) activities; realization of such benefits is essential to provide engineers and analysts alike vital information when needed to support critical decision making throughout the entire life cycle. The SMA community often operate in parallel with engineering activities, for which information exchange with relevant context is paramount. Far too often, such information lags key decision points and/or is absent of the robust, integrated, knowledge needed, given inherent barriers associated with traditional document-centric means to data sharing, analysis, and reporting. This paper provides an overview of how NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is evolving its policies, standards, guidance, and training to transform to eliminate such barriers, thus realizing the benefits emerging in this new digital era. A roadmap for achieving this digital future is presented along with key building blocks involving use and implementation of concepts such as: Objectives-Hierarchies, Objective-Driven Requirements, Accepted Standards, Safety and Assurance Cases, data digitization (i.e., ontologies, structured data, and model-centric data), FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, & Reusable) and/or FAIRUST (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Reusable, Understandable, Secure, and Trusted) principles [1]. This paper also describes how OSMA, leveraging the Agency’s overall commitment to Digital Transformation (DT), is using the power of Policy, “Digital” Domain representation, Product Evolution, and Community Outreach and Engagement as part of a strategic vision and roadmap to evolve and transform its SMA organizations to become better able to serve its stakeholders and customers. Future publications will elaborate on these building blocks and deeper concepts.

Authoritative Source of Truth (ASOT),↗
NASA NTRS1971

Saturn 5 launch vehicle flight evaluation report-AS-509 Apollo 14 mission

A postflight analysis of the Apollo 14 flight is presented. The basic objective of the flight evaluation is to acquire, reduce, analyze, and report on flight data to the extent required to assure future mission success and vehicle reliability. Actual flight failures are identified, their causes are determined and corrective actions are recommended. Summaries of launch operations and spacecraft performance are included. The significant events for all phases of the flight are analyzed.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

From BERTopic to SysML: Informing Model-Based Failure Analysis With Natural Language Processing for Complex Aerospace Systems

The development of emerging complex aerospace systems will require new approaches for capturing safety incident scenarios as early as possible in the design phase. However, for novel systems, relevant data available is limited. In this work, we propose a framework informing model-based mission assurance activities with historical incident reports, lessons learned, or other relevant engineering documents using natural language processing. In doing so, we investigate whether there is useful information in data sets that are relevant, if not identical, to the system under design and whether, through rigorous systems engineering practice, this information can be effectively leveraged through model-based failure analysis. In a worked case study, we apply state-of-the-art topic modeling techniques to two data sets, a mission relevant data set and a system relevant data set. The sets of topics are merged and interpreted to form a preliminary list of failure topics that can be used to inform the identification of off-nominal modes in the model-based failure modes and effects analysis development. Once data from the system in operation is available, it can be used to update the topics identified. By extracting information about likely failures from relevant historical data sets and utilizing model-based mission assurance to ensure relevance and rigor, unanticipated failures can be reduced, and projects can more effectively learn from past missions.

Failure Analysis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

From BERTopic to SysML: Informing Model-Based Failure Analysis With Natural Language Processing for Complex Aerospace Systems

The development of emerging complex aerospace systems will require new approaches for capturing safety incident scenarios as early as possible in the design phase. However, for novel systems, relevant data available is limited. In this work, we propose a framework informing model-based mission assurance activities with historical incident reports, lessons learned, or other relevant engineering documents using natural language processing. In doing so, we investigate whether there is useful information in data sets that are relevant, if not identical, to the system under design and whether, through rigorous systems engineering practice, this information can be effectively leveraged through model-based failure analysis. In a worked case study, we apply state-of-the-art topic modeling techniques to two data sets, a mission relevant data set and a system relevant data set. The sets of topics are merged and interpreted to form a preliminary list of failure topics that can be used to inform the identification of off-nominal modes in the model-based failure modes and effects analysis development. Once data from the system in operation is available, it can be used to update the topics identified. By extracting information about likely failures from relevant historical data sets and utilizing model-based mission assurance to ensure relevance and rigor, unanticipated failures can be reduced, and projects can more effectively learn from past missions.

Failure Analysis↗
NASA NTRS2022

Assurance Equations: A Cost and Criticality Model for Optimizing Quality Assurance Surveillance

The cost of quality vs cost of failure correction has been a long-running topic of discussion within the Aerospace community. It leads directly to concepts of “risk tolerance”, and risk-based decision-making. It would be valuable if there was a way to compute the optimal investment in customer-executed quality assurance activities using defect significance with respect to performance objectives, the activities’ defect detection effectiveness, and the cost-penalty for late discovery of impactful defects. This optimization is particularly of interest to projects whose budget constraints significantly limit their risk management options.The cost to fix defects (i.e., failure correction) escalates as the project matures. There have been studies attempting to determine the relative cost of fixing defects discovered during various phases of a project life cycle with important implications, all of which suggest growth factors are large. The commonly referred to 1:10:100 rule represents a cost multiplier for repair/rework across the Design to Fab to Test hardware development phases. Cost premiums for QA activities also accumulate when they are treated as mandatory (due to schedule drag) or are performed later than their assigned phase.This paper describes the modeling of development phase -dependencies in the conduct of typical customer-executed quality assurance activities. Our initial modeling encompasses:• Distinct phases of the production lifecycle• Multiple kinds of Defects, each with some a-priori likelihood of being present• Each defect’s impact on performance Objectives for a type of hardware• The cost and efficacy of assurance techniques at detecting such Defects• The costs of fixing those Defects detected in a given phase of the production lifecycleThe model captures assurance activities’ abilities to Detect defects. Upon detection it is assumed that the Defect is immediately fixed. Defects that “escape” detection by some activity may thereafter be detected by a later activity, but by then the cost of fixing the Defect may have escalated. Defects are related to the performance Objectives they would detract from, were those Defects to remain present in the operating system.We have constructed and are exploring, a model that relates the importance of hardware system elements to mission objectives, the impact of types of Defects on those hardware types, the cost of customer-executed assurance activities (i.e., supplier controls) and their effectiveness towards reducing an impactful quality escape, and the cost of Defect correction across production phase. We describe the approach taken to select the key model aspects, why they are relevant to our NASA mission, and our efforts to populate it with relevant and contemporary data. We use a notional example to illustrate model design and function.

Plante, Jeannette↗
NASA NTRS1971

Saturn 5 Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report, AS-510, Apollo 15 Mission

A postflight analysis of the Apollo 15 flight is presented. The performance of the launch vehicle, spacecraft, and lunar roving vehicle are discussed. The objective of the evaluation is to acquire, reduce, analyze, and report on flight data to the extent required to assure future mission success and vehicle reliability. Actual flight problems are identified, their causes are determined, and recommendations are made for corrective actions. Summaries of launch operations and spacecraft performance are included. Significant events for all phases of the flight are tabulated.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1973

Saturn 5 Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report-AS-512 Apollo 17 Mission

An evaluation of the launch vehicle and lunar roving vehicle performance for the Apollo 17 flight is presented. The objective of the evaluation is to acquire, reduce, analyze, and report on flight data to the extent required to assure future mission success and vehicle reliability. Actual flight problems are identified, their causes are determined, and recommendations are made for corrective action. Summaries of launch operations and spacecraft performance are included. The significant events for all phases of the flight are analyzed.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2008

Analysis of Proposed 2007-2008 Revisions to the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for United States Space Launches

Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches under the jurisdiction of the United States are generally subject to a set of rules called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) (Krider etal., 1999; Krider etal., 2006). The LLCC protect both the vehicle and the public by assuring that the launch does not take place in conditions posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the mission while releasing both toxic materials and debris. To assure safety, the LLCC are conservative and sometimes they may seriously limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as scheduled even when conditions are benign. In order to safely reduce the number of launch scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM II) program was undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed to collecting detailed high-quality data on the electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. Details may be found in Dye et al., 2007. The expectation was that this additional knowledge would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC and allow them to be revised to be less restrictive while remaining at least as safe. That expectation was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the LLCC in 2003 and 2005. The 2005 revisions included the application of a new radar-derived quantity called the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight through anvil clouds. VAHIRR is the product of the volume averaged radar reflectivity times the radardetermined cloud thickness. The reflectivity average extends horizontally 5 km west, east, south and north of a point along the flight track and vertically from the 0 C isotherm to the top of the radar cloud. This region is defined as the "Specified Volume". See Dye et al., 2006 and Merceret et al., 2006 for a more thorough description of VAHIRR. The units are dBZ km (not dBZ per kilometer) and the threshold is 10 dBZ km. It is safe to fly through an anvil cloud for which VAHIRR is below this threshold everywhere along the flight track as long as (1) the entire cloud within 5 nmi. (9.26 km) of the flight track is colder than 0 C, (2) the points at which VAHIRR must be evaluated are at least 20 km from any active convective cores and recent lightning, and (3) the radar return is not being attenuated within the Specified Volume around those points.

Dye, James E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Analysis of Proposed 2007-2008 Revisions to the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for United States Space Launches

Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches under the jurisdiction of the United States are generally subject to a set of rules called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC). The LLCC protect both the vehicle and the public by assuring that the launch does not take place in conditions posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the mission while releasing both toxic materials and debris. To assure safety, the LLCC are conservative and sometimes they may seriously limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as scheduled even when conditions are benign. In order to safely reduce the number of launch scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM) program was undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed to collecting detailed high-quality data on the electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. The expectation was that this additional knowledge would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC and allow them to be revised to be both safer and less restrictive. That expectation was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the LLCC in 2003 and 2005. The 2005 revisions included the application of a new radar-derived quantity called the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight through anvil clouds. Analysis of the ABFM data has continued, and two additional revisions to the LLCC were proposed in late 2006 for adoption in 2007 or 2008. One proposal was to apply the VAHIRR concept to debris clouds, and the other was to reduce the "stand-off distances" in the rules for anvil and/or debris clouds. The stand-off distance is the clearance (out side of the cloud) required between the flight path of the vehicle and the edge of a cloud that it is not permissible to fly through. This paper will discuss these proposed changes in the LLCC and the scientific rationale for adopting or rejecting them based on ABFM data.

Dye, J. E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

3D Stereo Immersive Environment Utilizing Mobile Devices / Peripherals

This project expands upon some of the FY23 IRAD funded "Full Lunar Surface Simulation Platform" (FLS-SP) derived technologies. The results have demonstrated a low-cost, compact, immersive technology that supports training, interaction, mission planning, and other man-in-loop activities in simulated environments called “3D Stereo Immersion Environment Utilizing Mobile Devices” (3D SIEUMD). These activities will become crucial for safety and mission, planning, and assurance in the Artemis program, as well as future commercial crew programs. The FLS-SP enabled the visualization of simulated lunar surface operations for rovers, landers, habitation, and EVA. The 3D SIEUMD technology allows for NASA S&MA experts, tasked with defining safety protocols and procedures, to interact in an immersive environment without expensive immersion gear. Reduction of the overall safety risk by immersing safety concepts into the design and engineering phase for very small cost is accomplished even before hardware is deployed to the lunar surface.

Scott Johnson↗