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NASA NTRS2008

Human Factors in Training

Future space missions will be significantly longer than current Shuttle missions and new systems will be more complex than current systems. Increasing communication delays between crews and Earth-based support means that astronauts need to be prepared to handle the unexpected on their own. As crews become more autonomous, their potential span of control and required expertise must grow to match their autonomy. It is not possible to train for every eventuality ahead of time on the ground, or to maintain trained skills across long intervals of disuse. To adequately prepare NASA personnel for these challenges, new training approaches, methodologies, and tools are required. This research project aims at developing these training capabilities. Training efforts in FY07 strongly focused on crew medical training, but also began exploring how Space Flight Resource Management training for Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Controllers could be integrated with systems training for optimal Mission Control Center operations. Beginning in January 2008, the training research effort will include team training prototypes and tools. The Training Task addresses Program risks that lie at the intersection of the following three risks identified by the Project: 1) Risk associated with poor task design; 2) Risk of error due to inadequate information; 3) Risk associated with reduced safety and efficiency due to poor human factors design.

Barshi, Immanuel↗
NASA NTRS2009

Spaceflight Human System Standards

NASA created a new approach for human system integration and human performance standards. NASA created two documents a standard and a reference handbook. The standard is titled NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard (SFHSS) and consists of two-volumes: Volume 1- Crew Health This volume covers standards needed to support astronaut health (medical care, nutrition, sleep, exercise, etc.) Volume 2 Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health This volume covers the standards for system design that will maintain astronaut performance (ie., environmental factors, design of facilities, layout of workstations, and lighting requirements). It includes classic human factors requirements. The new standards document is written in terms so that it is applicable to a broad range of present and future NASA systems. The document states that all new programs prepare system-specific requirements that will meet the general standards. For example, the new standard does not specify a design should accommodate specific percentiles of a defined population. Rather, NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2 states that all programs shall prepare program-specific requirements that define the user population and their size ranges. The design shall then accommodate the full size range of those users. The companion reference handbook, Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH), was developed to capture the design consideration information from NASA-STD-3000, and adds spaceflight lessons learned, gaps in knowledge, example solutions, and suggests research to further mature specific disciplines. The HIDH serves two major purposes: HIDH is the reference document for writing human factors requirements for specific systems. HIDH contains design guidance information that helps insure that designers create systems which safely and effectively accommodate the capabilities and limitations of space flight crews.

Holubec, Keith↗
NASA NTRS1996

Considerations in miniaturizing simplified agro-ecosystems for advanced life support

Miniaturizing the Earth's biogeochemical cycles to support human life during future space missions is the goal of the NASA research and engineering program in advanced life support. Mission requirements to reduce mass, volume, and power have focused efforts on (1) a maximally simplified agro-ecosystem of humans, food crops, and microbes; and, (2) a design for optimized productivity of food crops with high light levels over long days, with hydroponics, with elevated carbon dioxide and other controlled environmental factors, as well as with genetic selection for desirable crop properties. Mathematical modeling contributes to the goals by establishing trade-offs, by analyzing the growth and development of experimental crops, and by pointing to the possibilities of directed phasic control using modified field crop models to increase the harvest index.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS2015

The Human Factors of an Early Space Accident: Flight 3-65 of the X-15

The X-15 was a critical research vehicle in the early days of space flight. On November 15, 1967, the X-15-3 suffered an in-flight breakup. This 191st flight of the X-15 and the 65th flight of this third configuration was the only fatal accident of the X-15 program. This paper presents an analysis, from a human factors perspective, of the events that led up to the accident. The analysis is based on the information contained in the report of the Air Force-NASA Accident Investigation Board (AIB) dated January, 1968. The AIBs analysis addressed, primarily, the events that occurred subsequent to the pilots taking direct control of the reaction control system. The analysis described here suggests that all of the events that caused the accident occurred well before the moment when the pilot switched to direct control. Consequently, the analyses and conclusions regarding the causal factors of, and the contributing factors to, the loss of Flight 3-65 presented here differ from those of the AIB based on the same evidence. Although the accident occurred in 1967, the results of the presented analysis are still relevant today. We present our analysis and discuss its implications for the safety of space operations.

accident investigation↗
NASA NTRS2000

Bubbly Suspension Generated in Low Gravity

Bubbly suspensions are crucial for mass and heat transport processes on Earth and in space. These processes are relevant to pharmaceutical, chemical, nuclear, and petroleum industries on Earth. They are also relevant to life support, in situ resource utilization, and propulsion processes for long-duration space missions such as the Human Exploration and Development of Space program. Understanding the behavior of the suspension in low gravity is crucial because of factors such as bubble segregation, which could result in coalescence and affect heat and mass transport. Professors A. Sangani and D. Koch, principal investigators in the Microgravity Fluid Physics Program managed by the NASA Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field, are studying the physics of bubbly suspension. They plan to shear a bubbly suspension in a couette cell in microgravity to study bubble segregation and compare the bubble distribution in the couette gap with the one predicted by the suspension-averaged equations of motion. Prior to the Requirement Definition Review of this flight experiment, a technology for generating a bubbly suspension in microgravity has to be established, tested, and verified.

Nahra, Henry K.↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Human Factors of an Early Space Accident: Flight 3-65 of the X-15

The X-15 was a critical research vehicle in the early days of space flight. On November 15, 1967, the X-15-3 suffered an in-flight breakup. This 191st flight of the X-15 and the 65th flight of this third configuration was the only fatal accident of the X-15 program. This paper presents an analysis, from a human factors perspective, of the events that led up to the accident. The analysis is based on the information contained in the report of the Air Force-NASA Accident Investigation Board (AIB) dated January, 1968. The AIBs analysis addressed, primarily, the events that occurred subsequent to the pilot's taking direct control of the reaction control system. The analysis described here suggests that, rather than events following the pilot's switch to direct control, it was the events preceding the switch that led to the accident. Consequently, the analyses and conclusions regarding the causal factors of, and the contributing factors to, the loss of Flight 3-65 presented here differ from those of the AIB based on the same evidence. Although the accident occurred in 1967, the results of the presented analysis are still relevant today. We present our analysis and discuss its implications for the safety of space operations.

X-15↗
NASA NTRS1992

Biochemical and hematologic changes after short-term space flight

Clinical laboratory data from blood samples obtained from astronauts before and after 28 flights (average duration = 6 days) of the Space Shuttle were analyzed by the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and compared with data from the Skylab flights (duration approximately 28, 59, and 84 days). Angiotensin I and aldosterone were elevated immediately after short-term space flights, but the response of angiotensin I was delayed after Skylab flights. Serum calcium was not elevated after Shuttle flights, but magnesium and uric acid decreased after both Shuttle and Skylab. Creatine phosphokinase in serum was reduced after Shuttle but not Skylab flights, probably because exercises to prevent deconditioning were not performed on the Shuttle. Total cholesterol was unchanged after Shuttle flights, but low density lipoprotein cholesterol increased and high density lipoprotein cholesterol decreased. The concentration of red blood cells was elevated after Shuttle flights and reduced after Skylab flights. Reticulocyte count was decreased after both short- and long-term flights, indicating that a reduction in red blood cell mass is probably more closely related to suppression of red cell production than to an increase in destruction of erythrocytes. Serum ferritin and number of platelets were also elevated after Shuttle flights. In determining the reasons for postflight differences between the shorter and longer flights, it is important to consider not only duration but also countermeasures, differences between spacecraft, and procedures for landing and egress.

NASA Program Flight↗
NASA NTRS2005

Smart Sensors' Role in Integrated System Health Management

During the last decade, there has been a major effort in the aerospace industry to reduce the cost per pond of payload and become competitive in the international market. Competition from Europe, Japan, and China has reduced this cost to almost a third from 1990 to 2000. This cost has leveled in recent years to an average price of around $12,000/pound of payload. One of NASA's goals is to promote the development of technologies to reduce this cost by a factor of 10 or more Exploration of space, specially manned exploration missions, involves very complex launch and flight vehicles, associated ground support systems, and extensive human support during all phases of the mission. When considering the Space Shuttle Program, we can see that vehicle and ground support systems' processing, operation, and maintenance represent a large percentage of the program cost and time. Reducing operating, processing and maintenance costs will greatly reduce the cost of Exploration programs. The Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) concept is one of the technologies that will help reduce these operating, processing and maintenance costs. ISHM is an integrated health monitoring system applicable to both flight and ground systems. It automatically and autonomously acquires information from sensors and actuators and processes that information using the ISHM-embedded knowledge. As a result, it establishes the health of the system based on the acquired information and its prior knowledge. When this concept is fully implemented, ISHM systems shall be able to perform failure prediction and remediation before actual hard failures occurs, preventing its costly consequences. Data sources, sensors, and their associated data acquisition systems, constitute the foundation of the system. A smart sensing architecture is required to support the acquisition of reliable, high quality data, required by the ISHM. A thorough definition of the smart sensor architectures, their embedded diagnostic agents, and communication protocols need to be established and standardized to allow the embedding and exchange of health information among sensors and ISHM. This workshop is aimed to foster the exchange of ideas and lessons learned between government, industry and academia to aid in the establishment of ISHM (and smart sensors) standards and guidelines as well as to identify present technology gaps that will have to be overcome to successfully achieve this goal.

Perotti, Jose M.↗
NASA NTRS2008

A Successful Infusion Process for Enabling Lunar Exploration Technologies

The NASA Vision for Space Exploration begins with a more reliable flight capability to the International Space Station and ends with sending humans to Mars. An important stepping stone on the path to Mars encompasses human missions to the Moon. There is little doubt throughout the stakeholder community that new technologies will be required to enable this Vision. However, there are many factors that influence the ability to successfully infuse any technology including the technical risk, requirement and development schedule maturity, and, funds available. This paper focuses on effective infusion processes that have been used recently for the technologies in development for the lunar exploration flight program, Constellation. Recent successes with Constellation customers are highlighted for the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) Projects managed by NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC). Following an overview of the technical context of both the flight program and the technology capability mapping, the process is described for how to effectively build an integrated technology infusion plan. The process starts with a sound risk development plan and is completed with an integrated project plan, including content, schedule and cost. In reality, the available resources for this development are going to change over time, necessitating some level of iteration in the planning. However, the driving process is based on the initial risk assessment, which changes only when the overall architecture changes, enabling some level of stability in the process.

Over, Ann P.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Human Factors in Training

Future space missions will be significantly longer than current shuttle missions and new systems will be more complex than current systems. Increasing communication delays between crews and Earth-based support means that astronauts need to be prepared to handle the unexpected on their own. As crews become more autonomous, their potential span of control and required expertise must grow to match their autonomy. It is not possible to train for every eventuality ahead of time on the ground, or to maintain trained skills across long intervals of disuse. To adequately prepare NASA personnel for these challenges, new training approaches, methodologies, and tools are required. This research project aims at developing these training capabilities. By researching established training principles, examining future needs, and by using current practices in space flight training as test beds, both in Flight Controller and Crew Medical domains, this research project is mitigating program risks and generating templates and requirements to meet future training needs. Training efforts in Fiscal Year 08 (FY08) strongly focused on crew medical training, but also began exploring how Space Flight Resource Management training for Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Controllers could be integrated with systems training for optimal Mission Control Center (MCC) operations. The Training Task addresses Program risks that lie at the intersection of the following three risks identified by the Project: (1) Risk associated with poor task design (2) Risk of error due to inadequate information (3) Risk associated with reduced safety and efficiency due to poor human factors design

Barshi, Immanuel↗
NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors in Training

Future space missions will be significantly longer than current shuttle missions and new systems will be more complex than current systems. Increasing communication delays between crews and Earth-based support means that astronauts need to be prepared to handle the unexpected on their own. As crews become more autonomous, their potential span of control and required expertise must grow to match their autonomy. It is not possible to train for every eventuality ahead of time on the ground, or to maintain trained skills across long intervals of disuse. To adequately prepare NASA personnel for these challenges, new training approaches, methodologies, and tools are required. This research project aims at developing these training capabilities. By researching established training principles, examining future needs, and by using current practices in space flight training as test beds, both in Flight Controller and Crew Medical domains, this research project is mitigating program risks and generating templates and requirements to meet future training needs. Training efforts in Fiscal Year 09 (FY09) strongly focused on crew medical training, but also began exploring how Space Flight Resource Management training for Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Controllers could be integrated with systems training for optimal Mission Control Center (MCC) operations. The Training Task addresses Program risks that lie at the intersection of the following three risks identified by the Project: 1) Risk associated with poor task design; 2) Risk of error due to inadequate information; and 3) Risk associated with reduced safety and efficiency due to poor human factors design.

Barshi, Immanuel↗
NASA NTRS2003

Regulatory coding of lymphoid lineage choice by hematopoietic transcription factors

During lymphopoiesis, precursor cells negotiate a complex regulatory space, defined by the levels of several competing and cross-regulating transcription factors, before arriving at stable states of commitment to the B-, T- and NK-specific developmental programs. Recent perturbation experiments provide evidence that this space has three major axes, corresponding to the PU.1 versus GATA-1 balance, the intensity of Notch signaling through the CSL pathway, and the ratio of E-box transcription factors to their Id protein antagonists.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS1993

Echocardiograms during six hours of bedrest at head-down and head-up tilt and during space flight

Left ventricular end-diastolic volume increased after 4 1/2 to 6 hours of space flight, but was significantly decreased after 5 to 6 days of space flight. To determine the role of acute gravitational effects in this phenomenon, responses to a 6-hour bedrest model of 0 gravity (G; 5 degrees head-down tilt) were compared with those of fractional gravity loads of 1/6 G, 1/3 G, and 2/3 G by using head-up tilts of 10 degrees, 20 degrees, and 42 degrees, respectively. On 4 different days, six healthy male subjects were tilted at one of the four angles for 6 hours. Cardiac dimensions and volumes were determined from two-dimensional and M-mode echocardiograms in the left lateral decubitus position at control (0), 2, 4, and 6 hours. Stroke volume decreased with time (P < .05) for all tilt angles when compared with control. Ejection fraction (EF) at -5 degrees was greater than at +20 degrees and +42 degrees (not significant); EF at +10 degrees was greater than at +42 degrees (not significant). For the tilt angles of -5 degrees, +10 degrees, and +20 degrees, mean heart rate decreased during the first 2 hours, and returned to control or was slightly elevated above control (+20 degrees) by 6 hours (not significant). At the +42 degrees angle of tilt, heart rate was increased above control at hours 2, 4, and 6. There were no significant differences in cardiac output at any time point for any tilt angle.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS).

Flight Experiment↗
NASA NTRS2005

Uncertainty Considerations for Ballistic Limit Equations

The overall risk for any spacecraft system is typically determined using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A PRA attempts to determine the overall risk associated with a particular mission by factoring in all known risks (and their corresponding uncertainties, if known) to the spacecraft during its mission. The threat to mission and human life posed by the mircro-meteoroid & orbital debris (MMOD) environment is one of the risks. NASA uses the BUMPER II program to provide point estimate predictions of MMOD risk for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. However, BUMPER II does not provide uncertainty bounds or confidence intervals for its predictions. With so many uncertainties believed to be present in the models used within BUMPER II, providing uncertainty bounds with BUMPER II results would appear to be essential to properly evaluating its predictions of MMOD risk. The uncertainties in BUMPER II come primarily from three areas: damage prediction/ballistic limit equations, environment models, and failure criteria definitions. In order to quantify the overall uncertainty bounds on MMOD risk predictions, the uncertainties in these three areas must be identified. In this paper, possible approaches through which uncertainty bounds can be developed for the various damage prediction and ballistic limit equations encoded within the shuttle and station versions of BUMPER II are presented and discussed. We begin the paper with a review of the current approaches used by NASA to perform a PRA for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station, followed by a review of the results of a recent sensitivity analysis performed by NASA using the shuttle version of the BUMPER II code. Following a discussion of the various equations that are encoded in BUMPER II, we propose several possible approaches for establishing uncertainty bounds for the equations within BUMPER II. We conclude with an evaluation of these approaches and present a recommendation regarding which of them would be the most appropriate to follow.

Schonberg, W. P.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Human Factors Lessons Learned on the International Space Station

Experience on International Space Station (ISS) provides many important lessons for future space flight. NASA human factors engineers have been systematically collecting lessons learned from crew debriefs, as well as working with ground support teams to continuously improve crew operations. This paper describes the methods for collecting data from debriefs, lessons learned through that process, and an example of a technology development task funded through the Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) program element in response to an identified operational need. Each ISS increment crew spends many hours after the flight answering questions from the various subsystem leads. The Flight Crew Integration subsystem lead asks questions specific to human factors and habitability issues. In addition, crew comments on many other subsystems provide insight into interface designs, operability and maintainability. The debrief comments are unique to each crew, and must be categorized to provide operational lessons learned. Personal identifiers are removed and comments aggregated to separate consistent issues from personal preferences. Examples will be given, and the procedure for incorporating the lessons into requirements and guidelines for the next human space vehicle will be described. In flight, very few astronauts are medical doctors. Written medical procedures during flight need to be easy to follow and quick to understand. The problem was analyzed as part of a SHFE task. Organization was analyzed and reorganizations were created and tested. Results will be reported. The ISS is a very important analog for planning future long-term missions. Collection of data from debriefs, studying the lessons learned and focusing on requirements for future missions are examples of the accomplishments through the SHFE program.

Woolford, Barbara↗
NASA NTRS2012

Fast Paced, Low Cost Projects at MSFC

What does an orbiting microsatellite, a robotic lander and a ruggedized camera and telescope have in common? They are all fast paced, low cost projects managed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) teamed with successful industry partners. MSFC has long been synonymous with human space flight large propulsion programs, engineering acumen and risk intolerance. However, there is a growing portfolio/product line within MSFC that focuses on these smaller, fast paced projects. While launching anything into space is expensive, using a managed risk posture, holding to schedule and keeping costs low by stopping at egood enough f were key elements to their success. Risk is defined as the possibility of loss or failure per Merriam Webster. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk using procedural requirement 8705.4 and establishes eclasses f to discern the acceptable risk per a project. It states a Class D risk has a medium to significant risk of not achieving mission success. MSFC, along with industry partners, has created a niche in Class D efforts. How did the big, cautious MSFC succeed on these projects that embodied the antithesis of its heritage in human space flight? A key factor toward these successful projects was innovative industry partners such as Dynetics Corporation, University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAHuntsville), Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU APL), Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE), Von Braun Center for Science and Innovation (VCSI), SAIC, and Jacobs. Fast Affordable Satellite Technology (FastSat HSV01) is a low earth orbit microsatellite that houses six instruments with the primary scientific objective of earth observation and technology demonstration. The team was comprised of Dynetics, UAHuntsvile, SAIC, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and VCSI with the United States Air Force Space Test Program as the customer. The team completed design, development, manufacturing, environmental test and integration in one year. FastSat HSV01 also deployed a Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (PPOD) for a separate nano ]satellite class spacecraft (Cubesat: Nano Sail Demonstration) in partnership with Ames Research Center. The Robotic lunar lander is a MSFC JHU APL partnership that led to the development of a flexible architecture for landers to support robotic missions to a wide range of lunar and asteroid destinations. The team started with the goal of meeting NASA agency directives that led to the creation of a test bed focusing on GN&C and software to demonstrate the descent and landing on any airless body for the final 30 to 60 meters. The team created a complex technology demonstration as well as Guidance Control and Navigation (GN&C) algorithms providing autonomous control of the lander. The team uses a green propellant of 90% hydrogen peroxide and has completed 18 successful test flights. The International Space Station (ISS) SERVIR Environmental Research and Visualization System (ISERV) is a technology demonstration payload to assist the SERVIR project with environmental monitoring for disaster relief and humanitarian efforts. The ISERV project was a partnership with TBE. The ISERV payload consists of a commercial off the shelf camera, telescope, and MSFC developed power distribution box and interfaces on ISS with the Window Observational Research Facility in the US Lab. MSFC has identified three key areas that enabled the low cost mission success to include culture, partnering, and cost/schedule control. This paper will briefly discuss these three Class D efforts, FastSat HSV-01, the Robotic Lunar Lander and the ISERV camera system, the lessons learned, their successes and challenges.

Watson-Morgan, Lisa↗
NASA NTRS2017

Minimizing Human Risk: Human Performance Models in the Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element

Human space exploration has never been more exciting than it is today. Human presence to outer worlds is becoming a reality as humans are leveraging much of our prior knowledge to the new mission of going to Mars. Exploring the solar system at greater distances from Earth than ever before will possess some unique challenges, which can be overcome thanks to the advances in modeling and simulation technologies. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is at the forefront of exploring our solar system. NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) focuses on discovering the best methods and technologies that support safe and productive human space travel in the extreme and harsh space environment. HRP uses various methods and approaches to answer questions about the impact of long duration missions on the human in space including: gravitys impact on the human body, isolation and confinement on the human, hostile environments impact on the human, space radiation, and how the distance is likely to impact the human. Predictive models are included in the HRP research portfolio as these models provide valuable insights into human-system operations. This paper will provide an overview of NASA's HRP and will present a number of projects that have used modeling and simulation to provide insights into human-system issues (e.g. automation, habitat design, schedules) in anticipation of space exploration.

human systems integrations↗
NASA NTRS2019

Supporting Crew Autonomy in Deep Space Exploration: Preliminary Onboard Capability Requirements and Proposed Research Questions. Technical Report of the Autonomous Crew Operations Technical Interchange Meeting

Communication delays are a critical challenge posed by long duration deep space exploration. Space missions historically have relied on an ever-present Mission Control Center (MCC) to direct operations in near real-time. As unanticipated anomalies that defeat fault detection and resolution systems do arise, the lack of real-time communication will significantly weaken what the MCC support represents: a reliable safety net for the flight crew through its deep and diverse areas of expertise and investigative resources. As a consequence, future space vehicles and habitats need to be equipped with capabilities to support the flight crew to operate with little or no ground support. Considerations must be given to vehicle and mission designs that will fortify the traditionally ground-centered safety net and forge new support systems, when communication delays exist. In August 2018, NASA’s Human Research Program, through its Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element, convened a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) on Autonomous Crew Operations at NASA Ames Research Center. The goal of the meeting was to gather input from NASA centers, industry, academia, and branches of the Department of Defense (DoD) to address how intelligent technologies can be applied to augment onboard capabilities to support crew anomaly response. The TIM featured 24 presentations by 29 speakers and hosted a total of 59 attendees, including 43 from 5 NASA centers (Ames, Johnson, Langley, Marshall, and Jet Propulsion Lab) and 4 from the DoD (3 from Army Research Lab and 1 from Naval Postgraduate School), with remaining attendees from academia (e.g., UC Davis, CMU) and industry (e.g., IBM, Siemens). Discussions were centered around three themes: standards and guidelines, lessons learned in analog environments, and technologies. To help provide a framework for discussion, a concept matrix describing anomaly response processes was created prior to the TIM (Figure 1, page 6). The matrix captures the steps involved (monitoring and detection, diagnosis, solution development and evaluation, solution implementation and verification, resolution documentation) as well as the resources and capabilities required to support these steps (data, knowledge, analysis, synthesis, resource management). A wallpaper size printout of the matrix was utilized at the TIM to solicit attendee inputs along the three themes; the activity garnered 108 submissions of ideas. Overall, what emerged from TIM discussions was a picture of mismatch between crew anomaly response needs and support that can be provided by existing intelligent technologies. The needs are broad, spanning multiple steps and processes/resources, with many of which lacking support from existing technologies, such as knowledge management throughout the steps of problem solving (especially in resolution documentation) and manpower management. The solutions provided by existing intelligent technologies are specific to the steps/processes that they are designed to support and constrained to solving only problems similar to those that have occurred before. What is lacking from technologies is typically made up by humans, specifically their complex critical thinking, creative problem solving, and domain expertise. In the end, the TIM highlighted the pressing need to support responses to onboard anomalies during autonomous crew operations, particularly those that have eluded the system tests, inspection, and other assurance processes. Such anomalies can potentially threaten crew and vehicle safety, as well as significantly impact overall operations with additional workload. These fairly rare events are difficult to anticipate and prepare for, given the state-of-the-art in intelligent technologies. This is true even for anomalies that stem from “unknown knowns”—cases in which there is sufficient external information to characterize the problem but the overall pattern fails to be recognized by the problem solver, or in which the internal knowledge needed to solve a problem is held tacitly and potentially accessible by the problem solver but not articulated. It follows that the ability to tackle anomalies lies not only with the availability of relevant information and knowledge but also their accessibility in times of need. To that end, we propose research questions along the following three broad themes: • How intelligent technologies can help make relevant knowledge and information available? • How intelligent technologies can help make relevant knowledge and information accessible? • How intelligent technologies can help support the crew operating as a team in anomaly response processes?

autonomous crew operations↗