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The Nature and State of Groundwater Contamination at the Nevada National Security Site: What Have We Learned from Decades of Groundwater Analysis? - 20337

The regulatory framework for remediating radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is based on a combination of characterization and modeling studies, monitoring, and institutional controls [1]. Currently, tritium is the largest contributor (∼90%) to the estimated 44.6 million-curie radionuclide inventory resulting from underground testing [2]. Because of its short half-life (12.32 years), its relative contribution reduces below 10% of the total radiologic inventory over the next 120 years as a result of radioactive decay. Although tritium levels are observed well above the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) in groundwater, other radionuclides are well below their MCLs except within the nuclear test near-field (nuclear test cavity and chimney) environment. In fact, most device-derived radionuclides are below their MCL in groundwater even in samples collected from this near-field environment. The distribution of radionuclides following the nuclear detonation greatly influences the availability of potential contaminants for groundwater transport. Tritium is initially distributed in the gas phase, later as tritiated water in steam, and finally as liquid water, and is available to groundwater transport away from the near-field environment. Other radionuclides that are mobile in groundwater are {sup 14}C, {sup 36}Cl, {sup 99}Tc, and {sup 129}I though their radiologic inventory is small when compared to tritium. Many radionuclides (e.g. U, Pu, Am) are incorporated to a significant extent into the melt glass at the bottom of the cavity and are accessible to groundwater primarily through the slow process of glass dissolution. These radionuclides are also adsorbed to the surfaces of the crushed rock within the cavity and chimney which limits their migration in groundwater. Although colloid facilitated transport of radionuclides at the NNSS has been observed [3], radionuclide concentrations decrease with time and migration distances due to desorption and colloid filtration processes. Current studies indicate that radionuclides associated with colloids are unlikely to migrate downgradient from NNSS underground nuclear tests at concentrations above the SDWA MCL [4][5]. The results of over 50 years of sampling, along with an understanding of these post detonation processes, indicate that tritium is the only contaminant of concern downgradient of testing and that even tritium will not exceed its MCL in groundwater after ∼120 years. Although other longer-lived radionuclides may continue to be released slowly from the near-field environment they will likely never reach levels exceeding their MCLs in groundwater downgradient of the NNSS. Groundwater monitoring will continue to verify these observations. (authors)

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Second Quarter Transportation Report - Fiscal Year 2021 - Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5. This report summarizes the second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2021 and serves as a quarterly report for the following types of shipments: Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW) Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW) Classified Non-Radioactive (CNR) Waste Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous (CNRH) Waste

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Mosquito Distribution and West Nile Virus Surveillance Results on the Nevada National Security Site in South Central Nevada

A 10-year study (2004-2013) was conducted to determine mosquito distribution and the prevalence of West Nile Virus (WNV) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in south central Nevada. Mosquito traps baited with dry ice were set overnight at sites where standing water provided potential breeding sites for mosquitoes. Captured mosquitoes were identified to species and tested for WNV. A total of 556 mosquitoes representing 6 species were captured and identified at 20 sites around the NNSS during 124 surveys. A vast majority (89%) of mosquitoes were Culex tarsalis. None of the mosquitoes tested were positive for WNV although 2 samples, both Culiseta inornata, were suspect for WNV in 2005 and 2006, both from Well 3 Pond. Additionally, 24 birds representing 5 species were opportunistically collected and tested for WNV with no positive results. Results from this study reveal patterns of mosquito distribution across the NNSS and suggest that NNSS workers have a very low risk of being exposed to WNV.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Groundwater Monitoring Report, U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during calendar year (CY) 2019 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12. The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system, shown as Plant North. The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Background information in Section 2 of this report outlines the hydrogeologic framework for groundwater and surface water quality monitoring at Y-12 and includes an overview of the groundwater contamination in each hydrogeologic regime. Section 3 provides details regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP, including sampling locations and frequency, sample collection and handling, field measurements and laboratory analytes, quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling, data management, and data quality assessment (DQA). However, the equivalent QA/QC or DQA information for the groundwater and surface water data associated with the monitoring programs implemented by UCOR are not included in this report and instead are deferred to referenced programmatic plans and reports issued by OREM and UCOR. Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the CY 2019 monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring. The evaluation is based primarily on the analytical results for the following principal groundwater contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, gross alpha activity, gross beta activity, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Section 5 summarizes the most significant findings with respect to the principal contaminants along with recommendations for any proposed changes to the ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP. Technical reports and plans cited in the narrative sections of the report are listed in Section 6. Narrative sections of this report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and data tables (excluding data summary tables incorporated in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Appendix C contains construction details for each well sampled during CY 2019 by either the Y-12 GWPP or UCOR, along with schematic diagrams for wells equipped with Westbay™ multiport sampling equipment or Barcad® pump systems. Appendix D supports the background summary discussion in Section 2 and provides more detailed information about the hydrogeologic framework for groundwater and surface water monitoring at Y-12, including the primary sources of groundwater contamination in each hydrogeologic regime. Results for all field measurements and laboratory analyses obtained by the Y-12 GWPP and UCOR are presented in Appendix E, which also includes the sample numbers for the QA/QC samples associated with groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the Y-12 GWPP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Assessing the Potential for Inadvertent Human Intrusion at the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This paper recommends an approach to inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) at the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). IHI analysis uses the consequences of an individual inadvertently contacting buried waste to set waste concentration limits for near-surface disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Regulatory agencies are increasingly applying risk-informed decision-making to LLW waste management (NRC 2006). Risk-informed decision-making combines scientific risk assessment with stakeholder values and perceptions to determine a level of acceptable risk. Risk considers not only the consequences of an event, but also its probability of occurring.

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Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan, Revision 2

This Use Restriction Management Plan (URMP) provides the information needed to create, modify, and manage use restrictions (URs) for sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and sites accessed through the NNSS main gate, that were closed using the corrective action alternative (CAA) of closure in place under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). It addresses URs established under the FFACO for releases related to the development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons that are located on the NNSS and that are accessed through the NNSS main gate. FFACO URs are established at sites where contamination remains at levels exceeding final action levels (FALs) or is forecasted to exceed Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) maximum contaminant levels (CFR, 2025a) over the next 1,000 years following completion of corrective actions. Administrative URs are established at Industrial Sites and Soils sites where contamination remains at levels exceeding industrial action levels as defined in the Soils RBCA document. All URs stipulate restrictions sufficient to ensure the protection of human health, safety, and the environment.

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Y-12 National Security Complex Biological Monitoring and Abatement Program—2024 Calendar Year Report

This report provides the results of the CY 2024 sampling of East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) as part of the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) Biological Monitoring and Abatement Program (BMAP). The results are presented in the context of historical trends. The Y-12 BMAP was developed in 1985 to demonstrate that the effluent limits established for Y-12 protected the classified uses of the receiving stream, particularly the growth and propagation of aquatic life (Loar et al. 1989). Over the years, the BMAP has become an important and valuable long-term measure of stream conditions resulting from actions and activities at the Y-12 Complex. The BMAP currently consists of three tasks: (1) bioaccumulation monitoring, (2) benthic macroinvertebrate community monitoring, and (3) fish community monitoring. The benthic macroinvertebrate community monitoring task includes studies to evaluate the receiving stream’s biological integrity annually in comparison with Tennessee Water Quality Criteria following Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) protocols. In addition to presenting the EFPC biological monitoring results, this report includes results from Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act–funded BMAP programs in Bear Creek and McCoy Branch (presented in Appendixes A and B, respectively), as required in the Y-12 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Additional biological testing at the Y-12 Complex includes toxicity testing of select storm drains as required in the NPDES permit. Although toxicity testing is not formally part of the BMAP, toxicity testing results from 2024 are provided in Appendix C.

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Understanding long-term groundwater flow at Pahute Mesa and vicinity, Nevada National Security Site, USA, from naturally occurring geochemical and isotopic tracers

Abstract Recently collected naturally occurring geochemical and isotopic groundwater tracers were combined with historic data from the Pahute Mesa area of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada, USA, to provide insights into long-term regional groundwater flow patterns, mixing and recharge. Pahute Mesa was the site of 85 nuclear detonations between 1965 and 1992, many of them deeply buried devices that introduced radionuclides directly into groundwater. The dataset examined included major ions and field measurements, stable isotopes of hydrogen (δ 2 H), oxygen (δ 18 O), carbon (δ 13 C) and sulfur (δ 34 S), and radioisotopes of carbon ( 14 C) and chloride ( 36 Cl). Analysis of the patterns of groundwater 14 C data and the δ 2 H and δ 18 O signatures indicates that groundwater recharge is predominantly of Pleistocene age, except for a few localized areas near major ephemeral drainages. Steep gradients in sulfate (SO 4 ) and chloride (Cl) define a region near the western edge of the NNSS where high-concentration groundwater flowing south from north of the NNSS merges with dilute groundwater flowing west from eastern Pahute Mesa in a mixing zone that coincides with a groundwater trough associated with major faults. The 36 Cl/Cl and δ 34 S data suggest that the source of the high Cl and SO 4 in the groundwater was a now-dry, pluvial-age playa lake north of the NNSS. Patterns of groundwater flow indicated by the combined data sets show that groundwater is flowing around the northwest margin of the now extinct Timber Mountain Caldera Complex toward regional discharge areas in Oasis Valley.

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Discrete Fracture Network Modeling to Estimate Upscaled Parameters for the Topopah Spring, Lava Flow, and Tiva Canyon Aquifers at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

This report describes the results of Discrete Fracture Network (DFN) simulations for the Topopah Spring Aquifer (TSA), Lava Flow Aquifer, and Tiva Canyon Aquifer (TCA), at Pahute Mesa on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site. The research focuses on calculating upscaled groundwater flow and contaminant transport parameters using DFNs generated according to fracture characteristics observed in the TSA, LFA and TCA at Pahute Mesa. The highly fractured and heterogeneous nature of these aquifers makes them candidates for stochastic DFN modeling of radionuclide transport on a small scale with subsequent upscaling. One hundred independent DFN realizations are generated for each aquifer, and the upscaled parameters for continuum simulations of subsurface flow and transport in fractured media at Pahute Mesa are calculated. Our goal is to implement a modeling approach that can translate parameters to larger-scale models that account for local-scale flow and transport processes, such as channelization of flow and transport along a few well connected, large fractures. Additionally, to simulate advective and advective-diffusive transport through the fracture networks, the Time Domain Random Walk (TDRW) approach is applied to account for matrix diffusion into a finite half-space. Moreover, a novel approach to calculate dynamic (active) fracture surface area to reflect flow channeling is implemented. This work will improve the representation of radionuclide transport processes in largescale, regulatory-focused models by providing estimates of hard-to-measure flow and contaminant transport parameters at large scales. In this report, we (1) show recent results of flow and transport simulations on multiple DFN realizations of the TSA, LFA, TCA; (2) discuss the resulting distributions of estimated upscaled parameters; (3) describe the estimation of upscaled parameters for an equivalent parallel-plate continuum model and (4) present a comparison between simulated transport from the equivalent continuum model and an actual DFN.

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Nevada National Security Site 2019 Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This report presents groundwater and leachate sample results from the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site in Nye County, Nevada. Since 1993, groundwater samples have been collected and static water levels have been measured from the aquifer immediately below the Area 5 RWMS. The data are evaluated for evidence of effects on the aquifer related to the Area 5 RWMS. Leachate from the Cell 18 lined mixed waste cell has been sampled since 2011, and leachate from the Cell 25 lined mixed waste cell was first sampled in 2019 after it began receiving waste in August 2018. Leachate data are analyzed for hazardous contaminants to determine appropriate leachate handling and disposal. This report includes five years of data from 2015 through 2019.

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NEVADA NATIONAL SECURITY SITE 2020 DATA REPORT- GROUNDWATER MONITORING PROGRAM AREA 5 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT SITE

This report presents groundwater and leachate sample results from the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site in Nye County, Nevada. Since 1993, groundwater samples have been collected and static groundwater depths have been measured from the aquifer immediately below the Area 5 RWMS. The data are evaluated for evidence of effects on the aquifer related to the Area 5 RWMS. Leachate from the Cell 18 lined mixed waste cell has been sampled since 2011, and leachate from the Cell 25 lined mixed waste cell was first sampled in 2019 after it began receiving waste in August 2018. Leachate data are analyzed for hazardous contaminants to determine appropriate leachate handling and disposal. This report includes five years of data from 2016 through 2020.

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Data Release Report for the Source Physics Experiment Phase II: Dry Alluvium Geology Experiments (DAG-1 through DAG-4), Nevada National Security Site

The Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) project was Phase II of the Source Physics Experiment and consisted of a series of four chemical explosive tests conducted in the same source hole on the Nevada National Security Site. This hole is located at 37.1146°N and -116.0693°W, with a surface elevation of 1,285.2 meters (m) (4,216.5 feet [ft]) above sea level. The first test (DAG-1) was conducted on July 20, 2018, at 16:51:52.67838 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The explosive source for DAG-1 was nitromethane initiated by a small plastic-bonded explosive (PBX) charge, detonated at the depth of 385.0 m (1,263.2 ft) below ground surface. DAG-1 had a trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent yield of 0.908 metric tons (2,002 pounds [lbs]). DAG-2 was conducted on December 19, 2018, at 18:45:56.92115 UTC. This test was the largest in the series, with a TNT equivalent yield of 50.997 metric tons (112,429 lbs). The explosive source for DAG-2 was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 299.8 m (983.6 ft) below ground surface. DAG-3 was conducted on April 27, 2019, at 15:49:01.84183 UTC. The explosive source for this test was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 149.9 m (492.0 ft) below ground surface. DAG-3 had a TNT equivalent yield of 0.908 metric tons (2,002 lbs). The final DAG test (DAG-4) was conducted on June 22, 2019, at 21:06:19.87632 UTC. The explosive source for DAG-4 was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 51.6 m (169.3 ft) below ground surface. DAG-4 had a TNT equivalent yield of 10.357 metric tons (22,833 lbs). The four tests were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that included sensors both at near-field (less than 200 m) and far-field (200 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component (3C) accelerometers installed at various depths ranging from 51.6 to 385 m (169.3 to 1,263.1 ft) below ground surface in boreholes positioned around the source hole, and arrays of single-component and 3C accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network comprised a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, and 3C accelerometers at distances of 200 m to 400 kilometers. In addition, the DAG-2, DAG-3, and DAG-4 explosions were recorded by a temporary array of 496 geophones arranged in a densely spaced grid pattern known as “Large N.” This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the four DAG tests and the various types of near-field, far-field, and other data that are available. Assembled data sets are accessible through: Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, Data Management Center 1408 NE 45th Street, Suite 201, Seattle, Washington 98105 USA. www.iris.washington.edu

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Non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Post-Closure Inspection Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (CY2021, Revision 0)

This report includes visual inspection results, maintenance and repair activities, and recommendations for calendar year (CY) 2021 for use restrictions (URs) at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) that are accessed through the NNSS Main Gate. This document is formatted by project activity (i.e., Industrial Sites, Soils, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA]); then by corrective action unit (CAU); and then by CAS.

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Nevada National Security Site 2019 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

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Effects of Intrusive Confining Units on Groundwater Flow at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

Geological, geophysical, hydrogeological, and hydrological evidence indicates that feeder dikes to lava flows play a role as confining units in the groundwater flow system underlying the Pahute Mesa area of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Of geological significance, the Pahute Mesa testing area is largely situated within the Silent Canyon caldera, which includes both tuffs and lavas that were fed by (and are connected to) intrusive rock units such as feeder dikes prior to and during volcanic eruptions (Orkild et al., 1968; Byers et al., 1976). Groundwater modeling results presented in this report support extension of “pool-dam” and “breach scenario” concepts presented in Jackson and Fenelon (2018) and Jackson et al. (2021) to low-permeability intrusive confining units (ICUs) such as feeder dikes that are expected to dissect and ring the caldera. As laterally extensive, steeply-dipping, and sub-parallel planar structures, ICUs can be expected to further compartmentalize groundwater flow in the volcanic aquifers systems at Pahute Mesa beyond the stratigraphically-defined tuff confining units (TCUs). ICUs provide an explanation for changes in water levels before and after the Cheshire test, detonated 2/14/76 (USDOE, 2015), and the unusually high horizontal gradient southwest of Cheshire. These ICU concepts are supported by groundwater modeling results presented in this report. The evidence and groundwater modeling results indicate that the downgradient extent of radionuclide contamination in some areas of Pahute Mesa could be overestimated by ignoring the confining effects of ICUs. On the other hand, contaminant extent could be underestimated by not considering transient flow effects and/or the re-equilibrated flow field caused by breaching of an ICU by an underground nuclear test.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev.1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in FY 2020 by DOE/EM Nevada Program UGTA Activity at CAU 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine at the Nevada National Security Site. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates); and verification of use restrictions, institutional controls, and water use.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗