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At least 163 records · Page 9

Mapping and Quantification of Vascular Branching in Plants, Animals and Humans by VESGEN Software

Humans face daunting challenges in the successful exploration and colonization of space, including adverse alterations in gravity and radiation. The Earth-determined biology of humans, animals and plants is significantly modified in such extraterrestrial environments. One physiological requirement shared by humans with larger plants and animals is a complex, highly branching vascular system that is dynamically responsive to cellular metabolism, immunological protection and specialized cellular/tissue function. The VESsel GENeration (VESGEN) Analysis has been developed as a mature beta version, pre-release research software for mapping and quantification of the fractal-based complexity of vascular branching. Alterations in vascular branching pattern can provide informative read-outs of altered vascular regulation. Originally developed for biomedical applications in angiogenesis, VESGEN 2D has provided novel insights into the cytokine, transgenic and therapeutic regulation of angiogenesis, lymphangiogenesis and other microvascular remodeling phenomena. Vascular trees, networks and tree-network composites are mapped and quantified. Applications include disease progression from clinical ophthalmic images of the human retina; experimental regulation of vascular remodeling in the mouse retina; avian and mouse coronary vasculature, and other experimental models in vivo. We envision that altered branching in the leaves of plants studied on ISS such as Arabidopsis thaliana cans also be analyzed.

Parsons-Wingerter, Patricia A.↗

Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control cyber security common vector access leading to relational common cause failures - 340

Nuclear power plants and facilities have been implementing digital system upgrades into their previously analog systems for well over twenty years. New nuclear facilities' control, security, and emergency preparedness systems are almost exclusively built on digital architectures with a high degree of communication between the various systems that are often integrated together into a central control station to aid in operation or security of the facility. As digital systems become more widespread in nuclear facility control system architectures, cyber security related issues have become a significant concern to operators, regulators, governments, and other groups. Among the many concerns related to digital systems and cyber security is the area of common cause and common mode failures. This paper introduces, defines, and discusses some sources of common cause failure from a cyber security perspective: common vector access. This refers to specific access points that an adversary can exploit through a single attack sequence that have the potential to provide relational failures through common cause on multiple components, subsystems, systems, or plants. This paper will further discuss interconnected processes where these access points may exist, the importance of limiting or controlling these pinch points, and some methods of protecting common vector access points. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

10 CFR 830 Major Modification Determination for Advanced Test Reactor RDAS and LPCIS Replacement

The replacement of the ATR Control Complex's obsolete computer based Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS) and its safety-related Lobe Power Calculation and Indication System (LPCIS) software application is vitally important to ensure the ATR remains available to support this national mission. The RDAS supports safe operation of the reactor by providing 'real-time' plant status information (indications and alarms) for use by the reactor operators via the Console Display System (CDS). The RDAS is a computer support system that acquires analog and digital information from various reactor and reactor support systems. The RDAS information is used to display quadrant and lobe powers via a display interface more user friendly than that provided by the recorders and the Control Room upright panels. RDAS provides input to the Nuclear Engineering ATR Surveillance Data System (ASUDAS) for fuel burn-up analysis and the production of cycle data for experiment sponsors and the generation of the Core Safety Assurance Package (CSAP). RDAS also archives and provides for retrieval of historical plant data which may be used for event reconstruction, data analysis, training and safety analysis. The RDAS, LPCIS and ASUDAS need to be replaced with state-of-the-art technology in order to eliminate problems of aged computer systems, and difficulty in obtaining software upgrades, spare parts, and technical support. The major modification criteria evaluation of the project design did not lead to the conclusion that the project is a major modification. The negative major modification determination is driven by the fact that the project requires a one-for-one equivalent replacement of existing systems that protects and maintains functional and operational requirements as credited in the safety basis.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Solidification technology for organic liquid waste combined with solid materials from Cernavoda NPP, Romania - 16453

Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU{sup R}) reactor designs were initially developed in the late 1950's and 1960's by the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) in partnership with Ontario Power Generation. CANDU{sup R} 6 reactors are Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), with an integrated containment system and are designed as either multi or single unit systems. Two single CANDU 6 systems are currently operating at Cernavoda with an additional two units expected to be brought online in the near future. The radioactive waste produced by the plant is currently stored in a waste interim storage facility located on-site. The main sources of radioactive waste in a CANDU plant are: - Primary Heat Transport (PHT) systems, - Moderator systems, - Other sources of radionuclides. The radioactive waste management system at Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) was designed to maintain acceptable levels of safety for workers and to protect human health and the environment from exposure to unacceptable levels of radiation. During the operation of the Cernavoda NPP, a series of waste streams have been generated for waste treatment purposes. One important waste stream is the combination of solid materials and liquid organic waste, creating flammable solids. Flammable solids represent solid materials, such as cloth, plastic, contaminated with oil containing gamma nuclides and H-3 from maintenance activities. This paper explores a method to solve the problem of liquid residues on solid materials by the application of absorbent materials. The existence of liquid residues on solid materials is a common problem at nuclear power stations globally. The primary issue centers on an effective method of eliminating the liquid to allow for the final acceptance and disposal of the solid waste by regulators. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modified Isotherm Modeling to Predict Cs Exchange with Crystalline Silicotitanate in Tank Waste Simulants

The U.S. Department of Energy is working to expedite processing of Hanford tank waste supernate at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. To support this goal, Washington River Protection Solutions is designing a Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system for suspended solids and cesium (Cs/ 137 Cs) removal from Hanford tank waste supernate. The ion exchange media selected for Cs removal at TSCR is crystalline silicotitanate (CST) that is manufactured in a nearly spherical form by Honeywell UOP LLC (UOP; Des Plaines, IL) as product IONSIV® R9140-B (Na form). The Zheng Anthony Miller (ZAM) isotherm model (Zheng et al. 1997) is a multicomponent ion exchange model used to predict the exchange of Group I metals onto CST. The ZAM isotherm has historically been used to predict Cs distribution values from Hanford and Savannah River Site (SRS) tank waste simulants. Figure S.1 summarizes model predictions from the ZAM isotherm that indicate poor prediction of Cs distribution values for simple and complex simulants with the engineered form of CST, IONSIV® R9140-B, and IONSIV® R9120-B where the solid line indicates a perfect fit by the model. The dotted lines indicate ±20% error. Batch contact testing with Hanford tank waste complex and simple simulants was used in conjunction with SRS simulants to experimentally determine Cs distribution values using a modification to the original isotherm model. The experimentally determined maximum Cs capacity for IONSIV® R9140-B CST in both the simple and complex matrices was found to be 0.53±0.3 mmoles Cs/g of CST. This value is not drastically different from the maximum Cs capacity of 0.58 mmoles Cs/g TAM-5 reported by Zheng et al. (1997). However, it is important to note that TAM-5 (commercially IONSIV® IE-910) is a powder. Hamm et al. (2002) determined that a dilution factor was needed to account for the Zr(OH)2 binder in the engineered form of CST. Hamm et al. determined that a dilution factor of 0.68 was appropriate to account for binder contribution and correct overprediction of Cs exchange on the engineered form of CST in ZAM calculations. This reduced the total capacity from 0.58 mmol/g with TAM-5 to 0.39 mmol/g for the engineered form of CST (Hamm et al. 2002). Despite substituting the experimentally determined maximum Cs capacity of 0.55 mmoles Cs/g for the literature-reported capacity of 0.39 mmoles Cs/g, it was determined that additional modifications to the model’s equilibrium rate constants were necessary in refining the isotherm model. The modified model overpredicted K+ uptake by the CST when compared to digested CST results described by Campbell et al. (2019). The modified model was further revised to omit three of the five K+ exchange equilibrium reactions described by ZAM to reduce the additional K+ loading seen by the model. Figure S.2 summarizes the revised model isotherm predictions plotted against measured Kd values.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

General description of HTR-PM emergency power system - 18415

The paper will describe the design concept of the emergency power system utilized in the high temperature gas cooled reactor project (HTR-PM) which is currently under construction in Shandong, China. As a class 1E system which is related to the safety feature of the reactor, emergency power system is responsible for providing multiple reliable power sources for nuclear safety class loads. Therefore, the structure, power source deployment, operation, maintenance and alignment of the system should meet several standards and regulations. The paper will give a detailed description about the designing process of the system which include structure design, determination of primary device parameters, and some calculation results of device capacity such as emergency diesel engine, UPS et al. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

317/319 Phytoremediation site monitoring report - 2009 growing season : final report.

In 1999, Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) designed and installed a series of engineered plantings consisting of a vegetative cover system and approximately 800 hybrid poplars and willows rooting at various predetermined depths. The plants were installed using various methods including Applied Natural Science's TreeWell{reg_sign} system. The goal of the installation was to protect downgradient surface and groundwater by intercepting the contaminated groundwater with the tree roots, removing moisture from the upgradient soil area, reducing water infiltration, preventing soil erosion, degrading and/or transpiring the residual volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and removing tritium from the subsoil and groundwater. This report presents the results of the monitoring activities conducted by Argonne's Energy Systems (ES) Division in the growing season of 2009. Monitoring of the planted trees began soon after the trees were installed in 1999 and has been conducted every summer since then. As the trees grew and consolidated their growth into the contaminated soil and groundwater, their exposure to the contaminants was progressively shown through tissue sampling. During the 2009 sampling campaign, VOC concentrations found in the French Drain area were in general consistent with or slightly lower than the 2008 results. Additionally, closely repeated, stand wide analyses showed contaminant fluctuations that may indicate short-term contaminant depletion in the area of interest of roots. This data will be useful to determine short-term removal rate by the trees. As in previous years, levels in the Hydraulic Control Area were close to background levels except for a few exceptions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Fukushima Safety Enhancement Activities in Canada

In the immediate aftermath of the common-cause seismic and tsunami events that triggered the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, the nuclear regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), requested that all Cass I nuclear facilities re-examine the safety cases for their nuclear facilities. Lessons-learned task forces were established by the CNSC, and the nuclear utilities, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Bruce Power (BP), and New Brunswick Power (NBP). The purposes of these independent task forces was to develop relevant lessons learned issues for the Candu nuclear power plants operating in Canada and to identify actions that could enhance safety. Subsequently, a CNSC Integrated Action Plan was developed to address the recommendations arising from the CNSC Task Force Report, and the licensees aligned their actions with this plan. The actions were grouped into four categories, as follows. 1. Strengthening defence in depth; Actions included re-assessment of a site-specific external hazards using PSA; physical plant changes to add further cooling water make-up capability to heat sinks; development of new Canadian standards and updated regulatory documents that address requirements for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA), Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Period Safety Review (PSR); development of a new and novel methodology for assessing multi-unit risk that is consistent with the IAEA construct of defence-in-depth (including a safety goal hierarchy and complementary risk analysis methods that address 'Black Swan' events); enhanced management of hydrogen combustion challenges; and enhanced Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). 2. Enhancing emergency response; Actions included provision of Emergency Mitigation Equipment (EME) such as transportable diesel-driven pumps or fire engines, transportable diesel generators for AC and instrument power; pre-installed connections to in-plant equipment via easily accessible and protected quick-connect points for water and electrical power; upgraded emergency response centres; enhanced communication systems and protocols; and enhanced emergency response programs, training and exercises. 3. Improving the regulatory framework and processes; 4. Enhancing international collaboration. Actions assigned under categories 3 and 4 were placed upon the regulator. This presentation will focus on the assigned actions in categories 1 and 2. The underlying motivation, objectives, and safety benefits associated with the actions will be described within the context of broader aspects of severe accident mitigation in water-cooled reactors. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

317/319 phytoremediation site monitoring report - 2004 growing season.

In 1999, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) designed and installed a series of engineered plantings consisting of a vegetative cover system and approximately 800 hybrid poplars and willows rooting at various predetermined depths. The plants were installed using various methods including Applied Natural Science's TreeWell{reg_sign} system. The goal of the installation was to protect downgradient surface and groundwater by hydraulic control of the contaminated plume by intercepting the contaminated groundwater with the tree roots, removing moisture from the upgradient soil area, reducing water infiltration, preventing soil erosion, degrading and/or transpiring the residual volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and removing tritium from the subsoil and groundwater. This report presents the results of the monitoring activities conducted by Argonne's Energy Systems Division (ES) in the growing season of 2004. Monitoring of the planted trees began soon after the trees were installed in 1999 and has been conducted every summer since then. As the trees grew and consolidated their growth into the contaminated soil and groundwater, their exposure to the contaminants was progressively shown through tissue sampling. Since the inception of the project, significant progress was made in the refinement and testing of the analytical method (for which no official method is available), the determination of the optimal tissue for sampling, and of the variability of the concentrations within a specific tree. An understanding has also been developed on background concentrations of VOCs, and how to discriminate between VOCs that are associated with plant tissue because of aerial or of soil/groundwater uptake pathways. Also, during the 2003 sampling campaign, core samples from tree trunks were collected for the first time (the trees were large enough to stand the procedure). Data collected from the French Drain area last year supported the hypothesis that a correlation was present between concentrations of VOCs in the soil and in corresponding branch tissue. During this year (2004), systematic data collection in the French Drain area further consolidated this correlation and indicated that trees are clearly in the condition to have reached the target rooting depth. Concentrations in the hundreds of ppb in branch and trunk samples confirm that uptake can be a quantitative way to remove VOCs from the contaminated media. Additionally, laboratory studies were conducted in 2004 to determine mass recoveries from leaves and branches using the headspace method, and to determine if we could further modify our sample pretreatment method to ensure optimal recovery. Results showed that the recovery of TCE in leaves and branches with our current method ranged between 98 and 138%, indicating that most of the TCE present in the samples is recovered during the analysis. Freezing and heating had variable results in recovery rates, which resulted in no significant changes being introduced to the current SOP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Used Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Components for Shutdown Plants to Expedite Defueling of Spent Fuel Pool - 18378

For plants that have announced plans to shut down, their main priority is to off-load the Used Nuclear Fuel from the spent fuel pool to dry storage at an ISFSI so that they can proceed to 'Safe store' or other storage options, and start their decommissioning process as soon as possible. One of the major expenses for a decommissioned plant is the cost of maintenance of the spent fuel pool. Therefore, the ability of the dry storage system to store short cooled fuel is an important aspect of dry storage system for shutdown plants. When a shutdown plant evaluates the dry storage options, total cost of the transferring the fuel from the pool to ISFSI site needs to be evaluated. One of the major costs to the utility for dry storage is the cost of ISFSI pad (basemat) along with the cost of dry storage system hardware. Smaller ISFSI footprint saves utility for the cost of ISFSI site excavation, cost of engineered backfill and cost of ISFSI pad. In order to minimize the cost of dry storage systems, besides the size of the ISFSI pad as described above, other important considerations is to use high capacity systems. The highest capacity systems available in the dry storage market today are with 37 PWR or 89 BWR used fuel assemblies per canister. These dry storage systems are expected to be at the plant sites for extended duration due to the unavailability of Interim Storage Facilities or a permanent disposal sites like Yucca Mountain. Maintaining the integrity of the dry storage systems canisters and storage overpack so that they can safely protect the fuel and integrity of used nuclear fuel is maintained during storage period is of utmost importance. Robust Aging Management Program is an important aspect for dry storage systems not only at the shutdown plants but also at the operating plants. This paper will provide the update of a reduced footprint version of TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} System with MATRIX HSM and NUHOMS{sup R} EOS Canisters that addresses the need for maximizing safety, ISFSI capacity while optimizing cost. It will provide an update on the current capabilities, design features and current status of the licensing and deployment of NUHOMS{sup R} EOS System. It will provide the current status of the MATRIX HSM along with the significant enhancement included for a robust Canister Evolved Safety Program for Aging Management. It will also describe the construction sequence; loading operations, and inspections during extended storage as a part of aging management program. The compact version of TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} System with MATRIX HSM offers a 'Universal' Storage Overpack which is designed to accept all different designs dry storage canisters available in the industry. As UNF storage continues to drives the industry towards innovations that address the need for optimized dry storage systems, compact ISFSIs and prudent aging management programs, this new evolution of the TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} system with MATRIX HSM and EOS Canisters offers a significant leap forward in addressing all of these challenges. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Instrumentation Cables Test Plan

A fire at a nuclear power plant (NPP) has the potential to damage structures, systems, and components important to safety, if not promptly detected and suppressed. At Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant on March 22, 1975, a fire in the reactor building damaged electrical power and control systems. Damage to instrumentation cables impeded the function of both normal and standby reactor coolant systems, and degraded the operators’ plant monitoring capability. This event resulted in additional NRC involvement with utilities to ensure that NPPs are properly protected from fire as intended by the NRC principle design criteria (i.e., general design criteria 3, Fire Protection). Current guidance and methods for both deterministic and performance based approaches typically make conservative (bounding) assumptions regarding the fire-induced failure modes of instrumentation cables and those failure modes effects on component and system response. Numerous fire testing programs have been conducted in the past to evaluate the failure modes and effects of electrical cables exposed to severe thermal conditions. However, that testing has primarily focused on control circuits with only a limited number of tests performed on instrumentation circuits. In 2001, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) conducted a series of cable fire tests designed to address specific aspects of the cable failure and circuit fault issues of concern1. The NRC was invited to observe and participate in that program. The NRC sponsored Sandia National Laboratories to support this participation, whom among other things, added a 4-20 mA instrumentation circuit and instrumentation cabling to six of the tests. Although limited, one insight drawn from those instrumentation circuits tests was that the failure characteristics appeared to depend on the cable insulation material. The results showed that for thermoset insulated cables, the instrument reading tended to drift and fluctuate, while the thermoplastic insulated cables, the instrument reading fell off-scale rapidly. From an operational point of view, the latter failure characteristics would likely be identified as a failure from the effects of fire, while the former may result in inaccurate readings.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Mapping and Quantification of Vascular Branching in Plants, Animals and Humans by VESGEN Software

Humans face daunting challenges in the successful exploration and colonization of space, including adverse alterations in gravity and radiation. The Earth-determined biology of plants, animals and humans is significantly modified in such extraterrestrial environments. One physiological requirement shared by larger plants and animals with humans is a complex, highly branching vascular system that is dynamically responsive to cellular metabolism, immunological protection and specialized cellular/tissue function. VESsel GENeration (VESGEN) Analysis has been developed as a mature beta version, pre-release research software for mapping and quantification of the fractal-based complexity of vascular branching. Alterations in vascular branching pattern can provide informative read-outs of altered vascular regulation. Originally developed for biomedical applications in angiogenesis, VESGEN 2D has provided novel insights into the cytokine, transgenic and therapeutic regulation of angiogenesis, lymphangiogenesis and other microvascular remodeling phenomena. Vascular trees, networks and tree-network composites are mapped and quantified. Applications include disease progression from clinical ophthalmic images of the human retina; experimental regulation of vascular remodeling in the mouse retina; avian and mouse coronary vasculature, and other experimental models in vivo. We envision that altered branching in the leaves of plants studied on ISS such as Arabidopsis thaliana cans also be analyzed.

Parsons-Wingerter, P. A.↗

Design study on safety protection system of JSFR

Development of Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (JSFR) has been progressed in Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development (FaCT) project aiming at realizing high level of safety, reliability and economic competitiveness. For JSFR, design consideration on safety protection system has also been performed, which is essential for reactor shutdown in the case of design basis events (DBEs). In the design activity, consideration of safety protection system includes logic circuits configuration, selection of trip signals, and its setting values for reactor trip. In addition, it is necessary to evaluate the performance of the safety protection system by safety analysis taking into account the comprehensive parameter ranges. For this purpose, it has been evaluated whether adequate reactor trip signals can be ensured for satisfying safety standard regarding the fuel integrity (e.g., maximum fuel clad temperature) for DBEs. In this paper, results obtained from the design study on safety protection system of JSFR is presented focusing on the evaluation results of satisfaction of safety protection system for representative events of transient over power (TOP), loss of coolant flow (LOF) and loss of heat sink (LOHS). (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

One System Overview - 16579

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for managing and completing the River Protection Project mission, which is to 'safeguard the nuclear waste stored in Hanford's 177 underground tanks, and to manage the waste safely and responsibly until it can be treated in the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant for final disposition'. The Office of River Protection's work scope is currently performed through two primary contracts: - The Tank Operations Contract, held by Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, (WRPS) includes the construction, operation, and maintenance activities necessary to safely store, retrieve, and transfer tank wastes; provide supplemental tank waste treatment; provide storage and/or disposal of primary and secondary waste streams; design, construction and commissioning of the Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System; and support ORP to integrate Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) completion and startup with Tank Farms operations. - The WTP Contract, held by Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), includes the design, construction, and commissioning of a Pretreatment Facility, two vitrification facilities (one for high-level waste and one for low-activity waste), a dedicated analytical laboratory, and supporting facilities to treat radioactive tank wastes by immobilizing them into a stable glass waste form. One System was established as a means to improve the integration between the tank farms and the WTP project to support its safe and successful startup. One System's scope and purpose focus on mission integration consistent with DOE's plans to treat tank waste in phases, starting with direct feed of the low-activity waste stream to the WTP's Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Vitrification Facility (referred to as DFLAW). The One System organization now has four major focus areas: - Flowsheet Integration? Integrated River Protection Project (RPP) flowsheet development and management; developing a gaps, risks, and opportunities management plan and technical roadmap; and waste feed qualification. - Mission Analysis and Planning? Strategic planning, system planning, and modeling integration. - WTP Startup, Commissioning, and Operations Integration? Interface Control Document (ICD) management, coordinating facilities startup-to-commissioning-to-operations, contract directives and standards identification, and DFLAW program integration. - Project Integration and Controls? Integrated schedule, metrics/dashboards monitoring, and One System risk register. ORP established the DFLAW Program Office in February 2015 as one of its key performance goals. ORP staff, along with contractor managers, have identified roles and responsibilities for the each of the four major focus areas. One System has established an Executive Council and Governance Board to drive program progress and make decisions on DFLAW. This approach allows appropriate government and contractor senior management involvement in the DFLAW Program. Monthly critical path analysis on the integrated DFLAW schedule is being performed. Interface control documents specific to DFLAW have been developed, and system planning and modeling tools are being used to help define the DFLAW flowsheet. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The pre-conceptual design of the nuclear island of ASTRID

The CEA is involved in a substantial effort on the ASTRID (Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor for Industrial Demonstration) pre-conceptual design in cooperation with EDF, as experienced Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) operator, AREVA, as experienced SFR Nuclear Island engineering company and components designer, ALSTOM POWER as energy conversion system designer and COMEX NUCLEAIRE as mechanical systems designer. The CEA is looking for other partnerships, in France and abroad. The ASTRID preliminary design is based on a sodium-cooled pool reactor of 1500 MWth generating about 600 MWe, which is required to guarantee the representativeness of the reactor core and the main components with regard to future commercial reactors. ASTRID lifetime target is 60 years. Two Energy Conversion Systems are studied in parallel until the end of 2012: Rankine steam cycle or Brayton gas based energy conversion cycle. ASTRID design is guided by the following major objectives: improved safety, simplification of structures, improved In Service Inspection and Repair (ISIR), improved manufacturing conditions for cost reduction and increased quality, reduction of risks related to sodium fires and water/sodium reaction, and improved robustness against external hazards. The core is supported by a diagrid, which lay on a strong back to transfer the weight to the main vessel. AREVA is involved in a substantial effort in order to improve the core support structure in particular regarding the ISIR and the connection to primary pump. In the preliminary design, the primary system is formed by the main vessel and the upper closure comprising the reactor roof, two rotating plugs - used for fuel handling - and the components plugs located in the roof penetrations. The Above Core Structure deflects the sodium flow in the hot pool and provides support to core instrumentation and guidance of the control rod drive mechanisms. The number of the major components in the main vessel, primary pumps, Intermediate Heat Exchangers, and Decay Heat Exchangers are now under consideration. Under normal conditions, power release is achieved using the steam/water plant (in case of Rankine steam cycle) or the gas plant (in case of Brayton gas cycle). The diverse design and operating modes of Decay Heat Removal systems provide protection against common cause failures. A Decay Heat Removal system through the reactor vault is in particular studied with the objective to complement Direct Reactor Cooling systems. At this stage of the studies, the secondary system comprises four independent sodium loops (two and three sodium loops configurations are also investigated). Each loop includes one mechanical pump (or a large capacity Annular Linear Induction Electromagnetic Pump), and three modular Steam Generator Units characterized by once through straight tube units with a ferritic tube bundle; nevertheless, helical coil steam generator with tubes made of Alloy 800, and inverted type steam generator with a ferritic tube bundle are also investigated. The limited power of each modular Steam Generator Unit allows the whole secondary loop to withstand a large water/sodium reaction consecutive to the postulated simultaneous rupture of all the heat exchange tubes of one module. The arrangement of the components is based on the 'Regain' concept, in which the secondary pump is situated at a low level in the circuit; conventional arrangement, as SUPERPHENIX type, is a back-up option. Alternative arrangements based on gas cycles are also studied together with Na-gas heat exchanger design. This paper presents a status of the ASTRID pre-conceptual design. The most promising options are highlighted as well as less risky and back-up options. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Gas Generation Testing of Crystalline Silicotitanate Ion Exchange Media

The Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) process has been proposed to support early production of immobilized low-activity waste (LAW) at the Hanford site. As planned, Hanford tank waste would be sent to the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system for solids removal (by filtration) and cesium removal (by ion exchange) during the initial phase of the DFLAW process. The resultant treated waste would be delivered to the LAW Vitrification Facility at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) for immobilization. The ongoing technology maturation of TSCR system components is being conducted by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS). The ion exchange process in the TSCR system will use columns of crystalline silicotitanate (CST) to remove cesium from the LAW. This report describes gas generation testing of the crystalline silicotitanate ion exchange media that was conducted to strengthen the technical basis of the media for use in the TSCR system. Specifically, the described study will inform the safety basis of both the operation of the TSCR system and the interim storage condition of the TSCR ion exchange columns after loading. Previous data on gas generation of CST are limited to a handful of studies using CST or similar media under unrepresentative conditions and durations. The safety basis underlying operation and storage of the CST columns needs to consider the rate and extent of radiolytic flammable gas generation. No existing studies provide a comprehensive set of gas generation data for column operating and storage conditions representative of those expected for TSCR. To address the data gap, this study was conducted under the following conditions (each in duplicate): (1) CST in water at 25°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose, (2) wet CST (soaked in water, then free-drained) at 25°C tested to both 300 Mrad and 900 Mrad total dose, (3) dry CST (air-dried, free-flowing material equilibrated to laboratory conditions) at 25°C tested to both 300 Mrad and 900 Mrad total dose, (4) CST in 5.6M Na simulant at 25°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose, and (5) CST in 5.6M Na simulant with 1% (w/w) total organic carbon as Na 3 -HEDTA at 25°C and 70°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose. For each of the listed conditions, the generation of the following gas species was measured: hydrogen, oxygen, nitrous oxide, and methane. The test data was used to determine the amount of gas generated (total and on a per-component basis), gas generation rates normalized to the CST bed volume tested, and G-values for each gas species. The reported results illustrate that the CST-in-water condition bounds the gas generation rate (at 25°C) of all other conditions, but there is some variability in the hydrogen G-value, depending on the lot of CST tested and the amount of residual moisture present at the start of the test.

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Gas Generation Testing of Crystalline Silicotitanate Ion Exchange Media

The Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) process has been proposed to support early production of immobilized low-activity waste (LAW) at the Hanford site. As planned, Hanford tank waste would be sent to the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system for solids removal (by filtration) and cesium removal (by ion exchange) during the initial phase of the DFLAW process. The resultant treated waste would be delivered to the LAW Vitrification Facility at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) for immobilization. The ongoing technology maturation of TSCR system components is being conducted by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS). The ion exchange process in the TSCR system will use columns of crystalline silicotitanate (CST) to remove cesium from the LAW. This report describes gas generation testing of the crystalline silicotitanate ion exchange media that was conducted to strengthen the technical basis of the media for use in the TSCR system. Specifically, the described study will inform the safety basis of both the operation of the TSCR system and the interim storage condition of the TSCR ion exchange columns after loading. Previous data on gas generation of CST are limited to a handful of studies using CST or similar media under unrepresentative conditions and durations. The safety basis underlying operation and storage of the CST columns needs to consider the rate and extent of radiolytic flammable gas generation. No existing studies provide a comprehensive set of gas generation data for column operating and storage conditions representative of those expected for TSCR. To address the data gap, this study was conducted under the following conditions (each in duplicate): (1) CST in water at 25°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose, (2) wet CST (soaked in water, then free-drained) at 25°C tested to both 300 Mrad and 900 Mrad total dose, (3) dry CST (air-dried, free-flowing material equilibrated to laboratory conditions) at 25°C tested to both 300 Mrad and 900 Mrad total dose, (4) CST in 5.6M Na simulant at 25°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose, and (5) CST in 5.6M Na simulant with 1%(w/w) total organic carbon as Na3-HEDTA at 25°C and 70°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose. For each of the listed conditions, the generation of the following gas species was measured: hydrogen, oxygen, nitrous oxide, and methane. The test data was used to determine the amount of gas generated (total and on a per component basis), gas generation rates normalized to the CST bed volume tested, and G-values for each gas species. The reported results illustrate that the CST in water condition bounds the gas generation rate (at 25°C) of all other conditions, but there is some variability in the hydrogen G-value, depending on the lot of CST tested and the amount of residual moisture present at the start of the test.

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