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At least 163 records · Page 9

Design study on safety protection system of JSFR

Development of Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (JSFR) has been progressed in Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development (FaCT) project aiming at realizing high level of safety, reliability and economic competitiveness. For JSFR, design consideration on safety protection system has also been performed, which is essential for reactor shutdown in the case of design basis events (DBEs). In the design activity, consideration of safety protection system includes logic circuits configuration, selection of trip signals, and its setting values for reactor trip. In addition, it is necessary to evaluate the performance of the safety protection system by safety analysis taking into account the comprehensive parameter ranges. For this purpose, it has been evaluated whether adequate reactor trip signals can be ensured for satisfying safety standard regarding the fuel integrity (e.g., maximum fuel clad temperature) for DBEs. In this paper, results obtained from the design study on safety protection system of JSFR is presented focusing on the evaluation results of satisfaction of safety protection system for representative events of transient over power (TOP), loss of coolant flow (LOF) and loss of heat sink (LOHS). (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

One System Overview - 16579

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for managing and completing the River Protection Project mission, which is to 'safeguard the nuclear waste stored in Hanford's 177 underground tanks, and to manage the waste safely and responsibly until it can be treated in the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant for final disposition'. The Office of River Protection's work scope is currently performed through two primary contracts: - The Tank Operations Contract, held by Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, (WRPS) includes the construction, operation, and maintenance activities necessary to safely store, retrieve, and transfer tank wastes; provide supplemental tank waste treatment; provide storage and/or disposal of primary and secondary waste streams; design, construction and commissioning of the Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System; and support ORP to integrate Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) completion and startup with Tank Farms operations. - The WTP Contract, held by Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), includes the design, construction, and commissioning of a Pretreatment Facility, two vitrification facilities (one for high-level waste and one for low-activity waste), a dedicated analytical laboratory, and supporting facilities to treat radioactive tank wastes by immobilizing them into a stable glass waste form. One System was established as a means to improve the integration between the tank farms and the WTP project to support its safe and successful startup. One System's scope and purpose focus on mission integration consistent with DOE's plans to treat tank waste in phases, starting with direct feed of the low-activity waste stream to the WTP's Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Vitrification Facility (referred to as DFLAW). The One System organization now has four major focus areas: - Flowsheet Integration? Integrated River Protection Project (RPP) flowsheet development and management; developing a gaps, risks, and opportunities management plan and technical roadmap; and waste feed qualification. - Mission Analysis and Planning? Strategic planning, system planning, and modeling integration. - WTP Startup, Commissioning, and Operations Integration? Interface Control Document (ICD) management, coordinating facilities startup-to-commissioning-to-operations, contract directives and standards identification, and DFLAW program integration. - Project Integration and Controls? Integrated schedule, metrics/dashboards monitoring, and One System risk register. ORP established the DFLAW Program Office in February 2015 as one of its key performance goals. ORP staff, along with contractor managers, have identified roles and responsibilities for the each of the four major focus areas. One System has established an Executive Council and Governance Board to drive program progress and make decisions on DFLAW. This approach allows appropriate government and contractor senior management involvement in the DFLAW Program. Monthly critical path analysis on the integrated DFLAW schedule is being performed. Interface control documents specific to DFLAW have been developed, and system planning and modeling tools are being used to help define the DFLAW flowsheet. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The pre-conceptual design of the nuclear island of ASTRID

The CEA is involved in a substantial effort on the ASTRID (Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor for Industrial Demonstration) pre-conceptual design in cooperation with EDF, as experienced Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) operator, AREVA, as experienced SFR Nuclear Island engineering company and components designer, ALSTOM POWER as energy conversion system designer and COMEX NUCLEAIRE as mechanical systems designer. The CEA is looking for other partnerships, in France and abroad. The ASTRID preliminary design is based on a sodium-cooled pool reactor of 1500 MWth generating about 600 MWe, which is required to guarantee the representativeness of the reactor core and the main components with regard to future commercial reactors. ASTRID lifetime target is 60 years. Two Energy Conversion Systems are studied in parallel until the end of 2012: Rankine steam cycle or Brayton gas based energy conversion cycle. ASTRID design is guided by the following major objectives: improved safety, simplification of structures, improved In Service Inspection and Repair (ISIR), improved manufacturing conditions for cost reduction and increased quality, reduction of risks related to sodium fires and water/sodium reaction, and improved robustness against external hazards. The core is supported by a diagrid, which lay on a strong back to transfer the weight to the main vessel. AREVA is involved in a substantial effort in order to improve the core support structure in particular regarding the ISIR and the connection to primary pump. In the preliminary design, the primary system is formed by the main vessel and the upper closure comprising the reactor roof, two rotating plugs - used for fuel handling - and the components plugs located in the roof penetrations. The Above Core Structure deflects the sodium flow in the hot pool and provides support to core instrumentation and guidance of the control rod drive mechanisms. The number of the major components in the main vessel, primary pumps, Intermediate Heat Exchangers, and Decay Heat Exchangers are now under consideration. Under normal conditions, power release is achieved using the steam/water plant (in case of Rankine steam cycle) or the gas plant (in case of Brayton gas cycle). The diverse design and operating modes of Decay Heat Removal systems provide protection against common cause failures. A Decay Heat Removal system through the reactor vault is in particular studied with the objective to complement Direct Reactor Cooling systems. At this stage of the studies, the secondary system comprises four independent sodium loops (two and three sodium loops configurations are also investigated). Each loop includes one mechanical pump (or a large capacity Annular Linear Induction Electromagnetic Pump), and three modular Steam Generator Units characterized by once through straight tube units with a ferritic tube bundle; nevertheless, helical coil steam generator with tubes made of Alloy 800, and inverted type steam generator with a ferritic tube bundle are also investigated. The limited power of each modular Steam Generator Unit allows the whole secondary loop to withstand a large water/sodium reaction consecutive to the postulated simultaneous rupture of all the heat exchange tubes of one module. The arrangement of the components is based on the 'Regain' concept, in which the secondary pump is situated at a low level in the circuit; conventional arrangement, as SUPERPHENIX type, is a back-up option. Alternative arrangements based on gas cycles are also studied together with Na-gas heat exchanger design. This paper presents a status of the ASTRID pre-conceptual design. The most promising options are highlighted as well as less risky and back-up options. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Gas Generation Testing of Crystalline Silicotitanate Ion Exchange Media

The Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) process has been proposed to support early production of immobilized low-activity waste (LAW) at the Hanford site. As planned, Hanford tank waste would be sent to the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system for solids removal (by filtration) and cesium removal (by ion exchange) during the initial phase of the DFLAW process. The resultant treated waste would be delivered to the LAW Vitrification Facility at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) for immobilization. The ongoing technology maturation of TSCR system components is being conducted by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS). The ion exchange process in the TSCR system will use columns of crystalline silicotitanate (CST) to remove cesium from the LAW. This report describes gas generation testing of the crystalline silicotitanate ion exchange media that was conducted to strengthen the technical basis of the media for use in the TSCR system. Specifically, the described study will inform the safety basis of both the operation of the TSCR system and the interim storage condition of the TSCR ion exchange columns after loading. Previous data on gas generation of CST are limited to a handful of studies using CST or similar media under unrepresentative conditions and durations. The safety basis underlying operation and storage of the CST columns needs to consider the rate and extent of radiolytic flammable gas generation. No existing studies provide a comprehensive set of gas generation data for column operating and storage conditions representative of those expected for TSCR. To address the data gap, this study was conducted under the following conditions (each in duplicate): (1) CST in water at 25°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose, (2) wet CST (soaked in water, then free-drained) at 25°C tested to both 300 Mrad and 900 Mrad total dose, (3) dry CST (air-dried, free-flowing material equilibrated to laboratory conditions) at 25°C tested to both 300 Mrad and 900 Mrad total dose, (4) CST in 5.6M Na simulant at 25°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose, and (5) CST in 5.6M Na simulant with 1% (w/w) total organic carbon as Na 3 -HEDTA at 25°C and 70°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose. For each of the listed conditions, the generation of the following gas species was measured: hydrogen, oxygen, nitrous oxide, and methane. The test data was used to determine the amount of gas generated (total and on a per-component basis), gas generation rates normalized to the CST bed volume tested, and G-values for each gas species. The reported results illustrate that the CST-in-water condition bounds the gas generation rate (at 25°C) of all other conditions, but there is some variability in the hydrogen G-value, depending on the lot of CST tested and the amount of residual moisture present at the start of the test.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Gas Generation Testing of Crystalline Silicotitanate Ion Exchange Media

The Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) process has been proposed to support early production of immobilized low-activity waste (LAW) at the Hanford site. As planned, Hanford tank waste would be sent to the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system for solids removal (by filtration) and cesium removal (by ion exchange) during the initial phase of the DFLAW process. The resultant treated waste would be delivered to the LAW Vitrification Facility at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) for immobilization. The ongoing technology maturation of TSCR system components is being conducted by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS). The ion exchange process in the TSCR system will use columns of crystalline silicotitanate (CST) to remove cesium from the LAW. This report describes gas generation testing of the crystalline silicotitanate ion exchange media that was conducted to strengthen the technical basis of the media for use in the TSCR system. Specifically, the described study will inform the safety basis of both the operation of the TSCR system and the interim storage condition of the TSCR ion exchange columns after loading. Previous data on gas generation of CST are limited to a handful of studies using CST or similar media under unrepresentative conditions and durations. The safety basis underlying operation and storage of the CST columns needs to consider the rate and extent of radiolytic flammable gas generation. No existing studies provide a comprehensive set of gas generation data for column operating and storage conditions representative of those expected for TSCR. To address the data gap, this study was conducted under the following conditions (each in duplicate): (1) CST in water at 25°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose, (2) wet CST (soaked in water, then free-drained) at 25°C tested to both 300 Mrad and 900 Mrad total dose, (3) dry CST (air-dried, free-flowing material equilibrated to laboratory conditions) at 25°C tested to both 300 Mrad and 900 Mrad total dose, (4) CST in 5.6M Na simulant at 25°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose, and (5) CST in 5.6M Na simulant with 1%(w/w) total organic carbon as Na3-HEDTA at 25°C and 70°C tested to 300 Mrad total dose. For each of the listed conditions, the generation of the following gas species was measured: hydrogen, oxygen, nitrous oxide, and methane. The test data was used to determine the amount of gas generated (total and on a per component basis), gas generation rates normalized to the CST bed volume tested, and G-values for each gas species. The reported results illustrate that the CST in water condition bounds the gas generation rate (at 25°C) of all other conditions, but there is some variability in the hydrogen G-value, depending on the lot of CST tested and the amount of residual moisture present at the start of the test.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies for Nuclear Power Plants

As any mechanical system ages, broken or outdated parts must be replaced; nuclear power plants (NPPs) are no different. The average age of a NPP in the United States' aging fleet of commercial reactors is 35 years, with many of these plants operating under extensions of their original licenses. These plants, originally designed in the 1960's and 1970's, are controlled by analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems, and have since been upgraded (to varying degrees) to hybrid analog-digital systems. As these NPPs are upgraded to continue operating and to meet more stringent safety requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the implementation of digital systems to monitor and run the power plant introduces new vulnerabilities that must be addressed. The main objectives of a vulnerability assessment (VA) are to identify, quantify, and prioritize all of the susceptibilities inherent in a system. This allows for all weaknesses to be analyzed, and for the most serious concerns to be addressed first. Traditional VA methodologies deal with the analysis of physical systems associated with the NPP; with the introduction of digital control systems and computer networks, these methodologies must be expanded to include these fundamentally different systems and vulnerability concerns. Digital systems have been used in NPPs since the 1980's, but only for non-safety control systems; attacks on these systems were not deemed consequential, and no dedicated VA methodology was required. However, 'all new NPPs are being designed with integrated digital instrumentation and control systems as the backbone of protection, controls, alarms, and display and monitoring'. This gives rise to new vulnerabilities such as disrupted data displays, the suppression of critical alarms, or unauthorized access to secure systems from connected networks. The NRC released formal cybersecurity regulations in March 2009 (10 CFR 73.54), as well as a guide for the program in January 2010 (RG 5.71). However, the regulations and guide provide limited insight on how to identify these vulnerabilities; the focus is on remediating them once found. Hence, there is a need for a comprehensive, systematic methodology to conduct a VA on digital computer and communications and network systems. In this paper, we review traditional VA methodologies and discuss relevant cases. Then we discuss challenges to vulnerabilities within the context of modernization of the fleet and what needs to be done to address this issue.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of Shielding Benchmarks Using the Godiva IV Assembly

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) is developing a shielding benchmark using the Godiva IV assembly as a source. Its present status is reviewed herein. Even eight decades into the nuclear era, substantial work remains to develop a database of shielding benchmarks to support future nuclear development. A nuclear simulation is only as good as its supporting data, inputs, and validation basis. Uncertainty in these areas is addressed using conservatism, which adds margin and, occasionally, cost. In many shielding situations, high accuracy is not necessary because additional material is not particularly expensive. After all, 1–2 cm of lead often reduces the gamma ray dose substantially. However, in certain areas, conservatism can add unnecessary cost. These areas include mobile shielding applications such as casks, ships, microreactors, and spacecraft, where weight and, thus, margin is expensive. Although these characteristics are side benefits for NCSP shielding benchmark development, the main driver is enabling more reliable placement of criticality accident alarm systems (CAASs) in nuclear material facilities, such as those dedicated to the production of advanced reactor fuels. CAAS placement relies on more than accurate data and code validation. It also relies on sufficiently accurate materials specifications, geometry specifications, and a well-defined, alarm-producing baseline accident. All these things require tacit knowledge and understanding of the problem being evaluated. Benchmarks can help ensure this understanding.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2017

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2017. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2017. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2017 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2018

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2018. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2018 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant U. S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection Submerged Bed Scrubber Condensate Disposition Project - 13460

The Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will generate an off-gas treatment system secondary liquid waste stream [submerged bed scrubber (SBS) condensate], which is currently planned for recycle back to the WTP Low Activity Waste (LAW) melter. This SBS condensate waste stream is high in Tc-99, which is not efficiently captured in the vitrified glass matrix [1]. A pre-conceptual engineering study was prepared in fiscal year 2012 to evaluate alternate flow paths for melter off-gas secondary liquid waste generated by the WTP LAW facility [2]. This study evaluated alternatives for direct off-site disposal of this SBS without pre-treatment, which mitigates potential issues associated with recycling. This study [2] concluded that SBS direct disposal is a viable option to the WTP baseline. The results show: - Off-site transportation and disposal of the SBS condensate is achievable and cost effective. - Reduction of approximately 4,325 vitrified WTP Low Activity Waste canisters could be realized. - Positive WTP operational impacts; minimal WTP construction impacts are realized. - Reduction of mass flow from the LAW Facility to the Pretreatment Facility by 66%. - Improved Double Shell Tank (DST) space management is a benefit. (authors)

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Overcoming challenges in delivering 5 Avantech water treatment systems at Fukushima - 15544

The Great East Japan Earthquake has left the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station with many challenges related to water treatment. This paper will provide information on three systems provided for the treatment of [1] accumulated water associated with the Circulated Water Cooling System, [2] sub-drain water removed from wells adjacent to the Unit 1-4 Reactor and Turbine Buildings, and [3] wash water from decontamination of vehicles and equipment. Specific information will be presented on work that was completed to overcome process, installation and logistical challenges associated with these water streams including the following: - Selection of technology and equipment for removal of specific radionuclides - Performance results of highly selective adsorbents used for removing radionuclides in the presence of varying concentrations of chlorides and other natural constituents - Description of process flowsheets and equipment configuration - Discussion of the post-accident work environment and the related work site restrictions Results show that the customized solutions will enable the utility to clean-up the wastewater for cooling, reuse and potential discharge. The technologies used for the three water treatment systems are directly applicable to the treatment of similarly challenging water streams at commercial nuclear power plants, fuel reprocessing plants and governmental nuclear facilities worldwide. The use of these technologies will aid in the lowering of radioactivity released to the environment, worker radiation exposure and the amount of secondary waste requiring long term storage and/ or disposal. (authors)

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Spread Spectrum Time Domain Reflectivity for String Monitoring in PV Power Plants (Final Technical Report)

This final report describes the methods and results of applying Spread Spectrum Time Domain Reflectivity (SSTDR) for String Monitoring in PV Power Plants for DE-EE0008169. The project created a new system for both detecting and locating electrical faults in photovoltaic systems. In this work, we address photovoltaic electric faults that are both common and costly. Based on interviews with photovoltaic power plant owners, operators, and maintainers, three types of faults are common and of significant interest: disconnects, ground faults, and arc faults. Disconnects can originate from many sources. They are often due to everyday events, such as lawnmowing (accidentally running over a cable), animals eating through the cables, or degradation that occurs over time due to corrosion or general degradation. Ground faults occur when the cables (for example, due to frayed insolation) connect to the ground, relaying current into the ground. These faults are particularly problematic since the ground faults are often intermittent. That is, ground faults commonly appear during rain storms due to a change in soil conductivity and then disappear when the rain ends. This makes the ground fault difficult to find because while current systems can detect the overall change in voltage and current associated with a ground fault, technicians are necessary to locate the fault. As a result, ground faults may disappear before the technician arrives at the power plant. Hence, locating and fixing ground faults often require multiple trips. We also study arc faults, which can result when nearby conductors create an arc of electrical current through the air. While less common, arc faults can be extremely dangerous. The energetic electrical arc can cause fires and destroy equipment, costing significant damage. Overall all three types of faults cost owners and operators money, either from the destruction of equipment or from technician time. Furthermore, while devices exist for detecting ground faults (ground fault circuit interrupters) and arc faults (arc fault circuit interrupter), these systems only search patterns of electrical current that correspond to each fault. This information cannot be used to locate the fault. In addition, these protection systems experience nuisance trips due to nearby electromagnetic interference, such as from a lawn mower or other motors that produce significant amounts of electromagnetic radiation. Hence, the overall goal of this project is to create an SSTDR tool that provides photovoltaic power plants with more reliable fault detection in addition to the localization of faults. SSTDR works by transmitting electrical signals into the photovoltaic string. Those signals reflect from impedance discontinuities (i.e., disconnects, ground faults, and arc faults). These faults are then detected by measuring the presence of a reflection at the SSTDR and can be located by identifying the location of that reflection in time. In addition, unlike current protection systems, these systems do not experience nuisance trips since their low amplitude, high frequency, and coded signal can by analyzed without interference from the regular operational voltage on the photovoltaic string.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Reducing the Vulnerability of Electric Power Grids to Terrorist Attacks

This report describes the development of a cascading outage analyzer that, given an initial disturbance on an electric power system, checks for thermal overloads, under-frequency and over-frequency conditions, and under-voltage conditions that would result in removal of elements from the system. The analyzer simulates the successive tripping of elements due to protective actions until a post-event steady state or a system blackout is reached.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2024

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2024. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2024 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2025

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2025. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of the DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, the evaluation of data collected in 2025 continued to indicate that WVDP activities posed no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Markov Model of Accident Progression at Fukushima Daiichi

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake followed by a tsunami caused loss of offsite power and disabled the emergency diesel generators, leading to a prolonged station blackout at the Fukushima Daiichi site. After successful reactor trip for all operating reactors, the inability to remove decay heat over an extended period led to boil-off of the water inventory and fuel uncovery in Units 1-3. A significant amount of metal-water reaction occurred, as evidenced by the quantities of hydrogen generated that led to hydrogen explosions in the auxiliary buildings of the Units 1 & 3, and in the de-fuelled Unit 4. Although it was assumed that extensive fuel damage, including fuel melting, slumping, and relocation was likely to have occurred in the core of the affected reactors, the status of the fuel, vessel, and drywell was uncertain. To understand the possible evolution of the accident conditions at Fukushima Daiichi, a Markov model of the likely state of one of the reactors was constructed and executed under different assumptions regarding system performance and reliability. The Markov approach was selected for several reasons: It is a probabilistic model that provides flexibility in scenario construction and incorporates time dependence of different model states. It also readily allows for sensitivity and uncertainty analyses of different failure and repair rates of cooling systems. While the analysis was motivated by a need to gain insight on the course of events for the damaged units at Fukushima Daiichi, the work reported here provides a more general analytical basis for studying and evaluating severe accident evolution over extended periods of time. This work was performed at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy to explore 'what-if' scenarios in the immediate aftermath of the accidents.

08 HYDROGEN↗