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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Lessons from Artist in Residence Program Design and Impact

As a national laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) seeks to be on the leading edge of public interest research and deliver innovation, a core value of the institution. Through the support of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Water Power Technologies Office, PNNL has convened a workshop entitled Advancing Energy Futures through Art in Seattle, Washington, on August 19th and 20th, 2024. An explicit focus on Artist in Residence (AiR) programs initiates the discussion, as this is one of the few clear places where public interest research, artistic engagement, and energy futures have aligned. The workshop proposes to hear from program managers of successful AiR programs, scientists, and artists who work in the energy futures space, to discuss AiR program models and successful modalities for art and storytelling. This paper is provided as background context for workshop participants.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

DOE Data Days 2025 Report

The DOE Data Days (D3) workshop brings together data managers, developers, researchers, and program managers across the Department of Energy (DOE) and its national laboratories to highlight data management successes, identify potential synergies and common problems, and establish channels for collaboration across the DOE data management community.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Competing Interests and Creating Value - Balancing Durable and Enforceable Institutional Controls with Beneficial Reuse - 20320

US DOE LM has various real property interests at the 100 sites within its current portfolio, with an anticipated total of 127 sites within the next 5 years. Each site has its own narrative with respect to the real property assets. Since the regulatory time frame for long-term surveillance and maintenance activities at some sites can be in perpetuity, durable and effective instruments and documentation are necessary to support LM's unique mission as a federal land manager and steward. More than half of the sites currently in LM's inventory do not allow unrestricted use, and institutional controls (ICs) are required to limit human and environmental exposures to residual contamination. LM's Asset Management program balances protection of human health and the environment with a goal of optimizing its land portfolio through mitigation of risk, limiting liability, and creating value, whether tangible or intangible, in these types of assets. The IC layering strategy utilizes multiple types, restrictions, and legal authorities to protect human health and the environment. This layering strategy influences the transition of these properties into LM's portfolio to assess potential beneficial reuses. The LM's beneficial reuse program aims to repurpose former contaminated sites to restore the environment, protect the public health, revitalize communities, and spur economic growth. LM strives to create value in a perceived valueless asset and reevaluates and revisits the potential opportunities for these sites as long-term surveillance and maintenance activities are performed and objectives are achieved. Beneficial reuse also promotes protectiveness by ensuring activities are compatible with long-term maintenance and protection of public health and the environment as well as ensuring activities are environmentally sound by retaining good stewardship of natural resources. LM has recently revised both the Institutional Control Program Guidance and its Beneficial Reuse Management Plan to integrate the issues of land use with ICs, creating value in these impaired assets. This paper presents the following topics: (1) a general overview of LM's IC and beneficial reuse programs; (2) the unique aspects of each of these programs as a result of the multiple regulatory requirements and programs that affect LM sites; (3) case studies of LM sites to show examples of how LM created value while complying with the ICs and layering strategies; and (4) the most common challenges to beneficial reuses at LM sites and potential options for value creation in impaired assets. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Unstated assumptions in alarm management - 202

Alarm management in the process industries has been an increasing area of activity since the first publications of EEMUA 191 in 1999 and ISA18.2 in 2008. Most major oil and chemical companies have adopted some or all of the metrics for alarm management presented in these documents. However, simply targeting for these metrics might not be the best course of action for a company. Many of the metrics involve assumptions or logic not explicitly stated in the guidelines, assumptions that might not be valid for a given console or plant. In other cases, metrics are the result of implied, rather than explicit, relationships between alarm guidelines. Again, the implied connection might not be true under certain circumstances. Understanding these unstated underpinnings of alarm management can facilitate the implementation of a useful and efficient alarm management program. This paper explores some of the key unstated assumptions in alarm management and how changes in those assumptions can alter both the interpretation of alarm metrics as well as what metrics are utilized. (authors)

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Best Practices to Support EMIS Operation at Federal Facilities

The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of Energy Management Information Systems (EMIS) at federal facilities, as detailed in the EMIS Technical Resources Report. A series of best practices documents was created by FEMP to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. This document highlights best practices for supporting EMIS use at federal facilities.

EMIS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Energy Data Management Guide

The step-by-step framework and best practices in the Energy Data Management Guide provide guidance on how to establish a robust and sustainable energy data management program.

Energy Data Management Guide, strategic energy man↗
DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Full-Scale Vessel Testing for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant - 18333

Concerns over the mixing performance of the planned pulse jet mixed (PJM) vessels for high-solids applications in the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Pretreatment (PT) Facility, led to the development of a standard high-solids vessel (SHSV) design and full-scale vessel testing program. The SHSV is intended as a potential replacement for several high-level waste feed receipt and lag storage vessels (High-Level Waste Facility lag storage and feed blending process), ultrafiltration feed preparation vessels (ultrafiltration process system), and plant wash vessels (plant wash and disposal system). The SHSV concept uses multiple smaller vessels (60 500 L - 79 500 L nominal batch size) to replace larger vessels, providing redundancy, improved mixing (PJM design and spargers), monitoring (multi-level bubblers), reduced material at risk, and improved structural features. The SHSV also requires qualification of a single vessel design for high solids Newtonian and non-Newtonian slurry processing, rather than having to qualify earlier multiple vessel designs. An Integrated Technical Team consisting of the U.S. Department of Energy, Bechtel National, Inc., and independent experts was established to accelerate and provide oversight and direction of the test program and SHSV qualification. Qualification of the SHSV for mixing has now been achieved through a comprehensive full-scale vessel testing program conducted in 2017 with a prototypic SHSV under a set of most adverse design conditions, in conjunction with additional engineering analyses. This paper will present an overview of the SHSV, results from the three-phase full-scale vessel test and qualification program completed in September 2017, and the management program to achieve resolution of the PJM mixing technical issue. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Closeout report for statistics for environmental sampling

This Project Closure Report is the final project document required to complete the project record and to close the project in the office’s web-based project management system. This report is for use by senior management to assess major project outcomes and their impact, identify best practices and other useful insights for future projects, and identify any open issues meriting attention. In accordance with DOE Order 243.1B, Records Management Program, this report will be managed in accordance with all prescribed laws, regulations, directives, and processes to ensure adequate and proper documentation of DOE’s organizations, missions, functions, policies, and decisions (See 44 U.S.C., Chapters 21, 29, 31, 33, and 35; 36 CFR Subchapter B, Records Management, and all applicable National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) mandated guidance.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Using Thermosyphon Hybrid Cooling System to Optimize Data Center Water Efficiency

Fact sheet describes a Federal Energy Management Program Federal Energy and Water Management Award-winning project that deployed an innovative thermosyphon cooler (TSC) as a test bed on the roof of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Energy Systems Integration Facility (ESIF). In combination with existing evaporative towers, the TSC forms an extremely water-and cost-efficient hybrid cooling system.

Data Center↗
DOE OSTI2015

Overview of neutron absorber materials used in spent fuel pools - 14622

Spent fuel pools (SFPs) were originally designed with low density storage racks that maintained subcriticality based on geometric separation. With the increasing need for storage, due to elimination of reprocessing as a viable alternative, SFPs with high-density racks required neutron absorber materials to control reactivity and maintain criticality safety margins. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) conducted an industry wide survey in 2013 and the survey was updated recently based on additional utility data provided by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). The survey results show that about one-quarter of the pools in the United States either do not have neutron absorber material in the SFP or do not credit it even when it is present. Also, about half of the plants in the U.S. use BORAL{sup R} as the neutron absorber material followed by Metamic, Carborundum, Alcan, and borated stainless steel. For neutron absorber monitoring, the majority of the plants rely on a coupon testing program. However, for those plants that never installed coupons or have exhausted their supply of coupons from coupon sampling, in situ measurements at periodic intervals can be performed to determine the status of the neutron absorber. In this paper, an overview of the types of neutron absorber materials used in SFPs, the distribution of absorber material use by material type, types of monitoring programs as part of aging management programs, operational experience to date with different absorber materials based on monitoring programs, and industry initiatives toward addressing long-term performance issues related to neutron absorber material degradation and monitoring are presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

F Reactor Inspection

Workers from Mission Support Alliance, LLC., removed the welds around the steel door of the F Reactor before stepping inside the reactor to complete its periodic inspection. This is the first time the Department of Energy (DOE) has had the reactor open since 2008. The F Reactor is one of nine reactors along the Columbia River at the Department's Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State, where environmental cleanup has been ongoing since 1989. As part of the Tri-Party Agreement, the Department completes surveillance and maintenance activities of cocooned reactors periodically to evaluate the structural integrity of the safe storage enclosure and to ensure confinement of any remaining hazardous materials. "This entry marks a transition of sorts because the Hanford Long-Term Stewardship Program, for the first time, was responsible for conducting the entry and surveillance and maintenance activities," said Keith Grindstaff, Energy Department Long-Term Stewardship Program Manager. "As the River Corridor cleanup work is completed and transitioned to long-term stewardship, our program will manage any on-going requirements."

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗