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3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY 2014: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. This report also includes annual summaries for FY 2014 in Tables 4 and 5. Tabular summaries are provided which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW and MLLW shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW and MLLW shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW and MLLW shipments. In this report shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. The disposal volumes presented in this report do not include minor volumes of non-radioactive materials that were approved for disposal. Volume reports showing cubic feet generated using the Low-Level Waste Information System may vary slightly due to differing rounding conventions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY2017 Waste Shipments To and From the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2017 low-level radioactive waste (LLW), mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW), which includes classified LLW and MLLW, classified non-radioactive (CNR) and classified non-radioactive hazardous (CNRH) shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment from a NNSS facility and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2017. Tabular summaries are provided, which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments.

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Radioactive Waste Management in Central Asia - 12034

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the newly independent states in Central Asia (CA) whose regulatory bodies were set up recently are facing problems with the proper management of radioactive waste and so called 'nuclear legacy' inherited from the past activities. During the former Soviet Union (SU) period, various aspects of nuclear energy use took place in CA republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Activities range from peaceful use of energy to nuclear testing for example at the former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) in Kazakhstan, and uranium mining and milling industries in all four countries. Large amounts of radioactive waste (RW) have been accumulated in Central Asia and are waiting for its safe disposal. In 2008 the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA), with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has developed bilateral projects that aim to assist the regulatory bodies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (from 2010) to identify and draft relevant regulatory requirements to ensure the protection of the personnel, population and environment during the planning and execution of remedial actions for past practices and radioactive waste management in the CA countries. The participating regulatory authorities included: Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency, Kyrgyzstan State Agency on Environmental Protection and Forestry, Nuclear Safety Agency of Tajikistan, and State Inspectorate on Safety in Industry and Mining of Uzbekistan. The scope of the projects is to ensure that activities related to radioactive waste management in both planned and existing exposure situations in CA will be carried out in accordance with the international guidance and recommendations, taking into account the relevant regulatory practice from other countries in this area. In order to understand the problems in the field of radioactive waste management we have analysed the existing regulations through the so called 'Threat assessment' in each CA country which revealed additional problems in the existing regulatory documents beyond those described at the start of our ongoing bilateral projects in Kazakhstan, Kirgizistan Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. (authors)

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The safety improvement of Romanian radioactive waste facilities as an example for human and environmental protection

According to IAEA classification, Romania with two nuclear research centres, with 2 Nuclear Power Units in operation at Cernavoda Town and with 2 new Units envisaged to be in operation soon, can be considered as a country with an average nuclear activity. In Romania there was an extensive interest in management of radioactive wastes generated by the use of nuclear technology in industry and research. Using the most advanced technologies in the mentioned time periods, Romania successfully accomplished to solve all management issues related to radioactive wastes being addressed all safety concerns. Every step of nuclear activity development was accompanied by the suitable waste management facilities. So that, in order to improve the existing treatment and disposal capacities for institutional waste, the existing Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (STDR) and the National Repository Radioactive Wastes (DNDR) at Baita, Bihor, will be improved to actual requirements on the occasion of VVR-S Research Reactor decommissioning. This activity is in development into the frame of a National funded project related to disposal galleries filling improvement and repository closure for DNDR Baita, Bihor. All improvements will be approved by Environmental Protection Authority and Regulatory Body, being a guaranty of human and environmental protection. Also, in accordance with national specific and international policies and taking into account decommissioning activities related to the present operating NPPs, all necessary measures were considered in order to avoid unnecessary generation of radioactive wastes, to minimize, as much as possible, waste production and accumulation and the necessity to develop optimum solutions for a new repository with the assurance of improved nuclear safety. (authors)

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There Are Safe Limits for Radioactivity - Does WIPP Need to Filter its Exhaust Air? - 17165

Pilot Plant (WIPP) underground repository resulted in the release of americium and plutonium (mostly {sup 241}Am) into the environment and contaminated portions of the repository, primarily along the ventilation path from the location of the incident. The WIPP uses a ventilation system to ensure that underground air is circulated through the repository and to ensure that air quality conditions are safe for the workers. Since the air in the repository exits to the surface through an exhaust shaft, this shaft is the sole potential pathway for airborne radioactivity release from the repository. During normal operations before the 2014 incident, exhaust air was released to the environment unfiltered, with an automatic switch to filtration when airborne radioactivity was detected immediately down-stream from the active waste disposal operation. However, since the radiation release event, the WIPP ventilation system has been, and will likely remain in what is called 'filtration mode,' (i.e., exhaust air is routed through a HEPA filter system). Redirection of the ventilation system through the HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Air) filter system was necessary at the peak of the radiation release event to protect aboveground workers at the site and the public in the surrounding areas; however, it has hampered recovery efforts and has exacerbated the inherent safety issues of working underground. As a component of the Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center's (CEMRC) WIPP environmental monitoring program, airborne radioactivity samples are collected daily in the exhaust shaft ventilation air as it reaches the surface, and before entering the HEPA filters. Since June 2014, airborne radiation levels entering the HEPA filters have averaged about 1% of a derived air concentration (DAC) for {sup 241}Am. An airborne radioactivity level of one DAC is equivalent to a potential worker internal dose exposure of 50 mSv per work year, if a worker were continuously exposed for a full work year (2000 hours). During Project Reach and throughout decontamination campaigns conducted in Panel 7 for several months in 2015, these unfiltered levels rose to 3-5% of a DAC, with a one week spike reaching almost one DAC in June 2015, during decontamination of the most heavily contaminated exhaust drift in Panel 7. Since that period, the unfiltered levels have never exceeded 2% of a DAC. Going forward, the question is, should WIPP resume unfiltered discharge of its underground ventilation air? Evaluation of more than two years of underground ventilation sampling data indicates that residual radioactivity levels in the underground no longer warrant HEPA filtration in order to meet either worker or environmental protection criteria. In terms of radiological risk at or in the vicinity of the WIPP site, the increased risk from resuming unfiltered ventilation is exceedingly small and would not result in a hypothetical dose to a member of the public in excess of the 100 micro Sv per year limit for periodic confirmatory sampling as required for operating repositories by the Environmental Protection Agency (40 CFR 191). In addition, the requirement for respiratory protection for workers underground exposed to 1-2% of a DAC is questionable, given the added industrial safety risk of heavy equipment operation while wearing respirators. (authors)

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A Comparison of Social and Economic Engagement Approaches: Lessons from Recent International Radioactive Waste Projects - 17478

The central challenge of any proposed radioactive waste management project is securing not only regulatory permissions, but also a social license to operate. 'Social license' generally refers to a community's acceptance or approval of a specific project. Oftentimes development of social license occurs outside of, or in parallel to, formal regulatory or permitting processes, and requires sustained commitment and proposed economic benefits to communities by proponents to acquire, build, and sustain social capital in the context of trust-based relationships. Historically, radioactive waste management projects have defaulted to demagoguery and 'siege warfare' modes of thinking and action by both proponents and opponents. While radioactive waste management projects are always inherently controversial, it is only recently that project owners and developers have experimented with alternative forms of social engagement outside of, or in addition to, formal regulatory processes. This paper compares and contrasts recent projects in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, by examining distinct approaches to social engagement, with a focus on new methods that have been used to promote mutual understanding, foster rational debate, build confidence, promote economic development, and secure social license. The projects examined span the life-cycle of radioactive waste management development, from ones that are purely aspirational, to ones in early planning stages, to ones seeking a host community, to one that is focused on sustainment of existing social license. Several notable lessons and innovative practices are identified that will be of interest to radioactive waste management project owners and developers, non-governmental organizations, potential host communities, and political decision-makers for such projects. (authors)

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Success in commissioning a key U.S. radioactive waste burial site through the technical support of Dufrane Nuclear Shielding Incorporated (DNSI) - 15476

With the -phase out- of the South Carolina based Barnwell Radioactive Waste Burial Site, and the stockpile and storage of radioactive waste and irradiated components throughout the U.S. Nuclear Industry for decades, the opening of the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Facility by Waste Control Specialists (WCS), is a game changer in solving this industry-wide issue. For the first time in decades, generators now have the opportunity to send their waste to a site specifically designed to permanently sequester the waste in a licensed facility that will protect public health and the environment, better than any built to date. As history has shown through the many decades of the U.S. Commercial and Federal Nuclear Industry, site operators and management have relied heavily on contractors and vendors with exceptional expertise and decades of experience to achieve success and meet their goals. The commissioning of WCS was no exception as DNSI was contracted to design, develop, build and deploy a major component required for the opening and successful operation of the WCS site. This component, being the Modular Concrete Canister (MCC), is the -work horse- of the site. With its enormous size, weight and strength, it provides many functions that meet and comply with the site performance assessment (PA) under 10 CFR Part 61, the site WAC, and Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority. Offsite contracting the production and delivery of this critical component was a major step toward success in meeting schedule and cost for the much needed opening of the Texas Compact and Federal site. In selecting a shielding vendor, WCS partnered with a U.S. Nuclear Service company with over 30 years of experience which spans the entire U.S. Commercial, Federal, and Nuclear Industry. The task given DNSI was not a simple one, it involved every aspect from start to finish of the design, production and delivery of rectangular, cylindrical and -irradiated hardware- (IH) MCCs, that could accept waste up to 100 Sv /Hr contact dose rates. The enormity of this project was quite clear and required extensive quality control, construction of batch plants, purchase of huge quantities of raw materials, setting up a production site in a neighboring city, relocation of personnel from company headquarters, and safely transporting 8,000 Tons of MCC components 75 miles one-way on West Texas highways daily. Most important of all, this was accomplished safely with no incidents, no component failures or rejects, and on schedule. The start of receipt, of -in-compact waste- and -out-of-compact waste- was conducted virtually in a 3 month period time span. To help guarantee success and quality of product, all forms had surfaces machined, heavy duty elastomer coatings were applied to concrete surfaces, only galvanized anchors were used, and the batch plant was run to strict ASME standards thus testing every 50 cubic yards of concrete poured. With significant teamwork and success from Vendors such as DNSI, WCS and the Texas Compact has evolved as one of the leading radioactive waste sites in the U.S. and the world, providing safe, secure and compliant permanent waste disposal services by using technical expertise and innovation of the highest standards. (authors)

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Measurement Quality Objective Considerations for Residual Alpha Surface Radioactivity Measurements at Remediation Sites - 16522

Surveys for residual alpha surface radioactivity on materials, equipment, and other non-porous surfaces are most-commonly performed using the traditional 'best available' equipment. The best available equipment for measuring alpha surface radioactivity includes portable gas-flow proportional or scintillation detectors with active surface areas typically ranging from 50 to 800 square centimeters (cm{sup 2}). The measurement equipment is offered by numerous service providers and instrument vendors applying basic detection principles that date back to the early-Atomic Age. The detector face is held as close to the surface as possible and scanned at a typical rate of 2 to 5 centimeters per second (cm/s). Any audible or visual indication of elevated alpha activity would result in a more careful assessment of the possible 'hot spot'. Modern surface contamination surveys continue to employ these best available technologies while endeavoring to achieve ever more restrictive measurement quality objectives and screening or release criteria. This paper considers the possibly unforeseen consequences to sensitivity and precision as scanning speeds are reduced to meet constraining measurement quality objectives. Sensitivity calculations are conducted to demonstrate how application of real-world efficiencies and the most common survey approaches are inadequate to meet sensitivity objectives based on American National Standard N13.12-2013, Surface and Volume Radioactivity Standards for Clearance screening criteria. Alternate data collection and assessment methodologies are offered to enhance the defensibility of collected data with stakeholders. Limitations of available or applied alpha survey technologies should be considered when establishing survey programs at project sites where alpha-emitting radionuclides are expected to contribute to residual surface radioactivity. These include but are not limited to nuclear fuel-cycle sites, military/weapons/energy research and production facilities, and 19.-20. Century-era commercial/ industrial/research/medical facilities where radioactive materials were handled. (authors)

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Development and Delivery of National Strategic Approaches to Radioactive Waste Management in the UK - 16595

The UK has limited capacity for the management of radioactive wastes. Such capacity is needed to enable nuclear and non-nuclear sectors to continue to make responsible use of radioactive substances (e.g. for health care provision) as well as to deliver key objectives such as the decommissioning and clean-up of the civil nuclear legacy. A revision in UK LLW policy in 2007 led to the development of a range of national LLW strategies, each focusing on a particular radioactive waste sector. For various reasons each of the strategies was developed in a different way. The success of these strategies to-date includes the development of a range of new routes for LLW management, greater transparency and understanding of the challenges facing LLW management across the UK, and recognition of priorities for national work, e.g., to address issues such as the management of radioactive asbestos waste and the treatment of metallic radioactive wastes. The work also revealed common issues across each of the waste producing sectors, and the opportunity to improve future waste management through further integration. (authors)

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Radioactive Test Platform Demonstrating the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste Process at Hanford - 18628

The Hanford Site is implementing a phased process for treating liquid legacy radioactive waste. The process is called the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste process (DFLAW). The DFLAW includes a filtration and ion-exchange unit in the Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) that removes solids and cesium. This pretreat feed is then sent to a vitrification facility where glass-forming solids are added and the waste is turned into glass in a melter. The melter off-gas liquid condensate is evaporated in the Effluent Management Facility (EMF), with the concentrate recycled back into the feed. A laboratory-scale test platform has been built to test various aspects of the DFLAW process using samples of actual radioactive waste. The current platform represents four of the major unit operations: filtration, ion-exchange, vitrification, and off-gas condensation. A lab scale EMF is being designed to supplement the current platform. The platform is expandable to add any or all unit operations. The radioactive test platform has three missions. The first is simply to demonstrate the DFLAW process with real waste. A second objective is to address flowsheet gaps and opportunities, some of which require testing with real waste. Some gaps and opportunities include addressing the fate of mercury in the flowsheet, evaluating salt and aluminum precipitation, and proving new glass formulations with real waste. A third objective of the radioactive test platform is to demonstrate or evaluate future operations and alternative flowsheets. Some of the future operations evaluated will be the life expectancy of the resin in real waste, resin sampling, evaluation of how waste affects melter throughput, and grouting various primary and secondary waste streams. The radioactive test platform is therefore a crucial tool for verifying and optimizing the DFLAW flowsheet at Hanford with real waste. (authors)

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Environmental evaluation of radioactivity levels and associated radiation hazards in groundwater around the WIPP site

Groundwater may contain radioactive substances which can be dangerous to human health. Concentrations of natural radionuclides polonium (Po), thorium (Th), uranium (U), and radium (Ra) isotopes were measured in groundwater samples collected from different locations in the vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site in Carlsbad, New Mexico. The average values of gross activity concentrations of 210 Po, 228 Th, 238 U, 234 U, 226 Ra and 228 Ra isotopes were determined to be 1.62 Bq L -1 in shallow groundwater and 5.88 Bq L -1 in deep groundwater, respectively. The total radioactivity in deep groundwater was higher than that in shallow groundwater, and most of the radioactivity in the water is from 226 Ra. Furthermore, the effective doses for ingestion of natural radionuclides were about 0.333 mSv y–1 for shallow groundwater and about 1.338 mSv y –1 for deep groundwater samples, which are higher than the World Health Organization (WHO, 2017) guideline level (0.1 mSv y –1 ) for drinking water. Ra dominated the total ingestion dose, contributing 93.06 % and 75.40 % of the total effective doses to the deep and shallow groundwater, respectively. The ingrowth and decay of natural radionuclides suggested that 228 Ra/ 226 Ra ratio can be a useful indicator of the source of radioactive contamination. The radioactivity data obtained from the investigated groundwater samples can be used to establish a baseline for radioactivity levels in groundwater around the WIPP site.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Review of particle deposition to and removal from clothing, skin, and hair after a radioactive airborne dispersal event

Explosive Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) – aka dirty bombs – are seen as a credible method to carry out a radiological terror attack. After exploding a radioactive source, the radionuclide-laden plume will be blown downwind of ground zero, with particles falling out and potentially depositing on people caught in and under the cloud. Some of these people may not show any sign of radiation sickness and therefore not realize they have been contaminated and may take the radioactive particulate with them on their daily activities, thus spreading the radioactive particulate outside the initially contaminated area. This paper reviews the scientific literature to better understand the rate at which particulate deposits on and is removed from the different “surfaces” of a person, i.e., hair, skin, and clothing. Prior research indicates that: 1) particle deposition is usually higher on skin than on hair and clothing; 2) particle deposition is greater for a person with higher skin moisture, 3) stronger wind increases the deposition flux onto a person, and 4) the fraction of particulate deposited on the hair, skin, and clothing respectively depends on the length of the hair, assuming all the hair surface is available for deposition. The studies taken into consideration show that the largest uncertainty in particulate deposition onto a person is due to clothing type because of the different possible weave arrangements and tightness which translate into differences in actual surface area and surface roughness. A factor of 2-to-20 variation in deposition rate was found. Removal of the particulate from the contaminated person may be due to wind, a person's movement, and/or contact transfer, i.e., by touching a different clean surface. Experiments show that the majority of the particulate is resuspended within 2–6 h mostly depending on the intensity of physical activity. The largest uncertainty in particulate removal from skin depends on the skin moisture, transfer rate of single-contact, and how many objects/people a person touches per hour. No data for hair were found for particle removal and resuspension. The studies considered did not utilize radionuclides directly; however, data on adhesion of radioactive vs. their non-radioactive counterpart have shown that the uncertainty due to the radioactivity of the particles is lower than that due to other factors. In conclusion, an idealized scenario involving a single building in the path of the cloud showed the impact of building-influenced flow on the cloud transport path and mixing, which affects the radiological dose the downwind population is exposed to and consequently the health effects.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Impact of boundary layer simulation on predicting radioactive pollutant dispersion: a case study for HANARO Research Reactor using the WRF-MMIF-CALPUFF modeling system

Wind plays an important role in cases of unexpected radioactive pollutant dispersion, deciding distribution and concentration of the leaked substance. The accurate prediction of wind has been challenging in numerical weather prediction models, especially near the surface because of the complex interaction between turbulent flow and topographic effect. As such, in this study, we investigated the characteristics of atmospheric dispersion of radioactive material (i.e. 137 Cs) according to the simulated boundary layer around the HANARO research nuclear reactor in Korea using the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF)-Mesoscale Model Interface (MMIF)-California Puff (CALPUFF) model system. We examined the impacts of orographic drag on wind field, stability calculation methods, and planetary boundary layer parameterizations on the dispersion of radioactive material under a radioactive leaking scenario. We found that inclusion of the orographic drag effect in the WRF model improved the wind prediction most significantly over the complex terrain area, leading the model system to estimate the radioactive concentration near the reactor more conservatively. We also emphasized the importance of the stability calculation method and employing the skillful boundary layer parameterization to ensure more accurate low atmospheric conditions, in order to simulate more feasible spatial distribution of the radioactive dispersion in leaking scenarios.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Opportunities in the Synthesis and Design of Radioactive Thin Films and Nanoparticles

Studies of radioactive isotopes at the liquid-solid or gas-solid interface are enabling a detailed mechanistic understanding the effects of radioactive decay on physical, biological, and chemical systems. In recent years, there has been a burgeoning interest in using radioactive isotopes for both imaging and therapeutic purposes by attaching them to the surface of colloidal nanoparticles. By merging the field of nanomedicine with the more mature field of internal radiation therapy, researchers are discovering new ways to diagnose and treat cancer. In this perspective, we discuss state-of-the-art radioactive thin films as applied to both well-defined surfaces and more complex nanoparticles. Here, we highlight the design considerations that are unique to radioactive films, which originate from the damaging and potentially self-destructive emissions produced during radioactive decay and highlight future opportunities in the largely underexplored area between radioisotope chemistry and nanoscience.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

RADIOACTIVE ELEMENTS IN THE STANDARD ATOMIC WEIGHTS TABLE

In the 1949 Report of the Atomic Weights Commission, a series of new elements were added to the Atomic Weights Table. Since these elements had been produced in the laboratory and were not discovered in nature, the atomic weight value of these artificial products would depend upon the production method. Since atomic weight is a property of an element as it occurs in nature, it would be incorrect to assign an atomic weight value to that element. As a result of that discussion, the Commission decided to provide only the mass number of the most stable (or longest-lived) known isotope as the number to be associated with these entries in the Atomic Weights Table. As a function of time, the mass number associated with various elements has changed as longer-lived isotopes of a particular element has been found in nature, or as improved half-life values of an element's isotopes might cause a shift in the longest-lived isotope from one mass to another. In the 1957 Report of the Atomic Weights Commission, it was decided to discontinue the listing of the mass number in the Atomic Weights Table on the grounds that the kind of information supplied by the mass number is inconsistent with the primary purpose of the Table, i.e., to provide accurate values of 'these constants' for use in various chemical calculations. In addition to the Table of Atomic Weights, the Commission included an auxiliary Table of Radioactive Elements for the first time, where the entry would be the isotope of that element which was the most stable, i.e., the one with the longest known half-life. In their 1973 Report, the Commission noted that the users of the main Table of Atomic Weights were dissatisfied with the omission of values for some elements in that Table and it was decided to reintroduce the mass number for the radioactive elements into the main Table. In their 1983 Report, the Commission decided that radioactive elements were considered to lack a characteristic terrestrial isotopic composition, from which an atomic weight value could be calculated to five or more figure accuracy, without prior knowledge of the sample involved. These elements were again listed in the Atomic Weights Table with no further information, i.e., with no mass number or atomic weight value. For the elements, which have no stable characteristic terrestrial isotopic composition, the data on the half-lives and the relative atomic masses for the nuclides of interest for those elements have been evaluated. The values of the half-lives with their uncertainties are listed in the table. The uncertainties are given for the last digit quoted of the half-life and are given in parentheses. A half-life entry for the Table having a value and an uncertainty of 7 {+-} 3 is listed in the half-life column as 7 (3). The criteria to include data in this Table, is to be the same as it has been for over sixty years. It is the same criteria, which are used for all data that are evaluated for inclusion in the Standard Table of Atomic Weights. If a report of data is published in a peer-reviewed journal, that data is evaluated and considered for inclusion in the appropriate table of the biennial report of the Atomic Weights Commission. As better data becomes available in the future, the information that is contained in either of the Tables of Standard Atomic Weights or in the Table of Radioactive Elements may be modified. It should be noted that the appearance of any datum in the Table of the Radioactive Elements is merely for the purposes of calculating an atomic mass value for any sample of a radioactive material, which might have a variety of isotopic compositions and it has no implication as to the priority for claiming discovery of a given element and is not intended to. The atomic mass values have been taken primarily from the 2003 Atomic Mass Table. Mass values for those radioisotopes that do not appear in the 2003 Atomic mass Table have been taken from preliminary data of the Atomic Mass Data Center. Most of the quoted half-lives.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Radioactivity Calculator for Research and Test Reactor Neutron-Activated Materials

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Nuclear Science User Facility (NSUF) supports nuclear energy-relevant research into the effects of radiation on nuclear fuels and structural materials. The NSUF provides access, at no cost to the researcher, to the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the High-Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), and other university and national laboratory research and test reactors for radiation effects experiments. Post-irradiation examination of materials poses some difficulties when studying neutron-irradiated materials due to the radioactivity levels of the materials. Inside a test reactor, under high neutron flux, stable materials can activate (capture a neutron) and become unstable or radioactive. These newly created radioactive materials decay, based on their respective half-lives, and emit energetic radiation. Nuclides with short half-lives are able to decay to sufficiently low radiation levels prior to the sample being removed from the reactor. However, nuclides with longer half-lives present a challenge since they must be handled with extreme caution and stored until their radioactivity levels decrease. If immediate examination is required, the examination may take place in a hot cell, which can dramatically increase the cost of the project. The NSUF has access to a variety of hot cells and characterization capabilities at national laboratories, universities, and industrial sites across the United States. In order to estimate the post-irradiation radioactivity levels of materials early in the experiment cycle, we created a radioactivity calculator, hosted on the NSUF web site (nsuf.inl.gov), which will consider three stages of neutron activations and decays for sample materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Real breakthrough in detection of radioactive sources by portal monitors with plastic detectors and New Advanced Source Identification Algorithm (ASIA-New)

Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) with plastic detectors represent the main instruments used for primary border (customs) radiation control. RPM are widely used because they are simple, reliable, relatively inexpensive and have a high sensitivity. However, experience using the RPM in various countries has revealed the systems have some grave shortcomings. There is a dramatic decrease of the probability of detection of radioactive sources under high suppression of the natural gamma background (radiation control of heavy cargoes, containers and, especially, trains). NORM (Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material) existing in objects under control trigger the so-called 'nuisance alarms', requiring a secondary inspection for source verification. At a number of sites, the rate of such alarms is so high it significantly complicates the work of customs and border officers. This paper presents a brief description of new variant of algorithm ASIA-New (New Advanced Source Identification Algorithm), which was developed by the Rapiscan company. It also demonstrates results of different tests and the capability of a new system to overcome the shortcomings stated above. New electronics and ASIA-New enables RPM to detect radioactive sources under a high background suppression (tested at 15-30%) and to verify the detected NORM (KCl) and the artificial isotopes (Co- 57, Ba-133 and other). New variant of ASIA is based on physical principles, a phenomenological approach and analysis of some important parameter changes during the vehicle passage through the monitor control area. Thanks to this capability main advantage of new system is that this system can be easily installed into any RPM with plastic detectors. Taking into account that more than 4000 RPM has been installed worldwide their upgrading by ASIA-New may significantly increase probability of detection and verification of radioactive sources even masked by NORM. This algorithm was tested for 1,395 passages of different transports (cars, trucks and trailers) without radioactive sources. It also was tested for 4,015 passages of these transports with radioactive sources of different activity (Co-57, Ba-133, Cs-137, Co-60, Ra-226, Th-232) and these sources masked by NORM (K-40) as well. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Assessment on Transport of Radioactive Species from Nuclear Facilities - 17079

It is generally recognized that radioactive nuclides are most hazardous fission products that could be released in the event of reactor accidents. The reactor coolant system of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear plant exhibits radioactivity from various sources. These radiation sources consist of the fission products from fuel element and activated products from corrosion products. The complex infrastructure of the processes does not allow detailed measurement of activity until after the reactor is shutdown. All of the components that require dismantling will be radioactive which was caused by neutron activation during operation, contamination by corrosion products, contamination by damaged by fuel rods and leaks by equipment. Due mainly to the various operation modes and their aging, there are the increasing needs to carry out repair works that are not sufficiently provided for by the original design. Many difficulties are involved in these tasks, namely, high radiation doses, cramped areas, hard to reach components, coupled with stringent quality conditions. The need to simulate the behavior of corrosion products in a nuclear power plant environment has attracted many researchers' attention. It has performed the in-depth reviews of the various theories and physics associated with the corrosion products transportation, the laboratory loop testing, and the field measurements in operating plants. Before we start the decommissioning of nuclear power plants, workers, the public and the environment shall be properly protected from radiation hazards. For this purpose, a safety assessment should be carried out relating to the potential hazards that may occur during the decommissioning. The radiological hazards involved in the decommissioning activities also should be identified, and be taken into account in the safety assessment. The radiation conditions of the primary circuit are determined by the activity of corrosion and fission products that have accumulated on the internal surfaces of the components. Therefore the estimation of contamination on the components is very important and, may be the first step in the reactor operation and decommissioning of components. The predominant radionuclide in the PWR primary coolant is Co-60, although Co-58 contributes significantly to radioactivity level at the early stage of a reactor operation. Since Co-60 is produced from the in-core Co-58, which is the source of cobalt in a reactor coolant system, many researchers have investigated its transmutation in the core, its transport around the system, and its subsequent deposition on surfaces. The major parameter influencing the behavior of radioactivity, such as Co-60 in the coolant, is the corrosion product oxides. The objective of this work is to analyze the corrosion product activity transported in the primary circuit by using a multi-region model. This model, which is incorporated with the mass and activity transport between the dissolved corrosion products in the coolant and the surface, describes the specific activity of corrosion products in coolant and on the surfaces according to the operation modes as well as decommissioning stage. In order to evaluate the analysis of the corrosion products in an integral type reactor, a multi-region mass balance model is applied. The specific activities of the various species on the surface of core and steam generator throughout the effective full power hours, 15,000 hours, are simulated for the various modes of operations. As a result, the specific activities of corrosion products from the surface of primary circuit were shown as very low compared to those of other commercial nuclear power plants. In this simulated reactor, a significant reduction of specific activities from the activated corrosion products is obtained due to the introduction of titanium alloy to the steam generator tube and the avoidance of boric acid induced corrosion. From this result we conclude that we are able to predict the level of radioactive nuclides generated by corrosion products in a primary circuit according to the various modes of operations by using multi-region model. In this point of view it is concluded that this multi-region model can be used as an engineering tool for analysis of the corrosion products within the primary coolant for the nuclear power plants. It is also considered that it is possible to extend to a calculation tool for estimating the radiological hazards involved in the decommissioning activities in terms of safety assessment. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗