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At least 163 records · Page 9

Improvement of Algorithms for Pressure Maintenance Systems in Drum-Separators of RBMK-1000 Reactors

The main tasks and challenges for pressure regulation in the drum-separators of RBMK-1000 reactors are described. New approaches to constructing algorithms for pressure control in drum-separators by electro-hydraulic turbine control systems are discussed. Results are provided from tests of the operation of modernized pressure regulators during fast transients with reductions in reactor power.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A human automation interaction concept for a small modular reactor control room - 101

Many advanced nuclear power plant (NPP) designs incorporate higher degrees of automation than the existing fleet of NPPs. Automation is being introduced or proposed in NPPs through a wide variety of systems and technologies, such as advanced displays, computer-based procedures, advanced alarm systems, and computerized operator support systems. Research consistently finds that there is a fundamental tradeoff between system performance with increased automation and reduced human performance. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) researchers and NuScale Power human factors and operations staff are working on a collaborative project to address the human performance challenges of increased automation and to determine the principles that lead to optimal performance in highly automated systems. This paper will describe this concept in detail and will describe an experimental test of the concept. The benefits and challenges of the approach will be discussed. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Model-free adaptive control for MHTGR-based nuclear steam supply systems - 144

Modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) uses helium as coolant and graphite as both moderator and structural materials. Due to its inherent safety feature, MHTGR has been regarded as an important candidate for next generation of nuclear plants. By coupling with the once-through steam generator (OTSG), MHTGR can be utilized to form the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) for producing superheated steam, which can be adopted for nuclear plants with high efficiency. Power-level control of is important for the stable and efficient operation of the MHTGR-based NSSS, and it is necessary to develop the power-level control law that is robust to physical and thermal parameters and can guarantee the closed-loop stability in normal and even abnormal conditions. In this paper, a model-free adaptive power-level control law is developed for the MHTGR-based NSSS, which is free from physical and thermal-hydraulic parameters, takes the simple forms of proportional-integral (PI) or proportional-differential (PD) feedback law, and can provide globally asymptotic closed-loop stability. Then, it is applied to the NSSS control of the two modular high temperature gas-cooled nuclear plant HTR-PM. Numerical simulation results in normal power maneuver and some typical abnormal cases show that this new control law can provide satisfactory closed-loop stability as well as transient performance. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Refurbishment program of HANARO control computer system

HANARO, an open-tank-in-pool type research reactor with 30 MW thermal power, achieved its first criticality in 1995. The programmable controller system MLC (Multi Loop Controller) manufactured by MOORE has been used to control and regulate HANARO since 1995. We made a plan to replace the control computer because the system supplier no longer provided technical support and thus no spare parts were available. Aged and obsolete equipment and the shortage of spare parts supply could have caused great problems. The first consideration for a replacement of the control computer dates back to 2007. The supplier did not produce the components of MLC so that this system would no longer be guaranteed. We established the upgrade and refurbishment program in 2009 so as to keep HANARO up to date in terms of safety. We designed the new control computer system that would replace MLC. The new computer system is HCCS (HANARO Control Computer System). The refurbishing activity is in progress and will finish in 2013. The goal of the refurbishment program is a functional replacement of the reactor control system in consideration of suitable interfaces, compliance with no special outage for installation and commissioning, and no change of the well-proved operation philosophy. HCCS is a DCS (Discrete Control System) using PLC manufactured by RTP. To enhance the reliability, we adapt a triple processor system, double I/O system and hot swapping function. This paper describes the refurbishment program of the HANARO control system including the design requirements of HCCS. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

I&C Modeling in SPAR Models

The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models for the U.S. commercial nuclear power plants currently have very limited instrumentation and control (I&C) modeling [1]. Most of the I&C components in the operating plant SPAR models are related to the reactor protection system. This was identified as a finding during the industry peer review of SPAR models. While the Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) actuation and control system was incorporated into the Peach Bottom Unit 2 SPAR model in a recent effort [2], various approaches to expend resources for detailed I&C modeling in other SPAR models are investigated.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Improving nuclear power plant safety and operating margins through linear quadratic estimation - 290

Redundant measurement, trip, and actuation channels are required for reactor trips and engineered safety systems in nuclear power plants. There are three or four independent channels in existing plants, depending on the system. To prevent failures, consistent signals from any two channels together can trip the reactor or actuate safety systems. Measurements associated with safety trips and actuations include uncertainties related to the instruments making the measurements and to process conditions. Margins that include measurement uncertainties are set for each trip and actuation channel as though it were the only one taking action, thus preserving independence. There are sensors, however, that provide partially redundant information that could be used to decrease the uncertainty associated with measurements of plant conditions, while maintaining the three-channel redundancy important to plant safety. Reducing these uncertainties would both improve plant safety by providing more accurate knowledge of plant conditions and improve the operating margins that must take such uncertainties into account. This paper demonstrates how information that is already available to plant instrumentation and control systems and is already redundant can be used through software routines to reduce the error that must be taken into account in reactor trip and safety system actuation setpoints. Issues that would have to be addressed related to standards, licensing, and implementation are also discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Application of quantitative methods for reliability testing of a nuclear power plant digital rod position indication diagnostic system - 391

Obsolescence, aging, reliability, and performance issues are driving nuclear facilities to replace conventional analog Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems with digital technologies. In addition, the designs of the next generation of nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), will incorporate digital I and C for most, if not all, of their safety and non-safety related functions. As part of an on-going research and development (R and D) effort under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Analysis and Measurement Services Corporation (AMS) is developing a platform to provide automated testing of digital I and C systems and create a standard method of evaluation for reliability assessments. This hands-on R and D effort has produced a Software Reliability Tester (SRT), which is a set of software and hardware tools designed to automate the testing of digital I and C systems to measure and quantify how well the systems perform under normal operating conditions and in the presence of faults. Furthermore, the SRT provides the foundation for a practical tool to automate verification and validation (V and V) activities and reduce the amount of testing time of digital I and C systems. When combined with its capabilities of integrating both reliability and fault tolerance quantification, the SRT can be used to ensure that digital I and C implementations are both safe and cost-effective for the nuclear industry. This paper describes the application of the SRT to perform V and V of a new Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) diagnostic system. The DRPI diagnostic system is a digital system that monitors the rod address and rod position data bus voltages of typical DRPI systems in nuclear power plants to detect and diagnose faults. For this application, the SRT was configured to exercise the inputs of the DRPI diagnostic system, and test cases were generated for common system faults such as address and data bit errors, bus voltage, and timing problems. These test cases were applied by the SRT hardware as voltage inputs to the DRPI diagnostic system and the outputs were compared to expected values generated by a model of the DRPI diagnostic system. Included in the paper is a description of the overall design of the SRT including the hardware and software architectures. Methodologies for automating test cases are also described. V and V using the SRT demonstrates the benefits of automated testing and qualification to provide a quantitative assessment of reliability and cost effective implementation of digital I and C in existing and next generation nuclear power plants. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Instrumentation, control, and human system interface contributions to historical severe accidents - 301

In 2015 EPRI completed a study of historical severe accidents. This study was intended to identify the lessons that these events had for instrumentation and control (I and C), and human systems interfaces (HSI) for nuclear power plants. The project studied 19 severe accidents that were identified by a parallel study that was underway for the International Atomic Energy Agency. I and C or HSI issues made significant contributions to 18 of the 19 events studied. This paper will summarize the I and C and HSI deficiencies that contributed to the propagation of the accidents, discuss the likely causes of these deficiencies and describe the role of I and C and HSI in finally terminating the events. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Enhancing power plant safety through simulated cyber events - 341

There are gaps in understanding how a cyber-attack would manifest itself within power plants and what these events would look like within the control room from an operator's perspective. This is especially true for nuclear power plants where safety has much broader consequences than nonnuclear plants. The operating and emergency procedures that operators currently use are likely inadequate for targeted cyber-attacks. This research focuses on understanding how a cyber event would affect the operation of the plant, how an operator would perceive the event, and if the operator's actions would keep the plant in a safe condition. This research is part of Sandia's Laboratory Directed Research and Development program where a nuclear power plant cyber model of the control system digital architecture is coupled with a generic pressurized water reactor plant training simulator. Cyber event scenarios will be performed on the coupled system with plant operators. The scenarios simulate plant conditions that may exist during a cyber-attack, component failure, or insider sabotage, and provide an understanding of the displayed information and the actual plant conditions. These scenarios will determine if plant operators can 1) recognize that they are under cyber-attack and 2) take appropriate actions to keep the plant safe. This will also provide the opportunity to assess the operator cognitive workload during such events and identify where improvements might be made. Experiments with nuclear power plant operators will be carried out over FY 2018 and results of the research are expected by the end of FY 2018. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

MARVEL Instrumentation, Control, and Software Considerations

This paper details the various I&C considerations and design decisions made throughout the MARVEL (Micro-reactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation) project, including sensor and actuator selection, safety-related functionality, digital control hardware and software, and testing methodologies. Key challenges such as managing radiation, temperature, and space constraints are discussed, along with the trade-offs between using standard equipment and custom solutions. The successful integration of off-the-shelf components, the emphasis on minimizing safety-related instrumentation, and the lessons learned from prototyping and testing are highlighted. The authors aim to provide insights that can benefit future micro-reactor designs and emphasize the importance of real-world testing in advancing reactor technology.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Synthesis and simulation of a two-level magnetic control system for tokamak-reactor plasma

Synthesis and simulation of a hierarchical (two-level) magnetic system for controlling a tokamakreactor plasma throughout the entire divertor discharge stage, including the plasma current ramp-up phase, are carried out. The plasma vertical velocity is stabilized about zero by using a proportional controller in a scalar control loop. The gain of the controller-the coefficient that ensures the required stability margins-is found by using a second-order linear model constructed by solving the identification problem on the basis of numerical experiments carried out with the DINA plasmophysical computer code. The internal cascade (the lower level of the system) for tracking the scenario currents in the poloidal magnetic field coils is synthesized by using the complete dynamic channel decoupling method. The external cascade (the upper level of the system) for tracking the plasma current and shape is synthesized by using the method of pseudoseparation of the control channels and the multidimensional diagonal proportional-integral controller, with proportional, integrating, and double integrating units connected in parallel in each channel. In the hierarchical control system, the lower level (the internal cascade) is subordinated to the upper level (the external cascade). The external cascade acts on the internal one by the signals that set the required currents in the coils of the central solenoid and of the poloidal magnetic field in order to ensure the required plasma current and shape in accordance with the output signals from the plant, which are transmitted through the vector feedback channel. The lower level is aimed exclusively at tracking the reference inputs by tracking the currents in the control coils. An operating mode of the system under the conditions of current saturation in the control coils is proposed and implemented. Results are presented from numerical simulations of the two-level (cascade) control system for reference scenario no. 2 of the ITER database (www.iter.org) with the DINA nonlinear code.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

A qualitative assessment of current CCF guidance based on a review of safety system digital implementation changes with evolving technology - 148

This paper is a summary of a study performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate current policy on software common-cause failure (CCF). The study reported in this paper is one of several that contributed to the technical basis to inform NRC staff. The study first reviewed policies and assessment guidance as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, 'Instrumentation and Controls', in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. The study then examined instrumentation and controls (I and C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF remains appropriate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed. The methodology adopted was to review the vendors' technology and software implementation processes for digital safety systems as technology evolved. The following three representative safety systems were selected to provide illustrative examples: - Eagle 21 was selected to represent vintage microprocessor-based technology used from the 1980's to mid-1990's, - TELEPERM XS (TXS) was selected to represent second generation microprocessor-based technology used from the mid-1990's to the 2000's, and - The advanced logic system (ALS) was selected to represent the latest trend of using technology based on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Technology implementations were reviewed in light of the basic premise of the NRC in BTP 7-19 (Revision 6), that software-based or software-logic-based digital system development errors are a credible source of CCF and therefore are susceptible to CCF because identical copies of the software-based logic and architecture are present in redundant divisions of safety-related systems. BTP 7-19 categorizes firmware and logic developed from software-based development systems all under software. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluating situation awareness in the control room: the development and initial testing of the process awareness and situation understanding (PASU) measure - 267

What should we ask the control room crew about when evaluating situation awareness? Currently available freeze probe techniques concentrate on trends of process parameters. Analysis of control room work shows that there are far more involved in control room crews' Situation Awareness (SA). The Process Awareness and Situation Understanding (PASU) measure has been developed from an analysis of control room work and includes probing the crew about the status of safety functions and main plant systems such as coolant supply, ordinary and emergency power supply, main reactor parameters, and main plant parameters. Results from a nuclear control room evaluation showed that the crew's overview of safety functions developed differently across scenario phases compared to the crew's overview of main process parameters. SA in the nuclear control room seems to be a multifaceted phenomenon and valid measurement needs to cover its aspects. Initial empirical testing showed that PASU was sensitive to scenario phases and related to other performance indicators. PASU, or measures based on similar principles, can be a valid and useful probe based technique for use in the evaluation of control room design and control room work. The measure will fill a gap in the research literature and will serve as an example of SA measurement with utility for control room evaluation. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Effect of Degraded Digital Instrumentation and Control systems on Human-system Interfaces and Operator Performance

Integrated digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in new and advanced nuclear power plants (NPPs) will support operators in monitoring and controlling the plants. Even though digital systems typically are expected to be reliable, their potential for degradation or failure significantly could affect the operators performance and, consequently, jeopardize plant safety. This U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) research investigated the effects of degraded I&C systems on human performance and on plant operations. The objective was to develop technical basis and guidance for human factors engineering (HFE) reviews addressing the operator's ability to detect and manage degraded digital I&C conditions. We reviewed pertinent standards and guidelines, empirical studies, and plant operating experience. In addition, we evaluated the potential effects of selected failure modes of the digital feedwater control system of a currently operating pressurized water reactor (PWR) on human-system interfaces (HSIs) and the operators performance. Our findings indicated that I&C degradations are prevalent in plants employing digital systems, and the overall effects on the plant's behavior can be significant, such as causing a reactor trip or equipment to operate unexpectedly. I&C degradations may affect the HSIs used by operators to monitor and control the plant. For example, deterioration of the sensors can complicate the operators interpretation of displays, and sometimes may mislead them by making it appear that a process disturbance has occurred. We used the findings as the technical basis upon which to develop HFE review guidance.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Cyber security best practices for the nuclear industry

When deploying software based systems, such as, digital instrumentation and controls for the nuclear industry, it is vital to include cyber security assessment as part of architecture and development process. When integrating and delivering software-intensive systems for the nuclear industry, engineering teams should make use of a secure, requirements driven, software development life cycle, ensuring security compliance and optimum return on investment. Reliability protections, data loss prevention, and privacy enforcement provide a strong case for installing strict cyber security policies. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis and improvement of input channel selection algorithm for reliability of control systems in nuclear power plants - 138

In most of non-safety NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) control systems, a process input is composed of two channels for redundancy. In a normal situation, the average of both input channels is used in the control algorithm. If a failed channel is detected, the 'channel selection algorithm' chooses the remaining normal input channel. For a bumpless transition, many implemented control systems include the 'ramping rate' function, which makes it possible for the selected input to slowly approach the new input channel. However, it recently turned out that this function adopted for positive effects may result in unintended consequences for the related control system and the plant in certain cases. Due to a process transient in the plant according to a significant event, any related sensor input signal can rapidly change and finally exceed the pre-defined range for detecting an out-of-range event in a short time. During the process of channel conversion due to a rapid transient in the plant, the processed input from the redundant channels can be distorted if the ramping rate function is not properly implemented. As a result, it can result in a plant shutdown because the control system fails to perform the critical function to mitigate a plant transient. To solve these potential problems, we analyzed the overall causes and derived a proposed algorithm for improving reliability and performance of the control systems. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Methodology for the Incorporation of Passive Component Aging Modeling into the RAVEN/ RELAP-7 Environment

Passive system, structure and components (SSCs) will degrade over their operation life and this degradation may cause to reduction in the safety margins of a nuclear power plant. In traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using the event-tree/fault-tree methodology, passive SSC failure rates are generally based on generic plant failure data and the true state of a specific plant is not reflected realistically. To address aging effects of passive SSCs in the traditional PRA methodology [1] does consider physics based models that account for the operating conditions in the plant, however, [1] does not include effects of surveillance/inspection. This paper represents an overall methodology for the incorporation of aging modeling of passive components into the RAVEN/RELAP-7 environment which provides a framework for performing dynamic PRA. Dynamic PRA allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties (including those associated with maintenance activities) in a consistent phenomenological and probabilistic framework and is often needed when there is complex process/hardware/software/firmware/ human interaction [2]. Dynamic PRA has gained attention recently due to difficulties in the traditional PRA modeling of aging effects of passive components using physics based models and also in the modeling of digital instrumentation and control systems. RAVEN (Reactor Analysis and Virtual control Environment) [3] is a software package under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) as an online control logic driver and post-processing tool. It is coupled to the plant transient code RELAP-7 (Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program) also currently under development at INL [3], as well as RELAP 5 [4]. The overall methodology aims to: • Address multiple aging mechanisms involving large number of components in a computational feasible manner where sequencing of events is conditioned on the physical conditions predicted in a simulation environment such as RELAP-7. • Identify the risk-significant passive components, their failure modes and anticipated rates of degradation • Incorporate surveillance and maintenance activities and their effects into the plant state and into component aging progress. • Asses aging affects in a dynamic simulation environment 1. C. L. SMITH, V. N. SHAH, T. KAO, G. APOSTOLAKIS, “Incorporating Ageing Effects into Probabilistic Risk Assessment –A Feasibility Study Utilizing Reliability Physics Models,” NUREG/CR-5632, USNRC, (2001). 2. T. ALDEMIR, “A Survey of Dynamic Methodologies for Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants, Annals of Nuclear Energy, 52, 113-124, (2013). 3. C. RABITI, A. ALFONSI, J. COGLIATI, D. MANDELLI and R. KINOSHITA “Reactor Analysis and Virtual Control Environment (RAVEN) FY12 Report,” INL/EXT-12-27351, (2012). 4. D. ANDERS et.al, "RELAP-7 Level 2 Milestone Report: Demonstration of a Steady State Single Phase PWR Simulation with RELAP-7," INL/EXT-12-25924, (2012).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗