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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1999

Monte Carlo mixture model of lifetime cancer incidence risk from radiation exposure on shuttle and international space station

Estimating uncertainty in lifetime cancer risk for human exposure to space radiation is a unique challenge. Conventional risk assessment with low-linear-energy-transfer (LET)-based risk from Japanese atomic bomb survivor studies may be inappropriate for relativistic protons and nuclei in space due to track structure effects. This paper develops a Monte Carlo mixture model (MCMM) for transferring additive, National Institutes of Health multiplicative, and multiplicative excess cancer incidence risks based on Japanese atomic bomb survivor data to determine excess incidence risk for various US astronaut exposure profiles. The MCMM serves as an anchor point for future risk projection methods involving biophysical models of DNA damage from space radiation. Lifetime incidence risks of radiation-induced cancer for the MCMM based on low-LET Japanese data for nonleukemia (all cancers except leukemia) were 2.77 (90% confidence limit, 0.75-11.34) for males exposed to 1 Sv at age 45 and 2.20 (90% confidence limit, 0.59-10.12) for males exposed at age 55. For females, mixture model risks for nonleukemia exposed separately to 1 Sv at ages of 45 and 55 were 2.98 (90% confidence limit, 0.90-11.70) and 2.44 (90% confidence limit, 0.70-10.30), respectively. Risks for high-LET 200 MeV protons (LET=0.45 keV/micrometer), 1 MeV alpha-particles (LET=100 keV/micrometer), and 600 MeV iron particles (LET=180 keV/micrometer) were scored on a per particle basis by determining the particle fluence required for an average of one particle per cell nucleus of area 100 micrometer(2). Lifetime risk per proton was 2.68x10(-2)% (90% confidence limit, 0.79x10(-3)%-0. 514x10(-2)%). For alpha-particles, lifetime risk was 14.2% (90% confidence limit, 2.5%-31.2%). Conversely, lifetime risk per iron particle was 23.7% (90% confidence limit, 4.5%-53.0%). Uncertainty in the DDREF for high-LET particles may be less than that for low-LET radiation because typically there is very little dose-rate dependence. Probability density functions for high-LET radiation quality and dose-rate may be preferable to conventional risk assessment approaches. Nuclear reactions and track structure effects in tissue may not be properly estimated by existing data using in vitro models for estimating RBEs. The method used here is being extended to estimate uncertainty in spacecraft shielding effectiveness in various space radiation environments.

NASA Center LaRC↗
NASA NTRS1998

T wave alternans as a predictor of recurrent ventricular tachyarrhythmias in ICD recipients: prospective comparison with conventional risk markers

INTRODUCTION: The current standard for arrhythmic risk stratification is electrophysiologic (EP) testing, which, due to its invasive nature, is limited to patients already known to be at high risk. A number of noninvasive tests, such as determination of left ventricular ejection fraction (LVEF) or heart rate variability, have been evaluated as additional risk stratifiers. Microvolt T wave alternans (TWA) is a promising new risk marker. Prospective evaluation of noninvasive risk markers in low- or moderate-risk populations requires studies involving very large numbers of patients, and in such studies, documentation of the occurrence of ventricular tachyarrhythmias is difficult. In the present study, we identified a high-risk population, recipients of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD), and prospectively compared microvolt TWA with invasive EP testing and other risk markers with respect to their ability to predict recurrence of ventricular tachyarrhythmias as documented by ICD electrograms. METHODS AND RESULTS: Ninety-five patients with a history of ventricular tachyarrhythmias undergoing implantation of an ICD underwent EP testing, assessment of TWA, as well as determination of LVEF, baroreflex sensitivity, signal-averaged ECG, analysis of 24-hour Holter monitoring, and QT dispersion from the 12-lead surface ECG. The endpoint of the study was first appropriate ICD therapy for electrogram-documented ventricular fibrillation or tachycardia during follow-up. Kaplan-Meier survival analysis revealed that TWA (P < 0.006) and LVEF (P < 0.04) were the only significant univariate risk stratifiers. EP testing was not statistically significant (P < 0.2). Multivariate Cox regression analysis revealed that TWA was the only statistically significant independent risk factor. CONCLUSIONS: Measurement of microvolt TWA compared favorably with both invasive EP testing and other currently used noninvasive risk assessment methods in predicting recurrence of ventricular tachyarrhythmias in ICD recipients. This study suggests that TWA might also be a powerful tool for risk stratification in low- or moderate-risk patients, and needs to be prospectively evaluated in such populations.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS2004

Uncertainties in estimates of the risks of late effects from space radiation

Methods used to project risks in low-Earth orbit are of questionable merit for exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data and knowledge of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) heavy ions, which causes estimates of the risk of late effects to be highly uncertain. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Using the linear-additivity model for radiation risks, we use Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective uncertainty distributions in each factor to obtain an estimate of the overall uncertainty in risk projections. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including a deep space outpost and Mars missions of duration of 360, 660, and 1000 days. The major results are the quantification of the uncertainties in current risk estimates, the identification of factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties, and the development of a method to quantify candidate approaches to reduce uncertainties or mitigate risks. The large uncertainties in GCR risk projections lead to probability distributions of risk that mask any potential risk reduction using the "optimization" of shielding materials or configurations. In contrast, the design of shielding optimization approaches for solar particle events and trapped protons can be made at this time and promising technologies can be shown to have merit using our approach. The methods used also make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative metrics, e.g., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well-defined confidence limits. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of COSPAR.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS2007

Robust Derivation of Risk Reduction Strategies

Effective risk reduction strategies can be derived mechanically given sufficient characterization of the risks present in the system and the effectiveness of available risk reduction techniques. In this paper, we address an important question: can we reliably expect mechanically derived risk reduction strategies to be better than fixed or hand-selected risk reduction strategies, given that the quantitative assessment of risks and risk reduction techniques upon which mechanical derivation is based is difficult and likely to be inaccurate? We consider this question relative to two methods for deriving effective risk reduction strategies: the strategic method defined by Kazman, Port et al [Port et al, 2005], and the Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP) tool [Feather & Cornford, 2003]. We performed a number of sensitivity experiments to evaluate how inaccurate knowledge of risk and risk reduction techniques affect the performance of the strategies computed by the Strategic Method compared to a variety of alternative strategies. The experimental results indicate that strategies computed by the Strategic Method were significantly more effective than the alternative risk reduction strategies, even when knowledge of risk and risk reduction techniques was very inaccurate. The robustness of the Strategic Method suggests that its use should be considered in a wide range of projects.

risk reduction↗
NASA NTRS2020

Ensemble Methodologies for Astronaut Cancer Risk Assessment in the face of Large Uncertainties

A new approach to NASA space radiation risk modeling has successfully extended the current NASA probabilistic cancer risk model to an ensemble framework able to consider sub-model parameter uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty in a radiation quality parameter) as well as model-form uncertainty associated with differing theoretical or empirical formalisms (e.g. combined dose-rate and radiation quality effects). Ensemble methodologies are already widely used in weather prediction, modeling of infectious disease outbreaks, and certain terrestrial radiation protection applications to better understand how uncertainty may influence risk decision-making. Applying ensemble methodologies to space radiation risk projections offers the potential to efficiently incorporate emerging research results, allow for the incorporation of future (including international) models, improve uncertainty quantification for underlying sub-models developed against sparse experimental data, and reduce the impact of subjective bias on risk projections. Moreover, risk forecasting across an ensemble of multiple predictive models can provide stakeholders additional information on risk acceptance if current health/medical standards cannot be met or the level of knowledge doesn’t permit a specific risk or exposure limit to be developed for future space exploration missions. In this work, ensemble risk projections implementing multiple sub-models of radiation quality, dose and dose-rate effectiveness factors, excess risk, and latency as ensemble members are presented. Initial consensus methods for ensemble model weights and correlations to account for individual model bias are discussed. In these analyses, the ensemble forecast compares well to results from NASA's current operational cancer risk projection model used to assess permissible exposure limits and permissible mission durations for astronauts. However, a large range of projected risk values are obtained at the upper 95th confidence level where models must extrapolate beyond available biological data sets; closer agreement is seen at the median + one sigma due to the inherent similarities in available models. Future work, including the addition of new models and methods for statistical correlation between predictive members are discussed to define alternate ways of thinking about risk and ‘acceptable’ uncertainty with respect to NASA’s current permissible exposure limits.

space radiation↗
NASA NTRS2004

Integrated Risk Management Within NASA Programs/Projects

As NASA Project Risk Management activities continue to evolve, the need to successfully integrate risk management processes across the life cycle, between functional disciplines, stakeholders, various management policies, and within cost, schedule and performance requirements/constraints become more evident and important. Today's programs and projects are complex undertakings that include a myriad of processes, tools, techniques, management arrangements and other variables all of which must function together in order to achieve mission success. The perception and impact of risk may vary significantly among stakeholders and may influence decisions that may have unintended consequences on the project during a future phase of the life cycle. In these cases, risks may be unintentionally and/or arbitrarily transferred to others without the benefit of a comprehensive systemic risk assessment. Integrating risk across people, processes, and project requirements/constraints serves to enhance decisions, strengthen communication pathways, and reinforce the ability of the project team to identify and manage risks across the broad spectrum of project management responsibilities. The ability to identify risks in all areas of project management increases the likelihood a project will identify significant issues before they become problems and allows projects to make effective and efficient use of shrinking resources. By getting a total team integrated risk effort, applying a disciplined and rigorous process, along with understanding project requirements/constraints provides the opportunity for more effective risk management. Applying an integrated approach to risk management makes it possible to do a better job at balancing safety, cost, schedule, operational performance and other elements of risk. This paper will examine how people, processes, and project requirements/constraints can be integrated across the project lifecycle for better risk management and ultimately improve the chances for mission success.

Connley, Warren↗
NASA NTRS2007

Evaluating Shielding Effectiveness for Reducing Space Radiation Cancer Risks

We discuss calculations of probability distribution functions (PDF) representing uncertainties in projecting fatal cancer risk from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and solar particle events (SPE). The PDF s are used in significance tests of the effectiveness of potential radiation shielding approaches. Uncertainties in risk coefficients determined from epidemiology data, dose and dose-rate reduction factors, quality factors, and physics models of radiation environments are considered in models of cancer risk PDF s. Competing mortality risks and functional correlations in radiation quality factor uncertainties are treated in the calculations. We show that the cancer risk uncertainty, defined as the ratio of the 95% confidence level (CL) to the point estimate is about 4-fold for lunar and Mars mission risk projections. For short-stay lunar missions (<180 d), SPE s present the most significant risk, however one that is mitigated effectively by shielding, especially for carbon composites structures with high hydrogen content. In contrast, for long duration lunar (>180 d) or Mars missions, GCR risks may exceed radiation risk limits, with 95% CL s exceeding 10% fatal risk for males and females on a Mars mission. For reducing GCR cancer risks, shielding materials are marginally effective because of the penetrating nature of GCR and secondary radiation produced in tissue by relativistic particles. At the present time, polyethylene or carbon composite shielding can not be shown to significantly reduce risk compared to aluminum shielding based on a significance test that accounts for radiobiology uncertainties in GCR risk projection.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Space Radiation Cancer Risks

Space radiation presents major challenges to astronauts on the International Space Station and for future missions to the Earth s moon or Mars. Methods used to project risks on Earth need to be modified because of the large uncertainties in projecting cancer risks from space radiation, and thus impact safety factors. We describe NASA s unique approach to radiation safety that applies uncertainty based criteria within the occupational health program for astronauts: The two terrestrial criteria of a point estimate of maximum acceptable level of risk and application of the principle of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) are supplemented by a third requirement that protects against risk projection uncertainties using the upper 95% confidence level (CL) in the radiation cancer projection model. NASA s acceptable level of risk for ISS and their new lunar program have been set at the point-estimate of a 3-percent risk of exposure induced death (REID). Tissue-averaged organ dose-equivalents are combined with age at exposure and gender-dependent risk coefficients to project the cumulative occupational radiation risks incurred by astronauts. The 95% CL criteria in practice is a stronger criterion than ALARA, but not an absolute cut-off as is applied to a point projection of a 3% REID. We describe the most recent astronaut dose limits, and present a historical review of astronaut organ doses estimates from the Mercury through the current ISS program, and future projections for lunar and Mars missions. NASA s 95% CL criteria is linked to a vibrant ground based radiobiology program investigating the radiobiology of high-energy protons and heavy ions. The near-term goal of research is new knowledge leading to the reduction of uncertainties in projection models. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. The current model for projecting space radiation cancer risk relies on the three assumptions of linearity, additivity, and scaling along with the use of population averages. We describe uncertainty estimates for this model, and new experimental data that sheds light on the accuracy of the underlying assumptions. These methods make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative metrics, i.e., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well defined confidence limits. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including lunar station, deep space outpost, and a Mars mission. Factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties and application of this approach to assess candidate mitigation approaches are described.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessments) Participation versus Validation

Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) are performed for projects or programs where the consequences of failure are highly undesirable. PRAs primarily address the level of risk those projects or programs posed during operations. PRAs are often developed after the design has been completed. Design and operational details used to develop models include approved and accepted design information regarding equipment, components, systems and failure data. This methodology basically validates the risk parameters of the project or system design. For high risk or high dollar projects, using PRA methodologies during the design process provides new opportunities to influence the design early in the project life cycle to identify, eliminate or mitigate potential risks. Identifying risk drivers before the design has been set allows the design engineers to understand the inherent risk of their current design and consider potential risk mitigation changes. This can become an iterative process where the PRA model can be used to determine if the mitigation technique is effective in reducing risk. This can result in more efficient and cost effective design changes. PRA methodology can be used to assess the risk of design alternatives and can demonstrate how major design changes or program modifications impact the overall program or project risk. PRA has been used for the last two decades to validate risk predictions and acceptability. Providing risk information which can positively influence final system and equipment design the PRA tool can also participate in design development, providing a safe and cost effective product.

DeMott, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2014

2014 Bone and Muscle Risks Standing Review Panel

The 2014 Bone and Muscle Risks Standing Review Panel (from here on referred to as the SRP) met for a site visit in Houston, TX on December 17 - 18, 2014. The SRP reviewed the updated research plans for the Risk of Impaired Performance Due to Reduced Muscle Mass, Strength and Endurance (Muscle Risk) and the Risk of Reduced Physical Performance Capabilities Due to Reduced Aerobic Capacity (Aerobic Risk). The SRP also received a status update on the Risk of Bone Fracture (Bone Risk), the Risk of Early Onset Osteoporosis Due To Spaceflight (Osteo Risk), the Risk of Intervertebral Disc Damage (IVD Risk), and the Risk of Renal Stone Formation (Renal Risk).

Steinberg, Susan↗
NASA NTRS2016

Post-Flight Back Pain Following International Space Station Missions: Evaluation of Spaceflight Risk Factors

INTRODUCTION Back pain during spaceflight has often been attributed to the lengthening of the spinal column due to the absence of gravity during both short and long-duration missions. Upon landing and re-adaptation to gravity, the spinal column reverts back to its original length thereby causing some individuals to experience pain and muscular spasms, while others experience no ill effects. With International Space Station (ISS) missions, cases of back pain and injury are more common post-flight, but little is known about the potential risk factors. Thus, the purpose of this project was to perform an initial evaluation of reported post-flight back pain and injury cases to relevant spaceflight risk factors in United States astronauts that have completed an ISS mission. METHODS All US astronauts who completed an ISS mission between Expeditions (EXP) 1 and 41 (2000-2015) were included in this evaluation. Forty-five astronauts (36 males and 9 females) completed 50 ISS missions during the study time period, as 5 astronauts completed 2 ISS missions. Researchers queried medical records of the 45 astronauts for occurrences of back pain and injury. A case was defined as any reported event of back pain or injury to the cervical, thoracic, lumbar, sacral, or coccyx spine regions. Data sources for the cases included the Flight Medicine Clinic's electronic medical record; Astronaut Strength, Conditioning and Rehabilitation electronic documentation; the Private Medical Conference tool; and the Space Medicine Operations Team records. Post-flight cases were classified as an early case if reported within 45 days of landing (R + 45) or a late case if reported from R + 46 to R + 365 days after landing (R + 1y). Risk factors in the astronaut population for back pain include age, sex, prior military service, and prior history of back pain. Additionally, spaceflight specific risk factors such as type of landing vehicle and onboard exercise countermeasures were included to evaluate their contribution to post-flight cases. Prior history of back pain included back pain recorded in the medical record within 3 years prior to launch. Landing vehicle was included in the model to discern if more astronauts experienced back pain or injury following a Shuttle or Soyuz landing. Onboard exercise countermeasures were noted for those astronauts who had a mission following 2009 deployment of the Advanced Resistive Exercise Device (aRED) (EXP 19 to 41). T-test and chi-squared tests were performed to evaluate the association between each individual risk factor and post-flight case. Logistic regression was used to evaluate the combined contribution of all the risk factors on post-flight cases. Separate models were calculated for cases reported by R + 45 and R + 1y. RESULTS During the study time period, there were 13 post-flight cases reported by R + 45 and an additional 5 reported by R + 1y. Most of these cases have been reported since EXP 19 with 10 cases by R + 45 and 4 by R + 1y. Individual risk factors of age, sex, landing vehicle, and prior military service were not significantly associated with post-flight cases identified at R + 45 or R + 1y (p greater than 0.05). Having back pain or injury within 3 years prior to launch significantly increased the likelihood of becoming a case by R + 1y (p = 0.041), but not at R+45 (p=0.204). Additionally, astronauts who experienced onboard exercise countermeasures that included aRED had a significantly increased risk of becoming a case at R + 45 (p = 0.024) and R + 1y (p=0.003). Multiple logistic regression evaluating all the risk factors for cases identified no significant risk factors at either the R + 45 or R + 1y time period (p greater than 0.05). Overall model fit was poor for both the R + 45 (R(exp 2) = 0.132) and R + 1y (R(exp 2) = 0.186) cases showing that there are risk factors not represented in our model. CONCLUSIONS Regardless of cause, post-flight cases are reported more often since aRED was deployed in 2009. This may reflect improved documentation or unidentified risk factors. No spaceflight risk factor explains the data fully. Post-flight cases are probably due to multi-faceted factors that are not easily elucidated in the medical data.

Laughlin, M. S.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗
NASA NTRS2024

Alignment of NASA’s Human System Risks with Technological Capability Gaps to Enable Integrated Research and Technology Development Strategic Planning

BACKGROUND: Radiation, reduced gravity, distance from earth, isolation and confinement, and habitation within artificially created and controlled life support environments are hazards that present risk to human space explorers. NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) maintains a set of twenty-nine different Human System Risks with subject matter experts from across the agency providing regular updates to the estimated likelihood and consequence associated with each risk. The Human Research Program (HRP) has historically used these risk classifications as a primary basis for identifying and prioritizing human research investments aimed at characterizing and/or mitigating the respective human system risks. In many cases, technology development is required to mature and validate risk mitigation strategies, however, NASA’s primary technology development programs have not typically used Human System Risks as a basis for strategic planning. A primary function of the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) – Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System Capability Leadership Team (SCLT) is to continually identify, review, and update technological capability gaps and to establish and oversee multiyear strategic roadmaps aimed at guiding NASA’s technology development priorities in these areas. These roadmaps are intended to be agency-wide and independent of any program, directorate, or other organization within NASA. DESCRIPTION: The SCLT and HRP collaborated to establish a set of Human System Capability Gaps, which establish a formal linkage between the capability gaps used to prioritize investments across much of NASA, and the Human System Risks that are primarily used to inform and prioritize human research. This set of twenty-eight gaps was developed by subject matter experts, and each gap mapped to the primary associated Human System Risks. The gaps and risk mapping were then reviewed and approved via the HSRB, thereby formally aligning the research-focused Human System Risks with the technology-focused capability gaps. DISCUSSION: This effort has enabled development of integrated roadmaps and budget coordination with research and technology development activities that are formally linked to agency-recognized capability gaps and Human System Risks. Close and ongoing coordination between the SCLT, HRP, Mars Campaign Office, and the Health & Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) is essential to ensure alignment and prioritization of CHP-related research and technology development to enable NASA’s future exploration missions.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Future of Integrated Performance Modeling in the Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment Project

The NASA engineering community utilizes event-driven and fault-tree probabilistic techniques to classify risks in the space environment by taking advantage of the inherent knowledge of complex spaceflight system design and testing to quantify failure risk. In harmonizing the risk of human space flight, answering the question of ‘How do we balance health, performance and resource risks with other engineering risks on long duration space missions?’ remains a deeply challenging and largely qualitative practice. The Human Research Program’s Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) was a significant step forward in efforts to robustly quantify the risk to crew health for exploration missions. However, there remains a significant gap in the ability to comprehensively assess and characterize risk across the disparate functionalities and capabilities which comprise the Crew Health and Performance (CHP) system. The Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) project seeks to characterize CHP risks by expanding beyond the foundation established by its PRA predecessors like IMM and MEDPRAT, that simulate medical risk metrics like loss of crew life and evacuations. One of the new risk measures in the CHP-PRA system is embodied in our Performance Risk Model (PRisM). PRisM provides a novel way of assessing crew performance on mission tasks, using a generalized framework which relates back to NASA-STD-3001. This approach allows PRisM to capture and integrate data from a variety of different domains into a single, unified, reproducible representation of astronaut performance. In this presentation, we discuss the motivation for the CHP-PRA work and give a high level overview of the goals of the project, outline the forward work for PRisM, and discuss collaboration opportunities for the community who might explore if their domain knowledge and data could be represented, integrated, and quantified with these tools, whose outcomes are metrics useful for supporting operational mission planning and decision making.

Lauren McIntyre↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Incorporation of Human Risk Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) With Mishap Investigations to Un-Silo Knowledge

NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has been a central driver in efforts to understand, mitigate, and communicate the 29 human systems risks monitored by the board. As a result of the collaboration between research, operations, and technical authorities, large bodies of knowledge have been collected and digested to represent the current understanding of the risks. As a part of these bodies of knowledge, directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) have been developed to communicate the current understanding of the causal relationship of the hazards, contributing factors, countermeasures, other risks, and outcomes that contribute to the overall risk. This risk knowledge is applied in a theoretical sense for potential incidents during exploration even while informed by surveillance data. However, there have been mishaps and close calls during past space exploration that intersect with one or more of the Human System Risks DAGs and knowledge bases. The purpose of this exercise was to un-silo this risk knowledge and connect it to the close call of EVA 23 through the development of a DAG representing the intersection of the HSRB Risks and the events of the close call. The development of the DAG occurred through an iterative process, with each iteration expanding and/or refining the nodes and connections described by the source materials. In addition to the risk documentation developed by the HSRB, lessons learned and other mishap investigation documents were utilized to understand the events that led to water entering the helmet of a crewmember on the EVA. New nodes specific to the events of EVA 23 were interconnected with existing HSRB DAG nodes and edges. Nodes within the DAG were defined within a “DAG-tionary” with any updates to a definition that may have previously existed from the HSRB DAGs, and edges were recorded in a matrix. Both the DAG-tionary and matrix describe where nodes and edges are present across the Risk and Mishap DAG. This DAG will then be reviewed by experts outside of HSRB and HRP to confirm that interpretations of the non-health related events (such as the engineering nodes) are represented accurately. DISCUSSION This process highlighted a method by which the knowledge generated among the contributing members of the HSRB Risks can be effectively adapted and utilized through the tools employed by the Risk Custodian teams. By leveraging these tools, new context and insights to the information at hand can be brought forward to address current spaceflight challenges. Moreover, un-siloing this knowledge through future DAGs and other efforts can drive interprofessional collaboration and foster communication. This will enable teams to work together more effectively, leveraging their diverse expertise to tackle the complex challenges of space exploration and human research. Ultimately, this collaboration will bring NASA closer to achieve agency goals and contribute to the overall shared mission and vision.

Samuel Jacobs↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk-Hedged Approach for Re-Routing Air Traffic Under Weather Uncertainty

This presentation corresponds to: our paper explores a new risk-hedged approach for re-routing air traffic around forecast convective weather. In this work, flying through a more likely weather instantiation is considered to pose a higher level of risk. Current operational practice strategically plans re-routes to avoid only the most likely (highest risk) weather instantiation, and then tactically makes any necessary adjustments as the weather evolves. The risk-hedged approach strategically plans re-routes by minimizing the risk-adjusted path length, incorporating multiple possible weather instantiations with associated likelihoods (risks). The resulting model is transparent and is readily analyzed for realism and treated with well-understood shortest-path algorithms. Risk-hedged re-routes are computed for some example weather instantiations. The main result is that in some scenarios, relative to an operational-practice proxy solution, the risk-hedged solution provides the benefits of lower risk as well as shorter path length. In other scenarios, the benefits of the risk-hedged solution are ambiguous, because the solution is characterized by a tradeoff between risk and path length. The risk-hedged solution can be executed in those scenarios where it provides a clear benefit over current operational practice.

air traffic routing↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of a Safety Hazards Risk Assessment Tool for Uncrewed Aircraft System Traffic Management during Preflight Planning

Tremendous growth in the uncrewed and remotely piloted vehicle market is expected in low-altitude, uncontrolled airspace, resulting in potential decreases in safety without systems that support monitoring, assessing, and mitigating risk. At NASA, the System-Wide Safety (SWS) project has been developing a suite of data-driven tools to predict hazards so that the potential risks that these hazards pose can be mitigated. Services to predict various hazards have been developed, including battery capacity, proximity to static obstacles, population risks, global positioning system signal strength, radio frequency spectrum interference risk, and vertiport congestion. These services can monitor hazards along a flight path and if any risks posed by these hazards exceed a threshold, the uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) fleet manager can be alerted to mitigate the risk by modifying the flight path, changing the scheduled departure or arrival times, and/or diverting the vehicle to an alternate vertiport. These services were originally developed to monitor and assess risks during flight, but they have been adapted to assess hazard risks prior to departure so that a fleet manager can evaluate the potential risks for a fleet of UAS along their planned flight paths. These services have been integrated into a prototype tool called the Supplemental Data Service Provider-Consolidated Dashboard (SDSP-CD), developed at NASA Ames Research Center. The tool consists of a dashboard which provides a comprehensive overview for a number of risks and a map display that shows the details of the hazards along each flight’s path. Based on the findings from three previous studies, the SDSP-CD has been updated with new design elements and functions. In this paper, we describe lessons learned from the previous studies, changes made to the interface, and the feedback received during a follow-up usability study. Overall, participants reported that there is a substantial benefit of having a fleet manager use a consolidated dashboard to assess hazards for the vehicles in their fleet and to provide situational awareness to potential risks so that they can be mitigated prior to flight. Once the SDSP-CD matures, it will need to be integrated into flight and mission planning tools. Some initial thoughts on how this integration should be accomplished are shared in this paper. Finally, the functional differences between preflight vs. in-flight risk assessment and the differences in fleet manager vs. UAS pilot roles that may require different information and user interactions are discussed.

preflight↗