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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2020

Recent NASA Wind Tunnel Free-Flight Testing of a Multirotor Unmanned Aircraft System Vehicle

Wind tunnel free-flight tests of a small quadrotor vehicle were completed in the NASA Langley 12-Foot Low Speed Tunnel and 20-Foot Vertical Spin Tunnel. The primary objective of these tests was to acquire flight data in forward and descending flight for the purpose of assessing the fidelity of an all-attitude flight dynamics simulation previously developed from static and dynamic wind tunnel data. A secondary objective was to demonstrate and mature free-flight test methods specific to the emerging class of small unmanned aircraft and urban air mobility vehicles. Experimental flight data correlated well with simulation predictions which included steady trim conditions consistent with straight and level flight and quasi-steady conditions associated with descent velocities prone to vortex ring state development. The test method was shown to be well suited to these classes of vehicles and several unique infrastructure requirements, including tether systems and data acquisition requirements were identified. In addition, unique operational test techniques and safety procedures were developed to accommodate the testing. Results of these tests will be used to support air traffic management studies and research into safety assurance concepts that enable the integration of these classes of vehicles into the National Airspace System.

John V Foster↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Urban Air Mobility National Campaign Test Series

The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) National Campaign test series is designed to promote public confidence in UAM safety, facilitate community-wide learning while capturing the public’s imagination, and give prospective vehicle manufacturers and operators, and prospective airspace service providers, insights into the evolving regulatory and operational environment. The National Campaign is also intended to support requirements and system development for Urban Air Mobility through integrated demonstrations of candidate vehicles and airspace in operational scenarios critical to scalable commercialization. The NASA National Campaign series will facilitate bringing together vehicle and airspace service providers to demonstrate industry’s concept and technology maturity levels with respect to vehicle performance, safety assurance, and airspace interoperability solutions for civil use.

Urban Air Mobility↗
NASA NTRS2022

In-Time Terminal Area Risk Management

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Commercial Operations Developing methods to Improve risk management and safety assurance processes by proactively identifying risks and causal factors before an accident/incident occurs.

Kyle Kent Edward Ellis↗
NASA NTRS2023

Concept of Operations for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Upper E Airspace

The National Airspace System undergoes continuous change including in the Upper Class E airspace involving increasingly complex operations and a widening diversity of vehicles. To secure a safe future system, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that is extensible to Upper E. Current Air Traffic Management is not cost-effective to scale for future Upper E operations and diversity of vehicles so the Federal Aviation Administration developed an Upper E Traffic Management ConOps to safely integrate the diverse operations and vehicles having different performance characteristics and flight missions without disrupting current operations including space launch and reentry, suborbital flights, supersonic and hypersonic flights, slow moving or stationary unmanned balloons, and long endurance fixed wing vehicles that are slow, stationary, or high speed. IASMS integrates state-of-the-art predictive modeling with reactive and proactive analytics to detect hazards and mitigate risk precursors for Upper E operators. IASMS identifies emergent safety risks exposed by transformation of the NAS with new and increasingly complex operations. Safety intelligence will also expand the data available and offer insight to new approaches for implementing safety improvements to mitigate risk with more seamless “in-time” integration across the policy, risk management, safety assurance, and promotion pillars of SMS.

K Ellis↗
NASA NTRS2023

An Analysis of Barriers Preventing the Widespread Adoption of Predictive and Prescriptive Maintenance in Aviation

The aviation industry has long recognized the potential benefits of predictive maintenance, a maintenance strategy that leverages sensor and operational data to predict the future degradation of components. Prescriptive maintenance takes this a step further and considers the entire aviation ecosystem to schedule maintenance actions optimally. With the ability to reduce maintenance costs by up to 30%, as reported by the Department of Energy, these maintenance strategies have been identified to be an important investment to reduce a airline costs. However, despite great interest and technological advances in areas such as diagnostics, prognostics, sensing, computation, and machine learning, the adoption of predictive and prescriptive maintenance has not been widely applied in aviation. To shed light on this issue, we conducted an analysis of the barriers preventing or limiting the adoption of predictive and prescriptive maintenance in aviation. Through discussions with subject matter experts across industry, academia, standards bodies, and government, we identified five key challenges: complexity of prediction; validation, safety assurance, and regulatory challenges; cost of adoption; difficulty in quantifying impact and informing decisions; and data availability, quality, and ownership challenges. This study provides a detailed overview of these barriers and areas where stakeholders could invest to overcome them, aiming to support the scaled adoption of predictive and prescriptive maintenance in aviation.

Christopher Teubert↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Capturing Complex Multivariate Time Series Interactions to Detect High-Risk Adverse Events During Flight

The reduction of aviation safety metrics below target thresholds continue to drive down the number of aviation fatalities and accidents. To meet future safety demands, sustained efforts by aviation agencies promoting safety assurance processes and systems have prompted ongoing research on identifying and mitigating in-flight risks. With the projected increase in passenger load factor and rollout of more autonomous systems into the national airspace, the need to detect high-risk events in-time or ahead-of-time is becoming increasingly crucial. New anomaly detection and precursor identification algorithms will need to scale to different airframes, levels of autonomy, and system complexity. While the pervasiveness of deep learning has resulted in the development of performant anomaly detection methods, these sophisticated models currently suffer from low end-user interpretability. Building off our previous work on identifying adverse events in multivariate flight data during descent, we propose a data-driven approach for detecting in-flight adverse events caused by the complex interplay of flight variables. Our approach utilizes ordinal patterns of important aircraft stability variables (e.g., airspeed and descent rate) to capture multivariate flight dynamics that can be used to predict the onset of unstable approaches, a high-risk adverse event that can occur during approach. Through the use of ordinal patterns, we aim to create more interpretable detection models of in-flight adverse events that can be translated to future autonomous systems without difficulty. Our analysis shows the presence of distinct ordinal pattern distributions that can be used to predict unstable approaches 1 minute ahead of time with an accuracy of 0.69 and a recall of 0.73 and 30 seconds ahead with an accuracy of 0.70 and a recall of 0.86.

Risk detection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Capturing Multivariate Time Series Interactions to Detect High‑Risk Instability During Approach

The reduction of aviation safety metrics below target thresholds continue to drive down the number of aviation fatalities and accidents. To meet future safety demands, sustained efforts by aviation agencies promoting safety assurance processes and systems have prompted ongoing research on identifying and mitigating in-flight risks. With the projected increase in passenger load factor and rollout of more autonomous systems into the national airspace, the need to detect high-risk events in-time or ahead-of-time is becoming increasingly crucial. New anomaly detection and precursor identification algorithms will need to scale to different airframes, levels of autonomy, and system complexity. While the pervasiveness of deep learning has resulted in the development of performant anomaly detection methods, these sophisticated models currently suffer from low end-user interpretability. Building off our previous work on identifying adverse events in multivariate flight data during descent, we propose a data-driven approach for detecting in-flight adverse events caused by the complex interplay of flight variables. Our approach utilizes ordinal patterns of important aircraft stability variables (e.g., airspeed and descent rate) to capture multivariate flight dynamics that can be used to predict the onset of unstable approaches, a high-risk adverse event that can occur during approach. Through the use of ordinal patterns, we aim to create more interpretable detection models of in-flight adverse events that can be translated to future autonomous systems without difficulty. Our analysis shows the presence of distinct ordinal pattern distributions that can be used to predict unstable approaches 1 minute ahead of time with an accuracy of 0.69 and a recall of 0.73 and 30 seconds ahead with an accuracy of 0.70 and a recall of 0.86.

Risk detection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluation of Novel eVTOL Aircraft Automation Concepts

As new electric propulsion technologies have matured, many new electric propulsion Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft concepts have been proposed. These new aircraft concepts enable the creation of new aviation markets including Urban Air Mobility (UAM) but also pose new challenges in safety assurance. One early challenge is the evaluation of the diverse aircraft configurations and accompanying advanced control systems and automation designed to aid controllability. This paper describes a research activity to propose candidate means of evaluation for the aircraft concepts and automation in the context of UAM operations. The research activity proposes the adaptation of an evaluation design standard used by the military for advanced rotorcraft along with proposed descriptions and definitions to support evaluation of diverse automated concepts in the civilian eVTOL community.

AAM↗
NASA NTRS2006

Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention

This viewgraph presentation reviews the issues surrounding the management of knowledge in regards to safety and mission assurance. The JSC workers who were hired in the 1960's are slated to retire in the next two to three years. The experiences and knowledge of these NASA workers must be identified, and disseminated. This paper reviews some of the strategies that the S&MA is developing to capture that valuable institutional knowledge.

Johnson, Teresa A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like those in NASA's Orion Program continue to grow in complexity. The role of software in achieving ambitious mission objectives has expanded dramatically in the last few decades. Assuring the safety and performance of the embedded flight software is quickly growing beyond the reach of traditional methods and resource levels. The methods used to build these software-dominant systems evolve in an on-going attempt to keep pace with the scope of our ambitions. Agile software development is now commonplace. The long timelines and large batches of work associated with traditional methods are being replaced by rapid delivery of small increments _ as system capabilities are realized in waves. Assurance of these critical software capabilities must therefore conquer an ever-expanding frontier of challenges, and do so with an approach matched to the evolving development methods. This paper recounts the journey of the Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) team as we addressed this dynamic environment. Widening our aperture to encompass a dramatically larger mission scope, while adjusting our cadence to synchronize with the rapid pace of agile software development, a new approach to IV&V is emerging. This approach is characterized by a sharper focus on mission capabilities, matched with a method to dynamically _follow the risk' as the IV&V team delivers more compelling assurance data in waves. Traditional methods prevalent in IV&V tend to scope the work using artifacts of the development process as they evolve from preliminary to final versions, and the pace of delivery was synchronized with the development timelines prevalent in the waterfall lifecycle. That more static approach is out of phase with the demands of the new environment. Scoping work according to the critical capabilities of the system (rather than artifacts of development) and synchronizing with the rapid pace of agile development, we are moving toward more effective parity with the demands of the environment. We explain the concrete steps we took, the principles that motivated our choices, and the results we have achieved to date.

Capability based assurance↗
NASA NTRS2016

Safety and Mission Assurance: A NASA Perspective

Manned spaceflight is an incredibly complex and inherently risky human endeavor. As the result of the lessons learned through years of triumph and tragedy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has embraced a comprehensive and integrated approach to the challenge of ensuring safety and mission success. This presentation will provide an overview of some of the techniques employed in this effort, with a focus on the processing operations performed at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC).

comprehensive↗
NASA NTRS2023

Technical Basis Related to the Posture of NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance for the Launch of Radioactive Material Other than Space Nuclear Systems: Volume 1–Overview of Analysis and Results

NASA has launched and reentered payloads containing radioactive material for over 50 years. The isotopes, their quantity, and their form have varied significantly. The handling of this material prior to its integration into the spacecraft at the launch Center (and after its return to Earth after flight, if applicable) falls under the purview of the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, while after the radioactive material is integrated into the spacecraft at the launch Center, it falls under the purview of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance’s (OSMA) Nuclear Flight Safety Program. Historically, OSMA concurrence was required for any launch or reentry involving radioactive material. However, OSMA recently revisited this posture due to changes in the Federal policy in this area, and the significant accrued experience. The current report represents the more quantitative study envisioned in the recent change in posture. More specifically, this document addresses the potential risks and other considerations associated with launching small quantities of radioactive material (below the level requiring the Federally-mandated process in National Security Presidential Memorandum- (NSPM-) 20, “Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems” (USG, 2019) to provide the technical basis for when such activities require OSMA concurrence versus notification, as it relates to nuclear flight safety.

Don Helton↗
NASA NTRS2015

Cascade Distillation System Design for Safety and Mission Assurance

Per the NASA Human Health, Life Support and Habitation System Technology Area 06 report "crewed missions venturing beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) will require technologies with improved reliability, reduced mass, self-sufficiency, and minimal logistical needs as an emergency or quick-return option will not be feasible." To meet this need, the development team of the second generation Cascade Distillation System (CDS 2.0) opted a development approach that explicitely incorporate consideration of safety, mission assurance, and autonomy. The CDS 2.0 prelimnary design focused on establishing a functional baseline that meets the CDS core capabilities and performance. The critical design phase is now focused on incorporating features through a deliberative process of establishing the systems failure modes and effects, identifying mitigative strategies, and evaluating the merit of the proposed actions through analysis and test. This paper details results of this effort on the CDS 2.0 design.

Sargusingh, Miriam J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Cascade Distillation System Design for Safety and Mission Assurance

Per the NASA Human Health, Life Support and Habitation System Technology Area 06 report "crewed missions venturing beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) will require technologies with improved reliability, reduced mass, self-sufficiency, and minimal logistical needs as an emergency or quick-return option will not be feasible".1 To meet this need, the development team of the second generation Cascade Distillation System (CDS 2.0) chose a development approach that explicitly incorporate consideration of safety, mission assurance, and autonomy. The CDS 2.0 preliminary design focused on establishing a functional baseline that meets the CDS core capabilities and performance. The critical design phase is now focused on incorporating features through a deliberative process of establishing the systems failure modes and effects, identifying mitigation strategies, and evaluating the merit of the proposed actions through analysis and test. This paper details results of this effort on the CDS 2.0 design.

Sarguisingh, Miriam↗
NASA NTRS2000

Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Review Report

This document summarizes questions and concerns raised during the 1999 IV&V Facility's Annual Review Presentation to the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA). Recommendations are provided for issues and action items identified.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2008

Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance in Design

This presentation describes how the Ares Projects are learning from the successes and failures of previous launch systems in order to maximize safety and reliability while maintaining fiscal responsibility. The Ares Projects are integrating Safety and Mission Assurance into design activities and embracing independent assessments by Quality experts in thorough reviews of designs and processes. Incorporating Lean thinking into the design process, Ares is also streamlining existing processes and future manufacturing flows which will yield savings during production. Understanding the value of early involvement of Quality experts, the Ares Projects are leading launch vehicle development into the 21st century.

Cianciola, Chris↗