Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Shuttle”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2001

Shuttle-Mir: The United States and Russia Share History's Highest Stage

This book is an example of what may become the norm for history texts-an illustrated narrative accompanied by a CD-ROM. The text tells the story from the human side. It is based on reflections and quotes from the astronauts, cosmonauts, and team members who participated in the historic partnership. The main chapters give the perspectives of the seven U.S. astronauts living on Mir. The "STS boxes" share the Space Shuttle crews' experiences from the 11 Shuttle-Mir missions. The "Meanwhile on Earth" sections provide details of what was happening on Earth while the attention of the Program focused on the situations in space. The text reflects conventional usage; that is, temperature is given in degrees Fahrenheit, and metrics are used as appropriate. While this publication provides an accurate overview of the Shuttle-Mir Program, the reader is encouraged to explore the companion CD-ROM. It contains a complete, searchable text of the book itself plus source publications, mission data, status reports, drawings and illustrations, videos and hundreds of images, and even a virtual Shuttle-Mir children's book. Of particular interest are the Shuttle-Mir oral history transcripts and the letters written by American astronauts while they were in residence on the Russian space station. Many of the quotes in "Shuttle-Mir: The U.S. and Russia Share History's Highest Stage" came from sources located on the CD-ROM. The reader is invited to explore the Shuttle-Mir story through the words, images, and insights of those who took part in it.

Morgan, Clay↗
NASA NTRS2002

STS 107 Shuttle Press Kit: Providing 24/7 Space Science Research

Space shuttle mission STS-107, the 28th flight of the space shuttle Columbia and the 113th shuttle mission to date, will give more than 70 international scientists access to both the microgravity environment of space and a set of seven human researchers for 16 uninterrupted days. Columbia's 16-day mission is dedicated to a mixed complement of competitively selected and commercially sponsored research in the space, life and physical sciences. An international crew of seven, including the first Israeli astronaut, will work 24 hours a day in two alternating shifts to carry out experiments in the areas of astronaut health and safety; advanced technology development; and Earth and space sciences. When Columbia is launched from Kennedy Space Center's Launch Pad 39A it will carry a SPACEHAB Research Double Module (RDM) in its payload bay. The RDM is a pressurized environment that is accessible to the crew while in orbit via a tunnel from the shuttle's middeck. Together, the RDM and the middeck will accommodate the majority of the mission's payloads/experiments. STS-107 marks the first flight of the RDM, though SPACEHAB Modules and Cargo Carriers have flown on 17 previous space shuttle missions. Astronaut Rick Husband (Colonel, USAF) will command STS-107 and will be joined on Columbia's flight deck by pilot William 'Willie' McCool (Commander, USN). Columbia will be crewed by Mission Specialist 2 (Flight Engineer) Kalpana Chawla (Ph.D.), Mission Specialist 3 (Payload Commander) Michael Anderson (Lieutenant Colonel, USAF), Mission Specialist 1 David Brown (Captain, USN), Mission Specialist 4 Laurel Clark (Commander, USN) and Payload Specialist 1 Ilan Ramon (Colonel, Israeli Air Force), the first Israeli astronaut. STS-107 marks Husband's second flight into space - he served as pilot during STS-96, a 10-day mission that saw the first shuttle docking with the International Space Station. Husband served as Chief of Safety for the Astronaut Office until his selection to command the STS-107 crew. Anderson and Chawla will also be making their second spaceflights. Anderson first flew on STS-89 in January 1998 (the eighth Shuttle-Mir docking mission) while Chawla flew on STS-87 in November 1997 (the fourth U.S. Microgravity Payload flight). McCool, Brown, Clark and Ramon will be making their first flights into space.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2002

Shuttle Reference Data

This collection of shuttle reference data contains the following information: shuttle abort history, shuttle abort modes, abort decisions, space shuttle rendezvous maneuvers, space shuttle main engines, space shuttle solid rocket boosters, hold-down posts, SRB (solid rocket boosters) ignition, electrical power distribution, hydraulic power units, thrust vector control, SBR rate gyro assemblies, SBR separation and Space Shuttle Super Super Light Weight Tank (SLWT).

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2003

Achieving Space Shuttle Abort-to-Orbit Using the Five-Segment Booster

The Five-Segment Booster design concept was evaluated by a team that determined the concept to be feasible and capable of achieving the desired abort-to-orbit capability when used in conjunction with increased Space Shuttle main engine throttle capability. The team (NASA Johnson Space Center, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, ATK Thiokol Propulsion, United Space Alliance, Lockheed-Martin Space Systems, and Boeing) selected the concept that provided abort-to-orbit capability while: 1) minimizing Shuttle system impacts by maintaining the current interface requirements with the orbiter, external tank, and ground operation systems; 2) minimizing changes to the flight-proven design, materials, and processes of the current four-segment Shuttle booster; 3) maximizing use of existing booster hardware; and 4) taking advantage of demonstrated Shuttle main engine throttle capability. The added capability can also provide Shuttle mission planning flexibility. Additional performance could be used to: enable implementation of more desirable Shuttle safety improvements like crew escape, while maintaining current payload capability; compensate for off nominal performance in no-fail missions; and support missions to high altitudes and inclinations. This concept is a low-cost, low-risk approach to meeting Shuttle safety upgrade objectives. The Five-Segment Booster also has the potential to support future heavy-lift missions.

Craft, Joe↗
NASA NTRS2004

Advanced Health Management System for the Space Shuttle Main Engine

Boeing-Canoga Park (BCP) and NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center (NASA-MSFC) are developing an Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) for use on the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) that will improve Shuttle safety by reducing the probability of catastrophic engine failures during the powered ascent phase of a Shuttle mission. This is a phased approach that consists of an upgrade to the current Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller (SSMEC) to add turbomachinery synchronous vibration protection and addition of a separate Health Management Computer (HMC) that will utilize advanced algorithms to detect and mitigate predefined engine anomalies. The purpose of the Shuttle AHMS is twofold; one is to increase the probability of successfully placing the Orbiter into the intended orbit, and the other is to increase the probability of being able to safely execute an abort of a Space Transportation System (STS) launch. Both objectives are achieved by increasing the useful work envelope of a Space Shuttle Main Engine after it has developed anomalous performance during launch and the ascent phase of the mission. This increase in work envelope will be the result of two new anomaly mitigation options, in addition to existing engine shutdown, that were previously unavailable. The added anomaly mitigation options include engine throttle-down and performance correction (adjustment of engine oxidizer to fuel ratio), as well as enhanced sensor disqualification capability. The HMC is intended to provide the computing power necessary to diagnose selected anomalous engine behaviors and for making recommendations to the engine controller for anomaly mitigation. Independent auditors have assessed the reduction in Shuttle ascent risk to be on the order of 40% with the combined system and a three times improvement in mission success.

Davidson, Matt↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Shuttle Strategic Planning Status

The Space Shuttle Program is aggressively planning the Space Shuttle manifest for assembling the International Space Station and servicing the Hubble Space Telescope. Implementing this flight manifest while concurrently transitioning to the Exploration architecture creates formidable challenges; the most notable of which is retaining critical skills within the Shuttle Program workforce. The Program must define a strategy that will allow safe and efficient fly-out of the Shuttle, while smoothly transitioning Shuttle assets (both human and facility) to support early flight demonstrations required in the development of NASA s Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicles (CLV). The Program must accomplish all of this while maintaining the current level of resources. Therefore, it will be necessary to initiate major changes in operations and contracting. Overcoming these challenges will be essential for NASA to fly the Shuttle safely, accomplish the President s "Vision for Space Exploration," and ultimately meet the national goal of maintaining a robust space program. This paper will address the Space Shuttle Program s strategy and its current status in meeting these challenges.

Henderson, Edward M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Rendezvous and Proximity Operations of the Space Shuttle

Space Shuttle rendezvous missions present unique challenges that were not fully recognized when the Shuttle was designed. Rendezvous targets could be passive (i.e., no lights or transponders), and not designed to facilitate Shuttle rendezvous, proximity operations, and retrieval. Shuttle reaction control system jet plume impingement on target spacecraft presented induced dynamics, structural loading, and contamination concerns. These issues, along with limited reaction control system propellant in the Shuttle nose, drove a change from the legacy Gemini/Apollo coelliptic profile to a stable orbit profile, and the development of new proximity operations techniques. Multiple scientific and on-orbit servicing missions, and crew exchange, assembly and replenishment flights to Mir and to the International Space Station drove further profile and piloting technique changes. These changes included new proximity operations, relative navigation sensors, and new computer generated piloting cues. However, the Shuttle's baseline rendezvous navigation system has not required modification to place the Shuttle at the proximity operations initiation point for all rendezvous missions flown.

Goodman, John L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Space Shuttle Strategic Planning Status

The Space Shuttle Program is aggressively flying the Space Shuttle manifest for assembling the International Space Station and servicing the Hubble Space Telescope. Completing this flight manifest while concurrently transitioning to the Exploration architecture creates formidable challenges; the most notable of which is retaining critical skills within the Shuttle Program workforce. The Program must define a strategy that will allow safe and efficient fly-out of the Shuttle, while smoothly transitioning Shuttle assets (both human and facility) to support early flight demonstrations required in the development of NASA's Crew Exploration Vehicle (Orion) and Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicles (Ares I). The Program must accomplish all of this while maintaining the current level of resources. Therefore, it will be necessary to initiate major changes in operations and contracting. Overcoming these challenges will be essential for NASA to fly the Shuttle safely, accomplish the Vision for Space Exploration, and ultimately meet the national goal of maintaining a robust space program. This paper will address the Space Shuttle Program s strategy and its current status in meeting these challenges.

Norbraten, Gordon L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The HYTHIRM Project: Flight Thermography of the Space Shuttle During the Hypersonic Re-entry

This report describes a NASA Langley led endeavor sponsored by the NASA Engineering Safety Center, the Space Shuttle Program Office and the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate to demonstrate a quantitative thermal imaging capability. A background and an overview of several multidisciplinary efforts that culminated in the acquisition of high resolution calibrated infrared imagery of the Space Shuttle during hypervelocity atmospheric entry is presented. The successful collection of thermal data has demonstrated the feasibility of obtaining remote high-resolution infrared imagery during hypersonic flight for the accurate measurement of surface temperature. To maximize science and engineering return, the acquisition of quantitative thermal imagery and capability demonstration was targeted towards three recent Shuttle flights - two of which involved flight experiments flown on Discovery. In coordination with these two Shuttle flight experiments, a US Navy NP-3D aircraft was flown between 26-41 nautical miles below Discovery and remotely monitored surface temperature of the Orbiter at Mach 8.4 (STS-119) and Mach 14.7 (STS-128) using a long-range infrared optical package referred to as Cast Glance. This same Navy aircraft successfully monitored the Orbiter Atlantis traveling at approximately Mach 14.3 during its return from the successful Hubble repair mission (STS-125). The purpose of this paper is to describe the systematic approach used by the Hypersonic Thermodynamic Infrared Measurements team to develop and implement a set of mission planning tools designed to establish confidence in the ability of an imaging platform to reliably acquire, track and return global quantitative surface temperatures of the Shuttle during entry. The mission planning tools included a pre-flight capability to predict the infrared signature of the Shuttle. Such tools permitted optimization of the hardware configuration to increase signal-to-noise and to maximize the available dynamic range while mitigating the potential for saturation. Post flight, analysis tools were used to assess atmospheric effects and to convert the 2-D intensity images to 3-D temperature maps of the windward surface. Comparison of the spatially resolved global thermal measurements to surface thermocouples and CFD prediction is made. Successful demonstration of a quantitative, spatially resolved, global temperature measurement on the Shuttle suggests future applications towards hypersonic flight test programs within NASA, DoD and DARPA along with flight test opportunities supporting NASA's project Constellation.

Horvath, Thomas J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Cast Glance Near Infrared Imaging Observations of the Space Shuttle During Hypersonic Re-Entry

High resolution calibrated infrared imagery of the Space Shuttle was obtained during hypervelocity atmospheric entries of the STS-119, STS-125 and STS128 missions and has provided information on the distribution of surface temperature and the state of the airflow over the windward surface of the Orbiter during descent. This data collect was initiated by NASA s Hypersonic Thermodynamic Infrared Measurements (HYTHIRM) team and incorporated the use of air- and land-based optical assets to image the Shuttle during atmospheric re-entry. The HYTHIRM objective is to develop and implement a set of mission planning tools designed to establish confidence in the ability of an existing optical asset to reliably acquire, track and return global quantitative surface temperatures of the Shuttle during entry. On Space Shuttle Discovery s STS-119 mission, NASA flew a specially modified thermal protection system tile and instrumentation package to monitor heating effects from boundary layer transition during re-entry. On STS-119, the windward airflow on the port wing was deliberately disrupted by a four-inch wide and quarter-inch tall protuberance built into the modified tile. In coordination with this flight experiment, a US Navy NP-3D Orion aircraft was flown 28 nautical miles below Discovery and remotely monitored surface temperature of the Orbiter at Mach 8.4 using a long-range infrared optical package referred to as Cast Glance. Approximately two months later, the same Navy Cast Glance aircraft successfully monitored the surface temperatures of the Orbiter Atlantis traveling at approximately Mach 14.3 during its return from the successful Hubble repair mission. In contrast to Discovery, Atlantis was not part of the Boundary Layer Transition (BLT) flight experiment, thus the vehicle was not configured with a protuberance on the port wing. In September 2009, Cast Glance was again successful in capturing infrared imagery and monitoring the surface temperatures on Discovery s next flight, STS-128. Again, NASA flew a specially modified thermal protection system tile and instrumentation package to monitor heating effects from boundary layer transition during re-entry. During this mission, Cast Glance was able to image laminar and turbulent flow phenomenology optimizing data collection for Mach 14.7. The purpose of this paper is to describe key elements associated with STS-119/125/128 mission planning and execution from the perspective of the Cast Glance flight crew that obtained the imagery. The paper will emphasize a human element of experience, expertise and adaptability seamlessly coupled with Cast Glance system and sensor technology required to manually collect the required imagery. Specific topics will include a near infrared (NIR) camera upgrade that was implemented just prior to the missions, how pre-flight radiance modeling was utilized to optimize the IR sensor configuration, communications, the development of aircraft test support positions based upon Shuttle trajectory information, support to contingencies such as Shuttle one orbit wave-offs/west coast diversions and then the Cast Glance perspective during an actual Shuttle imaging mission.

Tack, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2001

Shuttle Safety Improvements

The Space Shuttle has been flying for over 20 years and based on the Orbiter design life of 100 missions it should be capable of flying at least 20 years more if we take care of it. The Space Shuttle Development Office established in 1997 has identified those upgrades needed to keep the Shuttle flying safely and efficiently until a new reusable launch vehicle (RLV) is available to meet the agency commitments and goals for human access to space. The upgrade requirements shown in figure 1 are to meet the program goals, support HEDS and next generation space transportation goals while protecting the country 's investment in the Space Shuttle. A major review of the shuttle hardware and processes was conducted in 1999 which identified key shuttle safety improvement priorities, as well as other system upgrades needed to reliably continue to support the shuttle miss ions well into the second decade of this century. The high priority safety upgrades selected for development and study will be addressed in this paper.

Henderson, Edward↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Right Stuff: A Look Back at Three Decades of Flight Controller Training for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

This paper will summarize the thirty-year history of Space Shuttle operations from the perspective of training in NASA Johnson Space Center's Mission Control Center. It will focus on training and development of flight controllers and instructors, and how training practices have evolved over the years as flight experience was gained, new technologies developed, and programmatic needs changed. Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. This paper will give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified. The training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers will share their experiences in training and operating the Space Shuttle throughout the Program s history. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The audience will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, we will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Right Stuff: A Look Back at Three Decades of Flight Controller Training for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. This paper will give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified. The training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers will share their experiences in training and operating the Space Shuttle throughout the Program s history. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors. These endeavors could range from going to the moon or to Mars. The lessons learned from operating the space shuttle for over thirty years will help the space industry build the next human transport space vehicle and inspire the next generation of space explorers.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Docking Offset Between the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station and Resulting Impacts to the Transfer of Attitude Reference and Control

The Space Shuttle does not dock at an exact 90 degrees to the International Space Station (ISS) x-body axis. This offset from 90 degrees, along with error sources within their respective attitude knowledge, causes the two vehicles to never completely agree on their attitude, even though they operate as a single, mated stack while docked. The docking offset can be measured in flight when both vehicles have good attitude reference and is a critical component in calculations to transfer attitude reference from one vehicle to another. This paper will describe how the docking offset and attitude reference errors between both vehicles are measured and how this information would be used to recover Shuttle attitude reference from ISS in the event of multiple failures. During STS-117, ISS on-board Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC) computers began having problems and after several continuous restarts, the systems failed. The failure took the ability for ISS to maintain attitude knowledge. This paper will also demonstrate how with knowledge of the docking offset, the contingency procedure to recover Shuttle attitude reference from ISS was reversed in order to provide ISS an attitude reference from Shuttle. Finally, this paper will show how knowledge of the docking offset can be used to speed up attitude control handovers from Shuttle to ISS momentum management. By taking into account the docking offset, Shuttle can be commanded to hold a more precise attitude which better agrees with the ISS commanded attitude such that start up transients with the ISS momentum management controllers are reduced. By reducing start-up transients, attitude control can be transferred from Shuttle to ISS without the use of ISS thrusters saving precious on-board propellant, crew time and minimizing loads placed upon the mated stack.

Helms, W. Jason↗
NASA NTRS2011

Orbital Fitness: An Overview of Space Shuttle Cardiopulmonary Exercise Physiology Findings

Limited observations regarding the cardiopulmonary responses to aerobic exercise had been conducted during short-duration spaceflight before the Space Shuttle program. This presentation focuses on the findings regarding changes observed in the cardiopulmonary exercise responses during and following Shuttle flights. During flight, maximum oxygen uptake (VO2max) remained unchanged as did the maximum work rate achievable during cycle exercise testing conducted during the last full flight day. Immediately following flight, the ubiquitous finding, confirmed by investigations conducted during the Spacelab Life Sciences missions 1 and 2 and by NASA Detailed Supplemental Objective studies, indicated that VO2max was reduced; however, the reduction in VO2max was transient and returned to preflight levels within 7 days following return. Studies regarding the influence of aerobic exercise countermeasures performed during flight on postflight performance were mostly limited to the examination of the heart rate (HR) response to submaximal exercise testing on landing day. These studies revealed that exercise HR was elevated in individuals who performed little to no exercise during their missions as compared to individuals who performed regular exercise. In addition, astronauts who performed little to no aerobic exercise during flight demonstrated an increased HR and lowered pulse pressure response to the standard stand test on landing day, indicating a decrease in orthostatic function in these individuals. With regard to exercise modality, four devices were examined during the Shuttle era: two treadmills, a cycle ergometer, and a rowing device. Although there were limited investigations regarding the use of these devices for exercise training aboard the Shuttle, there was no clear consensus reached regarding which proved to be a "superior" device. Each device had a unique operational or physiologic limitation associated with its use. In conclusion, exercise research conducted during the Shuttle Program demonstrated that attenuation of postflight deconditioning was possible through use of exercise countermeasures and the Shuttle served as a test bed for equipment destined for use on the International Space Station. Learning Objective: Overview of the Space Shuttle Program research results related to aerobic capacity and performance, including what was learned from research and effectiveness of exercise countermeasures.

Moore, Alan D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Aerospace News: Space Shuttle Commemoration. Volume 2, No. 7

The complex space shuttle design was comprised of four components: the external tank, two solid rocket boosters (SRB), and the orbiter vehicle. Six orbiters were used during the life of the program. In order of introduction into the fleet, they were: Enterprise (a test vehicle), Columbia, Challenger, Discovery, Atlantis and Endeavour. The space shuttle had the unique ability to launch into orbit, perform on-orbit tasks, return to earth and land on a runway. It was an orbiting laboratory, International Space Station crew delivery and supply replenisher, satellite launcher and payload delivery vehicle, all in one. Except for the external tank, all components of the space shuttle were designed to be reusable for many flights. ATK s reusable solid rocket motors (RSRM) were designed to be flown, recovered, and the metal components reused 20 times. Following each space shuttle launch, the SRBs would parachute into the ocean and be recovered by the Liberty Star and Freedom Star recovery ships. The recovered boosters would then be received at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Hangar AF facility for disassembly and engineering post-flight evaluation. At Hangar AF, the RSRM field joints were demated and the segments prepared to be returned to Utah by railcar. The segments were then shipped to ATK s facilities in Clearfield for additional evaluation prior to washout, disassembly and refurbishment. Later the refurbished metal components would be transported to ATK s Promontory facilities to begin a new cycle. ATK s RSRMs were manufactured in Promontory, Utah. During the Space Shuttle Program, ATK supported NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center whose responsibility was for all propulsion elements on the program, including the main engines and solid rocket motors. On launch day for the space shuttle, ATK s Launch Site Operations employees at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) provided lead engineering support for ground operations and NASA s chief engineer. It was ATK s responsibility to have a representative in Firing Room 2 at KSC in case of potential motor problems. However, the last time ATK was responsible for a space shuttle launch slip was 1989. During launch, engineers were also stationed in Promontory on teleconference with counterparts at KSC in the event their support was required.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Shuttle Repair Tools Automate Vehicle Maintenance

Successfully building, flying, and maintaining the space shuttles was an immensely complex job that required a high level of detailed, precise engineering. After each shuttle landed, it entered a maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) phase. Each system was thoroughly checked and tested, and worn or damaged parts replaced, before the shuttle was rolled out for its next mission. During the MRO period, workers needed to record exactly what needed replacing and why, as well as follow precise guidelines and procedures in making their repairs. That meant traceability, and with it lots of paperwork. In 2007, the number of reports generated during electrical system repairs was getting out of hand-placing among the top three systems in terms of paperwork volume. Repair specialists at Kennedy Space Center were unhappy spending so much time at a desk and so little time actually working on the shuttle. "Engineers weren't spending their time doing technical work," says Joseph Schuh, an electrical engineer at Kennedy. "Instead, they were busy with repetitive, time-consuming processes that, while important in their own right, provided a low return on time invested." The strain of such inefficiency was bad enough that slow electrical repairs jeopardized rollout on several occasions. Knowing there had to be a way to streamline operations, Kennedy asked Martin Belson, a project manager with 30 years experience as an aerospace contractor, to co-lead a team in developing software that would reduce the effort required to document shuttle repairs. The result was System Maintenance Automated Repair Tasks (SMART) software. SMART is a tool for aggregating and applying information on every aspect of repairs, from procedures and instructions to a vehicle s troubleshooting history. Drawing on that data, SMART largely automates the processes of generating repair instructions and post-repair paperwork. In the case of the space shuttle, this meant that SMART had 30 years worth of operations that it could apply to ongoing maintenance work. According to Schuh, "SMART standardized and streamlined many shuttle repair processes, saving time and money while increasing safety and the quality of repairs." Maintenance technicians and engineers now had a tool that kept them in the field, and because SMART is capable of continually evolving, each time an engineer put it to use, it would enrich the Agency-wide knowledge base. "If an engineer sees something in the work environment that they could improve, a repair process or a procedure, SMART can incorporate that data for use in future operations," says Belson.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2015

Space Shuttle Rudder Speed Brake Actuator-A Case Study Probabilistic Fatigue Life and Reliability Analysis

The U.S. Space Shuttle fleet was originally intended to have a life of 100 flights for each vehicle, lasting over a 10-year period, with minimal scheduled maintenance or inspection. The first space shuttle flight was that of the Space Shuttle Columbia (OV-102), launched April 12, 1981. The disaster that destroyed Columbia occurred on its 28th flight, February 1, 2003, nearly 22 years after its first launch. In order to minimize risk of losing another Space Shuttle, a probabilistic life and reliability analysis was conducted for the Space Shuttle rudder/speed brake actuators to determine the number of flights the actuators could sustain. A life and reliability assessment of the actuator gears was performed in two stages: a contact stress fatigue model and a gear tooth bending fatigue model. For the contact stress analysis, the Lundberg-Palmgren bearing life theory was expanded to include gear-surface pitting for the actuator as a system. The mission spectrum of the Space Shuttle rudder/speed brake actuator was combined into equivalent effective hinge moment loads including an actuator input preload for the contact stress fatigue and tooth bending fatigue models. Gear system reliabilities are reported for both models and their combination. Reliability of the actuator bearings was analyzed separately, based on data provided by the actuator manufacturer. As a result of the analysis, the reliability of one half of a single actuator was calculated to be 98.6 percent for 12 flights. Accordingly, each actuator was subsequently limited to 12 flights before removal from service in the Space Shuttle.

Rudder↗