SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Space Shuttle Program”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 163 records · Page 9

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2009

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1994

STS-60 Space Shuttle mission report

The STS-60 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the sixtieth flight of the Space Shuttle Program and eighteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Discovery (OV-103). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET designated at ET-61 (Block 10); three SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2012, 2034, and 2032 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-062. The RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L035A (lightweight) for the left SRB, and 360Q035B (quarterweight) for the right SRB. This STS-60 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E. That document requires that each major organizational element supporting the Program report the results of its hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. The primary objectives of the STS-60 mission were to deploy and retrieve the Wake Shield Facility-1 (WSF-1), and to activate the Spacehab-2 payload and perform on-orbit experiments. Secondary objectives of this flight were to activate and command the Capillary Pumped Loop/Orbital Debris Radar Calibration Spheres/Breman Satellite Experiment/Getaway Special (GAS) Bridge Assembly (CAPL/ODERACS/BREMSAT/GBA) payload, the Auroral Photography Experiment-B (APE-B), and the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II).

Fricke, Robert W., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1993

STS-57 Space Shuttle mission report

The STS-57 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report provides a summary of the Payloads, as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the fifty-sixth flight of the Space Shuttle Program and fourth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Endeavour (OV-105). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET (ET-58); three SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2019, 2034, and 2017 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-059. The lightweight RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L032A for the left SRB and 360W032B for the right SRB. The STS-57 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement, as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume 8, Appendix E. That document states that each major organizational element supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies.

Fricke, Robert W., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2009

A Summary of NASA and USAF Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires

Several unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, the Titan Program, and a few others have occurred over the past several decades. Spill sites include the following government facilities: Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. Until now, the only method of capturing the lessons learned from these incidents has been "word of mouth" or by studying each individual incident report. The root causes and consequences of the incidents vary drastically; however, certain "themes" can be deduced and utilized for future hypergolic propellant handling. Some of those common "themes" are summarized below: (1) Improper configuration control and internal or external human performance shaping factors can lead to being falsely comfortable with a system (2) Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur and/or hardware is damaged (3) Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure (4) Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger (5) Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs (6) Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be detrimental and quickly lead to an undesirable incident (7) Improper materials cleanliness or compatibility and chemical reactivity can result in fires or explosions (8) Improper established "back-out" and/or emergency safing procedures can escalate an event The items listed above are only a short list of the issues that should be recognized prior to handling hypergolic fluids or processing vehicles containing hypergolic propellants. The summary of incidents in this report is intended to cover many more issues than those listed above.

Nufer, Brian M.↗

NASA NTRS2010

A Summary of NASA and USAF Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires

Nufer, Brian↗

NASA NTRS2010

Hypergolic Propellants: The Handling Hazards and Lessons Learned from Use

Nufer, Brian↗

NASA NTRS2011

Qualification of Electrical Ground Support Equipment for New Space Programs

With the Space Shuttle program coming to an end, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is moving to a new space flight program that will allow expeditions beyond low earth orbit. The space vehicles required to comply with these missions will be carrying heavy payloads. This implies that the Earth departure stage capabilities must be of higher magnitudes, given the current propulsion technology. The engineering design of the new flight hardware comes with some structural, thermal, propulsion and other subsystems' challenges. Meanwhile, the necessary ground support equipment (GSE) used to test, validate, verify and process the flight hardware must withstand the new program specifications. This paper intends to provide the qualification considerations during implementation of new electrical GSE for space programs. A team of engineers was formed to embark on this task, and facilitate the logistics process and ensure that the electrical, mechanical and fluids subsystems conduct the proper level of testing. Ultimately, each subsystem must certify that each piece of ground support equipment used in the field is capable of withstanding the strenuous vibration, acoustics, environmental, thermal and Electromagnetic Interference (EMf) levels experienced during pre-launch, launch and post-launch activities. The benefits of capturing and sharing these findings will provide technical, cost savings and schedule impacts infon11ation to both the technical and management community. Keywords: Qualification; Testing; Ground Support Equipment; Electromagnetic Interference Testing; Vibration Testing; Acoustic Testing; Power Spectral Density.

SotoToro, Felix A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Legacy of Space Shuttle Flight Software

The initial goals of the Space Shuttle Program required that the avionics and software systems blaze new trails in advancing avionics system technology. Many of the requirements placed on avionics and software were accomplished for the first time on this program. Examples include comprehensive digital fly-by-wire technology, use of a digital databus for flight critical functions, fail operational/fail safe requirements, complex automated redundancy management, and the use of a high-order software language for flight software development. In order to meet the operational and safety goals of the program, the Space Shuttle software had to be extremely high quality, reliable, robust, reconfigurable and maintainable. To achieve this, the software development team evolved a software process focused on continuous process improvement and defect elimination that consistently produced highly predictable and top quality results, providing software managers the confidence needed to sign each Certificate of Flight Readiness (COFR). This process, which has been appraised at Capability Maturity Model (CMM)/Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) Level 5, has resulted in one of the lowest software defect rates in the industry. This paper will present an overview of the evolution of the Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) project and processes over thirty years, an argument for strong statistical control of software processes with examples, an overview of the success story for identifying and driving out errors before flight, a case study of the few significant software issues and how they were either identified before flight or slipped through the process onto a flight vehicle, and identification of the valuable lessons learned over the life of the project.

Hickey, Christopher J.↗

NASA NTRS1973

Payloads.

Approaches to payload definition, design, and planning adopted in the Space Shuttle Program are described. The Space Shuttle offers many new modes of operation featuring reuse of spacecraft, on-orbit checkout and maintenance, sortie experiment missions, and opportunities to trade launch weight and volume for cost savings. In order to take advantage of these new approaches and to accommodate the varying missions, new payload elements have been identified, and new low-cost design approaches are being developed to utilize standardized components and modularized subassemblies that reduce spacecraft buildup and maintenance costs. A new payload planning technique makes use of the computer to provide large-scale planning, scheduling, and costing required for various program options.

Marshall, W. R.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Aerospace safety advisory panel

This report from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) contains findings, recommendations, and supporting material concerning safety issues with the space station program, the space shuttle program, aeronautics research, and other NASA programs. Section two presents findings and recommendations, section three presents supporting information, and appendices contain data about the panel membership, the NASA response to the March 1993 ASAP report, and a chronology of the panel's activities during the past year.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2009

A Summary of NASA and USAF Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills And Fires

Hypergolic fluids are toxic liquids that react spontaneously and violently when they contact each other. These fluids are used in many different rocket and aircraft systems for propulsion and hydraulic power including, orbiting satellites, manned spacecraft, military aircraft, and deep space probes. Hypergolic fuels include hydrazine (N 2H4) and its derivatives including monomethylhydrazine (MMH), unsymmetrical di-methylhydrazine (UDMH), and Aerozine 50 (A-50), which is an equal mixture of N2H4 and UDMH. The oxidizer used with these fuels is usually nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), also known as di-nitrogen tetroxide or NTO, and various blends of N2O4 with nitric oxide (NO). Several documented, unintentional hypergolic fluid spills and fires related to the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, and several other programs from approximately 1968 through the spring of 2009 have been studied for the primary purpose of extracting the lessons learned. Spill sites include KSC, JSC, WSTF, CCAFS, EAFB, McConnell AFB, and VAFB.

Nufer, B. M.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Lessons Learned Entry: Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires

The attached report is a compilation of all credible, unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, Titan Program, and a few other programs. Spill sites include the following government facilities: KSC, JSC, WSTF, VAFB, CCAFS, EAFB, Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. The root causes and consequences of the incidents contained in this document vary drastically; however, certain "themes" can be deduced and utilized for future hypergolic propellant handling. Some of those common "themes" are summarized below: (1) Improper configuration control and complacency can lead to being falsely comfortable with a system (2) Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur and/or hardware is damaged (3) Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure (4) Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger (5) Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs (6) Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be detrimental and quickly lead to an undesirable incident (7) Improper local cleanliness or compatibility can result in fires or explosions The items listed above are only a short list of the issues that should be recognized prior to handling of hypergolic fluids or processing of vehicles containing hypergolic propellants. The summary of incidents in this report is intended to cover many more issues than those listed above that have been found during nearly the entire spectrum. of hypergolic propellant and/or vehicle processing.

Nufer, Brian↗

NASA NTRS2014

Clearance Analysis of CTC2 (on ELC4) to S-TRRJ HRS Radiator Rotation Envelope

In response to the planned retirement of the Space Shuttle Program, International Space Station (ISS) management began stockpiling spare parts on the ISS. Many of the larger orbital replacement units were stored on the Expedite the Processing of Experiments to Space Station (EXPRESS) Logistics Carriers (ELCs) mounted on the end of the S3 and P3 truss segments, immediately outboard of the Thermal Radiator Rotary Joints (TRRJs) and their attached radiators. In an August 2009 computer-aided design (CAD) assessment, it was determined that mounting the Cargo Transport Container (CTC) 2 on the inboard face of ELC4 as planned would create insufficient clearance between the CTC2 and the rotational envelope of the radiators when the TRRJs were rotated to a gamma angle of 35.0 degrees. The true clearance would depend on how the Unpressurized Cargo Carrier Attachment System (UCCAS) was mounted to the S3 truss and how the ELC4 was attached to it. If the plane of the UCCAS attachment points were tilted even slightly inboard, it would significantly change the clearance between CTC2 and the Starboard TRRJ (S-TRRJ) radiators. Additionally, since CTC2 would be covered in multilayer insulation (MLI), the true outer profile of CTC2 was not captured in the CAD models used for the clearance assessment. It was possible that, even if the S-TRRJ radiators cleared CTC2, they could snag the MLI covering. In the fall of 2010, the Image Science and Analysis Group (ISAG) was asked to perform an on-orbit clearance analysis to determine the location of CTC2 on ELC4 and the S-TRRJ radiators at the angle of closest approach so that a positive clearance could be assured. To provide the measurements as quickly as possible to aid in the assessment, it was decided that the clearance analysis would be broken into two phases. Phase I: The location and orientation of the UCCAS fittings, which support and hold the ELC4 in place, would be measured relative to the ISS Analytical Coordinate System (ISSACS) as defined by nine preexisting Space Vision System (SVS) targets affixed to the forward/zenith side of the S1 and S3 truss segments. The location of the outboard edge of the S-TRRJ radiator would also be measured when positioned at the angle of closest approach to CTC2 (gamma = 35.0 degrees). This data would allow the Digital Pre-Assembly Group to predict how the ELC4 would sit on the UCCAS and how that would translate into the clearance between CTC2 and the S-TRRJ radiators. Phase II: After the ELC4 was delivered and installed into the UCCAS, the position of the CTC2 mounting plate on the inboard face of ELC4, would be measured in the ISSACS coordinate system relative to the SVS control points used in Phase I. Although CTC2 would not yet be mounted on ELC4, the working envelope of CTC2 could be mathematically added to the measured position of ELC4 to produce a best estimate for CTC2's mounted location. Comparing CTC2's best estimated location to the S-TRRJ radiator (measured in Phase I); relative to the ISSACS coordinate system, would provide a direct measurement of the expected clearance. Due to the impending delivery of ELC4 (scheduled for January 2011), planning for the Phase I clearance analysis began immediately. Using the Dynamic Onboard Ubiquitous Graphics (DOUG) program, ISAG designed a way to acquire images of the SVS control points on truss segments S1 and S3, the aft facing edge of the S-TRRJ Heat Rejection Subsystem (HRS) radiator, and the three UCCAS latch mechanisms mounted on the zenith face of the S3 truss using the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS). To minimize the number of SSRMS movements, the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) would be attached to the SSRMS. This would make it possible to park the SPDM in one position and acquire multiple images by changing the viewing orientation of the SPDM body cameras using the pan/tilt units on which they are mounted. Using this implementation concept, ISAG identified four SSRMS/SPDM positions from which the majority of the needed imagery could be acquired. Five additional images would be acquired using the CP-3 external ISS camera mounted on the S1 truss immediately inboard of ELC4. Based on a photogrammetric simulation, it was estimated that the measured location of the HRS radiator and UCCAS latch points would be accurate to about 0.3 in. in each of the three axes relative to ISSACS. Working with ROBO, ISAG collected 78 images of the ISS December 29, 2010. From this imagery, the best 40 were selected for use in the analysis process. The images were radiometrically enhanced to improve color and contrast and loaded into the FotoG analysis software along with the camera parameters and control data, which consisted of the coordinates for the nine SVS targets on the S1 and S3 trusses in the ISSACS coordinate system.

Liddle, Donn↗

NASA NTRS2017

Command and Control System Software Development

Kennedy Space Center has been the heart of human space flight for decades. From the Apollo Program to the Space Shuttle Program, and now to the coming Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion, NASA will be a leader in deep space exploration for mankind. Before any rockets blast off, there is significant work to be done in preparation for launch. People working on all aspects of spaceflight must contribute by developing new technology that has yet to participate in a successful launch, and which can work with technology already proven in flight. These innovations, whether hardware or software, must be tried and true, and includes the projects to which interns contribute to. For this internship, the objective was to create a data recording system for the developers of a LCS section that records certain messages in the traffic of the system. Developers would then be able to use these recordings for analysis later on, either manually or by an automated test. The tool would be of convenience to a developer as it would be used if the system's main data recorder was not available for tests.

Velasquez, Ricky↗

NASA NTRS2011

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Shuttle Cargo Integration Coupled Loads Analysis Lessons Learned

When a system experiences a loading environment characterized by rapidly varying forces, such as a rocket launch, a transient analysis is used to analyze the response of the system. The most common transient analysis methodology is the Coupled Loads Analysis(CLA). CLAs are used by the automotive and aerospace industry to analyze cars, trucks,planes, helicopters, spacecraft, etc. The Space Shuttle program used the CLA methodology to assess the compatibility of the payload with the Orbiter and the flight environment. The Space Shuttle Verification Loads Analysis (VLA) was a standardized CLA process that started between ten and thirteen months prior to launch, and included several meetings as well as analysis by both the Space Shuttle Program and the payload developers to verify that the payloads were compatible with the flight loads environment and would not interact negatively with the vehicle. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, many improvements were made to the process, which reduced cycle time and improved manifest flexibility. There were several issues which were never fully addressed, but work-arounds were developed to keep the process flowing. The lessons learned included automation of some processes and standardization of others, early assessments, improved documentation and better coordination with all stakeholders in the process. Lessons learned also included the limitations in the current process, and what to do to avoid the same issues.

ERICA E. BRUNO↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Shuttle Cargo Integration Coupled Loads Analysis Lessons Learned

When a system experiences a loading environment characterized by rapidly varying forces, such as a rocket launch, a transient analysis is used to analyze the response of the system. The most common transient analysis methodology is the Coupled Loads Analysis (CLA). CLAs are used by the automotive and aerospace industry to analyze cars, trucks, planes, helicopters, spacecraft, etc. The Space Shuttle program used the CLA methodology to assess the compatibility of the payload with the Orbiter and the flight environment. The Space Shuttle Verification Loads Analysis (VLA) was a standardized CLA process that started between ten and thirteen months prior to launch, and included several meetings as well as analysis by both the Space Shuttle Program and the payload developers to verify that the payloads were compatible with the flight loads environment and would not interact negatively with the vehicle. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, many improvements were made to the process, which reduced cycle time and improved manifest flexibility. There were several issues which were never fully addressed, but workarounds were developed to keep the process flowing. The lessons learned included automation of some processes and standardization of others, early assessments, improved documentation and better coordination with all stakeholders in the process. Lessons learned also included the limitations in the current process, and what to do to avoid the same issues in the future.

Erica E. Bruno↗

NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Post Launch MMT Briefing

Bill Parsons, Space Shuttle Program Manager, and Wayne Hill, Deputy Manager of the Space Shuttle Program, and Chair of the Mission Management Team talks about the flight day 2 of the Discovery. Bill noted that flight operations are extremely going on well. He also explained an unexpected debris event on a power ramp little ways down where LH2 ramp begins. Before flight and based from technical data, slight modifications were done on the power ramp to ensure safety of return to flight. Bill also noted that STS-114 is a test flight; all data collected and brought back by the crew will be analyzed to ensure that all information needed is sufficient to work on faults and defects and to make appropriate repairs. Wayne discussed on flight safety. He emphasized the need to thoroughly inspect the thermal protection system of the Orbiter to ensure safe entry. Inspection of still photographs from the ISS and the boom sensor system scan are the primary means to understand engineering data in terms of the immediate flight safety. He also reported accomplishments for the day such as survey of the Orbiter boom system, all the wing leading edge, RCC panels and the nose cap, to make sure these are in good shape and working well, and re-emphasized that these are primary methods to clear the thermal protection system of the Orbiter to prove that it is safe to come home on this flight.

Source record↗