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At least 163 records · Page 9

Panel Session 68: Key EFCOG Actions: Risk Communication, Supply Chain Management, Human Capital and More

Overview on the Energy Facility Contractor Group's (EFCOG) most recent work in partnership with DOE to improve performance and EFCOG's mission is to ensure safety, security, and quality across the US DOE complex. Best practices were highlighted in discussions with US DOE/ NNSA leaders and key project executives. EFCOG's key priorities for 2020 were featured in the panel discussions to include: addressing human capital issues to ensure future mission needs can be met; addressing supply chain issues for nuclear projects; improving the data quality and performance assurance; and improving risk communication and stakeholder relations. EFCOG accomplishes its mission through working groups that provide forums to address common challenges and exchange proven techniques and other management and technical information among member contractors. Panelists with presentations: WM EFCOG Panel Slides (Morgan Smith); EFCOG DOE Supply Chain Initiative (SCI) - Enabling The DOE Mission - (Darrell Graddy); Data Quality and Performance Assurance (JD Dowell); Risk Communication - Different Events - Very Different Responses from the Community (Rick McLeod); Current State of Cybersecurity (Liz Porter)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Domestic Supply Chain of Medical Consumables Needed During COVID-19 Pandemic

This report is an assessment of the availability, demand, and production capability of medical consumables needed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. We focus here on the ability of the supply chain to increase production to meet demand during peak pandemic conditions. In addition, we report on domestic production efforts and supply chain issues, as well as the propensity of other countries to limit export of needed medical supplies to the United States. In brief, the domestic supply chain and production capability vary greatly depending on the consumable. Some consumables, such as N95 masks or face shields, can likely be nearly fully supplied by domestic production, while other consumables, such as gloves or surgical masks, have little domestic production and thus will depend on imports to meet demand. The assessment pulls primarily from published news sources and company press releases. As such, the demand and production numbers are not precisely known, and some degree of uncertainty exists in them. The total production capability is also often difficult to ascertain from these reports especially as other industries have begun to supplement existing supply chains. In addition, local conditions (including company financial decisions, local public health issues, and political aspects) can vary throughout the pandemic which will affect future production. The report also pulls from estimates of demand and domestic production of some consumables compiled by the White House COVID-19 Supply Chain Taskforce (SCTF) presented by Rear Admiral John Polowczyk before a June 9, 2020 hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. These numbers, where applicable, are likely to be more accurate than those found in public news sources since they are more directly tied to private companies’ actual orders and actual production estimates, as opposed to publicly released estimates. Finally, we note that other issues with the supply chain, including the production of raw materials, increase demand due to industries that have not previously used PPE now using it, and increased domestic production from non-traditional suppliers, make complete picture of a rapidly changing supply chain difficult to obtain. This report attempts to produce an accurate image of the supply and estimated demand, as understood by the authors who are not experts in the medical supply chain.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Supplier Research & Analysis Approach

"The implementation of NASA GSFC's portfolio of mission projects relies upon inter-connected, multi-tiered supply chains of organizations operating under direct and indirect contracts and other agreements throughout the U.S. and around the world. These supply chains are subject to an inter-related array of technical/production, business, market and security risks that are amplified by the ongoing globalization of industry and technology and which can disrupt or threaten the production and delivery of products and services when needed and in conformance with requirements. In recognition of such risks and associated challenges, GSFC's SMA directorate launched an innovative Supplier Research and Analysis (SRA) capability three years ago to gain greater insight into the operating environment, performance, capabilities and viability of current and prospective suppliers for GSFC projects and proposals. The capability uses business intelligence techniques and primarily open source information resources as part of a cost-effective, non-intrusive methodology to produce several types of research and analysis reports. The reports are based on a holistic analytical framework encompassing key technical/production, business enterprise management, market and security factors, and feature in-depth information, summary information profiles, SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis, and candidate risk concerns in order to pro-actively support SMA and project management needs. The SRA capability, which is designed to complement and support ongoing SMA/project management activities and practices, has produced over 95 reports since its start-up in early 2015. This presentation addresses the approach, methodology and performance of the Supplier Research and Analysis (SRA) capability and its value in assuring the success of NASA mission projects. In doing so, the presentation provides lessons-learned, best practices, case examples and address how it fits into the development of an enterprise-level Supply Chain Risk Management capability."

supplier research and analysis↗

Grain export restrictions during COVID-19 risk food insecurity in many low and middle income countries

Global food security is threatened by the effects of COVID-19 on international agricultural supply chains and locusts destroying crops and livelihoods in the Horn of Africa and South Asia. We quantify the possible impacts on global supplies and prices of wheat, rice and maize. We show that local production declines have moderate impacts on global prices and supply – but trade restrictions and precautionary purchases by a few key actors could create global food price spikes and severe local food shortages.

Grain export restrictions↗

Smart Inverters, Dumb Risk: Taking Control of IBR Security in the Digital Age

This presentation addresses the security challenges posed by Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) in the modern energy landscape. The presentation highlights the vulnerabilities and risks associated with IBRs, including the potential for cyber-attacks, the impact of insecure defaults, and the systemic risks posed by supply chain dependencies. Key topics covered include: 1) The increasing digital transformation in energy systems and the associated security risks. 2) Specific vulnerabilities in IBRs, including weak passwords, hardcoded credentials, and insecure web application interfaces. 3) The implications of persistent connectivity and the strategic risks posed by foreign-manufactured components. 4) The role of regulatory frameworks, such as NERC CIP, in addressing these challenges and the limitations of current oversight. 5) Practical solutions for mitigating risks, including secure design practices, vendor risk assessments, and the importance of strong passwords and role-based access control. The presentation underscores the necessity of a comprehensive, system-of-systems approach to securing IBRs, emphasizing the need for collaboration across various stakeholders, including operators, developers, and regulators, to ensure the resilience and security of the energy grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Structural dynamics of the renewable energy economy: A longitudinal input-output insights for a resilient transition

As countries accelerate their energy transitions, understanding how renewable energy (RE) systems structurally integrate into national economies is essential. This study presents a longitudinal economic input-output (EIO) analysis of the renewable energy sector in South Korea from 2016 to 2022. We develop a novel EIO-based framework that disaggregates the RE sector both by energy source (thermal, hydro, nuclear and renewable) and by industrial function (manufacturing, generation, and services), allowing for a detailed assessment of production dynamics, value-added creation, and import dependency. By quantifying backward and forward linkages and induced economic effects, the analysis reveals persistent structural vulnerabilities in renewable manufacturing and increasing sectoral interdependencies. Results reveal that while the renewable energy sector's production and value-added shares have increased, critical segments remain highly import-dependent, particularly in equipment manufacturing. The analysis highlights systemic gaps in domestic supply chain resilience and offers sector-specific insights for reducing vulnerability and enhancing energy security. Although applied to South Korea as a case study, the proposed framework is designed to be transferable to other national contexts where renewable energy planning requires economic structural insights. The findings offer policy-relevant guidance for enhancing domestic energy resilience and aligning industrial strategy with long-term decarbonization goals.

Economic linkage↗

Harnessing the Risk-Related Data Supply Chain: An Information Architecture Approach to Enriching Human System Research and Operations Knowledge

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) and Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD), not unlike many NASA organizations today, struggle with the inherent inefficiencies caused by dependencies on heterogeneous data systems and silos of data and information spread across decentralized discipline domains. The capture of operational and research-based data/information (both in-flight and ground-based) in disparate IT systems impedes the extent to which that data/information can be efficiently and securely shared, analyzed, and enriched into knowledge that directly and more rapidly supports HRP's research-focused human system risk mitigation efforts and SLSD s operationally oriented risk management efforts. As a result, an integrated effort is underway to more fully understand and document how specific sets of risk-related data/information are generated and used and in what IT systems that data/information currently resides. By mapping the risk-related data flow from raw data to useable information and knowledge (think of it as the data supply chain), HRP and SLSD are building an information architecture plan to leverage their existing, shared IT infrastructure. In addition, it is important to create a centralized structured tool to represent risks including attributes such as likelihood, consequence, contributing factors, and the evidence supporting the information in all these fields. Representing the risks in this way enables reasoning about the risks, e.g. revisiting a risk assessment when a mitigation strategy is unavailable, updating a risk assessment when new information becomes available, etc. Such a system also provides a concise way to communicate the risks both within the organization as well as with collaborators. Understanding and, hence, harnessing the human system risk-related data supply chain enhances both organizations' abilities to securely collect, integrate, and share data assets that improve human system research and operations.

Buquo, Lynn↗

Space Exploration Supply Chain Modeling, Simulation and Analysis Using the SCOR Model

sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond. Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations. Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructure both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests

space operations↗

Evaluation of coal-associated sediments, wastes, and AMD sludge in the Southern Appalachian Basin as feedstock materials for REE and Li recovery

Critical minerals (CM) such as rare earth elements (REE+) and Lithium (Li) are essential to technological innovation, energy transitions, global economic and defense security, necessitating the search for unconventional resources and efficient recovery methods to avert supply chain disruptions. Here, this study evaluates coal-associated sediments (underclay and roof rock) and wastes from the Pennsylvanian Pottsville Formation of the Southern Appalachian Basin (SAB) as potential feedstocks for CM recovery. A total of 34 samples (15 underclays, 12 roof rocks, 5 Acid Mine Drainage (AMD) sludges, and 2 coal mining wastes) were characterized using XRD, XRF, ICP-MS, and μ-XRF analytical methods. The REE+ and Li concentrations of these materials ranged from 46.8 to 334.4 ppm and from 11.1 to 519 ppm, respectively, with one underclay sample (Hendrix 3456) yielding the highest values for both. Bulk mineralogy for all samples was dominated by aluminosilicate clay phases, particularly illite and kaolinite. All samples exhibited REY def, rel% values >26% and C outl indices that ranged from 0.69 to 0.94, classifying their REE ore potential as Category II (Promising) as defined by Seredin and Dai (2012). Extractability tests (EPA method 3051 A) yielded low REE+ and Li recoveries, with maximum values of 3.3% and 3.6%, respectively, suggesting associations with resistant minerals like clay and phosphates. Elemental mapping indicates that REE+ is associated with phosphate, whereas statistical analysis suggests that REE+ are associated with aluminosilicates, suggesting heterogeneous associations or minimal phosphate contribution. Li also correlated positively with Al 2 O 3 , indicating an aluminosilicate host. This study highlights the potential of coal-associated sediments in the SAB.

Clay minerals↗

X-ray absorption spectroscopy of lanmodulin-derived peptides bound to rare earth elements

A sustainable and robust supply chain of rare earth elements (REEs) is necessary to meet our consumer, national security and clean energy goals. However, current intra-REE separation technologies (e.g. solvent extraction) are costly and carry a heavy environmental burden. Therefore, the development of new aqueous based ligands that are selective for individual REEs will be integral in future REE production systems. To develop these ligands, an understanding of how ligand coordination structure relates to selectivity is imperative. We used X-ray absorption spectroscopy (XAS) to observe the local structure around four lanthanide (Ln) ions (La, Ce, Pr and Nd) complexed by water and several relevant chelating ligands [lanmodulin EF-hand 1 peptides (LanM1), ethyl­enedi­amine­tetra­acetic acid (EDTA), amino­tris­(methyl­ene­phospho­nic acid) (ATMP) and citric acid]. To collect these liquid-phase XAS spectra, we developed a new flow cell that prevents bubble interference and beam damage to the samples. In the X-ray absorption near-edge structure (XANES), we observed energy shifts in the white line, white line broadening and differences in the white line intensity of different Ln–ligand complexes between ligands. In the extended X-ray absorption fine structure (EXAFS), we distinguished differences in peak intensity and distance between coordinating ligands. Differences in the local coordination structure between Ln–LanM1 peptide complexes were more subtle compared with the other ligands (La–water, La–EDTA, La–ATMP and La–citric acid complexes). Further XANES and EXAFS studies, in combination with modelling and other techniques, could greatly improve our structural knowledge of how these aqueous ligands bind Ln ions and how they can be used to design more selective ligands for more efficient and sustainable REE separations.

EDTA↗

Cyber for Manufacturing [slides]

Protecting sensitive information is the number one national security challenge facing the United States. The US Manufacturing Industrial Base (MIB) information supply chain is extremely vulnerable to cyber attack from nation-state adversaries, criminal enterprises and insiders.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Pandemic, War, and Global Energy Transitions

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have impacted the global economy, including the energy sector. The pandemic caused drastic fluctuations in energy demand, oil price shocks, disruptions in energy supply chains, and hampered energy investments, while the war left the world with energy price hikes and energy security challenges. The long-term impacts of these crises on low-carbon energy transitions and mitigation of climate change are still uncertain but are slowly emerging. This paper analyzes the impacts throughout the energy system, including upstream fuel supply, renewable energy investments, demand for energy services, and implications for energy equity, by reviewing recent studies and consulting experts in the field. We find that both crises initially appeared as opportunities for low-carbon energy transitions: the pandemic by showing the extent of lifestyle and behavioral change in a short period and the role of science-based policy advice, and the war by highlighting the need for greater energy diversification and reliance on local, renewable energy sources. However, the early evidence suggests that policymaking worldwide is focused on short-term, seemingly quicker solutions, such as supporting the incumbent energy industry in the post-pandemic era to save the economy and looking for new fossil fuel supply routes for enhancing energy security following the war. As such, the fossil fuel industry may emerge even stronger after these energy crises creating new lock-ins. This implies that the public sentiment against dependency on fossil fuels may end as a lost opportunity to translate into actions toward climate-friendly energy transitions, without ambitious plans for phasing out such fuels altogether. We propose policy recommendations to overcome these challenges toward achieving resilient and sustainable energy systems, mostly driven by energy services.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) (Final Project Report) [Slides]

This is the final technical report for the SETO-funded project Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) from FY22-24. The project scope included development and dissemination of standards' requirements, best practices, equipment testing procedures, assessment tools, as well as education and training materials for cyber defense, posture and maturity tailored to solar technologies. The outcomes for this work include: co-led the development of cybersecurity certification standard (UL2941), co-led the development of cybersecurity guide (IEEE1547.3), development of recommendations for supply chain cybersecurity, and development of cybersecurity risk profiles and recommendations for DERMS.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. A comprehensive exploration of BESS cybersecurity supply chain risks, systematic vendor risk assessment through the BESS Procurement Guide, and practical application of the INL SCRM Chatbot for enhanced supply chain resilience. This is Session 2 of 3. (Full Version)

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

LWRS 2019 Accomplishments Report

Nuclear energy is an important part of supplying our nation’s energy—safely, dependably, and economically—with reduced carbon dioxide emissions. The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy-Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) supports a strong and viable domestic nuclear industry. In collaboration with industry programs, the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program supports the continued operation of the commercial fleet of nuclear power plants. DOE’s role in this program focuses on enhancing the safe, efficient, and economical performance of the nation’s nuclear fleet. This report describes the accomplishments of the LWRS Program during Fiscal Year 2019. DOE-NE’s0F primary mission is to advance nuclear power as a resource capable of making major contributions in meeting the nation’s energy supply, environmental, and energy security needs. Under the guidance of three research objectives, NE resolves barriers to technical, cost, safety, security, and proliferation resistance through early stage research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) to: • Enhance the long-term viability and competitiveness of the existing U.S. reactor fleet • Develop an advanced reactor pipeline • Implement and maintain national strategic fuel-cycle and supply-chain infrastructures.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Can the United States Maintain Its Leadership in High-Performance Computing? - A report from the ASCAC Subcommittee on American Competitiveness and Innovation to the ASCR Office

The United States (U.S.) is no longer the unambiguous leader in the vitally important field of high performance computing (HPC). Japan, the European Union (EU), and China have fielded systems that are on par with our fastest supercomputers. The supply chain for everything from semiconductors to scientific software is globally distributed. Yet our economic future and security depend critically on our ability to innovate faster than our competitors, and the speed of innovation depends increasingly on large-scale computational science and engineering and thus HPC. How should the United States respond to this challenge? This report seeks to initiate a new and potentially transformative national discussion on this vital question. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) program is well-positioned to make informed, targeted decisions about where the United States should cooperate and where it should compete in the global market for scientific exploration and discovery. By setting its sights on problems critical to our nation and the world, by establishing productive new collaborations, and by making strategic investments, ASCR can restore and maintain U.S. scientific leadership in the critical areas described in this report while strengthening our research infrastructure and training a large, diverse cohort of scientists. In doing so, ASCR and its scientists will pave the way for a secure and prosperous future for America. For more than 30 years, the ASCR program has provided the HPC and networking capabilities and expertise needed to support DOE’s mission to advance the national, economic, and energy security of the United States. The program now faces the challenge of developing and deploying the next generation of HPC systems and technologies, as well as supporting the application of HPC and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to a wide range of scientific and engineering research problems. Through its research and development efforts, the ASCR program must also advance the state of the art in HPC and accelerate the pace of scientific discovery and technological innovation. Fulfilling this promise will require significantly increased investments, as well as innovative policies and programs. This subcommittee is aware that we are making recommendations and calls for action at a time when federal resources are limited. We understand that a wide range of competing priorities must be balanced by the nation’s leaders and that there is a need to leverage resources in new ways and seek efficiencies in facilities and operations. However, we must not let these realities limit our imagination or silence our advocacy. The ASCR program is a key part of the U.S. research infrastructure and an important component of economic growth and U.S. competitiveness. ASCR has a responsibility to pursue its mission, including advanced scientific computing, applications of AI technologies, and the required advanced research facilities, with determination and enthusiasm. To fulfill the scientific enterprise’s responsibility to the nation, the ASCR program must not only develop and publish a clear vision with an associated list of goals, priorities, and recommendations but also demonstrate scientific leadership by consistently securing long-term funding. This will allow the program to build on its achievements to date, to realize its ambitious vision, and to make lasting contributions to the field.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Nuclear Security Risks for HALEU Fuels

There is growing interest in high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in advanced nuclear reactors as a high-energy fuel source. The primary objectives of this report are to identify the security risks that directly result from HALEU and to identify the gaps and challenges it presents from a theft and sabotage perspective. This study focuses on HALEU security risks for the front end of the fuel cycle and includes a review of the supply chain, fuel fabrication, and transport for terrestrial reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗