Results for “System Wide Safety” — Page 9

NASA NTRS2009

Towards A Comprehensive Consideration of Epistemic Questions in Software System Safety

For any software system upon which lives depend, the most important question one can ask about it is, 'How do we know the system is safe?' Despite the critical importance of this question, no widely accepted, generally applicable answer exists. Instead, debate continues to rage over the question, with theorists and practitioners quarrelling with each other and amongst themselves. This paper suggests a possible way forward towards quelling the quarrels, based on refining the critical safety question into additional questions, which may be more likely to have answers on which a consensus can be reached.

Holloway, C. M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Vehicle-Level Reasoning Systems: Integrating System-Wide Data to Estimate the Instantaneous Health State

At the aircraft level, a Vehicle-Level Reasoning System (VLRS) can be developed to provide aircraft with at least two significant capabilities: improvement of aircraft safety due to enhanced monitoring and reasoning about the aircrafts health state, and also potential cost savings by enabling Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). Along with the benefits of CBM, an important challenge facing aviation safety today is safeguarding against system and component failures and malfunctions. Faults can arise in one or more aircraft subsystem their effects in one system may propagate to other subsystems, and faults may interact.

system-wide data↗

NASA NTRS2016

Evaluating Alerting and Guidance Performance of a UAS Detect-And-Avoid System

A key challenge to the routine, safe operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is the development of detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems to aid the UAS pilot in remaining "well clear" of nearby aircraft. The goal of this study is to investigate the effect of alerting criteria and pilot response delay on the safety and performance of UAS DAA systems in the context of routine civil UAS operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). A NAS-wide fast-time simulation study was conducted to assess UAS DAA system performance with a large number of encounters and a broad set of DAA alerting and guidance system parameters. Three attributes of the DAA system were controlled as independent variables in the study to conduct trade-off analyses: UAS trajectory prediction method (dead-reckoning vs. intent-based), alerting time threshold (related to predicted time to LoWC), and alerting distance threshold (related to predicted Horizontal Miss Distance, or HMD). A set of metrics, such as the percentage of true positive, false positive, and missed alerts, based on signal detection theory and analysis methods utilizing the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves were proposed to evaluate the safety and performance of DAA alerting and guidance systems and aid development of DAA system performance standards. The effect of pilot response delay on the performance of DAA systems was evaluated using a DAA alerting and guidance model and a pilot model developed to support this study. A total of 18 fast-time simulations were conducted with nine different DAA alerting threshold settings and two different trajectory prediction methods, using recorded radar traffic from current Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations, and supplemented with DAA-equipped UAS traffic based on mission profiles modeling future UAS operations. Results indicate DAA alerting distance threshold has a greater effect on DAA system performance than DAA alerting time threshold or ownship trajectory prediction method. Further analysis on the alert lead time (time in advance of predicted loss of well clear at which a DAA alert is first issued) indicated a strong positive correlation between alert lead time and DAA system performance (i.e. the ability of the UAS pilot to maneuver the unmanned aircraft to remain well clear). While bigger distance thresholds had beneficial effects on alert lead time and missed alert rate, it also generated a higher rate of false alerts. In the design and development of DAA alerting and guidance systems, therefore, the positive and negative effects of false alerts and missed alerts should be carefully considered to achieve acceptable alerting system performance by balancing false and missed alerts. The results and methodology presented in this study are expected to help stakeholders, policymakers and standards committees define the appropriate setting of DAA system parameter thresholds for UAS that ensure safety while minimizing operational impacts to the NAS and equipage requirements for its users before DAA operational performance standards can be finalized.

UAS Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) System↗

NASA NTRS1992

An EVACS simulation with nested transactions

Documented here is the recent effort of the MISSION Kernel Team on an Extra-Vehicular Activity Control System (EVACS) simulation with nested transactions. The team has implemented the EVACS simulation along with a design for nested transactions. The EVACS simulation is a project wide aid to exploring Mission and Safety Critical (MASC) applications and their support software. For this effort it served as a trial scenario for demonstrating nested transactions and exercising the transaction support design. The EVACS simulation is a simulation of some aspects of the Extra-Vehicular Activity Control System, in particular, just the selection of communication frequencies. Its current definition is quite narrow, serving only as a starting point for prototyping purposes. (EVACS itself may be supplanted in a larger scenario of a lunar outpost with astronauts and a lunar rover.) Initially the simulation of frequency selection was written without consideration of nested transactions. This scenario was then modified to embed its processing in nested transactions. To simplify the prototyping effort, only two aspects of the general design for transaction support have been implemented: the basic architecture and state recovery. The simulation has been implemented in the programming language Smalltalk. It consists of three components: (1) a simulation support code which provides the framework for initiating, interacting and tracing the system; (2) the EVACS application code itself, including its calls upon nested transaction support; and (3) a transaction support code which implements the logic necessary for nested transactions. Each of these components deserves further description, but for now only the transaction support is discussed.

Auty, David↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 2 - Volume I: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements of the program's operations.

Jung, David S.↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Wet Life of Nickel-Hydrogen (Ni-H2) Batteries

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 3 - Volume I: Wet Life of Nickel-Hydrogen (Ni-H2) Batteries of the program's operations.

Jung, David S.↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Generic Safety, Handling and Qualification Guidelines for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Availability of Source Materials for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Maintaining Technical Communications Related to Aerospace Batteries (NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop)

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This report contains the Appendices to the findings from the first year of the program's operations.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Wet Life of Nickel-Hydrogen (Ni-H2) Batteries: Appendices - Volume 2, Part 3

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 3 - Volume II Appendices to Part 3 - Volume I.

Jung, David S,↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 2 - Volume II Appendix A to Part 2 - Volume I.

Jung, David S.↗

NASA NTRS2010

The ICARE Method

The ICARE method is a flexible, widely applicable method for systems engineers to solve problems and resolve issues in a complete and comprehensive manner. The method can be tailored by diverse users for direct application to their function (e.g. system integrators, design engineers, technical discipline leads, analysts, etc.). The clever acronym, ICARE, instills the attitude of accountability, safety, technical rigor and engagement in the problem resolution: Identify, Communicate, Assess, Report, Execute (ICARE). This method was developed through observation of Space Shuttle Propulsion Systems Engineering and Integration (PSE&I) office personnel approach in an attempt to succinctly describe the actions of an effective systems engineer. Additionally it evolved from an effort to make a broadly-defined checklist for a PSE&I worker to perform their responsibilities in an iterative and recursive manner. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Systems Engineering Handbook states, engineering of NASA systems requires a systematic and disciplined set of processes that are applied recursively and iteratively for the design, development, operation, maintenance, and closeout of systems throughout the life cycle of the programs and projects. ICARE is a method that can be applied within the boundaries and requirements of NASA s systems engineering set of processes to provide an elevated sense of duty and responsibility to crew and vehicle safety. The importance of a disciplined set of processes and a safety-conscious mindset increases with the complexity of the system. Moreover, the larger the system and the larger the workforce, the more important it is to encourage the usage of the ICARE method as widely as possible. According to the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, elements of a system can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies and documents; all things required to produce system-level results, qualities, properties, characteristics, functions, behavior and performance. The ICARE method can be used to improve all elements of a system and, consequently, the system-level functional, physical and operational performance. Even though ICARE was specifically designed for a systems engineer, any person whose job is to examine another person, product, or process can use the ICARE method to improve effectiveness, implementation, usefulness, value, capability, efficiency, integration, design, and/or marketability. This paper provides the details of the ICARE method, emphasizing the method s application to systems engineering. In addition, a sample of other, non-systems engineering applications are briefly discussed to demonstrate how ICARE can be tailored to a variety of diverse jobs (from project management to parenting).

Henke, Luke↗

NASA NTRS2008

Impact of Pilot Delay and Non-Responsiveness on the Safety Performance of Airborne Separation

Assessing the safety effects of prediction errors and uncertainty on automationsupported functions in the Next Generation Air Transportation System concept of operations is of foremost importance, particularly safety critical functions such as separation that involve human decision-making. Both ground-based and airborne, the automation of separation functions must be designed to account for, and mitigate the impact of, information uncertainty and varying human response. This paper describes an experiment that addresses the potential impact of operator delay when interacting with separation support systems. In this study, we evaluated an airborne separation capability operated by a simulated pilot. The experimental runs are part of the Safety Performance of Airborne Separation (SPAS) experiment suite that examines the safety implications of prediction errors and system uncertainties on airborne separation assistance systems. Pilot actions required by the airborne separation automation to resolve traffic conflicts were delayed within a wide range, varying from five to 240 seconds while a percentage of randomly selected pilots were programmed to completely miss the conflict alerts and therefore take no action. Results indicate that the strategicAirborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) functions exercised in the experiment can sustain pilot response delays of up to 90 seconds and more, depending on the traffic density. However, when pilots or operators fail to respond to conflict alerts the safety effects are substantial, particularly at higher traffic densities.

Consiglio, Maria↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

DOE OSTI2024

Dataset of mechanically induced thermal runaway measurement and severity level on Li-ion batteries

The deployment of Li-ion batteries covers a wide range of energy storage applications, from mobile phones, e-bikes, electric vehicles (EV) and stationary energy storage systems. However, safety issue such as thermal runaway is always one of the most important concerns to prevent Li-ion batteries from further market penetration. A standardized single-side indentation test protocol was developed to mechanically induce an internal short-circuit. The cell voltage, compressive load, indenter stroke, and temperature at the indentation point are measured in time series. The test data of each cell, along with cell parameters such as dimensions, mass, chemistry, state of charge (SOC), capacity, are integrated together to calculate a thermal runaway severity score from 0 to100. Complete data collection process including the original measured record, test method, severity score calculation scheme is presented in this article. The thermal runaway severity analysis and the more than 100 tested Li-ion battery records provide a good data source for further comparison and ranking of thermal runaway risks.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification and Validation of Safety-Critical Aircraft Systems Operating under Off-Nominal, Contingency, and Emergency Conditions

Verification and validation (V&V) of safety-critical technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery and other aviation safety concerns pose significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the verification and validation of these technologies must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks). V&V technologies must also enable the identification of system limitations and constraints, as well as enable the identification of safe and unsafe operating conditions (and their boundaries). Additionally, the V&V of complex, increasingly autonomous systems is a fundamental concern. Scalable, reproducible and cost-effective techniques for the assurance of safety critical systems during their design and operation is a key barrier to fielding new systems or updating current systems. Moreover, these techniques need to provide artifacts that enable a comprehensive evidence-based approach to certification. This briefing summarizes research performed under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program and follow-on research for the V&V of safety-critical aircraft system technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery and increasingly autonomous systems, and for a broad assurance capability in both current and emerging aviation applications. Note that, in this briefing, the term “validation” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation (e.g., algorithms etc.) is performing the intended function(s), as well as an affirmation of effectiveness in these functions. “Verification” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation in the software and hardware meets its (hopefully validated) specifications (e.g., correctly executes algorithms as designed).

Validation↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fire Safety Implications of Preliminary Results from Saffire IV and V Experiments on Large Scale Spacecraft Fires

The spread and growth of flames over large solid fuel samples and their effect on the pressurized spacecraft were studied inside the Cygnus spacecraft while in orbit after departing the International Space Station. These experiments were developed by NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems Division in the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. The ignited materials consisted of poly-methyl methacrylate (PMMA), cotton fabric and a cotton/fiberglass fabric blend. The samples were all 40 cm wide and with various lengths ranging from 18 cm for the PMMA samples to 50 cm for the fabrics. The overall results from these tests and their impact on the spacecraft are presented with emphasis on the fire safety implications of the results. The experiments included, a post-fire cleanup system, vehicle internal volume measurements, and transport of acid gases (HCl and HF). Measurements included video images, flame spread rate, flame temperatures and radiant heat output; energy release through oxygen calorimetry; distributed measurements of CO2 concentration and temperature at six locations in the spacecraft; CO2, CO, O2, HF and HCl concentrations; vehicle pressurized volume; and aerosol concentrations. Details of the flame growth and spread are discussed in other papers as are details of the post-fire cleanup system performance. The fire events had a measurable impact on the vehicle pressure, temperature, and carbon dioxide concentration. However, despite having heat release rates up to 10 kW, the average vehicle conditions did not rise to unacceptable levels. The combined results of the experiments provide significant new understanding of the impact of sample and flow duct height on flame spread and growth in addition to an improved perspective of the impact of a fire event on a spacecraft.

micorgravity↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fire Safety Implications of Preliminary Results from Saffire IV and V Experiments on Large Scale Spacecraft Fires

The spread and growth of flames over large solid fuel samples and their effect on the pressurized spacecraft were studied inside the Cygnus spacecraft while in orbit after departing the International Space Station. These experiments were developed by NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems Division in the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. The ignited materials consisted of poly-methyl methacrylate (PMMA), cotton fabric and a cotton/fiberglass fabric blend. The samples were all 40 cm wide and with various lengths ranging from 18 cm for the PMMA samples to 50 cm for the fabrics. The overall results from these tests and their impact on the spacecraft are presented with emphasis on the fire safety implications of the results. The experiments included, a post-fire cleanup system, vehicle internal volume measurements, and transport of acid gases (HCl and HF). Measurements included video images, flame spread rate, flame temperatures and radiant heat output; energy release through oxygen calorimetry; distributed measurements of CO2 concentration and temperature at six locations in the spacecraft; CO2, CO, O2, HF and HCl concentrations; vehicle pressurized volume; and aerosol concentrations. Details of the flame growth and spread are discussed in other papers as are details of the post-fire cleanup system performance. The fire events had a measurable impact on the vehicle pressure, temperature, and carbon dioxide concentration. However, despite having heat release rates up to 10 kW, the average vehicle conditions did not rise to unacceptable levels. The combined results of the experiments provide significant new understanding of the impact of sample and flow duct height on flame spread and growth in addition to an improved perspective of the impact of a fire event on a spacecraft.

microgravity fire safety↗

NASA NTRS2005

NASA Handbook for Spacecraft Structural Dynamics Testing

Recent advances in the area of structural dynamics and vibrations, in both methodology and capability, have the potential to make spacecraft system testing more effective from technical, cost, schedule, and hardware safety points of view. However, application of these advanced test methods varies widely among the NASA Centers and their contractors. Identification and refinement of the best of these test methodologies and implementation approaches has been an objective of efforts by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory on behalf of the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer. But to develop the most appropriate overall test program for a flight project from the selection of advanced methodologies, as well as conventional test methods, spacecraft project managers and their technical staffs will need overall guidance and technical rationale. Thus, the Chief Engineer's Office has recently tasked JPL to prepare a NASA Handbook for Spacecraft Structural Dynamics Testing. An outline of the proposed handbook, with a synopsis of each section, has been developed and is presented herein. Comments on the proposed handbook are solicited from the spacecraft structural dynamics testing community.

Kern, Dennis L.↗