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At least 163 records · Page 9

A/C 67 Investigation Board Final Report

On March 26, 1987, after the launch of an Atlas/Centaur rocket with a payload of a Navy Communications Satellite, a problem developed and the rocket was lost. John Busse chaired the Accident Investigation Board that was convened to investigate the incident. This videotape is a press conference with Mr Busse, who reviews the findings of the investigation concerning the loss of the Atlas/Centaur-67 launch vehicle. The loss is primarily attributed to a hardover engine yaw command that was caused by an erroneous signal from the digital computer unit. The generation of the erroneous signal is blamed on unfavorable weather conditions which created a lightning hazard. Mr. Busse, also, reviews the investigation's recommendations for avoiding similar occurrences. The press then asks questions about the findings and recommendations.

Source record↗

Monitor weather conditions for cloud seeding control

The author has identified the following significant results. The near real-time DCS platform data transfer to the time-share compare is a working reality. Six stations are now being automatically monitored and displayed with a system delay of 3 to 8 hours from time of data transmission to time of data accessibility on the computer. The DCS platform system has proven itself a valuable tool for near real-time monitoring of mountain precipitation. Data from Wolf Creek Pass were an important input in making the decision when to suspend seeding operations to avoid exceeding suspension criteria in that area. The DCS platforms, as deployed in this investigation, have proven themselves to be reliable weather resistant systems for winter mountain environments in the southern Colorado mountains.

Kahan, A. M.↗

High-Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Map - An Avoidance Approach for UAM, AAM, and UAS Vehicles

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Urban Air Mobility (UAM), and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) vehicles will fly in similar airspace to Transport Category Rotorcraft, thereby requiring them to meet the most severe requirements for HighIntensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) certification. The environment is severe for rotorcraft, much more so than for fixed-wing aircraft, due to lower altitude operations, potentially exposing the vehicles to close and direct view of high-power transmitters on the ground. High-level HIRF exposure potentially leads to avionic system upsets, interference, and undesirable effects. Shielding and circuit protection against HIRF will be a significant barrier to size, weight, and cost, especially for emerging electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) and electric short take-off and landing (eSTOL) vehicles. This paper proposes a novel approach to HIRF protection, which reduces costs by testing and certifying vehicles to a “vehicle tolerance level” that is lower than required for Transport Category Rotorcraft. The remaining protection is achieved by maintaining a safe distance from known HIRF sources, calculated based on the vehicle's tolerance level and transmitter characteristics such as transmit power, antenna beamwidth, and direction. Tailored maps are developed, identifying transmitters and avoidance zones within an operating area or along a flight path, allowing for restricted vehicle operations. The HIRF avoidance zones could be smaller for vehicles with higher tolerance levels, enabling them to operate closer to transmitters. Transmitter data can be extracted from regulatory databases like the FCC and NOAA. A map tool is developed in Matlab to calculate and plot HIRF avoidance zones from transmitters in FCC and NOAA databases as proof of concept. Illustrations are presented for AM/FM/TV transmitters, communication satellite dishes, and weather radars. Also illustrated are HIRF zones for smaller transmitters, including land-mobile radios, pagers, microwave links, and cellular towers. An example of flight planning around the transmitters is presented. This method is a substantial deviation from the standard approach and involves slightly higher flight-planning complexity, but the potential cost savings are significant. Future AAM/UAM/UAS aeronautical charts could include these new HIRF avoidance zones.

HIRF↗

High-Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Map - An Avoidance Approach for UAM, AAM, and UAS Vehicles

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Urban Air Mobility (UAM), and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) vehicles will fly in similar airspace to Transport Category Rotorcraft, thereby requiring them to meet the most severe requirements for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) certification. The environment is severe for rotorcraft, much more so than for fixed-wing aircraft, due to lower altitude operations, potentially exposing the vehicles to close and direct view of high-power transmitters on the ground. High-level HIRF exposure potentially leads to avionic system upsets, interference, and undesirable effects. Shielding and circuit protection against HIRF will be a significant barrier to size, weight, and cost, especially for emerging electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) and electric short take-off and landing (eSTOL) vehicles. This paper proposes a novel approach to HIRF protection, which reduces costs by testing and certifying vehicles to a “vehicle tolerance level” that is lower than required for Transport Category Rotorcraft. The remaining protection is achieved by maintaining a safe distance from known HIRF sources, calculated based on the vehicle's tolerance level and transmitter characteristics such as transmit power, antenna beamwidth, and direction. Tailored maps are developed, identifying transmitters and avoidance zones within an operating area or along a flight path, allowing for restricted vehicle operations. The HIRF avoidance zones could be smaller for vehicles with higher tolerance levels, enabling them to operate closer to transmitters. Transmitter data can be extracted from regulatory databases like the FCC and NOAA. A map tool is developed in Matlab to calculate and plot HIRF avoidance zones from transmitters in FCC and NOAA databases as proof of concept. Illustrations are presented for AM/FM/TV transmitters, communication satellite dishes, and weather radars. Also illustrated are HIRF zones for smaller transmitters, including land-mobile radios, pagers, microwave links, and cellular towers. An example of flight planning around the transmitters is presented. This method is a substantial deviation from the standard approach and involves slightly higher flight-planning complexity, but the potential cost savings are significant. Future AAM/UAM/UAS aeronautical charts could include these new HIRF avoidance zones.

HIRF↗

Space-Based Sentinels for Measurement of Infrared Cooling in the Thermosphere for Space Weather Nowcasting

Infrared radiative cooling by nitric oxide (NO) and carbon dioxide (CO2) modulates the thermosphere’s density and thermal response to geomagnetic storms. Satellite tracking and collision avoidance planning require accurate density forecasts during these events. Over the past several years, failed density forecasts have been tied to the onset of rapid and significant cooling due to production of NO and its associated radiative cooling via emission of infrared radiation at 5.3 μm. These results have been diagnosed, after the fact, through analyses of measurements of infrared cooling made by the Sounding of the Atmosphere using Broadband Emission Radiometry instrument now in orbit over 16 years on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Thermosphere, Ionosphere, Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics satellite. Radiative cooling rates for NO and CO2 have been further shown to be directly correlated with composition and exospheric temperature changes during geomagnetic storms. These results strongly suggest that a network of smallsats observing the infrared radiative cooling of the thermosphere could serve as space weather sentinels. These sentinels would observe and provide radiative cooling rate data in real time to generate nowcasts of density and aerodynamic drag on space vehicles. Currently, radiative cooling is not directly considered in operational space weather forecast models. In addition, recent research has shown that different geomagnetic storm types generate substantially different infrared radiative response, and hence, substantially different thermospheric density response. The ability to identify these storms, and to measure and predict the Earth’s response to them, should enable substantial improvement in thermospheric density forecasts.

Mlynczak, Martin G.↗

Simulation studies of the impact of advanced observing systems on numerical weather prediction

To study the potential impact of advanced passive sounders and lidar temperature, pressure, humidity, and wind observing systems on large-scale numerical weather prediction, a series of realistic simulation studies between the European Center for medium-range weather forecasts, the National Meteorological Center, and the Goddard Laboratory for Atmospheric Sciences is conducted. The project attempts to avoid the unrealistic character of earlier simulation studies. The previous simulation studies and real-data impact tests are reviewed and the design of the current simulation system is described. Consideration is given to the simulation of observations of space-based sounding systems.

Atlas, R.↗

The Traffic-Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) in the glass cockpit

This volume contains the contributions of the participants in the NASA Ames Research Center workshop on the traffic-alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) implementation for aircraft with cathode ray tube (CRT) or flat panel displays. To take advantage of the display capability of the advanced-technology aircraft, NASA sponsored this workshop with the intent of bringing together industry personnel, pilots, and researchers so that pertinent issues in the area could be identified. During the 2-day workshop participants addressed a number of issues including: What is the optimum format for TCAS advisories. Where and how should maneuver advisories be presented to the crew. Should the maneuver advisories be presented on the primary flight display. Is it appropriate to have the autopilot perform the avoidance maneuver. Where and how should traffic information be presented to the crew. Should traffic information be combined with weather and navigation information. How much traffic should be shown and what ranges should be used. Contained in the document are the concepts and suggestions produced by the workshop participants.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗

Aviation meteorology research and development: A status report

The dynamic and rapid growth of technology in the area of aviation meteorology research and development are described with emphasis on the measurement of hazardous weather phenomena. Aspects of both onboard instrumentation and ground based facilities are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness of in avoiding hazards due to atmospheric electricity and lightning. Methods of alleviating terminal are hazards such as fog, low visibility and ceilings are also described.

Enders, J.↗

The NASA Aircraft VOrtex Spacing System (AVOSS): Concept Demonstration Results and Future Direction

Since the late 1990s the national airspace system has been recognized as approaching a capacity crisis. In the light of this condition, industry, government, user organizations, and educational institutions have been working on procedural and technological solutions to the problem. One aspect of system operations that holds potential for improvement is the separation criteria applied to aircraft for wake vortex avoidance. These criteria, applied when operations are conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR), were designed to represent safe spacing under weather conditions conducive to the longest wake hazards. It is well understood that wake behavior is dependent on meteorological conditions as well as the physical parameters of the generating aircraft. Under many ambient conditions, such as moderate crosswinds or turbulence, wake hazard durations are substantially reduced. To realize this reduction NASA has developed a proof-of-concept Aircraft VOrtex Spacing System (AVOSS). Successfully demonstrated in a realtime field demonstration during July 2000 at the Dallas Ft. Worth International Airport (DFW), AVOSS is a novel integration of weather sensors, wake sensors, and analytical wake prediction algorithms. AVOSS provides dynamic wake separation criteria that are a function of the ambient weather conditions for a particular airport, and the predicted wake behavior under those conditions. Wake sensing subsystems provide safety checks and validation for the predictions. The AVOSS was demonstrated in shadow mode; no actual spacing changes were applied to aircraft. This paper briefly reviews the system architecture and operation, reports the latest performance results from the DFW deployment, and describes the future direction of the project.

Rutishauser, David K.↗

Air/ground wind shear information integration: Flight test results

An element of the NASA/FAA wind shear program is the integration of ground-based microburst information on the flight deck, to support airborne wind shear alerting and microburst avoidance. NASA conducted a wind shear flight test program in the summer of 1991 during which airborne processing of Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) data was used to derive microburst alerts. High level microburst products were extracted from TDWR, transmitted to a NASA Boeing 737 in flight via data link, and processed to estimate the wind shear hazard level (F-factor) that would be experienced by the aircraft in the core of each microburst. The microburst location and F-factor were used to derive a situation display and alerts. The situation display was successfully used to maneuver the aircraft for microburst penetrations, during which in situ 'truth' measurements were made. A total of 19 penetrations were made of TDWR-reported microburst locations, resulting in 18 airborne microburst alerts from the TDWR data and two microburst alerts from the airborne in situ measurements. The primary factors affecting alerting performance were spatial offset of the flight path from the region of strongest shear, differences in TDWR measurement altitude and airplane penetration altitude, and variations in microburst outflow profiles. Predicted and measured F-factors agreed well in penetrations near microburst cores. Although improvements in airborne and ground processing of the TDWR measurement would be required to support an airborne executive-level alerting protocol, the feasibility of airborne utilization of TDWR data link data has been demonstrated.

Hinton, David A.↗

Terminal weather information management

Since the mid-1960's, microburst/windshear events have caused at least 30 aircraft accidents and incidents and have killed more than 600 people in the United States alone. This study evaluated alternative means of alerting an airline crew to the presence of microburst/windshear events in the terminal area. Of particular interest was the relative effectiveness of conventional and data link ground-to-air transmissions of ground-based radar and low-level windshear sensing information on microburst/windshear avoidance. The Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator located at Ames Research Center was employed in a line oriented simulation of a scheduled round-trip airline flight from Salt Lake City to Denver Stapleton Airport. Actual weather en route and in the terminal area was simulated using recorded data. The microburst/windshear incident of July 11, 1988 was re-created for the Denver area operations. Six experienced airline crews currently flying scheduled routes were employed as test subjects for each of three groups: (1) A baseline group which received alerts via conventional air traffic control (ATC) tower transmissions; (2) An experimental group which received alerts/events displayed visually and aurally in the cockpit six miles (approx. 2 min.) from the microburst event; and (3) An additional experimental group received displayed alerts/events 23 linear miles (approx. 7 min.) from the microburst event. Analyses of crew communications and decision times showed a marked improvement in both situation awareness and decision-making with visually displayed ground-based radar information. Substantial reductions in the variability of decision times among crews in the visual display groups were also found. These findings suggest that crew performance will be enhanced and individual differences among crews due to differences in training and prior experience are significantly reduced by providing real-time, graphic display of terminal weather hazards.

Lee, Alfred T.↗

The Design of a Remote Sensing Data Acquisition Campaign for Precision Agriculture and Some Early Results

In the 1970s NASA and the Department of Agriculture attempted to use the new Landsat MSS system for agricultural purposes. The program had relatively little success. With the advent of differential GPS, yield monitors on harvest equipment and higher spatial resolution remote sensing systems it seemed likely the situation should be reexamined. Therefore, a campaign of data acquisition involving remote sensing and other modalities with dependent research was assembled and funded by the Space Grant Consortia in Alabama and Georgia. The design of the remote sensing data acquisition was driven by the biology and physics of the crop system and limited by the available sensor platforms. Major parameters included crop stage, spatial resolution, seasonal and daily weather conditions, and which portion of the EM spectrum would actually capture the most discriminating information. Joint visible and Near IR with Thermal IR would permit use of existing indices, such as greenness, as well as phenomena driven by the plant' s evapotranspiration. Spatial resolution in the 2-5 meter range was chosen, avoiding many complexities caused by aliasing crop row spacing at, higher resolutions yet finer than the harvester's tightest recording rate. This dictates use of an airborne system. Use of an airborne system also makes scheduling around weather much simpler than use of satellite data. Active video calibration was recognized as essential if quantitative measures were ever to be obtained or reproduced. The system would also have to have onboard geoOF1 Based on these elements 3 data acquisitions have been flown. Seven flight lines were flown twice in 1998 and 16 lines flown in 1999. Total raw data is several GBytes. All of the data has now been geometrically corrected and some preliminary analysis accomplished. The thermal bands have an extremely high correlation with yield. For one@test case with corn, correlation in excess of 0.86 was obtained from a data acquisition two months prior to harvest! Soil images show significant within field variation in clay, soil brightness and emissivity. Light wind has been found to effect the reflectance and temperature of broad leaf crops, including soybeans, cotton and peanuts. Clearly, this work has already demonstrated some very important results. With continued development of the remote sensing technology there is good reason to believe this research will soon be able to help the individual farmer.

Rickmanl, D.↗

Microburst avoidance simulation tests

Implementation issues for uplinked microburst alerts are presented in the form of view-graphs. The following topics are covered: evaluation, transmission, and presentation of ground-based Doppler weather radar derived information through a limited bandwidth digital data link; electronic cockpit presentation of uplinked wind shear alerts (pilot opinion survey, part-task simulation experiment); presentation modes (verbal, textual, and graphical); and ground evaluation of ground-measures wind shear data.

Hansman, John↗

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

Aircraft performance in a JAWS microburst

Attention is given to the detailed features of a servere microburst event, the flight behavior of a 727 airliner in such an event as predicted by a numerical simulation, and several low level wind shear detection and warning concepts. The Joint Airport Weather Studies project data sets are the basis of the numerical simulation. The calculation of meaningful flight paths under varying wind conditions for microburst avoidance is demonstrated.

Frost, W.↗

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.

Harry W Jones↗

Quantifying the benefits of improved satellite remote-sensing observations for inverse modeling of NOx and NMVOC emissions

This study aims to demonstrate the benefits of using novel high spatiotemporal retrieval products from newer satellites for top-down emission estimates of nitrogen oxides (NO x ) and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs) for the summer of 2019 over the contiguous United States. Recent satellite retrievals have not only advanced spatiotemporal resolution but also greatly reduced error and uncertainty due to reduced noise in the retrievals compared to spaceborne sensors launched in the past. We applied inverse modeling techniques using tropospheric nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ) and formaldehyde (H-CHO) column retrieval products from the Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI) and TROPOspheric Monitoring Instrument (TROPOMI) in conjunction with the Weather Research Forecast and Community Multiscale Air Quality Modeling system (WRF-CMAQ). In order to provide a better representation of background chemical composition and avoid misalignment of emission adjustment, we applied monthly scaling factors for ozone (O 3 ) and CO boundary concentrations in addition to the inclusion of lightning and aviation emissions. Satellite-constrained NO x and NMVOCs posterior emissions showed a mitigated discrepancy between observed and modeled columns. The improvement in the model performance was greater when using TROPOMI, primarily benefiting from reduced errors/biases of the satellite retrievals that enabled us to explore corresponding changes in O 3 concentrations and production sensitivity regimes using the ratio of H-CHO and NO 2 .

remote sensing↗