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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1985

NASA Space controls research and technology program

The NASA technological organization is outlined. The Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) is one of the four major technical offices that comprise NASA. The Office of Space Science and Applications administers programs directed towards using space-based or related techniques to further understanding of the total universe and to apply that understanding to practical applications in such areas as Astrophysics, Solar System exploration, Earth Sciences, Life Sciences, Communications and Information Systems. The Office of Space Flight administers the programs for all U.S. civil launch capability, plus Spacelab development and operations. The Office of Space Tracking & Data Systems administers the programs that operate and maintain a world-wide network of facilities for data acquisition, processing, and ground to spacecraft communications for all NASA missions. The OAST has primary responsibility within NASA for conducting space research and technology development to support commercial and military as well as NASA space interests.

Mciver, D. E.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Using the CYBER-Champ Model to Determine Cyber Competencies and Role Alignment

Cybersecurity roles, tasks, and skills are seen by many organizations as nonessential, abstract, or complicated. Although standards are in place, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-181 document titled “Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework)” available since September 2012, companies are still showing security vulnerabilities in their cyber networks (Hatzes, 2020). Barriers towards creating a cyber-ready workforce are not always due to a lack of resources, but often caused by organizational structure. The need for cyber-cognizant job postings, improved communication between Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) employees, increases in staffing and funding for cyber teams, and better communication of standards and training can all contribute to increasing an organization’s cyber resilience. Cybersecurity Competency Health and Maturity Progression model (CYBER-CHAMP) is a model aimed at evaluating an organization’s structure and individual employee’s cyber knowledge and helps develop a plan to reach competency. This model was used to engage with organizations to promote proper cyber protocols and policies. The aim of this paper is to answer if it is possible for an organization to build a cyber-ready workforce by providing education and training options for current employees and prepare the future workforce to be ready on day one of employment. Both open source and firsthand interviews with organizations were used to conduct the research contained in this document. Further research may include additional development to the CYBER-CHAMP model and its delivery platform.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1976

United States societal experiments via the Communications Technology Satellite

After a brief description of the Communication Technology Satellite and its U.S. coverage, the U.S. societal experiments via the CTS are discussed. These include education (college curriculum sharing, and project interchange), health care (biomedical communications, health communications, and communication support for decentralized education), and community and special experiments (satellite library information network, and transportable earth terminal).

Donoughe, P. L.↗
NASA NTRS1998

High End Computer Network Testbedding at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

The Earth & Space Data Computing (ESDC) Division, at the Goddard Space Flight Center, is involved in development and demonstrating various high end computer networking capabilities. The ESDC has several high end super computers. These are used to run: (1) computer simulation of the climate systems; (2) to support the Earth and Space Sciences (ESS) project; (3) to support the Grand Challenge (GC) Science, which is aimed at understanding the turbulent convection and dynamos in stars. GC research occurs in many sites throughout the country, and this research is enabled by, in part, the multiple high performance network interconnections. The application drivers for High End Computer Networking use distributed supercomputing to support virtual reality applications, such as TerraVision, (i.e., three dimensional browser of remotely accessed data), and Cave Automatic Virtual Environments (CAVE). Workstations can access and display data from multiple CAVE's with video servers, which allows for group/project collaborations using a combination of video, data, voice and shared white boarding. The ESDC is also developing and demonstrating the high degree of interoperability between satellite and terrestrial-based networks. To this end, the ESDC is conducting research and evaluations of new computer networking protocols and related technologies which improve the interoperability of satellite and terrestrial networks. The ESDC is also involved in the Security Proof of Concept Keystone (SPOCK) program sponsored by National Security Agency (NSA). The SPOCK activity provides a forum for government users and security technology providers to share information on security requirements, emerging technologies and new product developments. Also, the ESDC is involved in the Trans-Pacific Digital Library Experiment, which aims to demonstrate and evaluate the use of high performance satellite communications and advanced data communications protocols to enable interactive digital library data access between the U. S. Library of Congress, the National Library of Japan and other digital library sites at 155 MegaBytes Per Second. The ESDC participation in this program is the Trans-Pacific access to GLOBE visualizations in real time. ESDC is participating in the Department of Defense's ATDNet with Multiwavelength Optical Network (MONET) a fully switched Wavelength Division Networking testbed. This presentation is in viewgraph format.

Gary, James Patrick↗
NASA NTRS1991

The Telecommunications and Data Acquisition Report

A compilation is presented of articles on developments in programs managed by JPL's Office of Telecommunications and Data Acquisition. In space communications, radio navigation, radio science, and ground based radio and radar astronomy, activities of the Deep Space Network are reported in planning, in supporting research and technology, in implementation, and in operations. Also included is standards activity at JPL for space data and information systems and reimbursable DSN work performed for other space agencies through NASA. In the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI), implementation and operations are reported for searching the microwave spectrum.

Posner, Edward C.↗
NASA NTRS1993

The Telecommunications and Data Acquisition Report

This quarterly publication provides archival reports on developments in programs managed by JPL's Office of Telecommunications and Data Acquisition (TDA). In space communications, radio navigation, radio science, and ground-based radio and radar astronomy, it reports on activities of the Deep Space Network (DSN) in planning, supporting research and technology, implementation, and operations. Also included are standards activity at JPL for space data and information systems and reimbursable DSN work performed for other space agencies through NASA.

Posner, E. C.↗
NASA NTRS1994

The Telecommunications and Data Acquisition Report

Reports on developments in programs managed by JPL's Office of Telecommunications and Data Acquisition (TDA) are provided. In space communications, radio navigation, radio science, and ground-based radio and radar astronomy, it reports on activities of the Deep Space Network (DSN) in planning, supporting research and technology, implementation, and operations. Also included are standards activity at JPL for space data and information systems and reimbursable DSN work performed for other agencies through NASA.

Yuen, Joseph H.↗
NASA NTRS1995

The Telecommunications and Data Acquisition Report

This quarterly publiction provides archival reports on developments in programs managed by JPL Telecommunications and Mission Operations Directorate (TMOD), which now includes the former communications and Data Acquisition (TDA) Office. In space communications, radio navigation, radio science, and ground-based radio and radar astronomy, it reports on activities of the Deep Space Network (DSN) in planning, supporting research and technology, implementation, and operations. Also included are standards activity at JPL for space data and information systems and reimbursable DSN work performed for other space agencies through NASA. The Orbital Debris Radar Program, funded by the Office of Space Systems Development, makes use of the planetary radar capability when the antennas are configured at science instruments making direct observations of planets, their satellites, and asteroids of our solar system.

Yuen, Joseph H.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Attack-resilient algorithms and testbed federation for wide-area protection and control in smart grid

Today’s energy infrastructure is undergoing a massive transformation across all generation, transmission, and distribution systems to provide reliability, efficiency, and sustainability to the power system network. During the past 10 years, there has been a remarkable enhancement in developing close-loop wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) applications, such as automatic generation control (AGC), wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), synchrophasor-based wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), etc., in the energy management system (EMS) to provide an adequate situational awareness to control center operators during physical disturbances and natural events. The rapid digitalization, unencrypted communication, and numerous data-sharing devices have increased digital access points that have exposed the grid network to countless cyberattacks pertinent to the WAPAC cybersecurity. Given the amount of complex grid network coupled with legacy infrastructures, it is untrustworthy to completely rely on information technology (IT)-based conventional security measures to defend against evolving cyberattacks. Hence, there is a compelling need to go beyond the traditional paradigm of ‘security by obscurity’ and ‘bolt-on’ security measures, and develop a suite of innovative security solutions at multiple layers to transform the current “fault-resilient” grid into “fault and attack-resilient” grid of the future. This dissertation specifically focuses on developing application-specific attack-resilient solutions for critical WAPAC applications in the smart grid. The first part of the study, Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Protection Scheme, presents a cyber-physical attack-resilient system (CPARS) for WAPS, where two anomaly detection methods are proposed to detect multi-level cyberattacks followed by the rules-based intrusion mitigation system (RIMS) to initiate effective mitigation strategies, tailored to these attacks, to restore the normal grid operation after disturbances. The first anomaly detection component, Machine learning-based Anomaly Detection for Centralized WAPS, discusses a novel architecture and methodology for developing a machine-learning-based anomaly detection system (ADS) for the centralized wide-area protection system (CWAPS) by applying the variational mode decomposition (VMD) technique and decision tree (DT) algorithms using cyber logs and synchrophasor measurements. The second component, Multi-Agent-based Anomaly Detection for Decentralized WAPS, presents a two-level hierarchical multi-agent-based decentralized WAPS against the system-aware stealthy cyber-attacks. Finally, for the RIMS, the state transition diagram-based mitigation measures are defined based on the grid operation states and experimental testing and evaluation are presented in a cyber-physical testbed environment. The second part of the study, Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Voltage Control System, addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), presents the methodology for performing an impact analysis during data integrity attacks, and proposes a data-driven attackresilient system (DARS) by incorporating machine learning-based ADS and rules-based anomaly mitigation system (RAMS) to detect these attacks and provide necessary mitigation actions to maintain the transient voltage stability after disturbances. Finally, the third part, Networked Federation Testbed (NEFTSec) for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, focuses on developing an interconnected federated testbed through a common network like the internet, describes its conceptual architectures, and also presents its design components for experimental testing, validation, and evaluation. Further, it presents the co-simulation interface algorithm (CIA) to facilitate the geographically-dispersed real-time distributed simulation (GD-RTDS) during the cyber-physical federation. In general, this dissertation presents innovative attack-resilient solutions for WAPAC applications that are experimentally tested and evaluated using the PowerCyber testbed and NEFTSec platform to accelerate the transition of state-of-the-art research works to the real-field deployments.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2009

Use of Web 2.0 Technologies for Public Outreach on a Simulated Mars Mission

Recent advances in social media and internet communications have revolutionized the ways people interact and disseminate information. Astronauts are already taking advantage of these tools by blogging and tweeting from space, and almost all NASA missions now have presences on the major social networking sites. One priotity for future human explorers on Mars will be communicating their experiences to the people back on Earth. During July 2009, a 6-member crew of volunteers carried out a simulated Mars mission at the Flashline Mars Arctic Research Station (FMARS). The Mars Society built the mock Mars habitat in 2000-01 to help develop key knowledge and inspire the public for human Mars exploration. It is located on Devon island about 1600 km from the North Pole within the Arctic Circle. The structure is situated on the rim of Haughton Crater in an environment geologically and biologically analogous to Mars. Living in a habitat, conducting EVAs wearing spacesuits, and observing communication delays with "Earth,"the crew endured restrictions similar to those that will be faced by future human Mars explorers. Throughout the expedition, crewmembers posted daily blog entries, reports, photos, videos, and updates to their website and social media outlets Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Picasa Web Albums. During the sixteen EVAs of thier field science research campaign, FMARS crewmembers collected GPS track information and took geotagged photos using GPS-enabled cameras. They combined their traverse GPS tracks with photo location information into KML/KMZ files that website visitors can view in Google Earth.

Ferrone, Kristine↗
DOE OSTI2022

Aggregate attack surface management for network discovery of operational technology

Interconnectivity has become a substratum of technology as the benefits of data-driven functionality are being realized in nearly all industries. Increased connectivity of Operational Technology (OT) exacerbates cyber risks because Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are becoming exposed to the Internet. These exposures are often done inadvertently through misconfigurations as additional network devices come online. Attack surface management (ASM) platforms can be used to identify vulnerabilities by performing external network discovery over the Internet using web spiders. These web spiders enable big data analytics of Internet of Things (IoT) devices as identifiable information of Internet-exposed equipment are archived in searchable databases that are made publicly available. There are a multitude of ASM service providers on the market. Here, this study was conducted to evaluate several commonly known tools to determine the aggregate attack surface of control systems. Queries were crafted by targeting commonly known manufacturers and communication protocols found in OT networks. Identified devices were that categorized based on technology types. Each query was replicated between several tools to target identical ICS equipment. Findings in this paper suggested a significant variance in the exposures discovered by each tool, but unique contributions were identified for each tool when a merged attack surface was derived. Therefore, all tools should be used in aggregate.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1991

High data rate systems for the future

Information systems in the next century will transfer data at rates that are much greater than those in use today. Satellite based communication systems will play an important role in networking users. Typical data rates; use of microwave, millimeter wave, or optical systems; millimeter wave communication technology; modulators/exciters; solid state power amplifiers; beam waveguide transmission systems; low noise receiver technology; optical communication technology; and the potential commercial applications of these technologies are discussed.

Chitwood, John↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS1991

The Telecommunications and Data Acquisition Report

This quarterly publication provides archival reports on developments in programs managed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL's) Office of Telecommunications and Data Acquisition (TDA). In space communications, radio navigation, radio science, and ground-based radio and radar astronomy, it reports on the activities of the Deep Space Network (DSN) in planning, in supporting research and technology, in implementation, and in operations. Also included is standards activity at JPL for space data, information systems, and reimbursable DSN work performed for other space agencies through NASA.

Posner, Edward C.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Photonics: Technology project summary

Photonics involves the use of light (photons) in conjunction with electronics for applications in communications, computing, control, and sensing. Components used in photonic systems include lasers, optical detectors, optical wave guide devices, fiber optics, and traditional electronic devices. The goal of this program is to develop hybrid optoelectronic devices and systems for sensing, information processing, communications, and control. It is hoped that these new devices will yield at least an order of magnitude improvement in performance over existing technology. The objective of the program is to conduct research and development in the following areas: (1) materials and devices; (2) networking and computing; (3) optical processing/advanced pattern recognition; and (4) sensing.

Depaula, Ramon P.↗
NASA NTRS1994

The Telecommunications and Data Acquisition Report

This quarterly publication provides archival reports on developments in programs in space communications, radio navigation, radio science, and ground-based radio and radar astronomy. It reports on activities of the Deep Space Network (DSN) in planning, supporting research and technology, implementation, and operations. Also included are standardization activities at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for space data and information systems.

Yuen, Joseph H.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗